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When I arrived at the University of Idaho College of Law in 1987, I was assigned to teach 
one of the two sections of first year torts, at that time a two-semester class.  The teacher of the 
other section was Dale Goble, who had been hired five years before me.  He offered that I could 
use his supplement on Idaho torts cases in addition to the national casebook (Franklin & Rabin) 
we both used.  I took his advice and never regretted it.  Professor Goble has been my most 
pedagocially experimental colleague. Professor Goble’s book has taken many forms over the 
years, sometimes published under the copyright “Torts R Us.”   
  
 Studying Idaho cases at the Idaho College of Law makes sense, of course.  Idahoans, and 
Westerners in general, understand the settings and the controversies.  Students recognize the 
locales and, occasionally the parties. Even very old Idaho cases still resonate, such as Wilson v. 
Boise City, written in 1899 about water redirected near Cottonwood Creek, which still 
overflows today. How can a professor refrain from teasing people who grew up in Nampa, 
where crawling under parked boxcars on F Street was the custom in 1894 (Rumpel v. Ore. Short 
Line RR)? 
 
 Students assigned this book should save their copies.  If they eventually practice in 
Idaho, it will be invaluable.  Even if they practice elsewhere, they will be amazed by how well 
they remember those cases discussed during the indelibly mind-altering experience of the first 
year of law school. 
 
 When Professor Goble retired in late Spring 2017, I publicly promised him that I would 
keep this book going forward, to serve the students, lawyers and jurists of Idaho.  What 
sounded easy became nightmarish when the book was almost lost in an electronic abyss.  
Professor Goble’s hard drive failed, so his working copy was lost.  The book was turned into a 
pdf, but then returning it to an editable format proved daunting.  Third-year law student 
Patricia Taylor was valiant as she went over and over this edition, correcting many of the 
formatting glitches and typos created in the transition.  For example, the letter “m” was 
changed to “rn” all the way through!  The edition you hold in your hands is still a work in 
progress.  Your professor will inform you how to notify me of potential changes and 
corrections. 
 
 My heartfelt thanks to Patricia Taylor, whose good cheer, patience, and attention to 
detail were phenomenal.  My hat is off to Professor Goble for starting this project and keeping 
it going over the years.  He has read every Idaho torts case from 1889 to 2013.  He culled them 
and organized the most instructive into this teaching supplement.  It is my honor to keep this 
compilation moving forward into the 21st Century, to fascinate and challenge you in your study 
of tort law.  
      Monique C. Lillard 
      Professor of Law 
      University of Idaho College of Law 
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ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF TORT LIABILITY: LOCATING 
NEGLIGENCE IN A TORT UNIVERSE 
 
 
       There is no clear definition of what a "tort" is. As William Prosser noted, "The word is derived from the 
Latin 'tortus' or 'twisted.' The metaphor is apparent: a tort is conduct which is twisted or crooked, not 
straight....'Tort' ...was at onetime in common use in English as a general synonym for 'wrong."' W. PAGE 
KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE lAW OF TORTS § 1 (5th ed. 1984). 
 
This section introduces six different categories of torts that are distinguished by the quality of the 





WHITE v. The UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO 
 
Idaho Court of Appeals 
115 Idaho 564, 768 P.2d 827 (1989), 
affirmed 118 Idaho 400, 797 P.2d 108 (1990) 
 
PER CURIAM: Carol and Kenneth White brought this action on a tort claim against the University of Idaho 
and Professor Richard Neher, alleging that the professor had caused injuries to Carol White. The district 
court granted the University's motion for summary judgment holding that, under the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act, a governmental entity has no liability "for any claim which*** [a]rises out of*** battery" committed by 
an employee. I.C. § 6-904(3). The Whites' appeal presents a single issue of law: whether Professor 
Neher's intentional and unpermitted touching of Mrs. White constituted a battery. We agree with the 
district court that it did, and we affirm. 
 
Summary judgment is an appropriate way to resolve this case. There are no genuine 
issues of material fact; the case simply calls for the application of law to undisputed facts. [] In 
such cases we exercise free review. 
 
 Professor Neher and Mrs. White had long been acquainted because of their mutual 
interest in music, specifically, the piano. Professor Neher was a social guest at the Whites' home 
when the incident here occurred. One morning Mrs. White was seated at a counter writing a resume for 
inclusion in the University's music department newsletter. Unanticipated by Mrs. White, Professor Neher 
walked up behind her and touched her back with both of his hands in a movement later described as one 
a pianist would make in striking and lifting the fingers from a keyboard. The resulting contact generated 
unexpectedly harmful injuries, according to the Whites. For purposes of summary judgment, we deem 
these allegations to be true. Mrs. White suffered thoracic outlet syndrome on the right side of her body, 
requiring the removal of the first rib on the right side. She also experienced scarring of the brachial plexus 
nerve which necessitated the severing of the scalenus anterior muscles. 
 
Both Professor Neher and Mrs. White gave deposition testimony which is summarized as follows. 
Professor Neher stated he intentionally touched Mrs. White's back, but his purpose was to demonstrate 
the sensation of this particular movement by a pianist, not to cause any harm. Professor Neher explained 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF TORT LIABILITY 
2 
that he has occasionally used this contact method in teaching his piano students. Mrs. White said 
Professor Neher's act took her by surprise and was non-consensual. Mrs. White further remarked that 
she would not have consented to such contact and that she found it offensive. The Whites argue that 
because Professor Neher did not intend to cause harm, injury or offensive contact, his act constitutes 
negligence rather than the intentional tort of battery. We disagree. 
 
The tort of battery requires intentional bodily contact which is either harmful or offensive. Doe v. 
Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238(1986) (citing RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 
(1965)). The intent element of the tort of battery does not require a desire or purpose to bring about a 
specific result or injury; it is satisfied if the actor's affirmative act causes an intended contact which is 
unpermitted, and which is harmful or offensive. See Rajspic v. National Mutual Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 
729,718 P.2d 1167(1986); RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 8A, 16, 18 & 20 (1965). Indeed, 
the contact and its result may be physically harmless. Thus, a person may commit a battery when 
intending only a joke, or a compliment- where an unappreciated kiss is bestowed without consent, or a 
misguided effort is made to render assistance. PROSSER & KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 8, 9 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
 
It is undisputed that Professor Neher intended to touch Mrs. White, though he did not intend to 
cause harm or injury. His lack of any specific intent to harm or injure Mrs. White is immaterial. Professor 
Neher's affirmative act caused an intended contact which was unpermitted, offensive and, apparently, 
harmful. Such voluntary contact constitutes the tort of battery. 
 





(1)  Choosing a theory of recovery: The central issue is the legal standard which is to be used to 
evaluate the quality of Professor Neher's conduct. What theory did the plaintiff choose? Plaintiff chose 
this theory because he was she was suing the University of Idaho. Her claim thus was controlled by the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act. The ITCA governs the tort liability of "governmental entities," which the Act defines 
as "the state and political subdivisions as herein defined." I.C § 6-902(3). "State" is defined as "the state 
of Idaho or any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university or other instrumentality thereof." Id. § (1). "Political subdivision" means "any county, city, 
municipal corporation, health district, school district, irrigation district, ...special improvement or taxing 
district, or any other political subdivision or public corporation." Id.§ (2). 
 
       Subject to several exceptions, governmental entities are liable for the torts of their employees when 
private entities would be liable. The exception that is relevant to White v. University of Idaho provides: 
 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their 
employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: 
 
3. Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of 




The plaintiff thus chose to sue the University in negligence because her claim against both the 
University and Neher was barred if Neher's conduct was a battery. See Umbert v. Twin Falls County, 955 
P.2d 1123, 131 Idaho 344 (1998). 
 
(2)  The Idaho Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the court of appeal's decision. The court 
noted, 
[Plaintiffs] assert that the decisions of this court, e.g., Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 




to constitute a battery. While we stated in Doe that, "A battery, on the other hand, 
requires intentional bodily contact which is either harmful or offensive," [] that does not 
mean that the person has to intend that the contact be harmful or offensive. 
White v. University of Idaho, 118 Idaho 400, 401, 797P.2d 108, 109(1990).  
 
Does the supreme court's decision clarify what must be intended? 
 
(3)  Intent: How is intent" defined? What must be intended"? Must the actor intend to harm the 
other? Note the court of appeals' statement: "The intent element of the tort of battery does not require a 
desire or purpose to bring about a specific result or injury; it is satisfied if the actor’s affirmative act causes 
an intended contact which is unpermitted, and which is harmful or offensive."  
 
Is the court saying that for there to be a "battery'' there must be (1) an act that was (2) intended to 
contact, i.e., "touch," the plaintiff and that the touch was (3) unpermitted and 
(4) either harmful or offensive? 
 
Was there an "act" as we have defined that term in Hammontree v. Jenner? Did Neher "intend" to 
touch the plaintiff? Note that, for there to be an actionable battery the contact must be either offensive or 
harmful- but the defendant need not have intended the contact to be offensive or harmful. 
 
(4)  Idaho Civil Jury Instructions (IDJI): A jury is informed of the law applicable to the case before it 
through instructions that the judge reads. Overtime, pattern jury instructions developed based on 
statements of law in Idaho Supreme Court decisions. The current jury instructions were written by the 
Civil Jury Instructions Committee. The Committee was appointed by the Court, which charged the 
Committee to "conduct [] a detailed review of the pattern jury instructions and [to] mak[e] 
recommendations to the Court for amendments to the instructions." The Committee delivered its 
recommendations to the Court in 2003. The Court stated, "Although the Court is not approving any 
specific instruction and will simply address instructions through appellate review, the Court does hereby 
accept the recommendation of the Committee and in accord with IRCP 51(a)(2) the instructions shall be 
disseminated for general use by the trial bench and the bar in Idaho." 
 
The IDJ is are available at www.isc.Idaho.gov uryinst_cov.htm. 
 
(5)  Legal status of Idaho Jury Instructions: The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 51(a)(2) on the 
use of Idaho Jury Instructions provides: 
 
Whenever the latest edition of Idaho Jury Instructions (IDJI) contains an instruction applicable to 
a case and the trial judge determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, it is 
recommended that the judge use the IDJI instruction unless the judge finds that a different 
instruction would more adequately, accurately or clearly state the law. Whenever the latest edition 
of IDJI does not contain an instruction on a subject upon which the trial judge determines that the 
jury should be instructed, or when an IDJI instruction cannot be modified to submit the issue 
property, the instruction given on that subject should be simple, brief, impartial and free from 
argument. When an instruction requested by a party is a modified IDJI instruction, the party 
should indicate therein, by use of parentheses or other appropriate means, the respect in which it 
is modified. 
 
As the Idaho Court of Appeals has noted, 
 
Pattern jury instructions are not a separate source of substantive law; rather, they 
seek to embody existing law. They are recommendatory in nature, not mandatory. IRCP 51(a)(2). 
Thus, the substantive standard by which the jury instruction in this case should be judged is not a 
subsequently promulgated pattern instruction, but the under1ying case law. As noted above, we 
find nothing in prior decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court indicating that an instruction such as 
the one given here should be held fatally defective for incompleteness. 
Packard v. Joint School District No. 171, 104 Idaho 604, 661 P.2d 770 (Ct. App. 1983). 
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(6) IDJI 4.22- Direct battery: On plaintiffs claim of battery, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
each of the following propositions: 
1. The defendant intentionally touched the plaintiff; 
2. The plaintiff did not permit or consent to the touching; 
3. The defendant knew the touching was not permitted; and 
4. The touching was unlawful, harmful or offensive. 
 
The intent means only an intent to touch without permission. It is not necessary to prove that the 
defendant intended the touching to be harmful or offensive. You will be asked the following question on 
the jury verdict form: "Did the defendant commit a battery upon the plaintiff, as defined in the 
instructions?" If the plaintiff proves all of the propositions in this instruction, you should answer the 
question ''Yes." If any of these propositions has not been proved, you should answer the question "No." 
 
COMMENT: The tort of battery is complete upon the completion of the prohibited act and the plaintiff is 
entitled to at least nominal damages. Bonner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 128 Idaho 351,913 
P.2d 567 (1996); Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529,768 P.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1989). Elements of damage 
should be outlined in a separate instruction. 
 
      The intent required is intent to do the act constituting the battery, not intent to do harm to the plaintiff. 
Neal v. Neal, 125 Idaho 617, 873 P.2d 871 (1994); White v. University of Idaho, 118 Idaho 400, 797 P.2d 
108 (1990); Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 110 Idaho 729, 718 P.2d 1167 (1986). 
 
(7)  The Restatement (Second) of Torts defined "intent" as meaning "that the actor desires to cause 
the consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to occur." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A. What are "the consequences" that the actor must be 
desire? Did Professor Neher "desire the consequences of his act"? 
 
        The new Restatement (Third) of Torts defines intent as: "A person acts with the intent to produce a 
consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) the person 
acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS § 1(2010). Does the new Restatements separation of "purpose" and "knowledge" resolve the 
seeming ambiguity? Comment b states: "In general, the intent required in order to show that the 
defendant's conduct is an intentional tort is the intent to bring about harm (more precisely, to bring about 
the type of harm to an interest that the particular tort seeks to protect)." 
 
(a) David and Paul were walking their dogs when they met on the street. The two 
dogs began to fight. David picked up a long branch that was lying at the curb to strike the two in an 
attempt to stop the fight. When he raised the branch over his head, he struck Paul. Did David intentionally 
harm Paul? See Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cus. (60 Mass.) 292 (1850) [FRANKLIN, RABIN, & GREEN at 35] 
Did David "act" as that term is defined in Hammontree v. Jenner? 
 
       (b)        The Allen F. Williams Company operates an aluminum smelter, which emits fluoride particles 
as a by product of the smelting process.  Williams knows that the particles will be carried downwind and 
that they will cause a variety of harms to the land where they come to rest. Williams regrets this result. 
Has he intentionally caused the harm? See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959) 
[FRANKLIN, RABIN, & GREEN at 670]; Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 709 P.2d 782 
(Wash. 1985). 
 
(8)  The legal status of the Restatements: The Restatements are multi-volume sets of treatises on 
different legal subjects such as torts, contracts, and property. They are published by the American Law 
lnstitute, an organization of legal academics and practitioners that was founded in 1923. The goal is to 
"restate" the common law as it develops through the judicial decisions of the state courts as a series of 
principles or rules - the "black letter law." Although the Restatements are not binding authority, they are 
persuasive because they generally reflect the consensus of the American legal community of what the 




       Each section of a Restatement includes a black letter principle, comments and illustrations, and 
reporters' notes that provide a detailed discussion of the cases that went into the principle summarized in 
the black letter statement. 
 
In White, plaintiffs argued before the supreme court that certain provisions of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts define the intent element of battery as including an intent to harm or offend. Without 
attempting to unravel which position the Restatement (Second) ultimately embraces -for it could be 
interpreted as supporting either position - we simply note that we have not previously adopted the 
Restatement (Second) in Idaho and decline any invitation to do so now. What is the relevance of the 
court's playground hypothetical? How does a playground differ from the classroom? 
 
       The court says that "plaintiff must show either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant is 
in fault." What does the court mean by "unlawful"? 
 
(10)  Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.: Both courts in White cited an earlier Idaho case, 
Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 110 Idaho 729, 718 P.2d 1167(1986). William Brownson 
was shot during a scuffle with Grace Rajspic. Rajspic was acquitted on a criminal charge of assault with a 
deadly weapon when the jury concluded that she suffered from a mental disease or defect sufficient to 
preclude criminal responsibility. Brownson subsequently brought a civil tort action against Rajspic for 
battery. Since the Rajspics had an insurance policy with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, the 
Rajspics were defended by an attorney employed by Nationwide as well as by their own attorney. The 
parties entered into a stipulation that Grace Rajspic was insane at the time of the shooting. The trial court 
instructed the jury (1) that battery was an intentional tort; (2) that insanity was not a defense; and (3) that 
to hold Rajspic liable, it needed to find that she intended to do the act complained of and not that she 
intended to kill or injure Brownson. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Brownson for $14,000.00. Nationwide then informed the 
Rajspics that their insurance policy did not cover the judgment because the policy excluded coverage for 
injuries intentionally caused by the insured. 
 
The Rajspics sued Nationwide alleging the exclusionary provision was improperly invoked. The 
trial court granted the Rajspic's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. On appeal, 
the Idaho Supreme Court reversed. Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 662 
P.2d 534 (1983) (Rajspic), holding that an insane person is capable of committing intentional torts and 
stated that "in the present case insanity under the law would not be dispositive of whether the act 
committed by Mrs. Rajspic was an intentional act and therefore within the embrace of the intentional act 
exclusion. On the record when examined in a light most favorable to the opposing party, it presents a 
question of fact." Id. at 664, 662 P.2d at 536. 
 
On remand, the trial court granted Nationwide's motion, holding that, because the jury in Brownson 
found Grace Rajspic had committed an intentional tort, the insurance policy's exclusion applied as a 
matter of law. The Supreme Court again reversed: 
 
       An insane person may be liable for an intentional tort yet may still not have intentionally caused 
an injury within the meaning of the insurance exclusion. In fact, many courts have held that, as a 
matter of law, an insane person cannot intentionally cause injury as excluded in insurance policies. [] 
Today, we are not called upon to go so far, but we do recognize that, as a matter of fact, an 
intentional tort and an intentional injury exclusion clause cannot be treated synonymously. We noted 
in Rajspic I that it is possible that an otherwise insane person may have sufficient capacity to 
understand and contemplate the nature and consequences of her actions. Rajspic I, at 664, 662 
P.2d at 536. It is also possible that the insane person may be completely incapable of understanding 
the nature and consequences of her actions, depending on the extent of her mental disabilities. 
Which of these characterizations appropriately applies to Mrs. Rajspic has yet to be determined by a 
trier of fact? 
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(11)  Neal v. Neal: Thomas A. Neal filed for divorce after his wife Mary became aware that he was 
having an extramarital affair. Mary counterclaimed for divorce and also asserted tort claims against 
Thomas Neal and Jill LaGasse. Among Mary's claims was one for battery: 
 
... Her battery claim is founded on her assertion that although she consented to sexual intercourse 
with her husband during the time of his affair, had she known of his sexual involvement with another 
woman, she would not have consented, as sexual relations under those circumstances would have 
been offensive to her. Therefore, she contends that his failure to disclose the fact of the affair 
rendered her consent ineffective and subjects him to liability for battery. 
 
Civil battery consists of an intentional, unpermitted contact upon the person of not in specific 
language "adopt" the Restatement (Second) definition of battery in Doe v. Durtschi. In the course of 
discussing the distinction between negligence and battery, the Doe opinion paraphrased part of 
Section 13 and then cited to the section. However, the Court did not expand any further on the 
definition of battery, nor did it need to in the context of the Doe opinion. 
 
White v. University of Idaho, 118 Idaho at 403 n.3, 797 P.2d at 111 n.3. Is the court correct that the 
Restatement "could be interpreted as supporting either position"? 
 
(9)  Vosburg v. Putney: A classic case on the meaning of intent is an 1891 decision by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, Vosburg v. Putney, 80Wis. 523, 50 N.W.403 (1891). The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court gave the following statement of the facts: 
 
The plaintiff was about fourteen years of age, and the defendant about eleven years of age. On 
the 20th day of February,1889, they were sitting opposite each other across an aisle in the high 
school of the village of Waukesha. The defendant reached across the aisle with his foot and hit 
with his toe the shin of the right leg of the plaintiff. The touch was slight. The plaintiff did not feel 
it, either on account of its being so slight or of loss of sensation produced by the shock. In a few 
moments he felt a violent pain in that place, which caused him to cry out loudly. [The plaintiffs 
condition grew worse and he eventually lost the use of the leg.) The theory of at least one of the 
medical witnesses was that the limb was in a diseased condition when this touch or kick was 
given, caused by microbes entering in through the wound above the knee, and which were 
revivified by the touch, and that the touch was the exciting or remote cause of the destruction of 
the bone, or of the plaintiff's injury. 
 
The case sought recovery for damages for a battery alleged to have been committed by defendant. A 
previous trial resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff for $2,800. Defendant appealed, the judgment was 
reversed, and a new trial ordered. The case was tried again and resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for 
$2,500. Defendant again appealed, citing the jury's response to a question on the special verdict: "Did the 
defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, intend to do him any harm? A. No." Defendant argued: 
 
The jury having found that the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, did not intend to do 
him any harm, counsel for defendant maintain that the plaintiff has no cause of action, and that 
defendant's motion for judgment on the special verdict should have been granted. In support of 
this proposition counsel quote from GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE §83, the rule that "the intention to 
do harm is of the essence of an assault." Such is the rule, no doubt, in actions or prosecutions for 
mere assaults. But this is an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery. In 
such case the rule is correctly stated, in many of the authorities cited by counsel, that plaintiff 
must show either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant is in fault. If the intended 
act was unlawful, the intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful. Hence, as applied to 
this case, if the kicking of the plaintiff by the defendant was an unlawful act, the intention of 
defendant to kick him was also unlawful. 
 
      Had the parties been upon the play-grounds of the school, engaged in the usual boyish sports, the 
defendant being free from malice, wantonness, or negligence, and intending no harm to plaintiff in what 




action. Some consideration is due to the to the implied license of the play-grounds. But it appears that the 
injury was inflicted in the school, after it had been called to order by the teacher, and after the regular 
exercise of the school had commenced. Under these circumstances, no implied license to do the act 
complained of existed, and such act was a violation of the order and decorum of the school, and 
necessarily unlawful. Hence, we are of the opinion that, under the evidence and verdict, the action may 
be sustained. 
 
Given the jury's response to interrogatory # 6, how can the defendant's conduct be 
"intentional"? What were "the consequences" that the defendant desired? Why were these consequences 
sufficient? If the teacher had not as yet called the school to order, would the result have changed? 
 
Civil battery consists of an intentional, unpermitted contact upon the person of another 
which is either unlawful, harmful or offensive. White v. University of Idaho, 118 Idaho 400, 797 
P.2d 108 (1990). The intent necessary for battery is the intent to commit the act, not the intent to 
cause harm. Id. Further, lack of consent is also an essential element of battery. []. Consent 
obtained by fraud or misrepresentation vitiates the consent and can render the offending party 
liable for a battery. []. 
 
The district court concluded that Thomas Neal's failure to disclose the fact of his 
sexual relationship with LaGasse did not vitiate Mary Neal's consent to engage in sexual relations 
with him, such consent being measured at the time of the relations. We do not agree with the 
district court's reasoning. To accept that the consent, or lack thereof, must be measured by only 
those facts which are known to the parties at the time of the alleged battery would effectively 
destroy any exception for consent induced by fraud or deceit. Obviously if the fraud or deceit 
were known at the time of the occurrence, the "consented to" act would never occur. 
Neal v. Neal, 125 Idaho 617, 873 P.2d 871 (1994). 
 
(12)  Why should the defendant be liable for highly improbable injuries? Is an instrumentalist 
explanation of the decisions in White and Rajspic satisfactory? For liability to affect behavior 
prospectively, at least three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the liability standard must be understood by 
the individual whose conduct is to be affected; (2) the addressee must want (perhaps because of the 
possible sanctions) to conform to the standard; and (3) the addressee must be in a position to comply 
with the standard. Are these three conditions satisfied in White? How likely is it, for example, that Neher 
knew of his potential liability? How willing would he be to comply? Stated differently: is it likely that 
imposing liability on Neher will make others act differently? Does the deterrence potential of a decision 
depend upon the identity of the class of potential defendants? Would a decision imposing liability on a 
doctor for medical malpractice have more deterrent effect than the decision in Vosburg might have on 
schoolchildren? 
 
Are there possible indirect effects? That is a distinction can be drawn between direct and indirect 
effects. Standards may affect behavior directly when they proscribe conduct and individuals conform to 
them; alternatively, standards may affect behavior indirectly when they reinforce existing social norms that 
discourage socially harmful conduct. Might the decision in Vosburg indirectly affect the behavior of 














ATHAY v. STACEY 
(Athay I) 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
142 Idaho 360, 128 P.3d 897 (2005) 
 
EISMANN, J. -This is an appeal from summary judgments dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims arising from a 
collision involving a driver fleeing a police pursuit. The district court held that none of the individual 
defendants' conduct reached the level of reckless disregard or was a proximate cause of the collision. We 
affirm in part and vacate in part.1 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On June 10, 1999, at approximately 10:12 p.m., the sheriffs’ dispatcher for Rich County, Utah, 
broadcast a call that a possible drunken driver in a green Mustang bearing Idaho license plate 3C 1086 
was heading north from the town of Randolph in northern Utah. Dale Stacey, the Rich County Sheriff 
(Sheriff Stacey), heard the radio call and headed to intercept the Mustang. Upon locating the car, Sheriff 
Stacey followed it for about one-and-one-half miles and observed it cross the centerline twice and the fog 
line four times. He decided to stop the car at the Sage Creek Junction, near the Utah-Wyoming border, to 
investigate whether the driver was under the influence of alcohol. 
 
As the Mustang approached the stop sign at the junction, Sheriff Stacey activated the 
overhead lights on his Chevrolet pickup. The Mustang ran through the stop sign and headed 
east toward Lincoln County, Wyoming. Sheriff Stacey activated the siren on his pickup and began pursuit. 
The Mustang accelerated to about 70 mph, and then to over 96 mph. The Sheriff's pickup had a governor 
that prevented it from traveling faster than 96 mph, and so he was unable to catch the Mustang. The 
Mustang driver's conduct gave Sheriff Stacey probable cause to believe that the driver was committing 
the felony offense of eluding. 
 
After entering Wyoming, the Mustang headed north. At Cokeville, Wyoming, it slowed to about 40 
mph, and Sheriff Stacey was able to catch up to it. Upon leaving Cokeville, however, the Mustang's driver 
again sped up, leaving the Sheriff behind. 
 
 The highway then curved northwesterly, toward Bear Lake County located in southeast Idaho. 
Sheriff Stacey radioed for assistance to the Bear Lake County Sheriff’s office. In response, Chad Ludwig, 
a deputy sheriff, (Deputy Ludwig) drove to a point southeast of Montpelier, Idaho, where he attempted to 
stop the Mustang using spike strips. He only succeeded in deflating its right front tire. 
 
 After crossing the spike strip, the Mustang did slow down to about 50 mph, allowing Sheriff 
Stacey to catch up. Once he did, however, the Mustang immediately accelerated to around 96 mph. It 
passed deputy sheriff Gregg Athay (Deputy Athay), who had stopped on the highway two miles from 
where the spike strips had been deployed. Deputy Athay joined in the pursuit after the Mustang and 
Sheriff Stacey passed his position, and Deputy Ludwig also joined in the pursuit behind Deputy Athay. 
 
                                                     
1 An instrumentalist theory views tort liability as a means to an end: liability ought to be imposed because it will serve some other 
goal. Deterrence is an example of an instrumentalist theory: liability should be imposed because it will deter risky conduct. 





The Mustang sped through Montpelier, Idaho, at a speed of 94 mph with the three police vehicles 
in pursuit. According to witnesses, the Mustang's lights were turned off as it was racing through 
Montpelier. While passing the Ranch HandTruck Stop, located about two miles north of Montpelier, the 
Mustang swerved to avoid colliding with an oncoming semi-truck that was turning left into the truck stop. 
The driver of the semi-truck later stated that he did not even see the Mustang. 
 
About one mile past the truck stop, the Mustang collided with a car driven by the plaintiff-
appellant Kyle Athay (Athay). He had stopped to assist two teenage girls whose car had hit a deer. He 
was just driving away from the scene of that accident when the Mustang slammed into the rear of his car 
at a speed of approximately 104 mph. Athay was severely injured in the collision. The pursuit had lasted 
about forty-five minutes through three states. After the collision, the driver of the Mustang was identified 
as Darrell Ervin (Ervin). 
 
On April 19, 2002, Kyle and Melissa Athay (Athays) filed this lawsuit against Sheriff Stacey, Rich 
County, Deputy Ludwig, Deputy Athay2, Brent Bunn (the Sheriff of Bear Lake County), and Bear Lake 
County. The district court dismissed the complaint after granting the Defendants' motions for summary 




A. Does Idaho Code §49-623 Establish a Reckless Disregard Standard of Care for Police Pursuits? 
 
Idaho Code   §49-623 provides as follows: 
 
(1) The driver of an authorized emergency or police vehicle, when 
responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the 
law, or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges 
set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions stated. 
 
      (4) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency or police 
vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall these 
provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of 
others. 
 
The focus of the dispute centers upon the words "due regard" and "reckless disregard" in 
subparagraph (4) of the statute. The Athays argue that it establishes two standards of care: due regard, 
which they equate with negligence, and reckless disregard. They contend that for policy reasons we 
should apply the negligence standard and simply disregard the last phrase of the statute referring to 
reckless disregard. 
 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free review. [] When 
construing a statute, the words used must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the 
statute must be construed as a whole. [] We must give effect to every word, clause and sentence of a 
statute, and the construction of a statute should be adopted which does not deprive provisions of the 
statute of their meaning. [] 
 
We are not at liberty to simply disregard a portion of the statute. The last phrase of Idaho Code § 
49-623(4) states, "nor shall these provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless 
disregard for the safety of others." It would be meaningless unless it establishes a reckless disregard 
standard. It would make no sense to interpret the statute as providing that the driver of an authorized 
emergency or police vehicle is liable for his or her negligence and will not be protected from his or her 
                                                     
2 Deputy Athay is Kyle Athay's half brother. 
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reckless disregard for the safety of others. If the driver is liable for negligence, then whether the driver's 
conduct also reached the level of reckless disregard would not matter. 
 
The confusion arises as a result of equating the words "due regard" with negligence. The words 
"due regard" mean "consideration in a degree appropriate to demands of the particular case." BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY 590 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). They are not words of art synonymous with negligence. In 
enacting Idaho Code §49-623, the legislature obviously balanced the need for emergency or police 
vehicles to respond quickly in emergencies or to pursue fleeing law violators with the risks created by 
such conduct. It decided that in such circumstances, due regard for the safety of others is a reckless 
disregard standard. 
 
The district court held that Idaho Code §49-623 created a reckless disregard standard for police 
pursuits when the vehicle being pursued collides with the vehicle of a third party and a negligence 
standard when the police or emergency vehicle collides with the vehicle of a third party. Such analysis is 
incorrect. The reckless disregard standard applies in both situations. There is nothing in the wording of 
subsection (4) that would indicate that the reckless disregard standard applies only when the vehicle 
being pursued causes a collision. The statute does not even refer to the conduct of the driver of that 
vehicle. It deals solely with the conduct of the person driving the emergency or police vehicle. 
 
The district court also adopted the definition in Idaho Code § 6-904C for the reckless disregard 
standard contained in § 49-623. Again, the district court erred. Idaho Code § 6-904C defines the phrase 
"reckless, willful and wanton conduct" as it is used in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The statute expressly 
provides that the definition applies only to Chapter 9 of Title 6, Idaho Code. By its terms, it does not apply 
to Chapter 6 of Title 49, Idaho Code. 
 
This Court has previously defined the term "reckless disregard." In Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 
125, 134, 417 P.2d 75, 84 (1966), we adopted the definition announced by the Oregon Supreme Court in 
Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or. 366, 354 P.2d 56, 67 (1960), which is, "'Reckless disregard of the rights 
of others' could be regarded as the type of conduct engaged in by the driver when he actually perceives 
the danger and continues his course of conduct." We distinguished reckless disregard from gross 
negligence in that the latter would apply where the driver does not know of the high degree of manifest 
danger but should have known. 
 
D.       Did the District Court Err in Granting Summary Judgment to the Defendants? 
 
The district court held that as a matter of law the defendants' conduct did not rise to the level of 
reckless disregard ...and therefore granted their motions for summary judgment. In an appeal from an 
order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial 
court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 106 P.3d 470 
(2005). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, 
then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review. Id. 
 
Sheriff Stacey and Rich County. The district court dismissed the case as to Sheriff Stacey .... 
 
Construing the facts in the record liberally in favor of the Athays and giving them all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record, there is a jury issue as to whether Sheriff 
Stacey's conduct rose to the level of reckless disregard and whether it was a proximate cause of the 
collision. 
 
Sheriff Stacey initially sought to stop Ervin for suspicion of driving while under the influence of 




he believed Ervin was dangerous except with respect to Ervin's driving conduct while trying to elude the 
Sheriff. 
 
Sheriff Stacey pursued Ervin for about forty-five minutes through three states over a distance of 
about sixty-three miles. Ervin sped up to 96 or more mph three times: (1) when Sheriff Stacey activated 
his pickup's overhead lights in an attempt to stop Ervin at the Sage Creek Junction in Utah; (2) when 
Sheriff Stacey caught up after Ervin had slowed to about 40 mph while driving through Cokeville, 
Wyoming; and (3) when Sheriff Stacey caught up after Ervin had slowed down to about 50 miles per hour 
upon running over the spike strips. After the first mile of the pursuit, Sheriff Stacey knew that he could not 
overtake the Mustang because its top speed exceeded his pickup's top speed of 96 mph. A reasonable 
inference is that Sheriff Stacey knew he had no reasonable chance of stopping the Mustang as long as 
the Mustang's driver was willing to drive in excess of 96 mph. 
 
Sheriff Stacey testified that he considered the hazards of this chase as being high. He 
acknowledged that the pursuit would stop only if the Mustang crashed into something or someone, or if 
the Mustang's driver decided to stop, or if the Mustang ceased operating due to a mechanical failure or 
running out of gas. Considering the length of the pursuit, there appeared to be little likelihood that the 
driver would voluntarily stop. The only possible mechanical failure mentioned was the loss of a tire due to 
the spike strips. Although the Mustang initially slowed to 50 mph after running over the spike strips, it had 
sped back up to 96 mph when it passed Deputy Athay's stopped vehicle two miles later, and it continued 
at that high rate of speed. There was no testimony offered that the Mustang could not be expected to 
travel very far running on the right front rim. The collision occurred about eleven miles after the Mustang 
ran over the spike strips. 
 
Eyewitness testimony and the post-accident examination of the filaments in light bulbs taken from 
the Mustang showed that Ervin turned off the Mustang's headlights and taillights as he raced through 
Montpelier, that they were off when he passed the truck stop, and that they were off when he crashed into 
Kyle Athay's vehicle. About two miles past Montpelier, the Mustang almost collided with an oncoming 
semi-truck that was turning left into a truck stop. The driver of the semi-truck did not see the Mustang 
because its lights were off. Sheriff Stacey saw the near-collision. A reasonable inference is that Sheriff 
Stacey knew that upon leaving Montpelier the Mustang's lights were off, creating a greater hazard that 
other drivers would not see the Mustang or that the driver of the Mustang would not see other persons or 
vehicles on the highway in time to avoid a collision. 
 
The record indicates that Sheriff Stacey was not familiar with the highway north of Montpelier. A 
reasonable inference is that he did not know what intersections or roadside businesses there may be 
where vehicles could be entering or leaving the highway. He apparently had no reason to believe that the 
risk to the public posed by the Mustang barreling down the two-lane highway at over 95 mph with its lights 
off would decrease once they had passed the Ranch Hand Truck Stop. 
 
Sheriff Stacey testified that upon Deputy Athay's command, he slowed down to give the Mustang 
some room hoping its driver would slow down. It is not clear from the record how much he slowed down 
or whether he slowed down enough to signal a termination or lessening of the pursuit. He was close 
enough at the instant of the collision to see the Mustang go off the left side of the road after it collided with 
Kyle Athay's vehicle. 
 
The above is not intended to be an exclusive list of factors that the jury could consider in deciding 
whether Sheriff Stacey's conduct rose to the level of reckless disregard and, if so, whether it was a 
proximate cause of the collision. That weighing process is, in the first instance, for the jury. These factors, 
taken together, are sufficient to create a jury issue as to Sheriff Stacey's liability. The Sheriff was an agent 
of Rich County. The County has not argued either below or on appeal that it would not be liable if Sheriff 




JUSTICE SCHROEDER AND JUSTICES TROUT, BURDICK AND JONES CONCUR. 
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       Following remand, the trial court granted summary judgment for all defendants. Plaintiffs again 
appealed: 
        
        
ATHAY v. STACEY 
(Athay II) 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 




C. Did the District Court Err in Dismissing the Complaint as to Bear Lake County? 
 
Did the district court err in concluding Deputy Athay's conduct did not rise to the level of reckless 
disregard? In Athay I, we held that under Idaho Code § 49- 623, the driver of an authorized police vehicle 
engaged in a high-speed chase can be held liable only if the driver's conduct amounts to reckless 
disregard for the safety of others. The district court held that Deputy Athay's conduct did not rise to that 
level. After stating that Deputy Athay was not aware of the deer-vehicle collision before Ervin crashed into 
the Plaintiff's vehicle, the court concluded, "On these facts, Captain Athay had no actual knowledge of 
any conditions that would have told him to immediately cease or lessen the pursuit any differently than he 
did." (Emphasis in original) The district court erred in its analysis. 
 
To constitute reckless disregard, the actor's conduct must not only create an unreasonable risk of 
bodily harm, Smith v. Sharp, 85 Idaho 17,27, 375 P.2d 184, 190 (1962), but, as we held in Athay I, the 
actor must actually perceive the high degree of probability that harm will result and continue in his course 
of conduct. 142 Idaho at 365, 128 P.3d at 902. Actual knowledge of the high degree of probability that 
harm will result does not require knowledge of the actual person or persons at risk, or the exact manner in 
which they would be harmed. It only requires knowledge of the high degree of probability of the kind of 
harm that the injured party suffered. See Harris v. State, 123 Idaho 295, 299, 847 P.2d 1156, 1160 
(1992). 
 
Plaintiff had pulled out onto the highway after stopping to assist at the scene of the deer-vehicle 
accident. It does not matter why he had pulled off the highway and stopped. He could have pulled onto 
the highway for a variety of reasons. What is significant is the foreseeability that there would be vehicles 
on the highway, such as Plaintiff's; that the Defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of bodily 
harm to the occupants of those vehicles; and that the Defendant perceived there was a high degree of 
probability that harm would result and continued his course of conduct. 
 
For example, in Smith v. Sharp, we held that the following course of conduct by a driver 
constituted reckless disregard: 
 
that he deliberately turned off his lights and proceeded in the darkness on the wrong side of the 
roadway toward the lighted intersection; was driving at a speed which was excessive for town 
driving; he was warned by one of the passengers that danger lurked ahead; he hit the 
depressions causing the occupants to be thrown violently forward; he continued on down an 
unfamiliar street for a distance of 173feet without applying his brakes, although he could have 
stopped safely within the 173 feet; that he drove down a 45 degree embankment at such speed 
as to cause the automobile to flip over onto its top into the river just as the brakes were applied, 
all of which when taken together shows a deliberate course of conduct in reckless disregard of 
the rights of others and constituted the proximate cause of Marilee Smith's death. 





We did not require that the driver know that his passenger would be killed by his conduct. 
Likewise, we did not require that he know that his manner of driving could cause his car to flip onto its top 
into the river, or that he even know the river was there as he drove in darkness at excessive speed down 
an unfamiliar street with his headlights off. Likewise, in State v. Papse, 83 Idaho 358, 363, 362 P.2d 
1083, 1086 (1961), we held that a driver acted in reckless disregard by intentionally running a stop sign 
where obstructions to his view prevented him from seeing whether any vehicles were approaching on the 
crossing through highway. We did not require proof that he had knowledge of the approaching car, or of 
the mother and daughter in that car who were killed in the collision. 
 
.... This Court can decide on appeal whether a defendant's conduct is sufficiently egregious to 
create a jury issue of whether it rises to the level of reckless disregard of the safety of others. Cafferty v. 
State, Dept. of Transp., Div. of Motor Vehicle Services, 144 Idaho 324,332, 160 P.3d 763,771 (2007); 
Harris v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 299, 847P.2d 1156, 1160(1992). Even though 
the district court applied the wrong standard for reckless disregard, we affirm the dismissal as to Deputy 
Athay because the evidence does not create a jury issue as to whether his conduct constituted reckless 
disregard in this case. 
 
Sheriff Stacey pursued a Mustang automobile being driven by Ervin from Utah, through part of 
Wyoming, into Idaho. When the Mustang was headed into Idaho, Sheriff Stacey radioed Deputy Athay 
and asked him to attempt to stop the Mustang with spike strips. 
 
After obtaining the approval of the Bear Lake County Sheriff, Deputy Athay dispatched Deputy 
Ludwig to attempt to spike the tires of the Mustang. Deputy Athay did not know that the Mustang had 
Idaho plates, nor did he know that it was registered in Caribou County. He did know that the driver of the 
Mustang was suspected of being intoxicated.  
 
Deputy Ludwig stopped at milepost442 at 10:50p.m.to prepare to spike the tires. At 10:56 p.m., 
he radioed that the Mustang had run over the spikes and was still going. Deputy Athay had stopped at 
milepost 440. When the Mustang passed him, he could smell burning rubber. Sheriff Stacey was 
approximately one mile behind the Mustang, and Deputy Athay joined in the pursuit after Sheriff Stacey 
went by. Deputy Athay remained behind Sheriff Stacey the entire time. 
 
The Mustang initially slowed after running over the spike strips, but then sped back upto around 
95 mph. Deputy Athay knew that a tire had been spiked because he could smell burning rubber when the 
Mustang passed his location. He believed that the Mustang would stop because of the flat tire before 
getting to Montpelier, which was about five miles away. The traffic on the highway that night was very 
light, the highway was dry, and the weather was clear, and the area from where he was to Montpelier was 
sparsely populated with few intersecting roads. 
 
At about milepost 439, Deputy Ludwig caught up with Deputy Athay. Deputy Ludwig had a faster 
vehicle, and he asked Deputy Athay if he could pass him and try to catch the Mustang. Deputy Athay had 
heard Sheriff Stacey state over the radio that the Mustang had slowed when entering Cokeville, 
Wyoming, and so he denied Deputy Ludwig's request and told him they would see if the Mustang slowed 
down when entering Montpelier. 
 
The highway through Montpelier had four traffic lanes and a center turn lane. All of the cross 
streets intersecting the highway through Montpelier were guarded by stop signs. The highway through 
town was well lit, and Deputy Athay called ahead to the police and requested their assistance to control 
any traffic on side streets that intersected the highway. 
 
After the Mustang passed through Montpelier, Deputy Athay saw it fishtail as it was leaving town 
near the location of the bowling alley at milepost 434. Deputy Athay thought it was speeding up, and so 
he told everyone to back off and told dispatch to notify Caribou County to request it have an officer in that 
jurisdiction again spike the vehicle. Deputy Athay slowed down. The Mustang continued on for about 
three miles, allegedly with its lights off, before colliding with the Plaintiffs vehicle. 
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From the point he joined in the pursuit until he told the officers to back off about six miles later, 
Deputy Athay did not engage in conduct that met the standard of reckless disregard. Although its 








(1)  Choosing a theory of recovery: The central issue is the legal standard which is to be used to 
evaluate the quality of the Deputy Athay's conduct. Plaintiff argued that the emergency vehicle statute 
was ambiguous because it stated that drivers of such vehicles were not liable unless they had acted (1) 
without "due regard for the safety of all persons" or (2) with "reckless disregard for the safety of others." 
I.C. §49-623(4). Given this ambiguity, the plaintiff contended that the court should evaluate Deputy 
Athay's conduct against the "due regard for the safety of all persons" standard - which he argued was a 
synonym for negligence. Why did the court reject plaintiffs choice of negligence? [Athay I, 1m 11, 13]. 
 
On remand, plaintiff thus was forced attempt to prove that the deputy had acted with "reckless 
disregard for the safety of all persons." The central issue in Athay I and II is what this standard means. 
Why was Deputy's conduct not reckless? Why was the driver's conduct in Smith v. Sharp [ in Athay I] 
reckless? 
 
The court not only addresses "reckless disregard," it also discusses (albeit briefly) "reckless, 
willful, and wanton," and "gross negligence." Each of these terms figures in the court's decision. Do you 
feel confident after reading Athay I and II that you can distinguish between them? 
 
(2)  Athay Ill: Following the Supreme Court's decision in Athay I, a jury trial against the only 
remaining defendant- Rich County- was held. The jury awarded Athay $2,720,126 in economic damages 
and $ 1,000,000 in non-economic damages. The jury found the fleeing driver (Ervin) 70% and Rich 
County 30% responsible for Athay's injuries. Rich County appealed, arguing in part that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding thatSheriff Stacey had acted with reckless disregard. The 
trial denied the motion and the county appealed. 
 
The Supreme Court affirmed, reciting a list of fifteen facts- including the length of the chase, the 
highs speed involved, the presence of other vehicles on the road, and Stacey's knowledge of the risk-- 
that the jury could have relied upon in concluding that Stacey acted with reckless disregard. The Court 
also quoted Stacey's testimony that police chases end "either because we step on the brakes and we 
stop voluntarily; our car breaks down or we get into an accident." Athay v. Rich County, Utah, 153 Idaho 
815,291 P.3d 1014 (2012). 
 
(3)  Risk: Moving from intent to recklessness is a crossing into the realm of risk, recklessness and the 
terms "reckless disregard," "reckless, willful, and wanton," and "gross negligence" occupy an ill-defined 
borderland between intent ("desires") and negligence ("unreasonable"). 
 
        For our purposes, it is sufficient to define "risk" as (i) the probability that something bad will occur 
and (ii) the magnitude of the badness. "Probability" is potentially misleading: a more accurate term is 
"uncertainty" because the probability (of the bad) is almost always unknown. Conduct is risky if it creates 
uncertainty that something may happen. 
 
The word "risk" does not appear in White v. University of Idaho; it appears five times in Athay. 
Recall that the Restatement defines intent as "desiring," which is not risk. Negligence is unreasonable 






Are all of the terms effectively synonyms? 
 
(4)  Criminal law and torts: Intent, recklessness, and negligence also form a borderland between 
criminal law and torts. 
Criminal law is an action by the state against an individual who violated a criminal statute. It is 
intended to vindicate the society's interest in maintaining the peace. Criminal law focuses on mens rea 
(the mental state required to commit a crime) and actual reus (the acts necessary to constitute the crime). 
A person convicted of a crime will be sentenced to jail and/or fined. The criminal may also be required to 
compensate her victim. 
 
Torts, on the other hand, is intended to vindicate the rights of an injured individual by 
compensating the individual for her losses- personal injury, property damage, and economic losses. 
 
Criminal law and torts share the terms intent, recklessness, and negligence. The operational 
definitions are likely to differ. Furthermore, where conduct falls on the border between knowledge and 
recklessness or recklessness and negligence, the criminal defendant is entitled to application of the law 
based on the principle that punitive laws ought to be applied so as to provide maximum protection for the 
accused. This is the "rule of lenity." Tort law has no similar principle to resolve border disputes. 
 
We have already seen one example of this difference in the previous discussion of Rajspic v. 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 110 Idaho 729, 718 P.2d 1167 (1986). Recall that, although Rajspic 
was found not guilty on a criminal charge of assault with a deadly weapon because the jury concluded 
that she suffered from a mental disease or defect sufficient to preclude criminal responsibility. Brownson 
subsequently brought a civil tort action against Rajspic for battery. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Brownson for $14,000.00. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an insane person is capable of 
committing an intentional tort. Rajspic v. Nationwide MutuaL Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 664, 662 P.2d 
534, 536 (1983). 
 
(5)  Five evaluative terms: To begin the classificatory ramble through the borderland between intent 
and negligence: Athay I introduces five different terms (in order of appearance): "due regard," 
"negligence," "reckless, willful, and wanton," "reckless disregard," and "gross negligence." 
 
(a) Due regard: How does the court define "due regard" []? Does the court define a theory of 
recovery or a standard for evaluating the actor's conduct? Note that the court treats the term 
as descriptive: due regard in a negligence case is acting with due care, i.e., without 
negligence. 
 
(b) Negligence: The court does not define "negligence," simply noting that it is not a synonym for 
"due regard." 
 
(c) Reckless, willful, and wanton: One approach to "reckless, willful, and wanton" would be to 
define each of the terms separately. "Willful," for example, seems to be a synonym for 
"intentional"; "wanton" seems "heartless," perhaps "depraved." 
 
  In Athay I [], the district court relied on the definition of "reckless, willful, and wanton" in the ITCA: 
 
"Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person intentionally and knowingly 
does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a 
high degree of probability that such harm will result. 
I.C. § 904C (2). The supreme court reversed, since the ITCA specifically states that its definition of 
"reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is only applicable to the Act itself. The court thus did not define this 
phrase. 
 
The IDJI include a definition of "willful and wanton": 
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       The words "willful and wanton" when used in these instructions and when applied to the 
allegations in this case, mean more than ordinary negligence. The words mean intentional or 
reckless actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should have known that the 
actions not only created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high degree of 
probability that such harm would actually result. 
IDJI2.25. 
(d) Reckless disregard: The Athay court [1'[17] adopts a definition from an earlier decision, 
Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125, 134,417 P.2d 75, 84 (1966) (adopting, in turn, Williamson v. 
McKenna, 223 Or. 366,354 P.2d 56,67 (1960)): "reckless disregard" is "the type of conduct 
engaged in by the driver when he actually perceives the danger and continues his course of 
conduct." 
 
(e)  Gross negligence: The court [1'[17] distinguishes "reckless disregard from gross 
negligence in that the latter would apply where the driver does not know of the high degree of manifest 
danger but should have known." 
 
The Idaho Torts Claim Act- which was the statute that structured the legal issues in White v. 
University of Idaho- defines "gross negligence" as "the doing or failing to do an act which a reasonable 
person in a similar situation and of similar responsibility would, with a minimum of contemplation, be 
inescapably drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty shows 
deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others." I.C. § 6-904C (1). This definition also does 
not apply beyond the ITCA. 
 
(f)  Synonyms? Are "recklessness," "reckless disregard," "reckless, willful, and wanton," and 
"gross negligence" synonyms? The drafters of the IDJI is thought that at least some of the terms were 
synonymous: 
 
There appears to be no distinction between "reckless" and "willful and wanton" or "willful or 
wanton." Hunter v. Horton, 80 Idaho 475, 479, 333 P.2d 459 (1958); Johnson v. Sunshine Mining 




The IDJI, however, includes a separate definition of "gross negligence": 
 
Gross negligence is distinguished as a matter of degree from ordinary negligence. Gross 
negligence involves carelessness that is so great that there was not just an absence of the 
ordinary care that should have been exercised, but a degree of negligence substantially greater 
than that which would constitute ordinary negligence. 
IDJI 2.24. See Peterson v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647,448 P.2d 653 (1968); Owen v. Taylor, 62 Idaho 408, 114 
P.2d 258 (1940). 
 
(6)  When Athay was decided, the Restatement (Second) of Torts defined "reckless disregard" as: 
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails 
to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would 
lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm 
to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his 
conduct negligent. 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). 
       Restatement {Third) has since replaced "reckless disregard" with "recklessness," which is defined as: 
engaging in conduct if: 
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk 
obvious to another in the person's situation, and 




so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the persons failure to adopt the 
precaution a demonstration of the person's indifference to the risk. 
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (2010). 
What are the differences between the definitions in the second and third Restatement? Would the 
new definition change the result in Athay? 
       Does the legislature's definition of the phrase "reckless, willful and wanton conduct" in the emergency 
vehicle statute differ significantly from the Restatement Third's definition of "reckless"? 
 
Do the definitions address both factors in our conceptual definition of "risk"? 
 
(7)  Knowledge: What must the actor "know" to be held liable for recklessness? What does the Athay 
court's distinction between "reckless" and "gross negligence" [11 17] tell us about the degree of 
knowledge needed in recklessness? Recall that the court distinguished "reckless disregard from gross 
negligence in that the latter would apply where the driver does not know of the high degree of manifest 
danger but should have known." 
 
Note that in Restatement (Third) requires the plaintiff to prove that the actor either (a) knew the 
risk or (b) knew of facts that made the risk obvious to another person in the actor's position. The first of 
these is a "subjective" standard: the actor had to know of the risk. The second is more "objective": the 
actor had to know facts that to another person would make the risk obvious. Thus, the actor cannot 
escape liability if she knew the facts (that would make the risk obvious to another) but honestly did not 
know the risk. 
 
       Restatement (Second) had only a subjective knowledge requirement: plaintiff needed to prove that 
the actor either knew or "had reason to know of facts relating to the risk presented by the conduct." Thus, 
it is the actor's knowledge: to prevail in a reckless disregard claim under the Restatement (Second) 
standard, plaintiff was required to prove some subjective knowledge by the defendant. 
 
       How is the factfinder (either a jury or the court sitting without a jury) to know what the defendant knew 
at the time of the event? 
 
(8)  Somewhere between?: Recklessness is commonly understood as involving a greater degree of 
fault than negligence but a lesser degree of fault than intentional conduct. It is conduct where the actor 
does not act with the purpose of invading a legally protected interest or knowing that an invasion of such 
an interest is substantially certain (intent) but which is beyond what a reasonable person would do under 
the circumstances (negligence). 
 
(a)  Intentional and reckless: How does "reckless" differ from "intent" when "reckless" is 
defined to include "intentional"? The Idaho Court of Appeals discussed this issue in Galloway v. Walker. 
Plaintiff was injured during a softball game when a runner slid into her as she was covering second base. 
She argued that "the [trial] court's use of the word 'intentional' within the definition of 'reckless' [was] 
confusing and misled the jury." The court disagreed: 
 
In the definition of reckless, the term "intentionally" does not modify the entire description of 
conduct constituting recklessness but modifies only the phrase "fails to do an act." The use of 
"intentional" therefore does not affect that portion of the instruction defining a reckless act. The 
instruction's use of "intentional" did not change the standard to reckless and intentional; rather, it 
excluded an inadvertent or merely negligent omission from the category of recklessness. 
Galloway v. Walker, 140 Idaho 672, 676, 99 P.3d 625, 629 (Ct. App. 2004). Is the court correct? What 
does the court's response suggest about how carefully legal documents must be read? 
 
Does defining the phrase as acting "intentionally'' mean that it is more or less than intent? That is, 
is it intent plus other requirements? What are those other requirements? Does this mean that a smaller 
set of conduct is "reckless" than "intentional"? Or, perhaps, the definition of "reckless" includes a looser or 
more colloquial definition of "intent" than that in the Restatement? 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF TORT LIABILITY 
18 
 
(b)  Reckless and negligent: Negligence involves conduct that is unreasonable in the face of 
a foreseeable risk of harm. The supreme court recently distinguished negligent and reckless: 
 
Reckless misconduct differs from negligence in several important particulars. It differs from that 
form of negligence which consists in mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness or a failure 
to take precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a possible or probable future 
emergency in that reckless misconduct requires a conscious choice of a course of action either 
with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which 
would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. It differs not only from the above-mentioned 
form of negligence, but also from that negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with 
knowledge that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless must recognize 
that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in amount than that which is necessary to 
make his conduct negligent. 
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 751, 274 P.3d 1256, 1266 (2012) (quoting State v. Papse, 
83 Idaho 358, 362-63, 362 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1961), quoting in turn RESTATEMENT {FIRST) OF TORTS 
§ 500 cmt. g (1934)}. 
 
(9)  Are the facts as they are described by the courts in the cases more helpful than the definitions? 
 
(10)  Partial statutory immunities: In Athay I, the court writes, "If the driver is liable for negligence, then 
whether the driver's conduct also reached the level of reckless disregard would not matter." Thus, in 
enacting emergency vehicle statute the legislature created a partial immunity for the drivers of such 
vehicles: they could only be held liable for injuries to others when their conduct was more than 
negligence. The emergency vehicle statute is an example of the most common modern source of the 
"more-than-negligence-and-less-than intent" category-- most commonly, stated as some variation on 
"recklessness." 
 
(a)  Guest Statute: In Smith v. Sharp, 85 Idaho 17, 375 P.2d 184 (1962), discussed in Athay, 
the statute was the Guest Statute: 
 
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment 
for such transportation shall have a cause for damages against such owner or operator for 
injuries, death or loss, incase of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the 
part of said owner or operator or caused by his intoxication or his reckless disregard of the rights 
of others. 
I.C. § 49-1401 (repealed). The Guest Statute has been repealed. Section 49-1401 is now titled "Reckless 
Driving." The first section of the statute now reads: 
 
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway, or upon 
public or private property open to public use, carelessly and heedlessly or without due caution 
and circumspection, and at a speed or in a manner as to endanger or be likely to endanger any 
person or property, or who passes when there is a line in his lane indicating a sight distance 
restriction, shall be guilty of reckless driving and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (2) of this section. 
l.C. § 49-1401. Unlike the Guest Statute, the Reckless Driving statute imposes criminal liability and makes 
no mention of the effect of such driving on civil liability. Should a criminal statute such as the Reckless 
Driving Statute play a role in tort liability? 
 
(b) Idaho Tort Claims Act: The ITCA applies to state agencies and entities such as counties and 
municipalities. The statute provides in part: 
 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of 
their employment and without ... reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6-





2. Arises out of injury to a person or property by a person under supervision, custody or care of a 
governmental entity or by or to a person who is on probation, or parole, or who is being 
supervised as part of a court-imposed drug court program, or any work release program, or by or 
to a person who is receiving services from a mental health center, hospital or similar facility. 
I.C. § 6-904A. The phrase "reckless, willful and wanton" is defined as: 
2. "Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person intentionally and 
knowingly does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which 
involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result. 
l.C. § 6-904C. The supreme court has described these provisions: "The statute protects against ordinary 
negligence claims which would significantly impair effective governmental process yet allows fair 
compensation for egregious wrongs." Harris v. State, Department of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 
301, 847 P.2d 1156, 1162 (992). The "supervision" requirement is discussed in Sherer v. Pocatello 
School District# 25, 148 P.3d 1232, 143 Idaho 486 (2006); Heiv. Holzer, 139 P.3d 81,85-85,73 P.3d 
94,97-98 (2003); Coonse ex ref. Coonse v. Boise School District, 132 Idaho 803, 805, 979 P.2d 1161, 
1163 (1999); Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 547, 944 p.2d 709 (1997); Mickelson v. School District No. 25, 
127 Idaho 401, 901 P.2d 508 (1995). 
 
       (c) Recreational Use Statute: A landowner who opens her land to the public without charge for 
recreational use (as defined in the statute) is exempt from liability. The statute does not explicitly limit the 
immunity it establishes. In Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 766 P.2d 736, 115 Idaho 266 (1988), the 
supreme court held that the statute "does not preclude liability of an owner for willful or wanton conduct 
that causes the injury of a person using the land for recreational purposes." Id. at 739, 115 Idaho at 269. 
 
(11)  The only relatively common situation in which willful and wanton is a common law-rather than a 
statutory- standard of care is when a trespasser is injured. The land occupier has a duty to trespassers to 
"refrain from willful or wanton acts which might cause injury." Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 
301, 612 P.2d 142, 144 (1980). 
 
In the IDJI restated the Huyck standard: 
 
The [owner] [occupant] owes no duty to a trespasser whose presence on the premises is 
unknown or could not reasonably have been anticipated. But, if the presence of the trespasser 
becomes known or reasonably could have been anticipated, the [owner] [occupant] has a duty 
not to injure the trespasser by any intentional or reckless act. 
IDJI 3.19. The drafters commented, "'Reckless' appears to be the equivalent of 'willful and wanton,' and is 
more understandable." 
 
Is it more understandable? 
 
(12)  There are at least some grounds for concluding that recklessness as it is currently defined is ill 
suited to how people actually think and act. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of 
Recklessness, 68 WASH. U.L. REV. 111, 120 (2008)






STEVENS v. FLEMING 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 




On August 22, 1984, Walter Roberts, age 78, perished in a fire which destroyed a two-story 
building in downtown Buhl, Idaho owned by Tom and Gloria Fleming. The Flemings operated a bar, 
kitchen, restaurant, dance floor and card room downstairs and Roberts resided in an apartment upstairs. 
Following the fire, Roberts was found dead in a doorway leading from the apartment into the hallway. The 
autopsy and death certificates note that he died of smoke inhalation while attempting to escape. Fire 
fighters reached the upstairs but did not know the location of Roberts' apartment. Roberts was the only 
upstairs tenant. The firefighters had to retreat after searching three to four rooms because the heat 
became unbearable. 
 
The trial court found that the cause of the fire was unknown. The fire started inside the building on 
the first floor in a back room and reached the second floor by burning through a plate on the bottom of a 
vertical shaft located in the service area for the bar and restaurant. The flame was fueled by materials 
located inside the vertical shaft, by materials located in the bathrooms and storage area located behind 
the restaurant on the first floor and by air drawn through the open stairway leading from the first to second 
floors and attic. 
 
There were no fire exits from the second floor. Roberts' apartment was located at the end of the 
upstairs hallway, requiring him to walk approximately eighty feet to reach a stairway leading to a 
downstairs exit. There were no doors at the top or bottom of the stairs leading to the second floor. The 
Flemings purchased the building in 1979. During their five years of ownership prior to the fire, no smoke 
alarms, fire alarms, warning signs or fire exits were installed anywhere in the building. The subject of the 
safety of the building for its occupants was never discussed between the Flemings and Mr. Roberts. Prior 
to the fire, the Flemings undertook extensive remodeling of the downstairs portion of the building without 
installing fire resistant materials and without removing flammable materials. In the mid-seventies, fire 
destroyed a business located on the first floor of the building. Although the Flemings were not yet owners 
at that time, they were aware of this fire. 
 
A wrongful death complaint was filed by Mr. Roberts' daughters, his sole surviving heirs, against 
the Flemings.... 




Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Flemings on their 
claim of common law negligence. Motions for summary judgment are only to be granted when, after a 
review of the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, there remain no genuine issues as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [] In determining whether any 
issues of material fact exist the trial court and this Court, upon review, must liberally construe all of the 
facts contained in the pleadings, affidavits and admissions in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. [] .... 
 
.... Analysis of any claim of negligence begins by identification and definition of a duty owed by 




circumstances. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984). In adopting the reasonable care 
standard for landlords in Stearns, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court noted by way of footnote that its 
holding was supported by a statutory version of the implied warranty of habitability, I.C. § 6-320. When 
applicable, specific statutory provisions such as the Uniform Fire Code may prove useful in delineating 
minimum standards which are binding upon every owner of a rented premises. Such on-point code 
provisions provide a ready measure of the base standard of care and failure to meet such standard may 
be negligence per se if the statutes or ordinances were designed to prevent the type of harm which 
occurred. 
 
In the present case, the provisions of the Uniform Fire Code were not operative as to the 
Flemings premises. The construction of their building predated the enactment of the code. The Uniform 
Fire Code applies to premises constructed before its effective date only under certain enumerated 
circumstances, such as where a fire marshal inspects a structure and gives notice to the landowner of 
specific hazards. None of those circumstances was present here. The inapplicability of the Uniform Code 
was incorrectly imbued with inordinate significance by the trial judge. Upon concluding that the Uniform 
Fire Code was inapplicable, the trial court should have considered facts and inferences sufficient to give 
rise to a question of the Flemings' having breached a duty of reasonable care which they owed to Roberts 
under common law, without regard to specific legislative or municipal pronouncements. Instead, the trial 
court seems to have made a direct leap from its finding that the Uniform Fire Code did not apply to its 
conclusion that the Flemings were, as a matter of law, immune from a claim of negligence. This analysis 
is contrary to established principles of jurisprudence in tort; it also violates the policy underlying building 
code legislation. 
 
The Uniform Fire Code is designed to improve building safety. Allowing the inapplicability of the 
Code to equate to an immunity from tort claims would result in the elimination of many sanctions capable 
of motivating the exercise of due care by landowners in maintenance of their properties. An illustrative 
scenario was the trial court's decision to stand, would be the preclusion of legal redress against the owner 
of a tavern who leases upstairs rooms to a boarder and idly watches as flames in the tavern fireplace lick 
the ceiling before bringing about the death of the upstairs boarder. So long as no "expert" came onto the 
scene and injected her professional opinion that the flames created a specific danger, the tavern owner 
would not be liable under the trial court's concept of due care. 
 
The common law has developed a doctrine of reasonable care under individual circumstances 
which is, in part, designed to avoid such self-serving attempts at avoiding responsibility for one's acts 
and/or omissions. Juries focus on what the reasonable person of average skill, ability and intelligence 
would do in the particular situation examined.  Individual inexperience is not a legitimate reason for a 
lower standard of conduct. Status as an expert will heighten expectations regarding the level of care. The 
burden is lodged squarely on the individual defendant to weigh the burdens associated with undertaking a 
particular precaution against the probability of loss occasioned by a dangerous condition multiplied by the 
gravity of that loss. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). It is the responsibility of 
the jury to evaluate the defendant's resolution of this equation in order to determine the presence or 
absence of negligence. 
 
In contrast to the well-established doctrine of individual responsibility discussed above, the trial 
court applied a novel approach to the standard of conduct which seems to consist of the notion that a 
landowner never acts negligently unless she first becomes privy to expert visitation and opinion and then 
renounces it acting in defiance to the guidance fortuitously rendered. The trial court stated as follows: 
 
However, Flemings were not required to comply with the fire code, and not being fire experts 
themselves, could only rely on the recommendations, or lack of recommendations, made by the 
fire chief or other qualified individuals. 
 
For the reasons recited above, we hold that this is an inaccurate statement of the law of 
negligence, specifically as to the duty to exercise reasonable care. 
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Appellants proffered evidence which raises genuine issues as to the material fact of Flemings' 
failure to exercise due care. The trial court disregarded the affidavit of Don Howard, an expert in fire 
reconstruction, who investigated this fire on behalf of appellants. The trial court decided that "there is 
nothing in the affidavit which is relevant to determining whether the Flemings were negligent." This 
conclusion was premised on the trial court's belief that Howard "presuppose[d) that the building was 
covered by the Uniform Fire Code, which it was not." This Court does not agree that Howard's affidavit 
would only be relevant to the negligence claim were the building covered by the Code. As the review of 
Howard's findings which is provided below will indicate, his statements constitute sufficient evidence in 
the record to give rise to genuine questions of adequate care which a jury could ultimately resolve by 
finding the Flemings negligent. Howard concluded that the rapid spread of fire from the first to second 
floor was caused by: 
 
1.  Failure of Flemings to install fire resistant wall and ceiling coverings, fire doors 
and/or self-closing doors when remodeling the cafe and bar and failure to remove 
flammable materials contained in the basement and accumulated in the vertical 
shaft of the building; 
2.  The failure of Flemings to separate the bar and restaurant, after remodeling, from 
the upstairs apartment and their failure to install sealed transoms and afire door 
leading from the first to second floor, all of which would have prevented the 
escape of heat, gases and flame from the first floor up the stairway and through 
the upstairs hallway, blocking Mr. Roberts' only avenue of escape; 
3.  Failure of Flemings to install smoke detectors or a smoke alarm which would 
probably have allowed Mr. Roberts to awake with sufficient time to escape down 
the hallway and out of the building notwithstanding the rapid spread of fire; 
4.        Failure of Flemings to install an upstairs fire escape. 
 
Because we find that a review of the record raises genuine issues of material fact regarding 
whether the Flemings acted negligently in their capacity as decedent's landlords, we conclude that the 
trial court erred in granting the Flemings' motion for summary judgment. [] Accordingly, grant of summary 
judgment on the claim of negligence against the Flemings is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further appropriate disposition of that cause of action. 
 
 
JOHNSON, BISTLINE JJ., concur. 
 
BAKES, C.J., concurs in the result. 
 




(1)  Duty: Note the steps in the court's analysis: it begins with the "identification and definition of a 
duty owed by defendant to plaintiff." The court then notes that the decision in Stephens v. Stearns held 
that a landlord owes a duty to the tenant that was defined as requiring the landlord "to exercise 
reasonable care ... in light of all the circumstances." The question then becomes whether the defendant 
breached the duty by failing to exercise reasonable care. 
 
(2)  Breach of duty: In negligence, the basic standard of care is "reasonable care ... in light of all the 
circumstances." In paragraph 10, the court offers three perspectives on how this standard is to be 
applied. 
 
(a) the "reasonable person": The court notes, "Juries focus on what the reasonable person of 
average skill, ability and intelligence would do in the particular situation examined." Juries do this because 





When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary care in 
the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a 
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the 
evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful 
person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under 
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably 
careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide. 
IDJI2.20. 
 
(b)  balancing risk and benefits: The court writes, "The burden [to act with reasonable care] is 
lodged squarely on the individual defendant to weigh the burdens associated with undertaking a particular 
caution against the probability of loss occasioned by a dangerous condition multiplied by the gravity of 
that loss. [] It is the responsibility of the jury to evaluate the defendant's resolution of this equation in order 
to determine the presence or absence of negligence." 
 
(c)  a policy rationale: Finally, the court states that the standard "is, in part, designed to avoid 
... self-serving attempts to avoid responsibility for one's acts-and/or omissions." It does so by objectifying 
the standard: how would a reasonable person have acted under these circumstances. 
 
(3)  Proof of breach: How is the jury to decide what a reasonable person would have done under the 
circumstances? In many situations, the jury will have sufficient experience with the activity that they will 
understood how a person should act. When roads are icy, for example, driving the speed limit may not be 
reasonably careful. 
 
       In situations in which the jury lacks sufficient knowledge, the parties must educate its members. This 
is commonly done through expert testimony. Here, plaintiffs had an expert in fire reconstruction who was 
prepared to testify that the rapid spread of the fire was caused by a number of the defendant's "failures." 
 
In addition, although the Uniform Fire Code was not applicable to the Fleming's building 
because it was constructed before the Code was adopted, the Code may nonetheless play a role in 
assisting the jury in determining what is reasonable conduct. 
 
(4)  Balancing risks and benefits: The court in Stevens expressly adopts the understanding of 
negligence as a balancing of risks and benefits of the defendant's conduct. This is a simple idea: conduct 
is negligent if the risk of the conduct outweighs its benefits. 
 
(a)  risks: As noted above, "risk" has two components: likelihood (uncertainty or probability) 
and badness. In torts, both involve the idea of "foreseeability." The focus is on the foreseeable likelihood 
that something bad will occur and the foreseeable magnitude of the bad if it does. 
 
(b)  benefits: These are the burden of preventing the foreseeable risk that are avoided. 
Driving more slowly, for example, delays arrival which can be avoided: is the benefit of arriving earlier 
greater than the foreseeable risk of an accident? 
 
The obvious implication of a balancing is that a small probability of a significant bad will make the 
actor negligent if the burden of precautions is small. Similarly, the actor can be negligent if there is a 
substantial probability of a small bad and the burden of precautions is small. Thus, the burden of 
precaution is an important consideration. 
 
In a case decided the year after Stevens, the supreme court offered this explanation of the role of 
foreseeability: 
 
Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the circumstances of each case. Where the 
degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of 
foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the burden of 
preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required. Thus, 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF TORT LIABILITY 
24 
foreseeability is not to be measured by just what is more probable than not, but also includes 
whatever result is likely enough in the setting of modem life that a reasonable prudent person 
would take such into account in guiding reasonable conduct. 
Sharp v. WH. Moore Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990). 
 
(5)  Acts (misfeasance I nonfeasance): As a general matter, negligence is predicated upon acts. If 
the defendant did not act, she generally will not be liable. The distinction between acts that lead to liability 
and non-actions is often more complex than the simple verbal distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance. 
 
      Negligent conduct can be an act - such as making an unsafe tum - or a course of conduct- such as 
driving at an unreasonable speed. It also is often a failure to take reasonable precautions- failing to stop 
at a stop sign. This could be described as not applying the brakes, as an omission or nonfeasance. As 
Restatement (Third) notes, it is preferable to describe the conduct as an unreasonable act of driving 
because is a risky activity that requires drivers to brake when appropriate. Often, as we saw in 
Hammontree, it depends upon where one begins the analysis. 
 
        In Stevens, the court noted negligence is about "responsibility for one's acts and/or omissions."Since 
the Flemings had remodeled the first floor, their conduct might be described as an omission: they did not 
include fire protection features in the remodeling. Alternatively, it could be described as misfeasance 
because an older building housing both a bar and a restaurant on the first floor and residential apartments 
on the second floor involves foreseeable risks. 
 
(6)       The Restatement Third defines "negligence" as 
 
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under 
all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's 
conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result 
in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm. 
RESTATEMENT {THIRD)OF TORTS § 3 (2010). 
 
In the comments to the section, the drafters noted that there are a variety of synonyms 
for conduct that is an exercise of reasonable care, including conduct that is reasonable, that shows 
ordinary care or prudence, or that does not create an unreasonable risk of harm. The standard can also 
be stated in terms of the "reasonable person" or a "reasonably prudent person." 
 
       The Idaho Supreme Court spoke of the "reasonable care standard" and noted that "juries focus on 




















[D] VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
 
VanVRANKEN v. FENCE-CRAFT 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
91 Idaho 742,430 P.2d 488 (1967) 
 
McFADDEN, J.- This action was instituted by Willie E. VanVranken, appellant, for damages for the death 
of his fifteen-year-old daughter, and for personal injuries and property damage sustained by him as a 
result of an automobile accident which occurred October 31,1963, on U.S. Highway No. 95, near the 
easterly city limits of Lewiston, Idaho. The accident occurred when appellants 1950 Ford automobile, 
driven by him and in which appellant, his ten-year-old son and fifteen-year-old daughter, deceased, were 
riding, struck the automobile owned and operated by defendant Myrl Bray. 
 
In his amended complaint, appellant alleged that at the time of the accident, Bray was operating 
his vehicle for and on behalf of respondent Fence-Craft, a California corporation engaged in Idaho in the 
buying of wood products for the making of fences. The amended complaint in substance alleged that Bray 
was the agent, servant, and employee of Fence-Craft and was operating his car within the scope of his 
employment by Fence-Craft at the time of the accident. 
 
The cause was tried to the jury on issues framed by a pre-trial order. At the close of appellant's 
case, respondent Fence-Craft moved for an involuntary dismissal ...on the grounds: 
 
*** that the evidence taken as a whole and every reasonable inference that could be drawn therefrom by 
reasonable men does not support*** the allegation of the complaint that defendant Bray was in fact an 
agent, servant, or employee of the defendant Fence-Craft, nor is there any evidence which can support 
the finding by reasonable men that defendant Bray was at the time of the accident within the scope of or 
course of any relationship of agency or master and servant at the time of the collision in question. The 
trial court granted this motion and dismissed the case as to respondent Fence-Craft. Following dismissal 
of Fence-Craft, Bray presented his evidence, and the case was submitted to a jury which returned a 
verdict in favor of appellant in the sum of $10,000; judgment accordingly ˙ was entered against Bray, from 
which judgment no appeal has been taken. Although Bray has been denominated in the title as a 
respondent, in fact, he is not involved in any of the issues presented here. This appeal was taken only 
from the order and judgment of dismissal of the case as to respondent Fence-Craft. 
 
Respondent Fence-Craft contends that the action of the trial court in granting the motion to 
dismiss as to it was correct on two grounds: first, the record fails to disclose any evidence of agency, 
master-servant, or employer-employee relationship between Bray and Fence-Craft that would authorize 
the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior, and further at the time of the accident, even if it be 
found such relationship did exist, the record affirmatively shows Bray, at the time of the accident, was 
acting outside the scope of employment; .... 
 
Two essential elements to be proven by a plaintiff in a negligence action for damages allegedly 
caused by a defendant's alleged servant in the negligent operation of an automobile owned by the 
servant are: (1) that in fact a master-servant relationship existed and (2) that the agent was acting within 
the scope of his employment or in furtherance of the defendants’ business at the time of damage or 
injury. Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952). In order to adduce evidence bearing of these 
issues, appellant called Myrl Bray, Fence-Craft's purported agent, for cross examination ....Bray testified 
extensively to the character of his relation with the respondent Fence-Craft and the purposes of his trip to 
Lewiston. The following facts appear from his testimony both on cross examination under the rule and on 
the subsequent redirect examination. 
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Prior to 1962, Bray had been independently engaged in buying fence posts and selling them at a 
profit to Penta Post, an Idaho treating plant, and, later, to Fence-Craft, respondent herein. In 1962 or 
1963, the nature of Bray's relationship with Fence-Craft changed and, after some negotiation, he became 
manager of a new picket mill built by Fence-Craft just west of Weippe, Idaho. Bray participated in the 
construction of the new mill, and during the period of construction, he was paid on an hourly basis. Since 
then, he and the employees of the mill under his supervision have been paid on a "piece-work" basis, i.e., 
in terms of the production of the mill. Bray and all of the other employees of the mill, numbering about six, 
are paid through the Fence-Craft payroll offices in California. 
 
Mr. Bray's duties as mill manager included supervision of the mill's employees, over whom he 
was given the authority of hiring and firing, buying timber in the field, seeing that it was processed and 
shipped, and getting "any parts or repairs or anything." The Fence-Craft mill owned no vehicles other than 
a lift truck and, consequently, Bray used his own auto (the 1950 Buick involved in the accident) "for my 
own use and for company use." Bray continued to buy posts for Penta Post, and in so doing, was able to 
secure a supply of material necessary for the Fence-Craft operation, but unusable by Penta Post. He 
testified affirmatively he did not use this car for the business purposes of anyone other than himself or 
Fence-Craft; and, in fact, the car was indispensable to his operation of the mill for Fence-Craft. 
 
On behalf of Fence-Craft, he had occasion to use his car "everyday'' to drive out to buy timber or 
"to go to get parts and repairs for anything we needed." He had been authorized by his superiors to get 
whatever parts were necessary to keep the mill running, at the expense of the company. Bray regularly 
drove to Lewiston to get parts, "once a week or every two weeks" from the time of the start of the mill 
operations in the spring of 1963. 
 
Mr. Speers, Bray's immediate superior at Fence-Craft, knew of this use of the car for company 
business, and knew that Bray had to regularly drive to Lewiston for some of the parts needed. On 
October 31, 1963, the date of the accident, Bray gave two reasons for his trip to Lewiston. His wife had 
an appointment with a Lewiston dentist for an extraction of some teeth, and he had to purchase or order 
"belts and teeth for the saw, edger" for use at the Fence-Craft mill. Bray had a charge account for and on 
behalf of Fence-Craft at Erb's Hardware in Lewiston, and purchases had previously been made by him 
and his wife (who was also employed by Fence-Craft) at Jameson's and the Golden Ranch store by 
Fence-Craft check, the Brays having also been authorized to sign checks for Fence-Craft. 
 
On their arrival in Lewiston about 10:00 o'clock a.m., Bray and his wife ''went to Erb's Hardware 
and Jameson's and then we went up to the doctor's [dentist's] office." Bray waited for his wife at the 
dentist's office, and following the extraction of her teeth, he drove her to the house of friends- the Roberts 
- in North Lewiston where, according to their plans, she was to spend the night; he, to return to the mill at 
Weippe. 
 
Bray testified it was his intention to stop at the Golden Ranch store before returning to Weippe "to 
get some sprockets" for use at the Fence-Craft mill, and that his wife, who was suffering from the 
extractions, had the dentist prescribe pain killing medication, which prescription was at the Owl Drug 
store. Just before 5:00 p. m., Bray drove to downtown Lewiston, parked his car, walked to the Owl Drug 
store where he picked up his wife's prescription, and then walked over to the Golden Ranch, where he 
remained just long enough to determine that the "sprockets" he was seeking were not in stock, and then 
he returned to his vehicle. 
 
Bray then drove out U.S. Highway 95, which was the direct return route to Weippe, until he 
reached the 3ist Street intersection. He made a left tum into the median of the divided highway, came to a 
stop, and was crossing the west bound lane on U.S. Highway 95 when his car was struck by the Van 
Vranken car. Bray testified it was his intention to drop the prescription off for his wife at the Roberts' 
home, located a few blocks north of the main highway (U.S. 95) on 31st Street, and continue on to 
Weippe with the "belts" for the saw at the Fence-Craft mill, which he had purchased at Jameson's earlier 
in the day. These belts were found in the trunk of his car immediately after the accident. Bray testified the 




checks drawn on the Fence-Craft account, payable to "Jameson's" and signed by Mrs. Myrl Bray, which 
checks were in payment of the belts and teeth. 
 
Respondent relies heavily on the case of Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952), in 
support of his position that, as a matter of law, any purported agency established by the appellant here is 
of the non-servant or "independent contractor'' variety. In that case, a judgment rendered on a jury verdict 
was reversed in part because the evidence there adduced would not support the existence of a master-
servant or employer-employee relationship. The evidence of the character of the agency relation and the 
scope of authority in Hayward v. Yost is not commensurate to the relation testified to by the defendant 
Bray as existing in the circumstances of the case at bar. 
 
In Hayward v. Yost the purported agent, a cattle buyer, did not testify as to the character of any 
relationship he had with the defendant Livestock Commission. Extraneous evidence revealed only that 
some of his buyer's checks cleared through the Commission's account, which process was explained, by 
the manager of the Commission as indicative of a debtor-creditor relation with buyers who sold through 
the Commission's cattle ring, with each buyer guaranteeing his own account. No competent evidence at 
all appeared to the effect that the buyer ("agent') was acting for or on behalf of the Commission at the 
time of the accident there in question. 
 
In the ultimate determination of whether one, alleged to have been operating within the scope of 
his employment when and where he committed a tort, was then and there functioning as a servant and 
not as an "independent contractor," an important guidepost is this the right to control reserved by the 
employer over the functions and duties of the agent. [] 
 
Since the principal concern is with the "right to control" the activities of the agent reserved by the 
employer and not with the extent of control actually exercised, except insofar as actual control may 
evidence the right, Burlingham v. Gray, 137 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1943), the fact that the agent may be imbued 
with some discretion in the performance of his duties is not determinative of his status for purposes of the 
imposition of liability for his negligence against his principal. Unless the evidence bearing on the question 
is susceptible of only one inference, the question is peculiarly one for the jury. []     
                                                                       
 In a jury case, a motion for involuntary dismissal made at the close of the proponent's case is 
indistinguishable in operation and effect from a motion for a directed verdict. [] .... For the purpose of a 
motion for directed verdict (motion for dismissal) the movant admits the truth of the adversary's evidence 
and every reasonable inference of fact which may be legitimately drawn therefrom, [], or as is sometimes 
stated, on a motion for directed verdict the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom 
must be considered in the light most favorable to the opponent. [] 
 
When viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, the testimony of the agent Myrl Bray to the 
effect that he was continuously employed as the manager of the Fence-Craft mill, his enumeration of his 
regular duties incident to his functioning as a manager, which duties specifically included an obligation to 
procure all necessary parts, and his further testimony and the evidence reflecting that the use of his own 
vehicle was necessary to the discharge of his duties, that he was regularly required to drive to the city of 
Lewiston to get parts, and that his Fence-Craft superior knew of these Lewiston trips and their necessity, 
provides an ample foundation from which reasonable men might infer that he was in fact a servant of 
Fence-Craft authorized to operate his vehicle on behalf of his employer in the area where the accident 
occurred. [] 
 
Respondent next argues that liability should not be asserted against a master where some 
business purpose of the master is to be accomplished merely as an incidental to the primary personal 
purpose of the venture or mission, []. While we are cognizant of this general principle, we are also aware 
that an act may be within the scope of employment although done in part to serve the personal purposes 
of the servant. [] 
 
In Baldwin v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 49 Idaho 231, 287 P. 944 (1930), this Court reversed a 
judgment entered on a jury verdict against the master. There, the employee, a salesman, had gone to 
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Nampa on business, as he testified, "for the company and himself." However, unlike the instant case, the 
salesman terminated his dual-purpose venture when he returned to Boise, parked his car, spent some 
time at the company's office, and has his supper. The accident occurred thereafter when he returned to 
his car and had started on the way to his residence. Of those circumstances, this Court reasoned: 
After reaching Boise, had he continued homeward, it might be said that he was concluding a trip made in 
his employer's business, but he terminated his trip at his own option when he went to the company's 
office. Id. at 238, 287 P. at 946. 
 
In the instant case, the agent Bray testified to a joint purpose for his trip to Lewiston and, 
similarly, to a joint immediate purpose for his return to downtown Lewiston after leaving his wife at the 
Roberts' home. In view of apparent mutual advantage, whether he was acting principally in furtherance of 
his employer's business at the time and place of his collision with appellant's car was, on this point, for the 
determination of the trier of fact, the jury. 
 
Lastly, respondent contends that the trial court could nevertheless property determine as a matter 
of law that, in turning left onto 3ist Street for the sole immediate purpose of dropping off the prescription 
for his wife at the Roberts' home, Bray thereby deviated from the direct return route to the Fence-Craft 
mill at Weippe and, hence, from any purpose to benefit his employer. However, the better reasoned 
authorities dealing with deviations by an employee from the geodesic route have generally recognized 
that a proportionately slight or expectable deviation will not relieve an employer of vicarious liability, and 
except where the deviation is gross, the jury should determine the scope of employment question as one 
of fact. [] 
 
Upon the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case for appellant on the issues presented; and thus, the order and judgment of dismissal must be 
reversed, and the cause remanded for new trial. 
 
SMITH AND McQuADE, JJ., CONCUR. 
 




(1)  What is the basis for liability? How does the quality of the Fence-Craft's conduct differ from that of 
the defendants in White and Stevens? Is this strict, i.e., faultless, liability? Was Fence-Craft negligent in 
employing or supervising Bray? Is the liability of the employer based upon negligence -albeit not its own 
negligence? Does the law simply increase the number of individuals who are held legally responsible for 
the negligence of an individual? 
 
 
(2)  Agency: ''Vicarious liability" is the general term applied to those situations in which one entity or 
individual is legally liable for injuries resulting from the tortious conduct of another person. The principle 
case is an example of the most common situation, the doctrine of respondeat superior- "let the master 
answer." As the case demonstrates, the doctrine is applicable to employment relationships; under it, the 
employer is responsible for most torts committed by most but not all employees. As a general rule, an 
employer is not legally responsible for the torts of independent contractors. These terms are defined in 
Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958): 
 
§2. Master; Servant; Independent Contractor 
 
(1)  A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs and 
who conduct of the other in the performance of the service. 
(2)  A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs 
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the 
right to control by the master. 




for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with 




A.  Servants and Non-servant Agents. A master is a species of principal, and 
a servant is a species of agent. The words "master" and "servant" are herein used to indicate the relation 
from which arises both the liability of an employer for the physical harm caused to third persons by the 
tort of an employee and the special duties and immunities of an employer to the employee. Although for 
brevity the definitions in this Section refer only to the control or right to control the physical conduct of the 
servant, there are many factors which are considered by the courts in defining the relation. These factors 
are stated in Section 220.... 
 
§219 When Master is Liable for Torts of His Servants 
 
(1)  A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting 
in the scope of their employment. 
 
(2)  A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their 
employment, unless: 
 
(a)  the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or 
(b)  the master was negligent or reckless, or 
(c)  the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or 
(d)  the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance 
upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency 
relation. 
 
§ 220 Definition of Servant 
 
(1)  A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and 
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to 
the other's control or right to control. 
 
(2)  In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the 
following matters of fact, among others, are considered: 
 
(a)  the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of 
the work; 
(b)  whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; 
(c)  the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done 
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(d)  the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e)  whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place 
of work for the person doing the work; 
(f)  the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g)  the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h)  whether or not the work is a part or the regular business of the employer; 
(i)  whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; 
and 
(j)         whether the principal is or is not in business. 
 
(3)  Independent contractors: Generally, respondeat superior is not applicable when the employee is 
an independent contractor rather than a servant. What are the justifications for this no-liability rule? Why 
should one group of employees be treated differently? 
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       The general, no-liability rule for the torts of an independent contractor has a number of exceptions. A 
significant exception is the "non-delegable duty." The Restatement (Second) of Agency rather unhelpfully 
defines "non-delegable duty" in § 214: "[a] master ...who is under a duty to provide protection for or to 
have care used to protect others or their property and who confides the performance of such duty to a 
servant or other person is subject to liability to such others for harm caused to them by failure of such 
agent to perform the duty." Restatement (Second) of Torts§§ 416-429 provides additional analysis. Non-
delegable duties frequently arise in the context of land occupier/land entrant relationships, statutory 
obligations, and ultrahazardous or inherently dangerous activities. 
 
(4)  Why should a master be held vicariously liable for the torts of her servant? Does such liability 
create an incentive for masters to exercise care in selecting and supervising employees? Does the fact 
that the employer allowed/required the employee to use a dangerous instrumentality in the context of the 
employment relationship provide a rationale? If both the victim and the employer are innocent, why 
should the law impose liability on the one rather than leaving the loss where it lies (to the extent that the 
employee is judgment proof)? Is such liability predicated upon the general fact that masters have more 
money than servants and an injured person thus is more likely to recover for his losses if the master is 
held vicariously liable? Is this compensatory goal a sufficient basis for assigning liability? Is vicarious 
liability simply a means of allocating to businesses the costs of the accidents caused by those 
businesses? Which of these rationales are sufficient to justify the imposition of liability on an innocent 
party? Consider the following statement by the United States Supreme Court: 
 
To this day, there is disagreement about the basis for imposing liability on an employer 
for the torts of an employee when the sole nexus between employer and the tort is the fact of the 
employer-employee relationship. [] Nevertheless, two justifications tend to stand out. First is the 
common-sense notion that no matter how blameless an employer appears to be in an individual 
case, accidents might nonetheless be reduced if employers had to bear the costs of accidents. [] 
Second is the argument that the cost of accidents should be spread to the community as a whole 
on an insurance theory. 
Monnell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.658 (1978). 
 
(5)  Eldridge v. Black Canyon Irrigation District: Does the doctrine apply to tortious conduct other 
than negligence? For example, should a master be held liable for the intentional torts of its servant? 
 
       In Eldridge, the court was presented with the whether the employer was liable for the conduct of its 
employee. Jordan was the district's superintendent and it was his responsibility to keep its canal 
operational. Plaintiff was an employee of an irrigated farm that bordered the canal. Because of the 
geology of the location, there was a tendency for the canal to become blocked by landslides from the 
farm. While checking the canal, Jordan called plaintiff to the canal bank to ask him to correct a potential 
problem. As the court noted, "during the conference, and as a result of it, Jordan "assaulted, struck and 
beat" plaintiff. 
 
The court upheld the jury verdict against the irrigation district, noting: 
[l]t is in general sufficient to make the master responsible that he gave to the servant an 
authority, or made it his duty to act in respect to the business in which he was engaged, 
when the wrong was committed, and that the act complained of was done in the course 
of his employment. The master, in that case will be deemed to have consented to and 
authorized the act of the servant, and he will not be excused from liability, although the 
servant abused his authority, or was reckless in the performance of his duty, or inflicted 
an unnecessary injury in executing his master's orders. The master who puts the servant 
in a place of trust or responsibility, or commits to him the management of his business, 
or the care of his property, is justly held responsible when the servant, through lack of 
judgment or discretion, or from infirmity of temper, or under the influence of passion aroused by 
the circumstances and the occasion, goes beyond the strict line of his duty 





The court concluded that it "was a question for the jury to decide whether he acted within the 
scope of his employment in committing the assault, or stepped aside from his line of duty and committed 
it pursuant to some purpose of his own and independent of his employment." Eldridge v. Black Canyon 
Irrigation District, 55 Idaho 443,43 P.2d 1052 (1935). 
 
(6)  Respondeat superior is only the most common form of vicarious liability. 
 
 
[E] STRICT LIABILITY 
 
At your request I accompany you when you are about your own affairs; my enemies fall upon and kill me, 
you must pay for my death. 
Leges Henrici 88, § 9 (c. 1155) 
 
 
You take me to see a wild beast show or that interesting spectacle, a mad man; beast or mad man kills 
me; you must pay. You hang up your sword; someone else knocks it down so that it cuts me; you must 
pay. In none of these cases can you honestly swear that you did nothing that helped to bring about death 
or wound. 
 
LegesHenrici 90, § 11 (c.1155) 
 
 
Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
117 Idaho 901, 792 P.2d 926 (1990) 
 
BAKES, C.J.- [The court was presented with three certified questions from the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals: 
 
[(1) Under Idaho law, may one be held liable without proof of fault for damages caused by the 
intentional discharge of water? 
[(2) Under Idaho law, may one be held liable pursuant to a direct trespass theory for 
˙  damages caused by the intentional discharge of water? 
[(3) Under Idaho law, may one be held liable pursuant to a private nuisance theory for 
damages caused by the intentional, but non-negligent, discharge of water? 
 
In its order certifying the questions, the Ninth Circuit provided a factual summary:] 
 
Bear Lake lies on the border between Idaho and Utah. Bear River begins high in the Uinta 
Mountains of Utah, meanders back and forth between Utah and Wyoming, flows north some distance into 
Idaho, and finally tums back south into Utah, where it terminates in the great Salt Lake. Bear River does 
not naturally enter Bear Lake; instead it flows past it a few miles to the north. In about 1917, however, the 
predecessor of Utah Power constructed Stewart Damon the river, diverting the river's flow southward via 
canals into Mud Lake, which connects with Bear Lake. Bear Lake is thereby utilized as a reservoir. After 
the water reaches Bear Lake, it flows northward out of the lake, by gravity or through pumping, via an 
outlet canal to rejoin the old natural bed of Bear River some distance north of Stewart Dam. Between 
certain maximum and minimum limits (the height of the release gates and the depth of the pumping intake 
facilities), Utah Power can control the flow out of Bear Lake, and it can close the lake so that the flow 
continues directly down the river. The use of Bear Lake for water storage is the central feature of the 
whole system. The dam, canals, and control facilities are located within Idaho. 
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Utah Power operates the system under the authority of various federal statutes, a court decree, 
and the Bear River Commission (established by the Bear River Compact, a joint effort of Idaho, Utah, and 
Wyoming). The explicit purposes for which Utah Power is commissioned to operate the system are (1) to 
store water for irrigation throughout the valley in Idaho and Utah below the Bear Lake facilities and (2) to 
generate hydroelectric power. In addition, as Kunz I [Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 (9th 
Cir. 1975), reprinted at Supplement] conclusively established, Utah Power is required to use the facilities 
for flood control, particularly as to the spring runoffs of the watershed. Flood control is not one of the 
specified purposes imposed by the authorizations but is imposed by common-law negligence principles. 
See generally Kunz, 526 F.2d at 502-04. Additionally, the Bear River Compact establishes a minimum 
irrigation reserve level requirement. Under the dictates of the compact, Bear Lake must be maintained at 
an elevation of 5914.61 [ft.]. 
 
Utah Power regulates the storage capacity of Bear Lake by adjusting the lake's elevation. The 
key period is spring because during that period the runoffs cause a substantial rise in the lake's elevation. 
The full capacity level of the lake is 5923.65 [ft.]. In regulating the lake elevation Utah Power balances the 
competing factors, including, irrigation, flood control, fish and wildlife, recreation, and power generation. 
 
Landowners are numerous farmers who own or lease riparian lands, and a private irrigation 
company, located along the Bear River below Bear lake. Prior to 1917 much of these lands were devoted 
to orchard grasses and wild hays, which were dependent upon flooding from natural spring runoffs to 
maintain their growth. The installation of the water storage system in 1917harnessed the spring runoffs 
and stopped the flooding, so the ranchers converted their operations to alfalfa and cereal crops, which will 
not tolerate floods. 
 
During the period between 1983-1986, the spring runoffs were unusually heavy. During this 
period, landowners' lands were flooded by stored and naturally flowing waters which were respectively 
discharged and "bypassed" by Utah Power from Bear lake into the natural channel of Bear River in 
amounts exceeding the carrying capacity of the natural channel. 
 
[The Ninth Circuit certified the questions after it concluded that there were two distinct lines of 
Idaho cases that applied different liability standards in cases involving flood damage. The federal court 
described one line of cases as] requiring a showing of negligence to hold a party liable for damages 
resulting from the escape, seepage, or percolation of water carried in an artificial channel, such as an 
irrigation canal or ditch." [In these cases, non-negligence based theories of liability, such as strict liability, 
trespass, or private nuisance, are not recognized. See e.g., Stephenson v. Pioneer Irrigation District, 49 
Idaho 189,288 P.421 (1930); Burt v. Farmer's Co-operative Irrigation Company, Ud., 30 Idaho 752, 168 P. 
1078 (1917). The court of appeals described the other line of cases that involve situations where] a 
natural channel is altered or obstructed through the placement of barriers which diminish the ability of the 
channel to carry its natural volume thereby causing flood damage to another riparian landowner. Under 
these factual circumstances, the injured riparian landowner may not be limited to a 'negligence only' 
cause of action. [See e.g., Campion v. Simpson, 104 Idaho 413, 659 P.2d 766 (1983); Milbert v. Carl 
Carbon, Inc., 89 Idaho 471,406 P.2d 113 (1965); Boise Development Company, Ud. v. Boise City, 30 
Idaho 675, 167 P. 1032 (1917); Fischer v. Davis, 19 9 Idaho 493, 116 P. 412 (1911).] 
 
  [The Idaho Supreme Court decided that its] task essentially is to determine which line of cases 
more closely applies to the factual circumstances presented here, which involve an artificial water 
diversion and storage system (Bear lake) which is subsequently discharged into a natural channel (Bear 
River) and thereafter causes flooding. [The court concluded that] "the Stephenson and Burt line of cases 
applies to the facts of this case, and that negligence is the only basis for imposing liability on Utah Power. 
[The court offered the following explanation:] 
 
  The starting point in our analysis of which line of cases applies to the present case is to explain 
why a distinction exists between them. For instance, why does Idaho case law limit the theories of liability 
which can be brought against an irrigation system operator whose canal floods over its banks when other 




someone who erects a breakwater into the natural channel that causes damage to the property owner on 
the opposite bank of the stream? The answer to this legal question is based almost entirely on the unique 
circumstances of Idaho's geography and economy. "The water of this arid state is an important resource. 
Not only farmers, but industry and residential users depend upon it." Miles v. Idaho Power Company, 116 
Idaho 635, 645-646, 778 P.2d 757, 767-768 (1989). Because Idaho receives little annual precipitation, 
Idahoans must make the most efficient use of this limited resource. "The policy of the law of this State is 
to secure the maximum use and benefit, and least wasteful use, of its water resources. Stickney v. 
Hanrahan, 7 Idaho 424, 63 P. 189 [(1900)]; Van Camp v. Emery, 13 Idaho 202, 89 P. 752 [(1907)]; 
Farmers' Co-operative Ditch Co. v. Riverside lrr. Dist., 16 Idaho 525, 102 P. 481 [(1909)]; Coulson v. 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 39 Idaho 320, 227 P.29 [(1924)]; Reynolds Irrigation Dist. v. Sproat, 69 
Idaho 315,206 P.2d 774 [(1949)]; Ramseyer v. Jamerson, 78 Idaho 504, 305 P.2d 1088 [(1957)]; 
Mountain Home Irrigation District v. Duffy, 79 Idaho 435, 319 P.2d 965 [(1957)]; I.C. §§ 42-101 and 42-
104." Poole v. Olaveson, 82 Idaho 496, 502, 356 P.2d 61, 65 (1960). See also Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 
735, 552 P.2d 1220 (1976). 
 
       Idaho's extensive agricultural economy would not exist but for the vast systems of irrigation canals 
and ditches which artificially deliver stored or naturally flowing water from Idaho's rivers and streams into 
abundant fields of growing crops. Many of these irrigation systems depend on dams which divert naturally 
flowing water, storing it in reservoirs and later releasing it for use on gated lands through canals and 
ditches. These artificial water storage systems serve an additional need for flood control, power 
generation, recreation, and provide beneficial environments for fish and wildlife.3 
This Court is cognizant of the crucial role which artificial water systems serve this state. As a 
result, limited liability rules have been applied to operators of these artificial water systems. Early on, in 
Burt v. Fanners' Co-operative Irrigation Co., 30 Idaho 752, 767, 168 P. 1078, 1082 (1917), we wrote: 
 
Under the common law one who diverted water from its natural course did so at his peril and was 
held practically to be an insurer against damage which might result from such action. [Citing 
cases] The common law has been modified and relaxed in this and other arid states, so that the 
owner of an irrigation ditch is only liable for damages occurring to others as a result of his 
negligence or unskillfulness in constructing, maintaining or operating of the ditch. [Citing cases]. 
 
In Stephenson v. Pioneer Irrigation District, 49 Idaho 189, 194,288 P.421,422 (1930), this Court wrote 
further that: 
 
[The owner of an irrigation ditch] is not an insurer against all damages arising from his ditches, 
but is liable when negligent in the construction, maintenance, and operation thereof. This, in other 
words, required to exercise reasonable or ordinary care only in the construction, maintenance, 
and operation of his ditches. 
See also Aibrethson v. Carey Valley Reservoir Co., 67 Idaho 529, 186 P.2d 853 (1947); Munn v. Twin 
Falls Canal Co., 43 Idaho 198,252 P. 865 (1926); Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Petrie, 37 Idaho 
45, 223 P. 531 (1923); Stuart v. Noble Ditch Co., 9 Idaho 765, 76 P. 255 (1904).The same policies which 
compelled this Court to limit the liability of operators of irrigation canals from suit for all but an action in 
                                                     
3 The operation of an artificial water diversion and storage system may at times diminish the carrying capacity of the natural stream 
into which it empties due to a lack of natural "scouring" which occurs during spring runoff. Such "scouring" clears the streambed of 
silt deposits thereby maximizing the stream's carrying capacity. We are not aware of any diminished carrying ca _>acity  in the Bear 
River due to the operation of the Bear Lake water storage system. The certification order only indicates that "naturally flowing waters 
...were respectively discharged and 'bypassed' by Utah Power into the natural channel of Bear River in amounts exceeding the 
carrying capacity of the natural channel." (Emphasis added.) We understand this to indicate that the amounts released into the 
natural channel of the Bear River would have caused flooding to the landowners regardless of whether the carrying capacity of the 
Bear River was diminished by the operation of the water storage system. Even so, we do not liken the possible diminution in the 
carrying capacity of a natural steam channel caused by the operation of a public reservoir to that diminution caused when a private 
party obstructs or diverts a natural stream channel for private gain. This position follows logically from the initial factual premise -the 
law of Idaho has developed to encourage the non-negligent management of Idaho's limited water resources in order to advance the 
economy and livelihood of Idaho's citizenry. 
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negligence also extends to those entities which operate the artificial water diversion and storage systems, 
i.e., dams and reservoirs which supply the water to the irrigation canals. 
 
This holding does not conflict with the other line of Idaho cases, identified by the Court of 
Appeals, dealing with the alteration or obstruction of natural streams. See Campion v. Simpson, 104 
Idaho 413, 659 P.2d 766 (1983); Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89 Idaho 471, 406 P. 2d 113 (1965); Boise 
Development Co. v. Boise City, 30 Idaho 675, 167 P. 1032 (1917); Fischer v. Davis, 19 Idaho 493, 116 P. 
412 (1911). These alteration or obstruction of natural stream cases present facts distinct from those 
contained in the case before us. Generally, these alteration cases involve situations where one riparian 
landowner takes measures to improve or protect its land from the natural stream flow thereby causing an 
alteration in the natural stream flow which injures another riparian landowner, usually the one on the 
opposite bank of the stream. 
 
In Campion, the two parties involved owned land on the opposite banks of the Wood River at a 
point where the river naturally flowed through three channels. The defendant filled in two channels to 
protect his property from flood waters thereby reducing the river's overall channel capacity. When the 
spring flood waters carne the carrying capacity of the remaining channel was exceeded and Campion's 
property was damaged. 
 
In Milbert, the parties owned land on opposite sides of the Palouse River. Milbert co complained 
that Carl Carbon's blasting operations reduced the carrying capacity of the Palouse River during a high 
spring runoff thereby causing flooding to his land. 
 
In Boise Development Company, the city was sued for flood damage to riparian landowners along 
the Boise River which occurred after the city constructed embankments, dams and riprapping along the 
opposite bank of the river in order to protect riverside parkland from erosion. 
 
In Fischer, dams, cribs and obstructions were erected by Davis in order to protect his property 
from the Boise River. These measures, however, reduced the carrying capacity of the river thereby 
causing flood damage to Fischer, the landowner on the opposite bank. 
 
The legal standard applicable to these "alteration or obstruction" cases is described in Boise 
Development Company in which we stated that "liability in such cases {does not] rest solely upon the 
narrow ground of negligence, but rather upon the broad legal principle that no one is permitted to so use 
his own property as to invade the property of another." [] 
 
A riparian owner of land abutting upon a stream, whether navigable or non-navigable, has the 
right to place such barriers as will prevent his land from being overflowed or damaged by the 
stream, and for the purpose of keeping the same within its natural channel. A riparian owner, 
however, has no right to place obstruction into the stream for the purpose of changing the natural 
channel of the stream, or for any other purpose, that would do damage to the riparian owner on 
the opposite side or to owners of land abutting upon the stream either above or below. 
[Campion] 
 
These obstructions of the natural channel cases do not apply to the factual scenario set forth in the Ninth 
Circuit's certification order. Utah Power, by diverting and storing, and later releasing the flood waters of 
the Bear River back into the natural channel, is carrying out its duty to "balance the competing factors, 
including irrigation, flood control, fish and wildlife, recreation and power generation."[] Balancing these 
competing and often conflicting interests as it must, Utah Power is only held to a standard of 
reasonableness, i.e., negligence. As the owner and operator of the diversion and storage system, Utah 
Power "is not an insurer against all damages arising from its storage system], but is liable when negligent 
in the construction, maintenance and operation thereof." Stephenson v. Pioneer Irrigation District, 49 
Idaho 189, 194,288 P.421,422 (1930). See also Albrethson v. Carey Valley Reservoir Co., 67 Idaho 529, 
186 P.2d 853 (1947); Munn v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 43 Idaho 198, 252 P. 865 (1926); Nampa & Meridian 
Irrigation District v. Petrie, 37 Idaho 45, 223 P. 531 (1923); Burt v. Farmers Co-operative Irrigation Co., 30 





Accordingly, the landowners' claim against Utah Power, whether denominated strict liability, an 
action in trespass, or private nuisance, is not maintainable against Utah Power on the facts of this case in 
the absence of proof of negligence.... 
 
JOHNSON & McDEVITT, JJ., & SCHROEDER, J. PROTEM., concur. 
 
BISTLINE, J., dissented. 
 
 
BOSWELL V. STEELE  
 
Court of Appeals of Idaho 
2017 Ida. App. LEXIS 65 
 
GUTIERREZ, J- Stephen and Karena Boswell appeal from the district court's judgment entered in favor of 
Amber Dawn Steele and the Estate of Mary Steele. The Boswells argue the district court erred in 
reducing their claims to negligence causes of action by not instructing the jury on common law and 
statutory strict liability, by instructing the jury on negligence, and by providing the negligence special 
verdict form. For the reasons explained below, we vacate the district court's judgment and remand for 
further proceedings. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
After Amber's dog bit Stephen, the Boswells filed a complaint alleging various causes of action. 
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Steeles. The Boswells filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. The district court entered a 
judgment in favor of the Steeles, dismissing the Boswells' claims. 
 
The Boswells appealed from the district court's summary judgment. This Court vacated and 
remanded after determining the Boswells pled a cause of action for liability for domestic animals, simple 
negligence, premises liability, negligence per se, and injury from a dangerous animal as defined by the 
Pocatello Municipal Code; and the Boswells sufficiently supported these claims with evidence to survive 
summary judgment. Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 348 P.3d 497 (Ct. App. 2015). 
 
On remand, the Boswells filed motions for partial summary judgment, arguing they were entitled 
to summary judgment on their strict liability and Pocatello Municipal Code claims, and that the Steeles' 
defenses of comparative negligence should be stricken. The district court denied the motions, reasoning 
the Boswells' claims all sound in negligence and therefore subject to the defense of comparative 
negligence. Before trial, the Boswells voluntarily dismissed their negligence claims. The district court 
instructed the jury on negligence and gave the jury a negligence special verdict form. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the Steeles, finding that they were not negligent. The Boswells appeal from the district 





The Boswells argue the district court erred in reducing the Boswells' claims to negligence by not 
instructing the jury on common law and statutory strict liability, by instructing the jury on negligence, and 
by providing the special verdict form about negligence. Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a 
question of law over which we exercise free review. Needs v. Hebener, 118 Idaho 438, 441, 797 P.2d 
146, 149 (Ct. App. 1990). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole, 
and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 126, 
937 P.2d 434, 438 (Ct. App. 1997). A requested jury instruction need not be given if it is either an 
erroneous statement of the law, adequately covered by other instructions, or not supported by the facts of 
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the case. Craig Johnson Constr., L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 
648, 651 (2006). 
 
A. Common Law and Statutory Strict Liability 
 
The core and dispositive issue on appeal is whether Idaho, at the time Stephen was bitten, had 
adopted strict liability in dog-bite cases. As we explained in Boswell, the Idaho Supreme Court "adopted a 
rule that an owner of a domesticated animal will be liable for injuries it causes if the owner had prior 
knowledge, or should have known, of the animal's dangerous propensity. It is the elements of the cause 
of action that are significant, not a label of strict liability or negligence." Boswell, 158 Idaho at 561, 348 
P.3d at 504 (discussing McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 
(1909)). 
 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently confirmed the elements of liability for domestic animals set 
forth in Boswell: 
 
In the context of liability for domestic animals, duty is governed by "a rule of law lacking 
the ordinary care scienter requirement of negligence when owners of domestic animals know of 
vicious tendencies. In cases where a domestic animal is not trespassing, the owner of the animal 
is liable for injuries caused if the owner knew or should have known of the animal's vicious or 
dangerous tendencies." 
Bright v. Maznik, 162 Idaho 311, 315, 396 P.3d 1193, 1197 (2017) (quoting Boswell, 158 Idaho at 560, 
348 P.3d at 503) (emphasis added). While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to classify this type of 
liability as "strict liability," the Restatement makes clear that what Idaho has referred to as "liability for 
domestic animals" is strict liability. The elements of liability for domestic animals set forth in Boswell mirror 
the elements of strict liability for abnormally dangerous animals set forth in Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 23 (2010). The Restatement provides: "An owner or 
possessor of an animal that the owner or possessor knows or has reason to know has dangerous 
tendencies abnormal for the animal's category is subject to strict liability for physical harm caused by the 
animal if the harm ensues from that dangerous tendency." 
 
The Boswells' proposed jury instruction 6 sets forth the exact language we provided in Boswell 
and the Supreme Court reiterated in Bright. The instruction reads: "[T]he owner of a dog is liable for 
injuries caused by the dog if the owner knew or should have known of the dog's dangerous tendencies. 
Similarly, the custodian of a dog is liable for injuries caused if such custodian knew or should have known 
of the dog's dangerous propensities." The proposed jury instruction further clarified: "There is no 
requirement under this claim for the Plaintiffs to prove that the owner or the custodian of the dog failed to 
exercise ordinary care." The district court, however, disregarded the Boswells' proposed instruction and 
instead conflated negligence with strict liability. The district court instructed the jury that "the owner of a 
dog is negligent if the owner knew or should have known of the dog's dangerous tendencies. Similarly, 
the custodian of a dog is also negligent for injuries caused if such custodian knew or should have known 
of the dog's dangerous tendencies." These are not accurate statements of the law. Had the district court 
replaced "negligent" with "liable," the instruction would have been an accurate statement of the law.  
 
Instead, the instruction misled the jury to consider negligence in a strict liability analysis. 
Moreover, the special verdict form only included negligence causes of action. Accordingly, the district 
court erred in instructing the jury by effectively reducing the Boswells' claims to negligence causes of 
action. While the Court in Boswell was justifiably hesitant to use the description "strict liability," as liability 
for domestic animals’ claims had never before been classified as such in Idaho, for purposes of 
clarification the district court is instructed that the elements of liability for domestic animals set forth in 
Boswell amount to strict liability. 
 
Turning to statutory strict liability, the Boswells argue Pocatello Municipal Code §§ 6.04.010 and 
6.04.050 create a private cause of action that imposes statutory strict liability on the owner of a vicious 
animal behind an unprovoked attack. Pocatello Municipal Code § 6.04.050(E) provides: "An adult 




any person or by animal caused by an unprovoked attack by any dangerous animal . . .."The district court 
instructed the jury on this code section, but further instructed that "a violation of the ordinance is 
negligence." This is not an accurate statement of the law because PMC § 6.04.050(E) does not set forth a 
negligence cause of action. The city code does not include any language pertaining to duty, breach of 
care, or the care of a reasonable person. Rather, it sets forth a statutory strict liability cause of action. The 
instruction was therefore improper. Moreover, the special verdict form only included questions pertaining 
to negligence. The district court erred by reducing the strict liability established in the city code to 






The district court erred in instructing the jury on negligence causes of action and only including 
negligence on the special verdict form because the Boswells were permitted to pursue both common law 
strict liability and statutory strict liability causes of action. 
… 
 
Judge Pro Tem WALTERS, SPECIALLY CONCURRING 
 
I concur in the result because the district court erred in giving to the jury instructions relating to 
causes of action predicated on theories of negligence when the plaintiffs had withdrawn their claims 
asserting liability based on alleged negligence. However, I am not convinced that causes of action for 
damage resulting from a domestic dog bite under the circumstances of this case needs to be 
characterized as a form of strict liability or that provocation by the plaintiff should be measured as a form 
of comparative fault. Consistent with the recently adopted legislative directive in Idaho Code § 25 
2810(10) and the City of Pocatello Municipal Code § 6.04.050(E), provocation by the plaintiff, if found by 




(1)  In Kunz, what is the basis for liability? How is it similar to the form of liability in Boswell? How 
does the evaluation of the quality of the defendant's conduct in those cases differ from that in White, 
Athay, Stevens, and Van Vranken? Does either line of cases involves strict liability? 
 
Why should a defendant who has acted with care be held liable for the unintended consequences 
of her actions? There are various rationales for tort liability -- retribution, compensation, risk-spreading, 
deterrence, or administrative concerns. Which of the of these offer(s) the most support for the imposition 
of strict liability? 
 
(2)  In Kunz, what type of risk-imposing conduct is involved? Does the risk involved differ from that 
involved in a negligence case? If so, how would you characterize each type of risk? Consider 
Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
 
§ 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to 
be considered: 
 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of 
others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 
        (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 
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How does the Restatement characterize the risk? Note that factors (a) and (b) relate to the 
magnitude of the risk and factor (c) suggests that greater care is not a factor in prevention of the accident. 
Factors (d)-(f) are less easily characterized. For example, the combination of factors (a}{c) with factors 
(d)and (e)suggest a reciprocity criterion: liability is appropriate when the actor imposes a nonreciprocal 
risk. Alternatively, factors (d}{f) can be viewed as concerned with the cost of reducing the risk. Under this -
an economic deterrence perspective- the coupling of an expected large loss and the inability to prevented 
that loss through the exercise of greater care suggest that a reduction in activity levels is appropriate, i.e., 
the activity ought to be deterred. Finally, factors (a) and (b) when coupled with factors (d} {f) suggest that, 
because of the unusual nature of the risk, it seems appropriate to spread the risk to those who benefit 
from risk imposed by the service or product. 
Restatement (Third) has modified the strict liability provisions: 
 
§ 20. Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
(a) An actor who carries on abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict liability for 
physical harm resulting from the activity. 
(b) An activity is abnormally dangerous if: 
                       (1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of 
physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and 
(2) the activity is not one of common usage. 
 
Would a single, non-recurring act be subject to liability under the terms of § 20? 
 
(3)  Rylands v. Fletcher in Idaho: In Burt v. Fanners 'Cooperative Irrigation Co., 30 Idaho 752, 186 
P. 1078 (1917), the court noted: 
 
Under the common Jaw one who diverted water from its natural course did so at his peril and was 
held practically to be an insurer against damage which might result from such action. Fletcher v. 
Rylands, L.R. 1Exch. 265, atrd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330; []. The common law has been modified and 
relaxed in this and other arid states, so that the owner of an irrigation ditch is only liable for 
damages occurring to others as a result of his negligence or unskillfulness in constructing, 
maintaining or operating the ditch. McCarty v. Boise City Canal Co., 2 Idaho 225,245, 10 P. 623 
{1886); Stuart v. Noble Ditch Co., 9 Idaho 765, 76 P. 255 (1904); []. It would be quite within the 
power of the legislature to restore the rule of the common law and render the owner liable for any 
damages resulting from the escapement of water which he brings upon his land by artificial 
means. 
 
The plaintiff in Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation District, 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80 {1976), 
argued that the irrigation district should be held strictly liable under the principles of Rylands v. Fletcher 
when water escaped from its canal and damaged plaintiffs land. The trial court rejected the argument and 
refused to so charge the jury. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff on other 
grounds. 
 
       Should Rylands v. Fletcher apply to such situations in Idaho? Would it under the standards set out in 
Restatement (Second)? in Restatement (Third)? 
 
(4)  Strict liability and blasting: A traditional area of strict liability applies to blasting. No case has 
adopted strict liability explicitly but consider the following cases: if the standard of care is high enough, the 
difference between negligence and strict liability can be vanishingly small. 
 
(a) Miller v. Gooding Highway District Plaintiff-- who was nine years old -was injured when he 
crawled through a window in defendants’ storage shed, where he and a friend found a tin can containing 
dynamite caps. Plaintiff was seriously injured when one of the caps exploded as he was playing with it. At 
the end of plaintiff’s case, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a nonsuit. The supreme court 





       Liability may be incurred for injuries to a child of tender years by having or leaving dangerous 
instrumentalities, such as high explosives, upon premises or elsewhere where they are 
accessible to children [], although there might be no liability with reference to an adult or a child of 
years of discretion, under like circumstances. [) A child without discretion, although a trespasser, 
occupies a legal attitude similar to that of an adult who is not a trespasser. [] In such 
circumstances, care and caution must be exercised by the owner or person in charge of such 
high explosives to prevent children of tender years obtaining possession of such dangerous 
instrumentality. It by no means follows that a property owner is an insurer of the safety of children 
who come upon his premises. The degree of care required of persons having the possession and 
control of dangerous explosives, such as dynamite caps, must be commensurate with the 
dangerous character of the article and is greater and more exacting as respects young children. 
As to such, the care required to be exercised is measured by the maturity and capacity of the 
child. What would constitute reasonable care with respect to adults might be gross negligence as 
applied to young children. [] Whether, under all of the facts and circumstances as are disclosed 
by appellants' testimony, respondent was negligent in its duty to take such precautions as a 
reasonably prudent person would have taken under like circumstances is a question of fact for 
the jury.... 
Miller v. Gooding Highway District, 55 Idaho 258,41 P.2d 625 (1935). 
 
Given the flexibility of the negligence standard, what purpose is served by having a separate 
theory of recovery in strict liability? 
 
(b) Lundahl v. City of Idaho Falls: The city entered into contract with Coleman Plumbing & 
Heating Company to construct a sewer line through an alley behind plaintiff's parcel. Plaintiff brought an 
action alleging that defendants "negligently, recklessly and carelessly, exploded large quantities of 
explosives .... approximately eight feet from ... [plaintiff's] garage" which "produced great and violent 
concussions and vibrations of the earth and air which ... caused great injury to the lava substrata ... and 
building by cracking and breaking same and causing great injury to the foundation of said building and 
whole superstructure, including its walls, windows, ceilings and chimneys, and rendered the same unsafe 
and uninhabitable." Plaintiff appealed dismissal of his claim. 
 
In the supreme court, the city argued that it could not be held liable because the company 
engaged in the blasting was an independent contractor. The court disagreed: 
 
Blasting in a populated area and in the vicinity of buildings is dangerous and hazardous and if not 
done with adequate and proper precautions and by proper means 
and methods, becomes a nuisance. [] The allegations in the amended complaint are that the 
blasting was being done in such a negligent manner as to create a nuisance and that the 
respondent, through its proper officers, was notified of such condition and refused to remedy the 
same. Under such conditions, the city cannot escape liability because the work was being done 
by an independent contractor. 
Lundahl v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 338, 303 P.2d 667 (1956). 
 
What standard was used to evaluate the city's actions? Recklessness? Negligence? Strict 
liability? Part of the difficulty in answering results from the fact that neither the plaintiff nor the court is 
clear. Plaintiff alleged recklessness and negligence. The court arguably went further, stating that blasting 
"in a populated area" is "dangerous and hazardous" and is a "nuisance." Nuisance is a term that 
describes a result- it can be either an invasion of the interest in the use and enjoyment of real property or 
it can describe quasi-criminal activities that are contrary to the public health, safety or morals. For our 
purpose, a nuisance can be a result of careful actions, i.e., it can be strict liability. 
 
(5)  Strict liability and animals: Another traditional area of strict liability applies to animals. Thus, the 
owner of an animal with known propensity for harm is strictly liable for that harm. Propensity for harm is 
generally assumed when the animal is wild, e.g., a lion. 
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The propensity-for-harm requirement is the source of the common misconception that every dog 
is entitled to one free bite. While it is true that the owner of a dog that has bitten someone is on notice of 
the dog's propensity to cause harm, the converse is not necessarily true. For example, the owner of a dog 
whose breed is known to be dangerous, e.g., a pit bull, has similar notice. For an interesting- and 
somewhat confused- case involving injuries to a jockey when a greyhound dog decided to join a horse 
race, see McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909). 
 
Domestic animals such as cattle have a well-recognized tendency to wander and the owner of 
cattle will generally be strictly liable for damages they cause. Liability for wandering cattle is now 
generally covered by statute. I.C. §§ 2 2118, -2119, -2408. See Griffith v. Schmidt, 110 Idaho 235, 715 
P.2d 905 (1985); Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181,418 P.2d 278 (1966). 
 
(6)  Less than strict but more than negligence? Plaintiffs decedent was killed when the helicopter he 
was piloting crashed. His employer had been hired by the state to transport state fish and game biologists 
to census game animals in wilderness areas. The crash -which was caused by equipment failure- 
occurred in a steep mountainous canyon. Plaintiffs argued that the state had a duty to decedent given the 
risk to which he was exposed. Chief Judge Walters dissented from the majority's decision that the state 
did not owe any obligation to the employee of an independent contractor, 
 
I dissent as to the portion of the opinion concerning whether a peculiar risk of physical harm 
should have been recognized by the state. I believe this is a factual question which should be 
resolved by a jury. Since a factual question remains to be decided, I would vacate the summary 
judgment and remand the case for trial. 
RESTATEMENT [(SECOND)] § 413 comment b explains the concept of peculiar risk as follows: 
This Section is concerned with special risks, peculiar to the work to be done, and arising out of its 
character, or out of the place where it is to be done, against which a reasonable man would 
recognize the necessity of taking special precautions. The situation is one in which a risk is 
created which is not a normal, routine matter of customary human activity, such as driving an 
automobile, but is rather a special danger to those in the vicinity, arising out of the particular 
situation created, and calling for special precautions. "Peculiar" does not mean that the risk must 
be one which is abnormal to the type of work to be done, or that it must be an abnormally great 
risk. It has reference only to a special, recognizable danger arising out of the work itself. 
[Emphasis added.] 
 
My reading of the RESTATEMENT leads me to believe that "peculiar" risks are risks which fit 
somewhere in a continuum between "normal" risks (e.g., driving an automobile) and "abnormal" risks 
(e.g., blasting explosives in a city, dropping an object from an aircraft). The RESTATEMENT takes the 
position that some risks are so common that they are normal as a matter of law. The RESTATEMENT 
also takes the position that the question of whether an activity presents abnormally dangerous risks is a 
legal question. RESTATEMENT §520, comment 1. While the RESTATEMENT§ 520A lists risks to 
persons or property on the ground from falling aircraft as being abnormally dangerous, the Restatement 
specifically says that the risks to the crew of an aircraft from the aircraft's falling are not abnormally 
dangerous. RESTATEMENT § 520A, comment e. 
 
The RESTATEMENT does not take a position on the question of whether peculiar risk 
determinations are legal or factual. There is a split of authority on this issue.... 
 
.... The risks to a helicopter pilot associated with flying over flat, sparsely populated land in good 
weather might be "normal." On the other hand, the risks to a helicopter pilot associated with flying over 
mountainous, forested, and uninhabited land are markedly greater and might be "peculiar." By changing 
the facts slightly, by focusing on the risks to persons on the ground instead of the pilot, the risks become 
"abnormally dangerous." RESTATEMENT § 520A, comment e. While the facts of this case make it clear 
that the pilot did not face abnormally dangerous risks, I cannot say whether the risks he faced were on 
the side of the line demarcating normal from peculiar risks. I believe this is a determination better suited 






"Abnormally dangerous" risks subject the actor to strict liability. What is the effect of finding that 
the risk is "peculiar"? 
 
(7)  In connection with the problem of "animals or wagons," consider Benjamin Cardozo's analysis of 
the process of judging: 
Let me assume a case where authority is silent. You, gentlemen, or as many of you 
as may be lucky enough to receive a retainer, are the lawyers. I am the distracted judge. 
You have ransacked the digests, the cyclopedias, the treatises, the law reviews. The 
decision on all fours which counsel love to produce with a latent note of triumph, cowing 
with authority the skeptic on the bench, this buried treasure of the law books, refuses to 
come forth. The vigils and the quest yield at most a few remote analogies, which can be 
turned as easily to the service of one side as to the service of the other. What are you 
going to do to persuade? What am I going to do to decide? Perhaps we shall, neither of 
us, be fully conscious of the implications of the process. Much that goes on in the mind is 
subconscious or nearly so. But if, when the task is finished, we ask ourselves what we 
have done, we shall find, if we are frank in the answer, that with such equipment as we 
have, we have been playing the philosopher. 
 
      We had in my court a year ago a case that points my meaning. [Hynes v. N.Y. Central 
R.R.,231 N.Y.229.] A boy was bathing in a river. He climbed upon a spring board which projected 
from a bank. As he stood there, at the end of the board, poised for his dive into the stream, 
electric wires fell upon him, and swept him to his death below. In the suit for damages that 
followed, competitive analogies were invoked by counsel for the administratrix and counsel for the 
railroad company, the owner of the upland. The administratrix found the analogy that suited her in 
the position of travelers on a highway. The boy was a bather in navigable waters; his rights were 
not lessened because his feet were on the board. The owner found the analogy to its liking in the 
position of a trespasser on land. The springboard, though it projected into the water, was, none 
the less, a fixture, and as a fixture it was annexed. The boy was thus a trespasser upon land in 
private ownership; the only duty of the owner was to refrain from wanton and malicious injury; if 
these elements were lacking, the death must go without requital. Now, the truth is that, as a mere 
bit of dialectics, these analogies would bring a judge to an impasse. No process of mere logical 
deduction could determine the choice between them. Neither analogy is precise, though each is 
apposite. There had arisen a new situation which could not force itself without mutilation into any 
of the existing molds. When we find a situation of this kind, the choice that will approve itself to 
this judge or to that, will be determined largely by his conception of the end of the law, the 
function of legal liability; and this question of ends and functions is a question of philosophy. 
 
      In the case that I have instanced, a majority of the court believe that liability should be 
adjudged. The deductions that might have been made from published definitions were 
subordinated and adapted to the fundamental principles that determine, or ought to determine, 
liability for conduct in a system of law wherein liability is adjusted to the ends which law should 
serve. Hynes v. The New York Central Rail Road Co., was decided in May, 1921. Dean Pound's 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Law had not yet been published. It appeared in 1922. In these 
lectures, he advances a theory of liability which it may be interesting to compare with the theory 
of liability reflected in our decision. ''The law," he says, "enforces the reasonable expectations 
arising out of conduct, relations and situations." I shall leave it to others to say whether the cause 
of the boy diving from the springboard would be helped or hindered by resort to such a test. This 
much I cannot doubt. Some theory of liability, some philosophy of the end to be served by 
tightening or enlarging the circle of rights and remedies, is at the root of any decision in novel 
situations when analogies are equivocal, and precedents are silent. As it stands today, the judge 
is often left to improvise such a theory, such a philosophy, when confronted overnight by the 
exigencies of the case before him. Often, he fumbles about feeling in a vague way that some 
such problem is involved, but missing the universal element which would have quickened his 
decision with the inspiration of a principle. If he lacks an adequate philosophy, he either goes 
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astray altogether, or at best does not rise above the empiricism that pronounces judgment upon 
particulars.... 
 





[F] PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
 
 
MASSEY V. CONAGRA FOODS, INC.  
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
156 Idaho 476, (2014) 
 
J. JONES, J.- This appeal arises out of a products liability case. In early June of 2007, Karrin Massey 
consumed at least one, but perhaps several, poultry pot pies that were manufactured by ConAgra Food, 
Inc. and sold under the Banquet brand name. Soon after, Karrin, who was six months pregnant at the 
time, developed salmonellosis. After an outbreak of salmonella was linked to Banquet pot pies, it was 
discovered that Karrin's strain of salmonella matched the strain of salmonella found in the contaminated 
pot pies. Karrin, her husband, Mark Massey, and their daughter Emma filed suit against ConAgra, 
alleging claims of product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. The district court eventually 
granted ConAgra's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Masseys had failed to establish 
the pot pies in question were defective. The Masseys filed a motion for reconsideration, which was 
denied. The Masseys then appealed to this Court. 
 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In early May of 2007, the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") identified a salmonella outbreak in 
several states, including Idaho. After an extensive investigation, the most likely source of the outbreak 
was identified as pot pie filling that was manufactured by ConAgra and marketed as part of the Banquet 
brand. 
 
Appellant Karrin Massey had long enjoyed pot pies as part of her diet. In the first part of June 
2007, Ms. Massey consumed one or more Banquet pot pies. Ms. Massey does not remember if she 
cooked the pot pies in the oven or in the microwave. She testified that she usually—but not always—
cooked them in the oven, and that she "always followed [cooking] time instructions." During the first week 
of June, Ms. Massey began to experience diarrheal symptoms and was hospitalized twice due to 
dehydration. On June 10, 2007, a stool sample was cultured for salmonella. The sample tested positive, 
and Ms. Massey was hospitalized on June 13 for treatment. On June 14, the Idaho Department of Health 
and Welfare ("IDHW") interviewed her in hopes of determining a possible source of her infection. At this 
time, Ms. Massey was approximately six months pregnant with her daughter, Emma. Because she was 
pregnant, Ms. Massey declined to take certain medications that may have been more effective in treating 
salmonellosis but could have harmed her unborn child. Emma Grace Massey was born on October 3, 
2007. On appeal, the Masseys do not delve into how Emma was injured, although ConAgra notes that 
Emma's birth itself was without complications. 
 
Ms. Massey was treated for salmonellosis until approximately September 4, 2007, at which time 
three consecutive stool samples tested negative for the presence of salmonella. Ms. Massey's particular 
strain of bacteria was later identified as salmonella enterica, serovar 4,5,12: i:-monophasic. 
 
According to the Masseys, near the end of 2007, CDC investigators collected samples of pot pie 
crust and filling at ConAgra's plant, which were found to contain salmonella enterica, serovar 4,5,12: i:-, 
the same strain present in Ms. Massey's stool sample. ConAgra disputes this, stating that in fact, "no 
salmonella was ever found within ConAgra's pot pie facility." In any event, salmonella enterica, serovar 
4,5,12:i:-, the same strain present in Ms. Massey's stool sample, was later found in Banquet pot pies 
sampled from a Boise store. 
 
Ms. Massey and her husband Mark filed a complaint on April 2, 2010, individually and on behalf 
of their daughter Emma. Therein, they alleged claims based on product liability, breach of warranty, and 
negligence. On March 21, 2012, ConAgra moved for summary judgment, alleging that the Masseys' 
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claims were barred because of the statute of limitations and that the Masseys could not establish that the 
pot pies in question were defective. The district court, upon request, granted the Masseys a continuance 
so that they could depose Dr. Leslie Tengelsen, an Idaho State Deputy Epidemiologist. Shortly after Dr. 
Tengelsen's deposition was taken, ConAgra filed a renewed motion for summary judgment. The district 
court held a hearing on ConAgra's renewed motion on June 4, 2012. In its resulting July 3, 2012 order 
("Summary Judgment Order"), the district court found in ConAgra's favor, holding that the Masseys had 
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether a product defect existed. The 
Masseys filed a timely motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court misunderstood the main 
issue of the case and misconstrued certain facts. The district court entered an order denying the 




ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
I. Whether the district court erred in determining that the Masseys failed to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact that the pot pies were defective? 
 
II. Whether the district court erred in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the 
Masseys' negligence claim? 
 
III. Whether the Masseys waived their right to challenge the district court's denial of their motion to 
reconsider? 
 
IV. Whether the district court erred in sua sponte concluding that the Masseys' failure to warn claim was 






A. Standard of review. 
 
The applicable standard of review is well-settled: 
 
"Appellate review of a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the same as that 
required of the district judge when ruling on the motion." Steele v. Spokesman Review, 138 Idaho 
249, 251, 61 P.3d 606, 608 (2002). Under I.R.C.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when 
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court must "liberally construe . . . the record in 
favor of the party opposing the motion and draw . . . all reasonable inferences and conclusions in 
that party's favor." Steele, 138 Idaho at 251, 61 P.3d at 608. Summary judgment is not 
appropriate "[i]f the evidence is conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach 
different conclusions." Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998). 
Liberty Northwest Ins. Co. v. Spudnik Equip. Co., LLC, 155 Idaho 730, 732-33, 316 P.3d 646, 648-49 
(2013). 
 
Additionally, this Court has recently clarified the standard of review utilized in reviewing a district 
court's denial of a motion to reconsider. "[W]hen the district court grants summary judgment and then 
denies a motion for reconsideration, 'this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a 
genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.' This means the Court reviews the district 
court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration de novo." Bremer, LLC v. E. Greenacres Irrigation Dist., 155 
Idaho 736, 744, 316 P.3d 652, 660 (2013) (quoting Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 





B. The district court erred in determining that the Masseys failed to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact that the pot pies were defective. 
 
In their complaint, the Masseys put forth three claims: products liability, negligence, and breach of 
warranty. In order "[t]o establish a prima facie case in a products liability action, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving that 1) he was injured by the product; 2) the injury was the result of a defective or 
unsafe product; and 3) the defect existed when the product left the control of the manufacturer.'" Liberty, 
155 Idaho at 733, 316 P.3d at 649 (quoting Farmer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 746-47, 553 P.2d 
1306, 1310-11 (1976)). The district court granted summary judgment on the grounds that the Masseys did 
not show that a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to whether the pot pies were defective. 
In its Summary Judgment Order, the district court determined that "[a] pot pie contaminated with 
salmonella is not defective because salmonella in an uncooked or under cooked product is not 
considered an adulterant." The district court explained that "[e]ven assuming that a pot pie eaten by 
Massey was contaminated by salmonella, the deposition testimony of Dr. Tengelsen clearly fails to 
establish that a pot pie contaminated with salmonella is defective." The district court also concluded that a 
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) investigation and its "conclusions drawn therefrom does not 
determine that any of the pot pies were adulterated, and therefore, defective." 
 
The Masseys argue that Karrin's affidavit established a defect under Idaho law, that Dr. 
Tengelsen's testimony did the same, and that the district court erred in its analysis of certain nonbinding 
case law. ConAgra disputes all of these assertions and adds that the district court did not err in failing to 
find evidence of a defect based on USDA guidelines. 
 
"[T]he term 'defect' is not susceptible of a general definition but must be considered on a case by 
case basis." Farmer, 97 Idaho at 747, 553 P.2d at 1311. In defining what constitutes a defect, this Court 
has favorably quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (comment g 1965) as follows: "Defective 
condition. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's 
hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous 
to him." Id. Comment i to § 402A defines "unreasonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond 
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary 
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Id. This Court has also quoted Prosser on 
Torts for the proposition that "'the prevailing interpretation of "defective" is that the product does not meet 
the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety.'" Id. (citing Prosser, Torts, § 99, p. 
659 (4th ed. 1971)). A defect can be shown either by direct evidence, or by circumstantial evidence. Id. "A 
circumstantial evidence showing under the Farmer case [requires] proof of: (1) the malfunction of the 
product; (2) the lack of evidence of abnormal use; and (3) proof excluding the possibility of other 
'reasonable causes.'" Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329, 332, 848 P.2d 387, 390 (1992). 
 
When circumstantial evidence is presented, it is the trier of fact who "is invited to infer the 
existence of a defect." Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 
1986). Furthermore, the defect may be established solely based upon the "[t]estimony of the user [or] 
operator of the product as to the circumstances of the event." Farmer, 97 Idaho at 748, 553 P.2d at 1312. 
This Court has explicitly refused to require a plaintiff to proffer expert testimony as part of its prima facie 
products liability case, stating: "[t]hough it is no doubt true that a plaintiff may bolster his or her case 
considerably through the use of expert testimony, we nevertheless decline to require such expert 
testimony for the establishment of a plaintiff's prima facie case." Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 107 
Idaho 701, 704, 692 P.2d 345, 348 (1984). 
 
The district court erred in its analysis of what constitutes a product defect under Idaho law. 
Specifically, it was error to equate "defective" with "adulterated." The origin and rationale behind using 
these terms interchangeably is unclear, although it was the Masseys who first made mention of the term 
in their complaint. "Adulterated" is a defined term under Chapter 10 of 21 U.S.C. § 453, a federal statute. 
21 U.S.C. § 453. Generally, Chapter 10 discusses "Poultry and Poultry Products Inspection." Id. No link 
exists between a defined term in a federal statute and what constitutes a product defect under Idaho law; 
thus, the district court's erroneous assumption to the contrary was in error. 
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Instead of determining that a pot pie must be "adulterated" to be defective, the district court 
should have looked to existing case law to determine what constitutes a product defect in Idaho. Under 
Farmer, a defect can be established solely based on the testimony of the user. Here, Karrin testified that 
(1) she ate at least one and possibly several Banquet brand pot pies during the last part of May and the 
first part of June; (2) despite not remembering whether she cooked those pot pies in the microwave or 
oven, she "always followed time instructions" on the box; (3) she was diagnosed with salmonellosis on 
June 13, 2007; and (4) her particular strain of salmonella was later found in Banquet brand pot pies. As 
for whether there was proof of the lack of evidence of abnormal use and the lack of other reasonable 
causes—which again is required under Farmer when making a showing of circumstantial evidence—
those are questions best answered by a jury, since it is the trier of fact who "is invited to infer the 
existence of a defect." In this case, the Masseys requested a jury trial. Based on Karrin's testimony alone, 
a jury could reasonably conclude that a pot pie cooked according to the instructions that nonetheless 
retains salmonella bacteria is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary consumer," "does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its 
safety," and is therefore defective. 
 
Because the district court erred in its analysis of what constitutes a product defect under Idaho 
law, and because a jury could reasonably conclude that Karrin's testimony sufficiently demonstrated 
product defect, we vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
 
C. The district court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of negligence. 
 
The district court also granted summary judgment on the Masseys' negligence claim, again 
because of a failure to show product defect. On appeal, the Masseys seem to be arguing that because 
the Idaho pattern jury instruction for negligence does not make mention of the term "defect," a negligence 
claim does not require that element. 
Regardless of whether a products liability case "is based on warranty, negligence or strict 
products liability, plaintiff has the burden of alleging and proving that 1) he was injured by the product; 2) 
the injury was the result of a defective or unsafe product; and 3) the defect existed when the product left 
the control of the manufacturer." Farmer, 97 Idaho at 746-47, 553 P.2d at 1310-11. Thus, product defect 
is a necessary element in a products liability case that is based on negligence. 
Because we hold that the district court erred in its product defect analysis, the Masseys' 






We vacate the judgment and award costs to the Masseys 
 
 
MAJOR V. SEC. EQUIP. CORP.  
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
155 Idaho 199, 307 P.3d 1225 (2013) 
 
BURDICK, C.J.,- This appeal arises from the Ada County district court's decisions regarding a products 
liability claim between Billie Jo Major and Security Equipment Corporation (SEC). Major brought an action 
against SEC alleging that the company failed to provide adequate warning to her employer, the Idaho 
Department of Corrections (IDOC), on the risks of its oleoresin capsicum (OC) pepper spray. Major 
alleged that the use of the spray in a training exercise worsened existing bronchial difficulties and caused 
her permanent injury. On July 19, 2011, the district court granted partial summary judgment to SEC on 
the grounds that Major failed to create a material issue of fact on whether her injuries were a known or 
foreseeable risk prior to March 2008, the date of sale to IDOC. In a motion to reconsider, Major submitted 
a second affidavit from her expert, Dr. Yost, which was declared a sham affidavit by the district court in its 




issue, the viability of Major's claim under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA). We vacate the 




FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Billie Jo Major was employed by IDOC beginning in July 2004. Major was assigned to the Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution from July 2004 to July 2006 and from August 2007 to March 2008. She 
worked at the South Boise Women's Correctional Facility in the interim. According to Major, she suffered 
periodic bouts of respiratory illness before and during her employment at IDOC. While employed at IDOC, 
Major participated in several training exercises that involved exposure to pepper spray. 
 
Pertinent to this action is the training that occurred on March 3, 2008, where Major was exposed 
to spray from SEC's MK-9 Fogger pepper spray. The MK-9 Fogger produces a widely dispersed aerosol 
designed to irritate and inflame the respiratory tract. During the training, bursts of pepper spray were 
sprayed into a jail cell before trainees would enter to experience the effects of the aerosol. The training 
lasted approximately two and a half hours. Major alleges that when the training took place she was on 
light duty and suffering from bronchitis. After the training, Major states that her respiratory problems 
worsened, and she developed a chronic cough. According to Major, her health issues prevented her from 
working, caring for herself, or engaging in other activities. 
 
Major filed a complaint against SEC on February 24, 2010, that contained three causes of action. 
Major alleged that: (1) the MK-9 Fogger spray was unreasonably dangerous, the proximate cause of her 
injuries, and SEC was subject to strict product liability; (2) that the spray's labeling did not provide 
adequate warnings or instructions for safe use and; (3) SEC breached express warranties to the 
consumer. 
 
On April 22, 2011, SEC filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Major would be 
unable to present evidence that SEC knew or should have known of the pepper spray's dangers. Major 
filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on June 10, 2011. Major's cross motion contained an 
affidavit from Dr. Garold Yost, a professor of pharmacology and toxicology. Dr. Yost's affidavit stated that 
SEC's pepper spray caused Major "to suffer acute adverse health responses and greatly exacerbated her 
underlying respiratory diseases." SEC filed a motion to strike portions of Dr. Yost's affidavit, which was 
heard with the cross motions for summary judgment in a hearing on July 14, 2011. 
 
After hearing argument on the motions, the district court issued its Order Re: Pending Motions for 
Summary Judgment and to Strike Affidavit of Garold Yost. In it, the district court granted SEC's motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that Major failed to show a genuine issue of fact regarding chronic 
injury that resulted from exposure to the pepper spray. The district court also denied Major's cross motion 
for summary judgment and SEC's motion to strike Dr. Yost's affidavit. The district court did not decide the 
issue of whether Major has any viable claim under the FHSA. 
 
SEC filed its second motion for summary judgment for the FHSA issue on July 22, 2011. On July 
26, 2011, Major filed a motion and memorandum for reconsideration of the district court's summary 
judgment order. The motion was supported by a second affidavit of Dr. Yost. In response, SEC filed a 
motion to strike portions of Dr. Yost's second affidavit on the grounds that it directly contradicts the 
doctor's deposition testimony without explanation. A hearing on these three motions was heard on 
September 15, 2011. After hearing argument from the parties, the district court granted SEC's second 
motion for summary judgment and its motion to strike Dr. Yost's second affidavit and denied Major's 
motion for reconsideration. The district court struck Dr. Yost's second affidavit on the grounds that the 
second affidavit contradicted the expert's deposition testimony without explanation and denied the motion 
for reconsideration because it was based on this affidavit. 
 
SEC filed a motion for clarification on September 20, 2011, to determine whether any of Major's 
issues survived the two grants of summary judgment. Specifically, SEC sought clarity on whether a claim 
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for Major's acute injuries had survived. The district court treated this as a motion for summary judgment. 
On October 4, 2011, Major filed a second motion for reconsideration on the issue of whether a material 
issue of fact exists as to the foreseeability of acute injury. Argument on these motions was heard on 
October 17, 2011. The district court concluded that the undisputed facts in the record led to only one 
conclusion, that the pepper spray's warning label provided an adequate notice to Major regarding the 
acute effects of the spray. On these grounds, the district court granted summary judgment to SEC and 
denied Major's second motion for reconsideration. A final judgment pursuant to these orders was issued 
on October 20, 2011. Major filed a third motion for reconsideration accompanied by a third affidavit from 
Dr. Yost, which was denied by the district court. Major timely filed a notice of appeal with this Court on 
November 23, 2011. 
 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
    1. Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment to SEC. 
 
    2. Whether the district court erred by striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit as a sham affidavit. 
 
    3. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court is 
the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is 
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should be construed in 
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. 
Fuller v. Callister, 150 Idaho 848, 851, 252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011) (quoting Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 
Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209, 213 (2010)). "However, the nonmoving party cannot rely on mere 
speculation, and a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact." Bollinger 





A. The district court erred by granting summary judgment to SEC. 
 
On appeal, Major argues that the district court erred when it granted SEC's first motion for 
summary judgment on her failure to warn claim. Specifically, Major argues that the affidavits from Dr. Yost 
presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether SEC knew or should have known that the MK-9 
Fogger pepper spray posed a danger of causing the kind of respiratory injury alleged by Major. SEC 
argues that Dr. Yost's first affidavit did not create a genuine issue of material fact because it "focused 
more on causation of injury, rather than foreseeability of risk, and on an acute injury which Major did not 
have, instead of the chronic injury that is the basis for her claim for damages." 
 
Failure to warn can be a basis for recovery in a products liability action, whether alleged under a 
theory of strict liability in tort or negligence. A product is defective if the defendant has reason to 
anticipate that danger may result from a particular use of his product and fails to give adequate 
warnings of such danger. 
Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 823, 979 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1999) (internal quotations omitted). 
"As is well established, a [**1229]   [*203]  supplier has no duty to warn where the use made of a product 
was not known or reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer or seller. The factual question of 




1267, 1273 (1986) (internal citations omitted). "While sellers need not be clairvoyant, they are held to the 
knowledge and experience of experts in their fields. Knowledge of the product's risks based on reliable 
and obtainable information is imputed to the seller." Toner v. Lederle Lab., 112 Idaho 328, 338, 732 P.2d 
297, 307 (1987) (internal citations omitted). 
 
In its decision, the district court found that Major failed to present evidence that her alleged 
injuries were foreseeable: 
 
Mr. Yost in response to the questions in the deposition . . . clearly indicates that he cannot point 
to any existing studies that would have put Security Equipment Corporation on notice that . . . it was a 
foreseeable danger to people using this product. 
 
SEC argues on appeal that Dr. Yost's conclusions are unsupported by the state of scientific 
knowledge in 2008. Based in part on the lack of supporting evidence, the district court concluded that 
Major failed to meet her burden: 
 
In other words, . . . this affidavit does not clearly tee up the issue of — does not create a material 
dispute of fact because there is not a direct dispute between Dr. Reilly other than for him to say I don't 
agree with him. But he doesn't come back and say that it's undisputed or that there are these studies or 
something that says there is this risk of chronic disease as a result to the exposure. 
 
On appeal, the pertinent analysis is whether Dr. Yost's affidavits and deposition create a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the foreseeability of chronic injury. 
 
1. Dr. Yost's first affidavit and deposition testimony. 
 
In his first affidavit, Dr. Yost concluded that in his expert opinion, within a reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty, SEC's pepper spray caused Major "to suffer acute adverse health responses and 
greatly exacerbated her underlying respiratory diseases." 
 
This opinion was based in part on the following excerpts from the affidavit: 
 
    4. According to the records and other documents I reviewed, after the Plaintiff completed the 
March 2008 OC Spray training session, she was not able to return to work due to a severe 
chronic cough and other respiratory related disease. The records also indicated the Plaintiff 
suffered a much milder form of chronic cough prior to the March 2008 training, and it was only 
after the exposure in that training that her condition worsened to the point that she was no longer 
able to work, whether at IDOC or in other similar employment settings. 
 
    5. I have expressed my expert opinions as to the cause of the Plaintiff's acute adverse health 
responses to the OC Spray, and how it greatly exacerbated her underlying respiratory diseases. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of those opinions. 
. . . 
    6. Based on my review of the above cited articles and my education, training, research and 
knowledge of the scientific literature in the relevant area, it is my opinion that the risks to the 
respiratory tract posed by exposure to SEC's SABRE Red law enforcement 10% OC Spray (MK-9 
Fogger) were known and foreseeable risks at the time SEC sold its product to IDOC. 
 
    7. It is known now and it was known prior to 2008 that people with asthma and chronic cough 
are more sensitive to pepper spray then [sic] other people with normal respiratory function. 
People with greater sensitivity to capsaicin would be expected to have increased TRPV1 receptor 
populations. Other important TRP channels exist, and several of them, particularly TRPA1, are 
activated by irritants, such as those that exist in cigarette smoke, and other environmental 
sources. Thus, it is reasonable to expect the multiple TRP channels act in concert with each other 
to result in higher acute respiratory responses to a multitude of respiratory irritants, particularly in 
people with increased sensitivity to pepper sprays. 
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Dr. Yost's first affidavit also contained a list of studies from which his conclusions were drawn. 
SEC argues that although Dr. Yost listed several studies, his affidavit did not cite from or supply copies of 
those studies. 
 
Additionally, SEC argues that Dr. Yost's comments only address acute injury, not the chronic 
injury alleged by Major. Dr. Yost's initial report, which was attached as an exhibit to his affidavit, more 
clearly stated the possibilities of chronic toxicity from OC exposure: 
 
[T]he biological responses to OC products are caused predominately by binding capsaicinoids to 
Transient Receptor Potential (TRP) calcium channels. The population of TRP channels in tissues 
is regulated by multiple exposures, and the number and activities of TRP channels usually 
determine the responses to chronic exposures that lead to sensitization or desensitization from 
multiple exposures in multiple organ systems. One highly characterized toxicity of capsaicinoids 
is the exacerbation of chronic cough, and people with this respiratory disease are up to 30-times 
more sensitive to capsaicin-induced cough. 
 
Given the standard of review of making all reasonable inferences in favor of Major, Dr. Yost's first 
affidavit addresses chronic injury that results from OC exposure. Major's complaint alleged that the 
exposure increased the severity of her pre-existing, chronic respiratory illness. It is thus reasonable to 
infer that Dr. Yost's conclusion that SEC's pepper spray caused Major "to suffer acute adverse health 
responses and greatly exacerbated her underlying respiratory diseases," refers to both an acute and a 
chronic response to the pepper spray. In addition to his first affidavit and deposition, Dr. Yost offered two 
more affidavits into evidence. 
 
2. Dr. Yost's third affidavit. 
 
Although the district court struck Dr. Yost's second affidavit from the record and did not consider it 
below, it took his third affidavit into consideration. The third affidavit was provided in support of Major's 
motion for reconsideration of the district court's order to strike the second affidavit. A significant portion of 
the third affidavit is used to explain any real or perceived inconsistencies between Dr. Yost's prior 
affidavits and his deposition testimony. But the third affidavit also provides more detailed explanations for 
Dr. Yost's opinion on the pertinent issues: 
 
As I explained in my deposition and in my affidavits, the weight of evidence is that long-term 
chronic adverse health effects can occur from exposure to OC for a certain population under certain 
circumstances. As I have repeatedly said, there is an entire body of research relating to the physiological, 
biological, toxicological, and pharmaceutical effects of capsaicinoids on human tissues. The weight of that 
evidence strongly suggests that exposure to capsaicinoids can cause long-term adverse health effects in 
persons who are already sensitized to capsaicinoids, whether it be because of pre-existing respiratory 
injury or because of prior exposures that up-regulated the TRPV1 receptor. 
 
The affidavit also discusses the state of scientific knowledge in 2008: 
 
The fact that there was [sic] not any definitive studies showing long-term adverse health 
effects does not detract from the reality that, prior to 2008, enough was understood about the 
toxicology of capsaicinoids that it was understood that capsaicinoids are irritants that are toxic to 
sensory neurons under certain circumstances.  . . . [I]t was understood that biological changes 
occurring within human and animal tissues can be of short duration, long duration, or even 
permanent. 
 
These statements are supplemented through citations to studies and are used to support Dr. Yost's 
ultimate conclusion that: 
the scientific literature and studies in existence prior to 2008 [were] such that when 




as SEC's MK-9 Fogger posed a risk of both acute and chronic respiratory injury such as that 
described in Ms. Major's medical records. 
 
When all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are construed in favor of 
Major, Dr. Yost's first affidavit, deposition, and third affidavit create a genuine issue of material fact. The 
third affidavit in particular identifies the injuries alleged by Major and the possibility that SEC's pepper 
spray could have caused them. The third affidavit is also supported by—and cites directly from—scientific 
research that was available when SEC sold the MK-9 Fogger to the IDOC. Therefore, Major has 
demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact to survive SEC's first motion for summary judgment. We 
hold that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to SEC on whether the company had a 
duty to warn Major of possible chronic injury. 
 
 
B. The district court erred by striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit as a sham affidavit. 
 
Major also appeals the district court's decision to grant SEC's motion to strike Dr. Yost's second 
affidavit in the September 15, 2011 hearing. The district court based its decision on the finding that Dr. 
Yost's testimony changed, and that the second affidavit still did not create a dispute of material fact. Major 




1. Standard of Review. 
 
"The admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold matter to be addressed before applying the liberal 
construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence creates a genuine issue 
of material fact for trial." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 271, 281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012). "This 
Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when determining whether testimony offered in connection 
with a motion for summary judgment is admissible." Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 
175 P.3d 172, 177 (2007). "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue 
as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) 
reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 
909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). 
 
2. Whether the district court erred by striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit as a sham affidavit. 
 
This Court has never adopted the sham affidavit doctrine. See Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 
Idaho 801, 805, 291 P.3d 1000, 1004 (2012). However, the Court of Appeals has previously stated that 
an affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony may be disregarded as a sham affidavit on a 
summary judgment motion. See In re Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 457, 465 (Ct. App. 
1994). "[A]ll tribunals inferior to the Court of Appeals are obligated to abide by decisions issued by the 
Court of Appeals." State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986, 842 P.2d 660, 665 (1992). Therefore, to the 
extent that the district court was following precedent from the Court of Appeals, the district court did not 
err in striking the affidavit. 
 
In Keeven, the statement of the sham affidavit doctrine is dicta—rather than an adoption of the 
doctrine—since the affidavit in that case was not a sham and the rule did not apply. 126 Idaho at 298, 882 
P.2d at 465. We have previously held that "[t]he issues of credibility should not be resolved at summary 
judgment unless the record is clear that credence cannot be given to the expert's affidavit." Mains v. 
Cach, 143 Idaho 221, 225, 141 P.3d 1090, 1094 (2006). The circumstances in this case are similar to 
those in Mains. In Mains, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against a neurosurgeon, Dr. 
Cach. Id. at 222, 141 P.3d at 1091. Mains alleged that she experienced severe pain following a surgery 
performed by Dr. Cach and offered expert testimony from Dr. Farzad Massoudi in support of her claim. 
Id., at 223, 141 P.3d at 1092. The district court declined to admit Dr. Massoudi's testimony into evidence, 
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having found that his affidavit contradicted testimony he gave in an earlier deposition. Id., at 224, 141 
P.3d at 1093. The district court then granted summary judgment to Dr. Cach. Id. 
 
This Court summed up the main issue on appeal: 
 
The problem with this case is simple. The testimony Massoudi gave in his deposition 
appears to contradict his subsequent affidavit. The testimony appears to say that he did not 
inquire as to the standard of care at the relevant time. The affidavit says that he did. Standing by 
itself, the affidavit would be sufficient to defeat summary judgment. The question is whether the 
affidavit should be disregarded because of Massoudi's prior deposition testimony. 
Id. at 225, 141 P.3d at 1094. This Court then reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on 
the grounds that a reasonable inference could be made showing that Dr. Massoudi's affidavit and 
deposition were consistent: 
 
Certainly, a contrary determination could be made by a trier of fact, but that type of 
weighing of the evidence is not appropriate for summary judgment. It is not clear that Massoudi 
failed to establish the relevant time frame for his opinion. Consequently, summary judgment 
should not have been granted. 
Id. at 226, 141 P.3d at 1095. 
 
Here, the district court struck the affidavit, in part, because several answers provided by Dr. Yost 
in his deposition contradicted the more direct language in the second affidavit. Specifically, the district 
court found that the affidavit unequivocally stated that SEC's pepper spray posed a known risk of both 
acute and chronic respiratory injury, and that Dr. Yost's deposition contained a contradictory statement 
regarding acute injury. When asked whether exposure to OC is generally deemed to cause temporary 
effects, Dr. Yost's deposition states that this is a fair statement. 
 
In this instance and others discussed by SEC, it would appear that the district court conflated the 
term "generally" with the words "always" or "only." Dr. Yost's affirmation that OC generally causes a 
temporary effect does not conflict with the affidavit's statement that the substance has a known risk for 
acute and chronic injury. Similar to Mains, it can be reasonably inferred that Dr. Yost was making very 
fine distinctions that do not contradict as much as they refine and clarify. Though this caused some 
confusion, other examples seem to demonstrate the fine lines involved. SEC points to an exchange 
where Dr. Yost is asked whether any literature has explored the effect of chronic exposure to OC. SEC 
offers this as proof that Dr. Yost's second affidavit contradicts this testimony. However, SEC clearly asked 
about chronic exposure, not chronic injury caused by exposure. 
 
This Court has never adopted the sham affidavit doctrine. We roundly criticized the doctrine in 
Mains because a sham affidavit finding necessarily turns on a credibility finding as well as a finding of bad 
faith. That is beyond the power of the trial courts at the summary judgment phase. 
Although the trial court followed Court of Appeals precedent, it is however an abuse of discretion 
to misinterpret an affidavit or deposition. That is what has happened here. The deposition, first affidavit, 
and third affidavit of Dr. Yost create material issues of fact. The issues of bad faith or unreasonableness 
of litigation can be addressed through I.R.C.P. 56(g) or other attorney fee provisions. 
 
C. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
 
Major and SEC both argue that they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-
121. Under this section a judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a civil 
action. I.C. § 12-121. Because we will only award attorney fees on appeal "when the court is left with the 
abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation," we award neither party attorney fees in this appeal. Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 









We hold that the district court erred in granting SEC's first motion for summary judgment. Further, we hold 
that the district court erred in striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit. We vacate the judgment of the district 
court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We award neither party attorney fees on 






LOUIE v. BAMBOO GARDENS 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
67 Idaho 469, 185 P.2d 712 (1947) 
 
MILLER, J.-This case was submitted to the Industrial Accident Board on a stipulation of the facts as 
agreed to between the parties, and from which, among other things, it is made to appear. 
 
That Tom Louie, claimant and appellant, about 45 years of age, on the 18th day of October 1946, 
and for more than three months prior thereto, was in the employ of the Bamboo Gardens, a restaurant in 
Boise, Idaho, as a dishwasher therein; that he was casually acquainted with one Fook Lee Hong, another 
Chinaman, but that said Hong was not a patron of the Bamboo Gardens, nor a customer thereof in that 
he had never taken his meals thereat and was in nowise interested therein. September 21, 1946, Fook 
Lee Hong and three other Chinese were arrested on a narcotic charge by officials of the United States; 
that during the latter part of September 1946, Hong was fined $50 by the U.S. District Judge, at Boise, 
Idaho, on account of his plea to said charge and thereupon discharged from further custody. Hong was a 
discharged veteran of World War II. After his discharge for the violation of the Narcotic Act, [], he seems 
to have labored under the delusion that it was thought that he had turned "State's evidence," and that 
someone was going to kill him. After his said discharge and prior to October 18, 1946, he stated to an 
Assistant United States District Attorney that members of a tong society to which Tom Louie belonged, 
and to which Hong did not belong were going to import "hatchet men" from Walla Walla, Washington to 
Boise, Idaho to kill him because members of such tong thought he had turned State's evidence against 
his former companions on the narcotic charge; that for several days before October 18, 1946, he was 
more or less in hiding at the American Legion Building in Boise, Idaho, asserting that someone was going 
to kill him. The Prosecuting Attorney of Ada County, Idaho, made an investigation and found there were 
no reasonable grounds for his suspicions that someone was going to kill him, but in his own mind he 
suffered the delusion that an attempt would be made upon his life. 
 
October 18, 1946, at about 5:45 P.M., Tom Louie, claimant and appellant, received an 
injury, during his regular hours, and in the course of his employment, and while he was on duty 
performing the tasks for which he was employed at his employer's place of business, at 107 South 7th 
Street, Boise, Idaho, in that while taking water glasses from the kitchen to the serving table in the dining 
room, Fook Lee Hong entered the restaurant by the front door on 7th Street, carrying a loaded38 caliber 
revolver, which he brandished in a threatening manner, and then shot the same within the restaurant 
three times, one of which shots struck Tom Louie, claimant and appellant, in the upper back region, 
piercing his chest cavity and his lungs.  
 
The employer was notified of such accident and injury sustained by said claimant and appellant, 
during the evening of October 18, 1946, and that a claim inwriting, stating the name, and address of the 
employer, the time, place, nature and cause of the injury, signed by claimant and appellant, was filed with 
the Industrial Accident Board on October 30, 1946; that as the result of the injury sustained, claimant and 
appellant was hospitalized at St. Luke's Hospital at Boise, Idaho, for a period commencing the evening of 
October 18, 1946, and until and including November 9, 1946, and that the hospital and medical charges 
in the sum of $475.55were paid by claimant and appellant; that cla1mant and appellant was under 
medical care at the time of filing the stipulation of facts with the Industrial Accident Board and that at the 
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time he was totally disabled for work and would continue to be so totally disabled for a period of time 
subsequently to be determined; that he was not then surg1cally healed and whether or not he will sustain 
a permanent injury is yet to be determined as well as the degree thereof, if permanent injury results 
therefrom. 
 
On or about October 21, 1946, a criminal complaint was filed against Fook Lee Hong by the 
Prosecuting Attorney of Boise, Idaho, and on October 31, 1946, Hong was held by the Committing 
Magistrate to answer to the District Court for the crime of assaulting Tom Louie with a deadly weapon with 
intent to commit murder. An information was filed in said District Court, November 1, 1946, charging Hong 
with an assault to commit murder. A plea was interposed under I.C.A. Sec. 19-3202, that Fook Lee Hong 
was insane. The issue was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict of insanity and which was duly filed 
and entered in said District Court on November 18, 1946. November 20, 1946, the said District Court 
made and entered its commitment, committing Hong to the State Hospital South at Blackfoot, Idaho, by 
virtue of his having been found insane as aforesaid. 
 
  The Industrial Accident Board considered the stipulated facts and on January 6, 1947, made and 
entered its findings of fact, rules of law and order dismissing appellant's claim. The findings of fact follow 
very closely the stipulation. Finding No. 7, among other things, recites as follows: "The sole issue 
presented is one of law. It is conceded that the accidental injury to claimant Tom Louie arose in the 
course of his employment by the Bamboo Gardens. The precise issue is whether said accidental injury 
arose out of such employment." There is no dispute as to the facts. 
 
We fail to find any evidence that would indicate that Fook Lee Hong, at the time he entered the 
restaurant at which Tom Louie was employed, or at the time he fired the shot resulting in the accidental 
injury of said Tom Louie, was looking for the appellant and had a real or imaginary grievance against him. 
There is no evidence to the effect that at the time Hong entered the restaurant that he knew that Tom 
Louie was employed there or that he would find him therein. In the conversation he had with various 
officials, no mention was ever made of Tom Louie and the only manner in which Tom Louie seems to 
have been connected with his delusion, is that Louie was a member of a tong that Hong asserted was 
going to bring in hatchet men from Walla Walla to kill him. 
 
It may, however, be of no significance as to whether or not said Hong was looking for Tom Louie 
at the time he shot him and had either a real or imaginary grievance against him. The fact remains that it 
was an accidental injury and under the Workmen's Compensation Law, claimant and appellant is entitled 
to receive compensation as a result of said injury. 
 
       The Industrial Accident Board was manifestly of the opinion, which opinion is concurred in and now 
urged by respondents, that it was incumbent upon appellant to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the accident arose out of his employment. It is admitted it occurred during the course of the 
employment.  … 
 
       .... The modern tendency of the decisions, in keeping with the spirit of the law, is to award 
compensation in all cases where a liberal construction of the statute would justify it. Even in view of this 
liberal construction, it is not enough for the applicant to say that the accident would not have happened if 
he had not been engaged in the particular employment or if he had not been at the particular place. He 
must go further and say that the accident arose because of something he was doing in the course of his 
employment and because he was exposed by the nature of his employment to some particular danger. [] 
 
It would seem that the evidence in this case is such as justifies the conclusion that the injury was 
the result of a risk to which appellant was subjected in the course of his employment, and to which he 
would not have been subjected had he not been so employed. Appellant was injured not merely because 
he was a dishwasher in the Bamboo Gardens' restaurant, but because he was an employee within the 
Bamboo Gardens restaurant and engaged in the performance of duties which his employment imposed 
upon him. It was his employment that placed him in the position and environment wherein he was 




attending accidental injury. At the precise time of the injury he was placed and engaged in the business of 
his employer. There is nothing to show that the brandishing of the pistol and the firing thereof was a 
deliberate intention to injure appellant. The intention of the assailant from the record may have been 
limited to "shooting up the place," and that it was a random shot that struck appellant. 
 
There are no provisions under the Workmen's Compensation Laws that prohibit a recovery, 
except Sec. 43-1002, in that compensation shall not be allowed for an injury caused, "By the employee's 
willful intention to injure himself or to injure another; or, 2. By his intoxication." The Workmen's 
Compensation Law, Sec. 43-902, states: 
The common law system governing the remedy of workmen against employers for injuries 
received in industrial and public work is inconsistent with modem industrial conditions.*** The 
state of Idaho, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all 
phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for 
injured workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of 
fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy *** and to that end all civil actions and civil 
causes of action for such personal injuries, and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such 
causes are hereby abolished, except as in this act provided. 
 
The legislature having declared that the common law system is inconsistent with modem 
industrial conditions, and all civil actions and causes for personal injuries, and all jurisdiction of the courts 
over such causes are abolished is the impelling reason for the liberalization of the rules governing the 
common law system. 
 
The order of the board denying compensation constitutes a clear error of Jaw. The order 
is, therefore, vacated and set aside, with directions to conduct such proceedings as may be 
necessary in a further consideration of appellant's claim and to make such findings and award as the 





(1)  What is the basis for liability? How does the evaluation of the quality of the defendant's conduct 
differ from that in White, Athay, Stevens, Van Vranken, and Kunz? 
 
       What is the difference between strict liability and no-fault? If an employer kept a lion that got lose as 
a result of lightning or the act of a third person, would the employer be liable to an individual in strict 
liability? Would the employer be liable to an employee? 
 
(2)  The central trade-off in workers compensation schemes is the preclusion of potential tort liability 
in exchange for modest but guaranteed benefits. The test for liability is not whether there was fault 
involved in the injury but whether it was work-related; it is a matter or marking boundaries, not one of 
assessing blame. The underlying philosophy thus is a belief that is it good or proper to provide efficiently 
for the major financial and medical costs associated with employment-related injuries. The insurance 
premium payments are simply a cost of doing business and, as such, can be planned for and passed 
along to consumers of the products through higher prices. 
 
(3)  Although workers compensation statutes vary from state to state, it is possible to set out typical 
features: 
 
(a) the basic principle is that an employee is entitled to certain benefits whenever the 
employee suffers an injury occurring in the course of employment; 
(b) fault is irrelevant: the employee's fault does not bar or reduce recovery and the 
employer's lack of fault does not lessen liability; 
(c) coverage is limited to certain enumerated classes of employed individuals; 
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(d) employee benefits include cash-wage benefits, hospital and medical expenses, and death and 
survivor benefits; the amount of benefits is set uniformly by legislative or administrative action rather than 
on a case-by-case basis; 
(e) the employee, spouse, and dependents are prohibited from suing the employer for any injury 
covered by the act; 
(f) the right to sue third parties whose conduct may have contributed to the injury is not 
abrogated, but the employee compensation fund generally is entitled to recoup any benefits 
it has paid; 
(g) the system is operated by an administrative agency with appeal generally to an appellate 
court; 
(h) the employer is required to pay for the system either through privately purchased insurance or 
a state-fund insurance. 
 
(4)  Idaho workers' compensation statutes: As with all other states, Idaho has adopted a statutory 
scheme to replace the potential tort liability of employers. The following are the major provisions as they 
appeared in 1947: 
 
43-901. Employments covered. This act shall apply to all public employment as defined in section 43-
903 and to all private employment not expressly excepted by the provisions of section 43-904. 
 
43-902. Declaration of police power. The common law system governing the remedy of workmen 
against employers for injuries received in industrial and public work is inconsistent with modem industrial 
conditions. The administration of the common law system in such cases has produced the result that little 
of the cost to the employer has reached the injured workman, and that little at large expense to the public. 
The remedy of the workman has been uncertain, slow and inadequate. Injuries in such employments 
formerly occasional have become frequent and inevitable. The welfare of the state depends upon its 
industries, and even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho, therefore, exercising 
herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private 
controversy, and sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families and dependents is hereby 
provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or 
compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil actions and civil causes 
of action for such personal injuries, and all jurisdiction of the courts of the stat over such causes are 
hereby abolished as is in this act provided. 
 
43-903. Public employment. This act shall apply to employees and officials of the state and of all 
counties, cities, cities under special charter or commission form of government, villages, school districts, 
irrigation districts, drainage districts, highway districts, road districts and other public and municipal 
corporations within the state: but not to include, judges of election, clerks of election or jurors .... 
 
43-904. Employments not covered- Election of coverage. None of the provisions of this act shall apply 
to: 
 
1.  Agricultural pursuits ...; or, 
2.  Household domestic service ...; or, 
3.  Casual employment ...; or, 
4.  Employment by charitable organizations; or, 
5.  Employment of outworkers; or of, 
6.  Members of the employer's family dwelling in his house; or, 
7.  Employment of airmen or individuals, ...engaged in the navigation of aircraft while 
under way; or 
8.  Employment which is not carried on by the employer for the sake of pecuniary 
gain: 
 
Unless prior to the accident for which the claim is made, the employer had elected in writing filed with the 





43-1001. Right to compensation for injury. If a workman receives personal injury by accident arising 
out of and in the course of any employment covered by this act his employer or the surety shall pay 
compensation in the amounts and to the person or persons hereinafter specified. 
 
43-1002. Injuries not covered. No compensation shall be allowed for an injury caused: 
 
1.  By the employee's willful intention to injure himself or to injure another; or, 
2.  By his intoxication. 
If the employer claims an exemption or forfeiture under this section the burden of proof 
shall be upon him. 
 
43-1003. Right to compensation exclusive. The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee on 
account of a personal injury for which he is entitled to compensation under this act shall exclude all other 
rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at 
common law or otherwise, on account of such injury. 
 
43-1004. Liability of third persons. When an injury for which compensation is payable under this act 
shall have been sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than the employer a legal 
liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the injured employee may, at his option, either claim 
compensation under this act or obtain damages from or proceed at law against such other person to 
recover damages .... 
 
       Note how the statute is structured: it creates categories and then specifies legal results that flow from 
being place in the categories. How many categories of employee-employers does the statute create? 
What results flow from being placed in the different categories? Does Louie have any other potential 
remedies that the worker compensation system? 
 
(5) Workers’ comp as a model for torts: The most comprehensive no-fault system is the New Zealand 
Accident Compensation Act. The Act, which abolished most tort actions for accidental injuries, became 
effective in 1974. Initially, it provided for compensation to accident victims from three different sources: 
(a)  the earners scheme: an extension of the previously existing workers compensation 
system, the earners scheme provides coverage for all workers against accidental injury both on 
and off the job 24 hours a day, seven days a week. When the accident occurs on the job, the employer 
pays 100% of the lost salary for the first week; there after, the Accident Compensation 
Corporation (ACC) pays 80% per week. The ACC also pays all medical expenses. Lifetime 
periodic payments are provided for permanent losses in earning capacity. 
(b) the motor vehicle accident scheme: only non-earners are covered since workers 
are covered under the earners scheme. They are entitled to compensation for full medical 
expenses and lost earning capacity, but do not receive weekly payment for lost earnings. 
(c)  the supplementary scheme: again, only non-earners are covered by this scheme. 
It covers are accidental injuries other than motor vehicles. 
 
In 1982, the New Zealand Parliament amended the statute to remove all references to the three 
separate funding schemes. The New Zealand system has prompted a significant amount of discussion in 
law reviews. For example, Professor James Henderson has argued that the New Zealand social 
insurance system was unwise on several grounds. He argued that the system did not address the "utility 
and fairness" goals of tort law but instead focused on compensation. On the fairness issue he wrote: 
 
A New Zealand-type system can be criticized on several fairness grounds. First, citizens would no 
longer have some of the traditional methods of vindicating individual rights in our legal system. A 
person intentionally struck by another, for example, would no longer be entitled to a legal 
judgment that his right to personal integrity had been violated. Second, the anomalies created by 
the Act are open to attack. For example, distinctions drawn between illness and accidental injury 
under the system cause persons similarly disadvantaged to be treated differently. Third, the 
measures of recovery include a number of arbitrary limits that cause persons dissimilarly 
disadvantaged to receive essentially the same benefits. Finally, the procedures under the 
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compensation system reflect a willingness to sacrifice the interests of the individual to the greater 
good. 
James A Henderson, Jr., The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, 48 U.CHI. L. REV. 781 
(1981). As to Professor Henderson's first argument: is there a satisfactory solution to the dignitary claim 
short of reinstituting the tort system? How important is this claim? Should such "revenge" be encouraged? 
Is it unavoidable? On his second point: why is the New Zealand system more anomalous than the tort 
system since tort actions are not available for diseases? On the third issue is the tort system any less 
arbitrary? Isn't this the inevitable result of reducing injuries to monetary compensation? Finally: is this 
true? Why? 
 
Henderson also argued that the New Zealand system fails to create adequate incentives 
for safety because it does not focus on allocative efficiency. A detailed study of motor vehicle accidents 
that compared accident statistics from before and after the adoption of the system does not, however, 
support this contention: 
 
      New Zealand abolished the system of tort actions for personal injury damages in 
1974. The new system created some obvious externalities, at least in regard to the costs of 
automobile accidents. The traditional view of the tort model [e.g., Henderson's view] suggests 
that the new system would produce: (1) an increase in motoring; and (2) an increase in the 
number and, in all probability, the severity of accidents. The available statistics, however, suggest 
exactly the opposite: (1) no significant increase in motoring activity (as represented by the 
number of vehicles registered and total kilometers driven) occurred; and (2) no noticeable 
increase in accident rates. In fact, the predominantly downward trend in the number of accidents, 
deaths, and injuries that had started prior to 1974 continued and even accelerated after New 
Zealand adopted the Accident Compensation Act. Similarly, the number of accidents (as 
compared to total vehicle usage) continued a steady decline. 
 
On the other hand, the total number of convictions for offenses involving potentially 
dangerous conduct continued an upward climb. When one takes into consideration the more 
effective measures adopted for dealing with alcohol-related offenses, however, even conviction 
rates have remained reasonably constant. 
 
  In conclusion, the removal of tort liability for personal in New Zealand has apparently had 
no adverse effect on driving habits. In fact, statistics show a decline in accident and fatality rates. 
Of course, the decrease in accident and fatality rates is probably attributable to deterrent 
measures, such as compulsory seat belt and safety helmet laws and stricter drunk-driving laws 
and enforcement measures. Although it will remain impossible to determine whether the reduction 
in accident rates would have been even greater if full tort rights had been retained to act as a 
silent "partner" to changes in the traffic laws, clearly removal of tort rights for personal injury 
cases did not produce the increase in accident-producing behavior predicted by the traditional 
theory of tort deterrence. 
Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CAL. L. REV. 
976 (1985). Do Brown's conclusions suggest that economic incentives may be less important than 
other factors such as the possibility of personal injury or death? 
 
For an overview of the scheme, see William C. Hodge, No-Fault in New Zealand: It Works, 50 
INS. COUNSEL. J. 222 (1983).







THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
 
 
Negligence law is fundamentally a creature of technology; really, it is the 
common law's response to technology....The best introduction to [these issues] 
might be the Walt Disney version. In scene one, Goofy is an American colonial 
walking down a country road. Even when he is quite inadvertent (maybe he is 
smelling a flower with a bumblebee inside), he causes little negligent harm. Next, 
our hero is a teamster in Old New York. With the same inadvertence as before (is 
that a piano wagon connected to the horses?), Goofy causes more negligent 
harm. In the last scene, Goofy is driving an 18-wheel rig down an interstate 
highway. With advanced technology, slight amounts of inadvertence can produce 
disastrously large quantities of negligent harm. Luckily, inadvertence does not 
always lead to negligent harm, but it is much more likely to do so if people are 
using technology. 
- Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable
 Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice 
Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293 (1988) 
 
 
As the excerpt suggests, negligence is concerned with risks. That is, with the probability (or more 
technically, the uncertainty) of some untoward event. Negligence is one attempt by society to reduce risk 
by imposing liability for injuries caused by risky behavior. "Negligence" thus is the general term for a 
group of decisions that lead to the conclusion that one person is obligated to compensate another person 
for injuries caused by unreasonably risky conduct. 
 
To make the liability decision more manageable and consistent, courts have developed a prima 
facie case - those combination of facts and legal conclusions (the "elements" of the prima facie case) that 
are sufficient, if established by the plaintiff, to have the plaintiff’s claim presented to the jury. 
 
The elements of a prima facie case for negligence can be stated in a number of slightly different 
ways. The Idaho Supreme Court, for example, has declared: 
 
The elements of a cause of action based upon negligence can be summarized as (1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a 
breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting 
injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage. 
Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian lnigation District, 97 Idaho 590, 593, 548 P.2d80, 83 (1976). See also 
Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). 
 
The Restatement (Second) Torts § 281 provides a similar list in a section entitled "The Elements 
of a Cause of Action for Negligence": 
 
The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if: 
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and 
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other, or a class of persons 
within which he is included, and 
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and 
(d) the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from 
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bringing an action for such invasion. 
See also WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). 
Leon Green provided a short statement highlighting the process aspects of the prima 
facie case: 
 
  How can law that never comes to rest be successfully studied, practiced, and 
administered from day to day? That is the problem we now consider. The prescription is not 
difficult to state. The chief virtue of negligence law is that it does not bind the judgment of 
advocate, judge, juror, appellate court, teacher, or student. Instead, it frees their judgment. It is 
only a process for making the law of any case brought within the boundaries of a negligence 
action. It does not forecast certainty. It only insures that a case will receive intelligent 
consideration. 
 
        The prescription is based on procedures for the allocation of the functions performed by 
trial judge and jury in the determination of the basic affirmation issues and affirmative defenses of 
a negligence case. Its requisites ... are as follows: 
 
(1) In the trial of a negligence case, there must be evidentiary data sufficient to establish 
causal connection between the conduct of the defendant and the injury of the victim; 
(2) In any negligence case the plaintiff must rely on the duty of the defendant to avoid 
the injury suffered by the victim as a result of the defendant's conduct; 
(3) There must be evidentiary data sufficient to support a finding that the conduct of 
the defendant violated his duty to avoid the injury suffered by the victim; 
(4) There must be evidentiary data sufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff 
suffered damages as a result of the defendant's conduct; and, 
(5) The defendant may show any defense that disproves anyone of theof these 
requisites. 
 
It is generally said that the issues of fact are for the jury and the issues of law are for the 
court. It will be noted, however, that all issues require the participation of both judge and 
jury. Only if an issue is uncontested will the judge alone so rule. 
Leon Green, The Negligence Action, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 369. 
 
       For analytical purposes, it is helpful to separate the causation element into two distinct components, 
cause in fact and scope of liability. In practice, courts and commentators generally make this distinction. 
Thus, these materials are structured by a prima facie case of negligence that has five elements, each of 
which must be proved by the plaintiff to prevail. Think of the elements of the prima facie case are a road 
map to the tort. 
 
a.  DUTY: duty is a legal issue to be determined by the judge. It is a question of whether the 
government through the operation of the legal system imposes an obligation on a person (the 
defendant) to exercise reasonable care (or some more exacting standard) towards another 
person (the plaintiff) under the circumstances. Duties are based upon policies which may be 
drawn from a wide range of sources. 
 
b.  BREACH OF DUTY: breach is the basic carelessness issue which characterizes the 
action for negligence; it is often loosely referred to as the negligence element because it poses 
the central question of negligence law: 'Was it reasonable for the defendant, under all of the 
circumstances, to engage in the conduct which caused the injury?" This has two aspects: (1) was 
a risk foreseeable? and (2) if so, was the defendant's conduct reasonable in the face of the 
foreseeable risk? The breach elementemploys the mythical "reasonable person." Green has 
called this element "an intellectual gyroscope" because the conduct which it requires "adjusts 
automatically commensurate with the danger." This element is the central law applying function of 
the tribunal. 
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c. CAUSE IN FACT: causation is a factual question for the trier of fact (classically a jury) to 
determine. It is a question of whether there actually is in fact a causal relation between the 
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury. It is not necessary that the defendant's conduct be 
the sole cause of the harm - since this is impossible. 
 
d.  SCOPE OF LIABILITY: aka, "proximate cause." This element centers on the limitation of 
liability for harms actually caused by the defendant's conduct. The law has concluded that an 
individual should not be liable for all harms which causally follow from her conduct; this element is 
the primary limiting factor. The issues considered under this heading are closely related to those 
considered under duty. Courts tend to become metaphysical in the presence of the questions 
surrounding this element; it is the least coherent. 
 
e.  DAMAGES: the plaintiff must suffer actual harm --that is, harm which is legally 
recognized as worthy of compensation. Because of the historical relationship between negligence 
and action in case, plaintiffs cannot recover nominal damages in a negligence action. 
 
For a recent, short introduction to the prima facie case and its utility in evaluating negligence see 













































"Duty" is the first element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. As noted in the brief description of the 
elements of the prima facie case, duty is a question of whether the government through the operation of 
the legal system imposes an obligation on a person (the defendant) to exercise reasonable care (or some 
more exacting standard) towards another person (the plaintiff) under the circumstances. Duty both serves 
prospectively to channel human behavior in ways deemed socially appropriate and retrospectively as the 
basis for determining the propriety of behavior. 
 
The Idaho Court of Appeals defined "duty" as "a requirement that one conduct himself in a 
particular manner with respect to a risk of harm.... The scope of the duty [i.e., how one is required to act] 
is defined by the nature of the risk and by the persons endangered by it. A risk may arise from a number 
of sources, including the actor's own conduct, the conduct of others, or a condition on the actor's 
property." Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 1112 (1983). "Duty" thus is the legal 
shorthand for the conclusion that one person is obligated to act with some degree of care to avoid risking 
an invasion of another person's interest. This obligation is a "duty"; the interest protected by the obligation 
is a "right." "Duty'' and "right" thus are flip sides of one another. 
 
From a defendant's perspective, the imposition of a duty involves a restriction of freedom of 
action: "duty," after all, means that the duty-bound individual must refrain from acting in ways that invades 
the protected interest ("right") of the right-possessor. This is the reason that libertarians (such as Richard 
Epstein) are fundamentally hostile to tort: tort law is a major societal limitation on the freedom of action. 
Libertarians seek to replace torts with contracts which (in theory, at least) allows individuals to determine 
their own limits. A primary insight that libertarianism offers is that tort law is a form of governmental 
control of individual conduct - judges are paid by the government and have available the full powers of the 
state to enforce their decisions. Epstein's solution is to replace negligence with strict liability. Under this 
approach, the actor would presumptively be liable even if she neither intended to harm the plaintiff nor 
failed to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. See Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. 
LEG. STUD. 151 (1973). 
 
From the plaintiff’s perspective, on the other hand, the problem is protection of an interest against 
invasive conduct. Why should one individual be able to act in a way that causes another a loss and not be 
required to make good that loss? Are there interests so worthless that they deserve no protection? 
 
Given its role and the nearly overwhelming hodgepodge of conduct, it is hardly surprising that 
"duty" is a complex concept. The rest of this chapter examines the recurrent situations in which the Idaho 
courts impose a duty. These can be broadly grouped into two categories: (1) misfeasance (the general 
rule) and its limitations and (2) nonfeasance and its exceptions. 
 
(1) RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS § 7: The Restatement (Third) defines "duty": 
 
 §7.   Duty 
(a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the 
actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm. 
(b) In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle or 
policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may 





RESTATEMENT {THIRD)OF TORTS § 7 (2010). 
 
(2) The Idaho caselaw is (perhaps) a bit more complex than a simplistic reading of § (a) might indicate. 
The law draws a basic distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance and recognizes exceptions to 
both: 
 
(a) misfeasance: the general rule is that everyone has a duty to avoid invading another's right. In 
Whitt v. Jarnagin, the Idaho Supreme Court wrote,  
 
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others, to avoid injury to 
others by any agency set in operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his 
property as to avoid such injury. The degree of care to be exercised must commensurate with the 
danger or hazard connected with the activity. 
Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188,418 P.2d278,285(1966). The court has frequently iterated this 
conclusion. E.g., Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300,796 P.2d 506,509 (1990) ("the general 
rule is that each person has a duty of care t9 prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others. 
Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980); Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 526 
(1974)"). 
 
Limitations on this general rule reflect situations in which the harm suffered is nonphysical. 
Emotional harm is the paradigm. The courts fear that the potential liability is out of proportion to the 
culpability: the amount of emotional distress that might result from any bit of careless conduct is 
unknowably large. Misrepresentation and economic loss presents similar problems. 
 
(b) nonfeasance: there generally is no duty to prevent harm not of the actor's making. Stated 
slightly differently: there is no obligation to act to prevent a foreseeable risk of harm; there is no duty to 
rescue. This reflects a general presumption in the common law: although conduct may be prohibited, the 
common law has been reticent to require affirmative conduct. 
 
Exceptions to the nonfeasance "no-duty" rule reflect the fact that the no-duty position can 
produce harsh and unjust results.  The Idaho courts have, therefore, created several 
exceptions by imposing duties to act in certain situations. 
 
(3) Synonyms: As you read through the materials, it is helpful to remember that there are a number of 
synonyms for the duty issue. For example, the duty question may be stated as whether 
 
(a) the plaintiff has "stated a cause of action" since, absent a duty, the defendant is under no 
obligation to avoid infringing the plaintiffs interest and plaintiff has no cause of 
action for the invasion of that interest. 
(b) the interest asserted by the plaintiff is justiciable, i.e., it will be protected by the 
court if the person asserting the interest can establish that the interest has been invaded. 
















[A] MISFEASANCE AND ITS LIMITS 
 




WILSON v. BOISE CITY 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
 391,55 P. 887 (1899) 
 
[Plaintiffs brought an action to recover damages to their land caused by flooding from defendant's 
canal. The canal had been constructed to redirect the water of Cottonwood Creek, a natural stream which 
arose in the hills northeast of Boise and flowed through the city. During periods of high water, the 
stream's bed was insufficient to carry the entire flow and lands adjacent to the stream were flooded. To 
prevent this flooding, the city redirected the creek outside the city limits and constructed an artificial 
channel of cement and rock. The canal was approximately five feet high and varied from three feet wide 
at the bottom to eight feet wide at the tip. As redirected, Cottonwood Creek ran along plaintiffs' land. In 
1892 and 1894, Cottonwood Creek overflowed its cement banks. Following a third flood in 1897, plaintiffs 
brought this action. Defendant appeals a jury verdict for plaintiff.] 
 
QUARLES, J.: .... The power to provide for the health and cleanliness of the city grants power to the 
mayor and common council to cause sewers to be constructed to carry the waste from the outside of the 
city and authorizes the mayor and common council to cause such sewers to be constructed to such 
points outside of the city as may be necessary in order to rid the city entirely of said waste. In order to 
protect the streets of said city, to protect the property and the health of its citizens, it appears from the 
record in this case that it was necessary to construct the artificial channel in question. A grant of power 
carries with it authority to do those things necessary to the exercise of the power granted. The mayor and 
common council, in constructing said channel, were exercising a power conferred upon them by said city 
charter. Now, having acted within the scope of the powers granted by the city charter, the defendant must 
take care of said artificial channel, and of the waters which naturally flow in Cottonwood creek, whether 
during the summer and fall seasons, when such waters are at a low stage, or during the spring thaws, 
when the said stream is naturally swollen from melting snows in the mountains. As a part of the common 
history of the country, we know that more snow falls some seasons than falls others, and that there is 
more water in said creek during the spring thaws in some years than there is in other years. The record 
before us shows that during the freshets, or spring thaws, during some of the years since its construction, 
said artificial channel, on account of its not being large enough, did not and could not carry all of the 
waters of said stream, causing the flooding of adjacent lands. Of course, the city has no control over the 
elements, and is not responsible for loss occasioned by the act of God, or by the acts of the common 
enemy; yet having constructed such artificial channel, it is under a legal obligation to take care of said 
artificial channel, and of the waters that naturally flow in said stream, at all seasons. 
 
If the damage complained of had occurred through and by means of a cloudburst, or unusual and 
unprecedented storm, the defendant, not being in fault, would not be responsible. But the injury 
complained of was caused by said artificial channel being too small to carry the waters of said stream 
during the spring high waters, and which water was the natural result of usual and ordinary causes, and 
the defendant is responsible, because it is the fault of said defendant that said artificial channel is not 
large enough. 
 
.... In the case at bar, the defendant, for its benefit has done this thing. Having changed the 
channel of said stream and caused the waters thereof to flow where they did not, and would not, flow by 
nature, it must keep such artificial channel in condition to carry the waters diverted by it, in high as well as 
low water seasons, and protect the property of residents upon and near such artificial channel, or respond 
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in damages to the parties injured. If the acts of the mayor and common council which caused the injury 
complained of consisted in attempting to confine the waters of said stream to the natural channel thereof, 
to save the property of adjacent owners, and its streets, it would not, of course, be responsible. In the 
case at bar, if the waters of said stream had not been diverted from their natural course, the plaintiffs' 
property would not have been injured, but the waters which injured their property would have injured the 
inhabitants of Boise City, and its streets. It is contrary to natural justice to say, as to the injury complained 
of, which was caused by the defendant, for its financial benefit, to protect its streets and save it expense, 
that the plaintiffs, innocent parties, must suffer their loss in silence, and the defendant, though the gainer, 
is under no obligation to compensate plaintiffs for their loss.... In the case before us, a condition 
confronted by defendant city. Its streets were being overflowed and damaged by the waters of a natural 
stream flowing through its boundaries. The presence of the said natural stream obstructed its streets at 
times, endangered the health of its inhabitants, and was a source of expense and annoyance. To meet 
this condition, and avoid its consequent evils, the mayor and common council, in fact, the municipality 
itself, decide to change the course of said natural stream by building an artificial channel sufficient to 
carry the waters of said stream therein.... It became the duty of the defendant to construct said artificial 
channel of sufficient permanency, strength, and size to carry all of the waters of said stream, and for its 
failure to discharge this duty, it is responsible to anyone injured by such failure. [].... 
 
It is urged by the appellant that the evidence is not sufficient to support the judgment. It is one of 
the facts stipulated that during the high-water seasons of 1892, 1894, and 1897, the artificial channel in 
question would not carry the waters of said stream, and the same was overflowed, and the adjacent lands 
flooded. It is not agreed that during the springs of said years the flooding of said artificial channel was the 
result of any cause, other than the natural and ordinary causes which came from the breaking up of 
winter and the introduction of spring, and there was no evidence offered by the defendant to show that 
the injury complained of resulted from any unusual cause which could not be reasonably anticipated. If 
the said injury was the result of unavoidable casualty, or the result of conditions which are unusual and 
could not be reasonably anticipated, the existence of such conditions would be a defense, but such 
defense should be pleaded and proven. We think the evidence sufficient to support the judgment. The 
natural and reasonable inference from the agreed statement of facts in that the artificial channel in 
question is not large enough to carry the waters of Cottonwood creek during the spring seasons. This fact 
was demonstrated the next spring following its construction, showing that it was negligently made too 
small. Having actual notice that said artificial channel was not large enough to carry the waters diverted 
by the defendant, soon after its construction, the defendant has negligently omitted to enlarge the same, 
and, now that innocent parties have suffered, seeks to avoid liability .... 
 





(1)  Analyzing duty: Analysis of the duty element involves three issues: 
 
(a)  What is the source of the defendant's duty? Why is the defendant obligated to act 
carefully in relation to the plaintiff? This is a question of facts: what facts does the court point to 
in holding that the actor does (or does not) have a duty? Note that, because the source question is based 
on facts, the logic that underlies a decision that there is or is not a duty is analogic, i.e., the facts in this 
case are analogous (or not) to the facts in other cases that have held there is a duty. Overtime, the 
analogies are increasingly generalized until they become a "rule" - a statement with a hard center and 
fuzzy edges. 
(b)  What was the scope of the duty? That is, what was the defendant required to do to avoid 
breaching the duty owed to the plaintiff? This is the standard of care that the court uses to evaluate the 
defendant's conduct. In most cases this will be the general, reasonable-person under-the circumstances 
standard such as IDJI2.20. 
(c) What interest is protected by the duty? Individuals have a number of interests that 
they seek to have protected by the legal system. Did defendant have a legally enforceable obligation not 
to invade the interest asserted by the plaintiff? The most common interest asserted in torts is the interest 
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in physical integrity, i.e., the claim is for "physical harm, i.e., "bodily harm" and "property damage" in the 
language of § 4 of Restatement (Third). As we will see, this does not exhaust the list of interests. 
 
(2)  What rationale did the court assert in requiring the city to compensate the plaintiff? What policies 
are advanced by obligating the city to act with care in regard to the interests of plaintiff? That is: why 
should the state be solicitous of the interests that plaintiff asserts? Wasn't the general welfare increased 
by rerouting Cottonwood Creek? Why isn't a net improvement in welfare a sufficient reason to allow 
defendant to act without being held responsible? What does this case suggest about the economic 
explanation of tort law? Which of the liability rationales best explains the result? 
 
(3) Willson [sic] v. Boise City (pt. 2): Twelve years later, the Wilsons were back in court again 
seeking damages for injuries to their property. The court reiterated its prior conclusion:  
if the municipality has undertaken to control and direct the flow of the waters of this stream. It has 
done that presumably for the benefit of the whole community. Since it has assumed the control 
and direction of the stream, it cannot tum its water loose upon other property owners and flood 
and damage them without also assuming a responsibility for such damages as may be sustained 
by the property owners on account of the negligence, or rather want of proper care and diligence 
upon the part of the city in providing for, directing and controlling the flow of such stream ....The 
city has undertaken the care and maintenance of this stream. It must now afford the property 
owner reasonable protection against the ravages of the stream in times of high water.... 
Willson v. Boise City, 20 Idaho 133, 117 P. 115 (1911). See also Dunn v. Boise City, 48 Idaho 550, 283 
P. 606 (1929). 
 
 
KEIM v. GILMORE & PITTSBURGH R.R. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
23 Idaho 511, 131  
P.656(1913) 
 
AILSHIE, C.J.-This is an appeal from a judgment awarding respondent $10,000 damages. [Keim was 
injured by a moving train while on the station grounds at the town of Leadore. At the time of the accident, 
Keim was walking back to his home in the village of Junction, which is about one mile from the depot at 
Leadore. To return to his house, it was necessary for him to cross the railroad tracks. Rather that 
following the wagon road, however, he walked north to the depot. When he reached the depot, he saw a 
train of cars on the track, either moving or just starting up. He therefore walked along a gravel walk that 
ran parallel to the track in front of the depot. He was from five to seven feet from the track. A baggage 
truck was standing about forty feet down the track from the depot.) As he walked past this truck, leaving it 
between him and the passing train, a projecting jack arm on a moving steam shovel car which was 
attached to the train struck the truck and threw it with violence against respondent, knocking him over, 
severely injuring him, and rendering him unconscious and permanently maimed and disabled. 
 
The first question to be considered is the alleged negligence of the appellant. Appellant insists 
that no negligence is shown on the part of the railroad company. Now, it appears, and is undisputed, that 
the whole mischief was caused by this projecting jack arm on the moving steam shovel car. It appears 
that these arms are placed on each side of such a car to be used in steadying the car when it is in 
operation, and that they are ordinarily either turned back or taken off when the car is being hauled over 
the road. On this occasion the jack arm on the side of the car next to the depot and to respondent was 
projecting. Itis uncertain as to the exact distance of this projection, but it seems quite dear from the 
evidence in the record that it was anywhere from eleven to twenty-two inches. Itis clear that the fault here 
was not with the employee who left the truck alongside the track. The truck was far enough away from the 
track to clear any ordinary car which was accustomed to pass over the track; and, indeed, it was not 
touched, so far as the evidence shows, by any car until the steam shovel car came along. Clearly there 
was no negligence on the part of the man who left the truck at this place, unless he had notice that the 
steam shovel car was going to be pulled over the road at this time in the condition in which it was when it 
passed this truck. The whole trouble in this matter lay with those who were operating the train. If they 
DUTY 
68 
were going to pull a car over the road with projections on the sides extending from eleven to twenty-two 
inches farther out than any of the cars usually transported over the road, then it was clearly the duty of 
such operators to notify other employees to govern their actions accordingly in the matter of leaving 
freight, baggage, trucks, etc., along the side of the track, and it was likewise the duty of such operatives 
to maintain a lookout for the protection of those who might be injured or taken unawares by reason of this 
increased danger from the projections from the steam shovel car. An employee or even a trespasser at 
the station grounds may know with almost exact accuracy the distance to which the cars which the 
company hauls over its road project over the track or beyond the rail. He may accordingly leave freight, 
baggage or other articles along the track where it would entail no danger upon anyone except for just 
such an unforeseen condition as arose in this case. The only persons who had it in their absolute power 
to prevent such an accident as this were the operatives of the train. They might warn other employees or 
in this case they might have taken off these arms and reduced the car to the standard width, and in the 
latter event no injury would have befallen the respondent and no damage would have been entailed. 
 
It has been argued with a great deal of force and ingenuity that the operatives of this train could 
not possibly foresee that Keim would be immediately opposite this truck when the steam shovel car would 
pass the truck and that they are therefore guilty of no negligence. This argument, however, confesses 
that the operatives of that train knew that the jack arm would strike the truck, and that they were carrying 
along with them a danger which might inflict upon Keim or any other person similarly situated either at a 
station ground or anywhere else along the track. The negligence lies back of and prior to the hitting of this 
truck by the jack arm of the steam shovel car. The real negligence was in carrying this car over the road 
in a train of cars without maintaining a proper lookout to prevent just such injuries as this. It is clear that 
they were maintaining no lookout to prevent accidents from the special hazard of this car. It is testified by 
a competent witness that one railroad company would not accept a car from another railroad company for 
shipment over its line in the condition this car was in, namely, with the jack arms in place and projecting 
as was the case with this car. 
 
....The railroad company set the danger in motion; they were the active agents carrying 
an unusual danger over their road. 
 
The judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered. 
 





(1)  What is the source of the defendant's duty? What was the scope of the duty? What interest is 
protected by the duty? 
 
(2)  Duty and breach are closely intertwined: the scope of the duty is the standard of care that is used 
to evaluate whether defendant breached its duty. Is Keim a breach case? Was defendant making the 
same argument that the defendant made in Adams v. Bullock? 
 
(3)  Note the specificity with which the court defines the scope of defendant's duty. Keim was decided 
during the same period in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes writing for the United States Supreme 
Court crafted the look-listen-and-alight in Baltimore & Ohio RR. v. Goodman [Franklin, Rabin, & Green at 
60]. 
 
(4)  The question of creation of risk can arise in many contexts.  For a discussion of this in the 
employment setting, see, Monique c. Lillard, “Their Servants’ Keepers: Examining Employer Liability for 
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McKINLEY v. FANNING 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
100 Idaho 189, 595 P.2d 1084 (1979) 
 
BAKES, J.: This is an appeal from summary judgments against plaintiff appellant Dorothy McKinley. 
McKinley, who slipped and fell on a public sidewalk, sought to recover damages resulting from that 
accident. We reverse. 
 
In 1969, June and Wayne Fanning were the owners of the Clearwater Hotel in Pierce, Idaho, and 
the Clearwater Cafe which was located in part of the hotel building.... McKinley was the lessee, occupier 
and operator of the Clearwater Cafe from 1969 until1972. During that time the Fannings hired Northwest 
Homes, Inc., to install on the building an awning which extended over the sidewalk in front of the cafe.... 
Because of the manner in which the awning was installed, water allegedly drained into one comer of the 
awning and then onto the sidewalk in front of the cafe. The record is clear that McKinley knew of the 
installation of the awning and that water drained from it onto the sidewalk. The record is also clear that 
McKinley was aware that because of this drainage ice occasionally accumulated on the sidewalk beneath 
the comer of the awning. The record indicates that the awning did not reach all the way to the curb but 
lacked approximately 2 1/2 to 3 feet from covering the entire sidewalk. 
 
In her deposition McKinley testified that on the date of the accident there was an accumulation of 
three to four inches of snow and slush on the street and on that portion of the sidewalk not covered by the 
awning and that there was an accumulation of ice on the sidewalk underneath the comer of the awning 
where water had drained onto the sidewalk. She testified that on the date of the accident she got out of 
her car, which was parked in front of the cafe, stepped up onto the sidewalk and took two or three steps 
to a point under the edge of the awning where she slipped and fell on ice which had accumulated from 
water draining off the comer of the awning. The injuries she sustained from the fall required surgery and 
ultimately required her to cease the operation of the cafe. 
 
McKinley brought suit against the Fannings and Northwest Homes, alleging that her injuries were 
the result of Northwest Homes' negligent installation of the awning and the Fannings' negligent failure to 
correct the improper installation and to remedy the hazard it created. Both defendants moved for 
summary judgment, which the district court granted. McKinley appeals from those summary judgments. 
 
As to the defendant Fanning, McKinley testified in her deposition that on several occasions she 
had advised Fanning that the awning had been improperly installed and had caused water to drain onto 
the sidewalk creating a dangerous condition. She alleged in her amended complaint that Fanning: 
"negligently failed to correct the improper installation of said awning after having actual notice of the 
unreasonable hazard thereby created." 
 
Furthermore, McKinley alleged in the amended complaint that the awning had been installed in 
violation of the municipal code of the City of Pierce, which provided that the roof of a marquee must "be 
sloped to downspouts which shall conduct any drainage from the marquee under the sidewalk to the 
curb" and that the construction of the awning violated this ordinance and was therefore negligence. Either 
of those two allegations raised factual issues which could not be resolved on summary judgment. 
Fanning's assertion on the motion for summary judgment that McKinley herself had violated a city 
ordinance requiring "the owner or tenant of any premises abutting or adjoining any public sidewalk to 
remove all snow and/or ice from such sidewalk" was not sufficient to defeat her claim for recovery. That 
assertion merely raised an issue of contributory negligence. Since the advent of comparative negligence, 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not grounds for granting summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant but requires the trier of fact to compare the contributory negligence of the plaintiff with that of 
the defendant. See I.C. §§ 6-801, -802. 
 
Neither does the assertion that Fanning, as lessor, owed no duty to McKinley, the lessee, to 
prevent or remedy the hazardous condition because McKinley was aware of the danger supply adequate 
grounds for summary judgment. In this case the injury was allegedly sustained not as a result of a 
DUTY 
70 
dangerous condition on the business premise of the cafe, but rather as the result of an allegedly 
dangerous condition on the public sidewalk abutting the cafe. Thus, the panoply of rules concerning the 
landowner's duties to persons on the property and the classification of those persons, such as 
trespassers, invitees, licensees and lessees, which are often made in those kinds of cases are inapposite 
here. The duty of care involved in this case is that owed by a landowner to pedestrians using a public 
sidewalk abutting the property. Certainly Fanning, who was the owner of the entire premises, lessor of the 
cafe and apparently the possessor of the hotel, had a duty to pedestrians using the public sidewalk to 
exercise reasonable care not to create a dangerous condition on the sidewalk. Fanning had a further duty 
to remedy any dangerous condition which his alterations of the property had caused if it jeopardized safe 
passage on the public sidewalk. Although McKinley was the lessee of the cafe, at the time of the accident 
she nevertheless was still a member of the public, a user of the sidewalk, and therefore, a person to 
whom Fanning owed that duty of care. However, because McKinley was a lessee and may have had 
some knowledge of the dangerous condition, she may have had a separate duty to correct it, a 
knowledge and duty not chargeable to the ordinary pedestrian using the sidewalk. But this difference 
between McKinley and the more typical pedestrian does not relieve Fanning of the duty to use due care 
to avoid creating a hazard on the sidewalk, but only raises an issue of contributory negligence of 
McKinley which must be resolved by the jury, not the court on a motion for summary judgment. 
 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment is 
reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.... 
 
DONALDSON & BISTLINE, JJ., CONCUR. 
 
 
SHEPARD, C.J., DISSENTING: I must dissent on the basis that (1) to me the record discloses no 
unresolved issues of material fact, and (2) the majority leaves unresolved, and therefore furnishes no 
guidance to the trial court on remand, a number of legal issues raised by this appeal.... 
 
.... At this juncture, we must assume that the plaintiff-appellant slipped on an accumulation of ice 
and snow on the sidewalk in front of her business premises, and that the hazardous condition was 
created by drainage from an awning over the sidewalk. We must also assume that she sustained injuries 
and that the injuries resulted in damage. 
 
From these facts, the trial court and this Court must determine whether an actionable cause for 
negligence exists in McKinley against the defendants-respondents. To assert, as does the majority, that 
issues of negligence and proximate cause are for the jury to resolve, I submit merely begs the questions 
presented by this appeal. In my view, the above set forth facts do not lead to a conclusion of the 
existence of actionable negligence. Hence, the purpose of summary judgment in avoiding useless trials is 
well served in the instant case. [] 
 
Prior to the enactment of Idaho's comparative negligence statute in 1971, a plaintiff was barred 
from recovery against a negligent defendant if plaintiffs own negligence contributed to the injury. 
However, since the enactment of that statute, I.C. § 6-801, a plaintiff may recover against a negligent 
defendant if plaintiffs negligence was "not as great" as defendants. Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 
P.2d 144 (1976); Fairchild v. Olsen, 96 Idaho 338, 528 P.2d 900 (1974). Nevertheless, the negligence, if 
any, of the plaintiff is prematurely raised unless and until a case of actionable negligence on the part of 
the defendant is supported by the record. Only after there has been found to be a breach of a duty by the 
defendant has a sufficient cause of actionable negligence been made out. Rehwalt v. American Falls 
Reservoir District No. 2, 97 Idaho 634, 550 P.2d 137 (1976). I would conclude that there has been no 
breach of a duty by the defendant Fanning toward the plaintiff McKinley. 
 
The elements of a cause of action based upon negligence can be summarized as (1) a duty 
recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that 
duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual 
loss or damage. Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation District, 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80 (1976); [] 
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Prosser has analyzed the concept of duty as it arises in negligence: 
 
It is better to reserve "duty'' for the problem of the relation between individuals which 
imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other, and to deal with particular 
conduct in terms of a legal standard of what is required to meet the obligation. In other words, 
"duty'' is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the 
particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is always the same, to conform to the legal 
standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk. What the defendant must do, or 
must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy the duty. The distinction 
is one of convenience only, and it must be remembered that the two are correlative, and one 
cannot exist without the other. 
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971); Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation District, 
supra. 
 
Each element of negligence must be present for the plaintiff to recover on a negligence claim. 
Thus, a sufficient allegation of actionable negligence must begin with a duty or obligation of a defendant 
to protect a plaintiff from injury and a failure to discharge that duty. Relevant to the issue of duty, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 355 sets forth a general rule of non-liability for conditions on the 
property arising after the lessor transfers possession. That section provides: 
 
Except as stated in §§ 357 and 360-362, a lessor of land is not subject to liability to his lessee or others 
upon the land with the consent of the lessee or sublessee for physical harm caused by any dangerous 
condition which comes into existence after the lessee has taken possession. 
 
Thus, in general, the lessor has no duty to prevent the existence of any dangerous condition on 
the leased property created during the tenancy. However, as noted in the above stated section, there 
exist certain exceptions to the general rule of nonliability. 
 
It is argued that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 362 may provide such an exception. 
That section provides as follows: 
 
§ 362. Negligent Repairs By Lessor. A lessor of land who, by purporting to make repairs 
On the land while it isin the possession of his lessee, or by the negligent manner in which 
he makes such repairs has, as the lessee neither knows nor should know, made the land 
more dangerous for use or given it a deceptive appearance of safety, is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused by the condition to the lessee or to others upon the land with the 
consent of the lessee or sublessee. (Emphasis added.) 
 
It is undisputed that McKinley was aware of the construction of the awning, and that the 
construction of the awning caused drainage onto the sidewalk with its resultant accumulation of 
ice and snow on the sidewalk. Comment d to § 362 declares that the lessor is subject to liability if, but 
only if, the lessee neither knows nor should know that the purported repairs have not been made or have 
been negligently made and so relying upon the deceptive appearance of safety, subjects himself to the 
dangers or invites or permits his licensees to encounter them. Conversely, it would follow that if the 
lessee knows or should know that the purported repairs have not been made or have been negligently 
made then the lessor is not liable under this exception. [] 
 
Once Mrs. McKinley knew of the condition caused by the awning, the lessors Fannings were 
under no further legal duty owed to the lessee McKinley. The liability of the lessor remains only so long as 
the lessee had no knowledge of the danger, his duty was to either correct the defective awning or warn of 
the danger caused by the defective awning, and once the lessee knew of the danger, the warning is no 
longer necessary. [] I find it more than difficult, therefore, to understand the assertion of the majority that 
the lack of duty flowing from Fanning to McKinley is irrelevant. 
 
McKinley also contends that the awning was constructed in violation of a local building 
code ordinance. That building ordinance provides as follows: 
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Section 4505(f). Roof Construction. Every roof and skylight of a marquee shall be sloped 
to downspouts which shall conduct any drainage from the marquee under the sidewalk to the 
curb. However, failure to comply with that ordinance herein would at best only establish that the 
awning had been constructed in a negligent manner.  
 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 362 specifically states that the fact that repairs were made 
in a negligent manner is not actionable where the lessee has knowledge of that negligent construction. 
The record in this case demonstrates that there is no genuine issue about the material and dispositive 
fact that Mrs. McKinley was fully aware of the accumulation of ice beneath the awning. Even if all of the 
remaining issues of fact are resolved in favor of McKinley, it cannot be found that the defendants 
breached a duty owed to her. 
 
The majority observes that, 
 
[B]ecause McKinley was a lessee and may have had some knowledge of the dangerous 
condition, she may have had a separate duty to correct it, a knowledge and duty not 
chargeable to the ordinary pedestrian using the sidewalk. But this difference between 
McKinley and the more typical pedestrian does not relieve Fanning of the duty to use due 
care to avoid creating a hazard on the sidewalk, but only raises an issue of contributory 
negligence of McKinley which must be resolved by the jury, not the court on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
Such conclusion, I believe, only confuses the concept of duty and contributory negligence. 
McKinley, as lessee, had a duty to clear the ice and snow from the sidewalk caused by a defective 
condition of the premises of which she had knowledge. She breached that duty, and she herself was 
injured as a result thereof. I fail to see how an issue of contributory negligence arises. The majority 
provides us only with muddy water and murky analysis. 
 





(1)  What is the source of the duty? What is the scope of the duty? What interest is protected by the 
duty? Which of the three elements do the dissenters challenge? 
 
(2)  What is the dispute between the majority and the dissent? What is the relevance of the lessor-
lessee relationship between plaintiff and defendant? What is: what is the status of the plaintiff? How does 
the majority define her status? How does the dissent? What is the unstated assumption implicit in the 
dissent's characterization of plaintiff's status? 
 
(3)  What role should plaintiffs? knowledge of the risk play in determining liability? Does the majority 
simply ignore the fact that she knew of the icy conditions? 
 
(4)  What role should the statute play in the decision? What is the dissents argument about the 
statue? Is it persuasive? 
 
(5)  What policies are advanced by obligating the lessor to act with care in regard to the interests of 
plaintiff? That is: why should the state be solicitous of the interests that plaintiff asserts? Which of the 
rationales for tort liability- retribution, deterrence, compensation, or risk-spreading - offers the best 
justification for imposing a duty on defendant? 
 
(6)  Scope of the duty owed by a landlord to her tenant or the tenant's visitors: Shepard argues that 
the lessor owes no duty to the lessee for conditions that occur after possession has been transferred to 
the lessee. Cf. Olin v. Honstead, 60 Idaho 211, 91 P.2d 380 (1939); McKenna v. Grunbaum, 33 Idaho 46, 
190 P.2d 919 (1920). 




(7) Idaho Northern R.R. v. Post Falls Lumber Co.: Defendant was driving logs down a stream to its 
sawmill when they jammed, flooding plaintiff’s property. After concluding that defendant had a duty to 
exercise care commensurate with the risks, the court noted that plaintiff was charged with a 
corresponding duty when it undertook to build its railroad up Prichard Creek. It was chargeable with 
notice that Prichard Creek was a stream capable of floating logs and lumber and that it might be used for 
such purpose. It was also chargeable with notice of the natural conditions of the country and the 
frequency of floods and freshets.  
 
It was likewise chargeable with notice that if anyone attempted to float Jogs or lumber down the 
stream, they would necessarily, in the course of such navigation, be likely to at some places and at some 
times strike the banks of the stream and that in doing so there would necessarily be some abrasions of 
the banks. If the company sought to convert one bank of the stream into a railroad grade and track, it was 
under the necessity of exercising such reasonable precaution in building the grade and protecting the 
same as the nature of the stream and the natural conditions of the country and use of the stream for the 
floating of logs and lumber would demand of a reasonably prudent person. It was also chargeable with 
due care and caution in the building and construction of bridges across the stream. Idaho Northern R.R. 
v. Post Falls Lumber Co., 20 Idaho 695, 119 P. 1098 (1911).  
 




GIBSON v. HARDY 
 
Court of Appeals of Idaho  
109 Idaho 247, 706 P.2d 1358 (1985) 
 
SWANSTROM, J.: Ned and Mame Hardy appeal from a district court judgment awarding damages to 
plaintiffs Gibson and Swallow caused by the Hardys in negligently performing a slash piling contract for 
the United States Forest Service (USFS). The Hardys assert that the judgment must be set aside 
because of the following errors: first, that plaintiffs had no justiciable interest in the property which was 
admittedly damaged or destroyed by the Hardys; second, that the trial court erred in concluding the 
Hardys breached a legal duty to plaintiffs to exercise due care not to damage or destroy wood materials 
being salvaged by plaintiffs; ....We affirm the judgment as to liability but we vacate and remand on the 
issue of damages. 
 
In July 1978 Marne Hardy signed a contract with the USFS for slash piling several designated 
"units" or areas of forested land in the Island Park area of eastern Idaho. Marne's husband, Ned, actually 
performed the contract. For convenience, we will simply refer to one or both of these parties as "Hardy." 
The contract work involved cutting down or pushing over standing trees and piling them along with all 
other logs, treetops and limbs within certain unit boundaries for later disposal by burning. The work was to 
be fully performed in ninety days. 
 
At approximately the same time, Gibson and Swallow, as salvage operators, contracted with the 
USFS to purchase all salvageable trees which were to be cut and removed from what we will call the 
Meadow Creek unit. The Gibson-Swallow salvage operation involved cutting small diameter lodge pole 
pines to form poles and posts for sale in Nevada. The salvage contract, in Gibson's name, carried a 
termination date of October 30, 1978. However, the contract further provided that the "sale may terminate 
prior to above date due to slash piling." The Meadow Creek unit, where Gibson and Swallow were 
allowed to cut and remove trees, was included in the Hardy contract to be slash piled. The Hardys had no 
contractual obligation with Gibson and Swallow. 
 
Gibson and Swallow worked the Meadow Creek unit for approximately twenty-four days and 
claimed they had many poles and posts cut and lined up in preparation for loading. On July 30, 1978, 
Gibson, Swallow and their crew left the Meadow Creek unit unattended and traveled to Nevada for a 
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three-day weekend. On August 3, after completing work at his first location, Hardy proceeded to the 
Meadow Creek area and slash piled the unit where Gibson and Swallow had been working. The salvage 
operators returned to find that all salvageable material, including cut and piled posts and poles, had been 
destroyed by being bulldozed into large piles of debris for burning. The USFS offered Gibson and 
Swallow an alternative area to work, which they refused. Subsequently, Gibson and Swallow filed this 
action against the Hardys, seeking damages for the loss of their property. 
 
Hardy first asserts that the salvage operators had "no justiciable interest" in the property that was 
destroyed. He relies on a provision of Gibson's salvage contract to support his argument. The provision 
states that "[t]itle to all timber included in this contract shall remain in the United States until it has been 
scaled or measured, paid for and removed from sale area." Hardy argues that this provision does not 
provide Gibson and Swallow an interest in the trees that had been standing or in the cut poles and posts 
because the material had not been removed, resulting in the title still vesting in the Forest Service. We 
find this contention to be without merit. It was established beyond dispute at trial that Gibson fully paid the 
USFS for the salvage on the Meadow Creek unit in advance. In spite of the printed contract language, no 
scale or measurement of the material had to be made before its removal by the salvage operators. The 
salvage contract gave Gibson and Swallow the right to cut and remove all salvageable material on the 
unit. They were prevented from doing this only by the destruction caused by Hardy. We hold that Gibson 
and Swallow had a sufficient interest to bring a cause of action for damages. 
 
Hardy next asserts that he did not breach any duty to Gibson and Swallow and, therefore, was 
not negligent in destroying the trees, poles and posts. We recognize that negligent conduct and breach of 
contract are two distinct theories of recovery. "Ordinarily, breach of contract is not a tort, although a 
contract may create the circumstances for the commission of a tort." Just's Inc. v. Arrington Construction 
Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 987 (1978). Negligence arises out of some duty imposed by law, irrespective 
of any contract. Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133,483 P.2d664 (1971). Therefore, the first issue to be 
resolved is whether there was a duty on the part of Hardy toward Gibson and Swallow. 
 
It has been established that "one owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable 
care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or 
foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury." Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 
P.2d 135 (1980), quoting Kirby v. Sanville, 286 Or. 339,594 P.2d 818,821 (1979).in addition, "[e]very 
person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others, ...and to do his work, render 
service; ls or use his property as to avoid such injury." Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181,418 P.2d 278 
(1966); []. In determining whether such duty has been breached by the allegedly negligent party, his 
conduct is measured against that of an ordinarily prudent person acting under all the circumstances and 
conditions then existing. Nagel v. Hammond, 90 Idaho 96,408 P.2d 468 (1965). 
 
Having established the duty of Hardy and the standard by which his conduct is to be judged, it 
must be determined whether that duty extends to Gibson and Swallow. Because this is an action in tort, 
the relevant questions are whether the duty was breached and whether the breach proximately caused 
actual damages to Gibson and Swallow. Alegria v. Payonk, supra. Hardy claims a breach of duty did not 
occur because Gibson-Swallow's salvage rights were subject to certain limitations, all relating to the 
condition that the slash pile operation had priority over the salvage operation. We have previously 
discussed the relevant contractual provisions and have held that, under their contract, Gibson and 
Swallow had an equitable interest in the poles and posts cut, but not removed from, the Meadow Creek 
unit. 
 
We must now tum to whether an ordinary prudent person acting in the same situation would have 
proceeded to slash pile the Meadow Creek unit under the circumstances facing Hardy. As previously 
mentioned, Hardy provided a work schedule to the Forest Service. A forest service official testified that 
this work schedule was created in part to accommodate the salvage operations. Based on this schedule, 
the Forest Service officials assured Gibson and Swallow on July 30 that the slash piling operation "was 
two-three weeks away." In fact, without informing anyone, Hardy commenced slash piling on the Meadow 
Creek unit on August 3. Hardy testified that he saw evidence of post and pole cutting going on. He 
noticed some trees cut and piled in the area and he noticed a campsite with a tent and trailer. He was 
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aware that salvage operators were working in the general forest area. Further, Hardy testified that he 
could have driven an approximately fifteen-minute drive to the Forest Service office to request a guide to 
his next scheduled work area. He did not do this as he felt it would unduly delay his operation. The 
undisputed evidence also showed that 100 yards away from the unit Gibson and Swallow were working 
was another unit to which Hardy could have moved. No salvage operation was going on there. There 
were several other units, also included in Hardy's contract, to which he could have moved without any 
significant delay to his own operation and without interference with any salvage operations. 
 
Upon the facts of this case, it could be concluded that an ordinary prudent person would not have 
proceeded with the slash piling of the unit in question. Further, it appears from the facts of this case that 
Hardy could reasonably have foreseen that proceeding to slash pile the Meadow Creek unit would 
damage or destroy the poles and posts cut by the salvage operators. Therefore, Hardy's conduct was a 
proximate cause of the damage. We will not disturb the district court's finding of negligence. 
 
 





(1)  What is the source of the defendant's alleged duty? What is the scope of the duty? What 
interest is protected by the duty? 
 
(2)      Interests: The Restatement (Second) Torts § 1 provides: "The word 'interest' is used ... to denote 
the object of any human desire." For example, emotional tranquility is an object of desire for many people 
and thus an "interest." The term carries no implication that the interest is or is not given legal protection. 
Society may regard a particular desire as improper and may, therefore, impose criminal or civil liability on 
efforts to satisfy the desire. Alternatively, society may recognize the desire as sufficiently worthy to 
impose criminal or civil liability on those whose conduct defeats its realization. Interests that fall within the 
latter category- interests given legal protection - are "rights." As noted in the introduction to this chapter, 
rights and duties are correlatives: an interest becomes a right because society imposes a duty on other to 
refrain from invading the interest. 
 
       The interests- the list of rights- protected by tort law is not static. As the Restatement notes, ''The 
entire history of the development of tort law shows a continuous tendency to recognize as worthy of legal 
protection interests which previously were not protected at all.... It is altogether unlikely that this tendency 
to give protection to hitherto unprotected interests and to extend a greater protection to those now 
infrequently protected has ceased." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1, comment e. Emotional 
tranquility presents a classic example of this tendency to protect additional interests; it also demonstrates 
why courts are reticent to protect new interests. 
 
(3)  Did Gibson and Swallow own the timber? If not, how can plaintiff have a "right" that imposes a 
"duty" on defendant to act with care in regard to their interest? 
 
  In Stanger v. Hunter, 49 Idaho 723, 291 P. 1060 (1930), the court reversed a verdict for plaintiff 
because he had failed to allege "any right or interest" in the Ford roadster that was damaged in the 
collision. Can Gibson be distinguished from Stanger? Did Gibson assert some "right or interest" in the 
posts and poles? 
 
In Gissel v. State, 111 Idaho 725, 727 P.2d 1153 (1986), the plaintiffs sued to recover part of the 
wild rice that they had illegally harvested on both state and Forest Service lands. The court held that "the 
Gissels do not seek the return of property which rightfully belonged to the state - but only that portion 
which belonged to the Forest Service. The Gissels, as prior possessors, have a superior right as against 
the state to possession of the proceeds attributable to Forest Service land." Does Gissel support the 
decision in Gibson? 
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Recall: (a) to say that A has a right is to say implicitly that everyone else has a duty not to 
damage the right and (b) to say that B has a duty not to harm A is to say that A has a right to be free from 
that harm. Did Gibson and Swallow have a right in the timber? If so, how did the 
acquire the "right"? 
 
 
A TRANSITIONAL NOTE 
 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts defines "negligence" as: 
 
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under 
all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's 
conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result 
in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden 
of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (2010) (emphasis added). This is the general rule that can 
be synthesized from the cases from Wilson to Hardy, which effectively adopt a default position: 
misfeasance gives rise to a duty of care. That is, everyone has a duty to act with reasonable care 
so as not to create a risk to others. 
 
Restatement (Third) builds on this definition of "negligence" in a subsequent section: 
 
An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk 
of physical harm. 
Id. §7(a) (emphasis added). 
 
An actor whose negligence is a factual cause of physical harm is subject to liability for any such 
harm ..., unless the court determines that the ordinary duty of reasonable 
care is inapplicable. 
Id.  §6 (2010). 
 
"Physical harm" is defined as 
the physical impairment of the human body ("bodily harm") or of real property or tangible 
person property ("property damage"). Bodily harm includes physical injury, illness, disease, 
impairment of bodily functions, and death. 
Id. §4. 
 
These provisions and the cases from Wilson to Hardy support a general, default rule which can 
be stated as: A person has a duty to act carefully when she has acted, and her act creates a foreseeable 
risk of harm to another person. Both the Idaho caselaw and the Restatement also recognize limitations on 
this general duty rule. 
 
We now tum to the most significant of the limitations: situations in which the defendant's negligent 








(1)  We begin this section of the materials with invasions of emotional interests. As noted, emotional 
harm is the paradigm: the courts fear that the potential liability is out of proportion to the culpability 
because the amount of emotional distress that might result from any bit of careless conduct is 
unknowably large. Emotional harms fall into two general categories: 
 
(a)  negligent infliction of emotional distress: In these cases, defendant's conduct 
causes emotional distress either through 
 
(i) direct invasions: The Restatement (Third) (Tentative Draft No.5) has 
two sections on negligent infliction of emotional distress. The first states: 
 
§46. Negligent Conduct Directly Inflicting Emotional Disturbance on Another 
An actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional disturbance to another is 
subject to liability to the other if the conduct: 
        (a)  places the other in immediate danger of bodily harm and the emotional 
disturbance results from the danger; or 
(b)  occurs in the course of specified categories of activities, undertakings, 
or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional disturbance. 
 
       (ii)  percipient witnesses: The second of the two sections in Restatement (Third) 
(Tentative Draft No. 5) on negligent infliction of emotional distress provides: 
 
§47.      Negligent Infliction of Emotional Disturbance Resulting from Bodily Harm to a 
Third Person 
An actor who negligently causes serious bodily injury to a third person is subject 
to liability for serious emotional disturbance thereby caused to a person who: 
(a)  perceives the event contemporaneously, and 
(b)  is a close family member of the person suffering the bodily injury. 
 
  (b) invasions of relational interests: If the actor's conduct causes the death of one spouse, the 
other spouse is likely to suffer emotional distress in addition to economic loss. This loss is "consortium," 
the conjugal fellowship of spouses and the right of each to the company, co-operation, affection, and 
service of the other spouse. Originally, the term comes from a common law cause of action, per quod 
consortium amisit ("by which he has lost the companionship") through which a husband could recover for 
bodily injury done to his wife by a third party. With the decline of the chattel status of the wife, the cause 
of action was expanded to cover both spouses. In some jurisdictions - including Idaho - consortium claims 
extend to other family members. These claims-  as well as other relational emotional distress claims- are 
most frequently brought in the context of a wrongful death action. 
 
(3) "physical harm" and "bodily harm": Is the invasion of the interest in emotional integrity "bodily harm" 
and thus "physical harm" that falls within the Restatement (Third) definition of the default duty rule? 
Comment b. to § 4 states: 
 
Bodily harm and emotional harm. The definition of bodily harm is meant to preserve the 
ordinary distinction between bodily harm and emotional harm. Accordingly, if a defendant's 
negligent conduct (for example, negligent driving) frightens the plaintiff (for example, a pedestrian 
crossing the street), the harm to the plaintiffs’ nerve centers caused by this fear does not 
constitute bodily hard. This distinction is not precise and may be difficult to make in certain cases, 
but the more restrictive rules for emotional harm ... require such a determination to be made. The 
essential difference is that bodily harm usually provides objective evidence of its existence and 
extent while the existence and severity of emotional harm is usually dependent upon the report of 
the person suffering it or symptoms that are capable of manipulation or multiple explanations. 
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Whether a specific injury constitutes bodily harm and therefore supports a claim for liability under 
§§ 5, 6, and 20-23 of this Restatement is a question of law for the court to decide. 
RESTATEMENT {THIRD) § 4 cmt. b (2010). 
 
(4)  Economic and noneconomic damages: In 1990, the legislature modified the damages 
available in tort actions.  
 
(a)  Definitions: The statute begins with several definitions: 
        (3) "Economic damages" means objectively verifiable monetary loss, including, but not 
limited to, out-of-pocket expenses, loss of earnings, loss of use of property, cost of replacement 
or repair, cost of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, medical expenses, 
or loss of business or employment opportunities. 
 
       (5) "Noneconomic damages" means subjective, nonmonetary losses including, but not 
limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, disability or disfigurement incurred by 
the injured party; emotional distress; loss of society and companionship; loss of consortium; or 
destruction or impairment of the parent-child relationship. 
 
(7) "Personal injury'' means a physical injury, sickness or death suffered by an individual. 
 
(8) "Property damage" means loss in value or in use of real or personal 
property, where such loss arises from physical damage to or destruction of such property. 
 
(9) "Punitive damages" means damages awarded to a claimant, over and above what will 
compensate the claimant for actual personal injury and property damage, to serve the public 
policies of punishing a defendant for outrageous conduct and of deterring future like conduct. 
 
I.C. § 6-1601. 
Does "noneconomic damages" include "personal injury"? 
 
(b) Noneconomic damages: The statute included a cap on noneconomic damages: 
 
(1) In no action seeking damages for personal injury, including death, shall a judgment for 
noneconomic damages be entered for a claimant exceeding the maximum amount of two 
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000); [providing for adjustments to the amount recoverable 
based on the industrial commission's adjustments to the average annual wage]. 
(2) The limitation contained in this section applies to the sum of: (a) noneconomic 
damages sustained by a claimant who incurred personal injury or who is asserting a wrongful 
death; (b) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant, regardless of the number of persons 
responsible for the damages or the number of actions filed. 
(3) If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of the limitation contained in 
subsection (1) of this section. 
(4) The limitation of awards of noneconomic damages shall not apply to: 
(a) Causes of action arising out of willful or reckless misconduct. 
(b) Causes of action arising out of an act or acts which the trier of fact finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt would constitute a felony under state or federal law. 
I.C. § 6-1603. 
 
The constitutionality of the statutory cap was upheld in Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 
134 Idaho 464, 4 P.3d 1115 (2000). The supreme court held that the cap was simply a change in the 
common law of personal injury, pursuant to legislature's power under the state constitution to modify or 
abolish common law causes of action. 
 






       (c) Punitive damages: The legislature (i) increased the burden of persuasion required to 
obtain punitive damages, (ii)adopted special pleading requirements, and (iii)capped punitive damages at 
$250,000. See I.C. § 6-1604. 
 
(5)  Evolution of legal rules: As you work through this section, pay attention to dates when cases 
were decided. Since the law is not static, you should be sensitive to the historical development: what are 
the various positions adopted by the courts at different times? For example, in Giffen v. City of Lewiston, 
6 ldaho 231,55 P. 545 (1898), plaintiff was permanently crippled by a fall caused by the removal of planks 
from the sidewalk. The Idaho Supreme Court summarily concluded that the trial court had not erred in 
instructing the jury that "disfigurement of the plaintiff caused by the injury ... is an element of damage; but 
annoyance to the plaintiff caused by contemplation of disfigurement is too remote to be considered as an 
element of damage resulting from personal injury." Would a contemporary case allow a claim for 
emotional distress arising out of a disfiguring injury? 
 
(6)  As the court noted in Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, a claim for emotional distress 
"may ... be asserted in connection with the ...torts of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress." Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980). 
 
(7)  Finally, as you read the cases focus on the reasons that the courts give for being reticent to 
extend protection to emotional tranquility. The cases frequently involve problems arguably caused by the 
presence of real suffering and the difficulty in fashioning limits. One result has been a series of devices 
intended to limit liability- the validating rules. 
 
 
a.  Emotional lnterests 
 
i. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress  
 
A Direct Invasions 
 
 
LINDSAY v. OREGON SHORT LINE R.R. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
13 Idaho 477, 90 P. 984 (1907) 
 
SULLIVAN, J.- This action was brought to recover damages on account of the alleged wrongful expulsion 
of the respondent from one of the appellant's passenger trains at Dewyville, Utah, on or about the 
nineteenth day of August 1905. The respondent alleges, among other things, that in the morning of that 
day he with his wife, who was ill, went to the station at Dewyville for the purpose of taking passage upon 
appellant's passenger train for his home in Montpelier, Idaho; that he had a ticket which entitled him to a 
passage on that train; that he boarded the train, and as he approached the door of one of the coaches 
thereof the brakeman thereon, an agent and employee of the appellant company, did "maliciously, 
wantonly, willfully, negligently and wrongfully'' order respondent off of said train, and placed himself 
between respondent and the door of said coach and refused to permit him to enter said coach, or any 
coach; that he took hold of the respondent's shoulder and turned him from said door, and commanded, 
and thus compelled him, to leave said train; that respondent's wife was a passenger on said train and was 
in a feeble, weak and helpless condition, and required his care and attention, of which fact he informed 
said brakeman. General damages in the sum of$975 and special damages in the sum of $25 were 
prayed. 
 
Demurrer to the complaint was overruled and an answer was filed denying generally the 
allegations of the complaint. The cause was tried by the court with a jury and a verdict was rendered in 
favor of the respondent for the sum of $300, and a judgment entered thereon. An order denying a new 




There was certain evidence introduced as to the anxiety of the respondent on account of the 
condition of his wife. Counsel for appellant contended that this was not a legitimate item of damages; that 
damages cannot be recovered for mental distress and anxiety in this case and cites a number of 
authorities sustaining that position. There is a clear distinction drawn in the cases as to what anxiety and 
mental suffering a plaintiff who is expelled or ejected by a common carrier may recover for, and we think 
the correct rule in cases like the one at bar is clearly stated in Moore on Carriers, page 887, as follows: 
''Where a person has been wrongfully and unlawfully expelled or ejected by the carrier from a train or car, 
he may recover in an action against the carrier the amount of the fare to the place to which he was 
entitled to be carried, damages for the loss of time occasioned by the delay, and any other pecuniary loss 
necessarily caused thereby and proven to be a proximate result of the ejection, and a reasonable 
compensation for the indignity, humiliation, wounded pride and mental suffering involved in and resulting 
from such wrongful expulsion." 
 
Sutherland, in his work on damages, [], states the rule as follows: ''We conceive the correct rule 
to be that mental suffering or nervous shock may be recovered whenever it is the natural and proximate 
result of the wrong done, if such wrong gives the injured party a cause of action." [] 
 
If the plaintiff had a right of action for being expelled from the train on which he had taken his sick 
wife, we think it is clear that he can recover for his anxiety and mental suffering on account of thus being 
separate from her. The unwarranted act of the servant of the appellant was the direct and sole cause of 
such separation. [] In Proctor v. Southern Cal.Ry. Co., 130 Cal. 20, 62 P. 306, it was held that a woman 
might recover for mental distress for being separated from her baggage. If this is the correct rule, we think 
that a husband might be entitled to recover for mental distress for being put off from a train on which he 
was traveling with his sick wife, and it is suggested by counsel for respondent that a man's wife ought to 
sustain as close and sacred relation to him as a woman's baggage to her. 
 
Other assignments of error go to the refusal of the court to give certain instructions requested by 
counsel for the appellant, to the effect that the acts complained of must not only have been wrongful and 
negligent under the pleadings, but that they must have been willfully wrong. We do not think there is 
anything in this contention, as we are clearly of the opinion that under the allegations of the complaint the 
[plaintiff] might recover for ordinary negligence. 
 
The judgment is affirmed .... 
 





(1)  What is the source of duty in Lindsay? What is the scope of duty? What interest is protected by 
the duty? 
 
(2)  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 46: Does Undsay fall within the liability rule stated in the draft 
Restatement (Third) § 46? 
 
(3)  Proof of injury (pt. 1): How can plaintiff prove that he was infact injured? Note that this question 
has two aspects: 
 
(a) was the interest actually invaded? When the actor's conduct causes a broken leg, it is 
possible to introduce an x-ray into evidence and have a physician explain to the jury what the 
x-ray shows. What can replace the x-ray when the injury is emotional distress? 
(b) what is the value of the loss caused by injury to the interest? How do you value the loss of 
emotional integrity? Note that this problem is not limited to emotional distress claims. 





Recall that the Idaho worker's compensation statute partially resolves this problem by assigning 
values to categories of injuries- a broken leg, for example, may be worth $ 250. How does the statute 
capping noneconomic losses address this issue? 
 
(4)  Maloney v. Winston Bros. Co.: Plaintiff was injured in a drilling accident while employed to 
construct a tunnel through the Bitterroot Mountains. As a result of the accident, his left leg was shorter 
than his right. Defendant argued that the jury's damage award was too generous. The court noted that 
[t]he pecuniary and financial loss sustained can be estimated with a reasonable degree of 
certainty. On the other hand, the amount allowed for humiliation, pain and suffering entailed by 
the injury must be left to the arbitrary judgment of the jury, Lindsay v. Oregon ShortUneRy., 13 
Idaho 477, 90 P. 984(1907); Tarr v. Oregon Short UneRy., 14 Idaho 192,93 P.957 (1908), subject 
only to correction by the courts for abusive and passionate exercise. 
Maloney v. Winston Bros. Co., 18 Idaho 740, 111 P.1080(1910). 
 
(5)  Tort and contract (pt. 1): The Lindsay case had its origin in the breach of the transportation 
contract by the railroad. The Idaho Supreme Court has more recently addressed the relationship between 
torts and contracts in the area of negligently inflicted emotional distress in Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 
357,699 P.2d 1371(1985). Brown purchased a residence from the Fritzes. She quickly discovered a large 
number of problems. Among the more serious was the faulty design of the sewage system, which caused 
raw sewage to accumulate beneath the house and which, because of the winter weather, could not be 
immediately remedied. Brown spent approximately $10,000 to repair the deficiencies of the property. She 
sued the Fritzes for misrepresentation and negligent infliction of emotional distress. After reviewing the 
various Idaho decisions, the court concluded: 
 
Based upon all of the above, we hold that in Idaho, when damages are sought for breach 
of a contractual relationship, there can be no recovery for emotional distress suffered by a 
plaintiff. If the conduct of a defendant has been sufficiently outrageous, we view the proper 
remedy to be in the realm of punitive damages. 
 
We emphasize that our ruling today speaks only to damages asserted for emotional 
distress which arise from or have their roots in the breach of a contractual relationship. We do not 
speak to the question of purely tortious conduct arising outside of and apart from a contractual 
relationship. We leave to another day the carving out of conduct which, while arising in contract, 
might be conclusively presumed to inflict emotional distress, e.g., mutilation of dead body, Hill v. 
Travelers' Ins. Co., [], or removal of a body from its casket, Boyle v. Chandler, []. See Hatfield [v. 
Max Rouse & Sons Northwest,] 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980). 
Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d 1371 (1985). 
 
The Brown decision was followed in Hathaway v. Krumery, 110 Idaho 515, 716 P.2d 
1287 (1986) (per curiam), in which the court held that the negligent repair of an airplane did not give rise 
to liability for emotional distress since "the 'roots' of the plaintiffs' claim in this case results from the 
contractual relationship which arose when the defendant contracted to perform repair and maintenance 
on plaintiffs’ aircraft." It further noted that "[t]his Court has refused to recognize a cause of action arising 
from negligent infliction of emotional distress where there was no physical injury." 
 
In a subsequent case involving a claim for wrongful discharge, the court also reaffirmed 
Brown, but was careful to note that a claim that began in a contractual relationship might nonetheless 
arise independently of the contractual claim: 
 
In Idaho, plaintiffs may not recover for emotional distress in breach of contract cases, but 
punitive damages might be appropriate if the defendant's conduct is sufficiently egregious. Brown 
v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357,362,699 P.2d 1371, 1376 (1985). 
 
However, a claim for infliction of emotional distress is not prohibited any time a breach of 
contract claim is involved. In order for the plaintiff to state a claim for infliction of emotional 
distress, the conduct complained of must arise independently of the breach of contract claim. 
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Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138,483 P.2d 664,669 (1971).in wrongful discharge cases, 
claims of infliction of emotional distress are allowed if the facts of the case support such a claim in 
addition to the contractual claims. See, e.g., Olson v. EG & G Idaho, Inc., 134 Idaho 778, 783-
84,9 P.3d 1244, 1249-50 (2000). In Olson, this Court upheld a jury verdict in favor of the 
defendant employer on an emotional distress claim arising from an employee's termination. Id. 
Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, 61 P.3d 557, 138 Idaho 200 (2002). 
 
Does Brown and its progeny overrule Lindsay? Did the claim for emotional distress in Lindsay 
"arise independently of the breach of contract claim"? 
We will return to these issues in the materials on economic loss below. 
 
 
SUMMERS v. WESTERN IDAHO POTATO PROCESSING CO. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
94 Idaho 1, 479 P.2d 292 (1971) 
 
McQUADE, J. -This appeal is from a summary judgment by the district court. The action is for damages 
arising out of an industrial accident. 
 
The plaintiff-appellant, Dorla Summers, alleged in her complaint that she was instructed to clean 
a certain piece of machinery at respondents' processing plant, and in the course of doing so her clothing 
became entangled in the machinery. She was pulled into the machinery and received certain physical 
injuries of a relatively minor nature. Her clothing was ripped off, and she was left "standing nude in front of 
her fellow employees." The appellant applied for and received workmen's compensation benefits for the 
physical injuries. She then brought this action seeking recovery of $10,000 for "great mental anguish 
together with nervous shock" and for pain and suffering. Appellant stresses in her brief on appeal that she 
is not suing for pain and suffering from the physical injuries but for the pain, suffering, mental anguish and 
nervous shock resulting from having her clothing stripped from her body in front of fellow employees. She 
alleges the accident resulted from the negligence of her employer. 
 
The district court held respondents herein were entitled to a summary judgment, on the 
Basis of respondents' motion therefor, which is based on the assertion that appellant's claim was barred 
by the Idaho Workmen's Compensation statutes. [] 
 
Appellant contends that tortious injuries not covered by the Workmen's Compensation law give 
rise to civil actions for damages sounding in tort. In support of this assertion it is urged that I.C. §§72-102, 
72-201, and 72-203 only abolished civil actions for injuries for which a workman is entitled to 
compensation under the act. Section 72-201, appellant contends, only brings within the coverage of the 
act injuries "caused by an accident *** which results in physical violence to the physical structure of the 
body." 
 
It is correct that actions based upon injuries otherwise remediable by common law action, which 
are not covered under the Idaho Workmen's Compensation scheme, are not abrogated by the Workmen's 
Compensation statutes. The statutes themselves make this evident. 
 
The injury that is the subject of this action arose out of the employment of the appellant by 
respondent Western Idaho Potato Processing Company. The injury was dearly a result of an industrial 
accident, as defined in I.C. §72-201. The only issue, then, is whether the injury for which recovery is 
sought is covered by the Idaho Workmen's Compensation law. 
 
This Court held in Miller v. Bingham County, [79 Idaho 87, 310 P.2d 1089 (1957)], that physical 
injuries resulting from emotional shock are covered by the Idaho Workmen's Compensation law. In that 
case, the injured party had suffered a stroke a short while after he received a severe fright during the 
course of his employment. If appellant is alleging specific physical injuries as a consequence of the 




precedent of the Miller case. She is then barred from any common law action by this state's Workmen's 
Compensation Statutes. 
 
If appellant is not alleging physical injuries, she must establish a right of recovery at common law 
for purely emotional trauma, negligently caused. Appellant cites no authority and presents no argument in 
support of the proposition that there is a common law right of recovery for purely emotional trauma, 
negligently caused. The rule is to the contrary. Recent cases in other jurisdictions, dealing with claims for 
recovery for negligently caused emotional trauma, have extended the common law right of recovery only 
so far as to allow recovery where there were physical manifestations of the injury. [] 
If, then, appellant is seeking recovery for purely emotional trauma, there is no common law right 
of recovery. If she is seeking recovery for emotional trauma manifested by physical injuries, her action is 
precluded by our statutory Workmen's Compensation scheme. 
 





(1)  Did the court hold that there was no duty, i.e., that Ms. Summers had no right to emotional 
tranquility? Did the court hold that the duty had not been breached? Did the court hold that the breach of 
the duty had already been compensated? What interest does the court focus on? What is the scope of 
duty? 
 
(2)  Are Undsay and Summers consistent? What was the basis of the Lindsay decision? Did the 
husband in Undsay have recovered solely for emotional distress? 
 
(3)  THE common law? The court states that "If ...appellant is seeking recovery for purely emotional 
trauma, there is no common law right of recovery." What is the basis or justification for this statement? 
The English courts at the time that Idaho was created as a territory had refused to recognize a claim for 
invasion of emotional tranquility. See Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C.577, 11 Eng.Rep.854 (House of Lords 
1861) ("The law does not pretend to redress mental pain when the unlawful act complained of consists of 
that pain alone"); Allsop v. Allsop, 5 H. & N.534,157 Eng. Rep. 1292(Ex.1861) ("illness arising from the 
excitement [i.e., emotional distress] is not the sort of damage which forms aground of action"). If this is 
the common law rule to which the Court alludes, how can it continue by stating that the common law 
recovery has been extended? 
 
(4) Rationales: It is interesting to note that the judges in Allsop cited the same concerns that trouble 
their modem counterparts: the large number of possible claims ('We ought to be careful not to introduce a 
new element of damage, recollecting to what a large class of actions it would apply"), the possibility of 
fanciful (or-less politely-fraudulent) claims ("The Courts have always taken care that parties shall for 
fanciful or remote damages" and "there is a distinction between the suffering of mind and the suffering of 
body''), and the idiosyncratic nature of the loss ("This particular damage depends on the temperament of 
the party affected"). 
 
(5) Miller v. Bingham County: Plaintiff suffered a stroke following a severe fright; he was not, 
however, physically touched by defendant. Both the majority and the dissent agreed that it was not 
necessary that there be physical contact with the claimant's body in order to award compensation. Miller 
v. Bingham County, 79 Idaho 87, 310 P.2d 1089 (1957). See also Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 Idaho 380, 
232 P.2d 975 (1951), where the deceased was frightened to death. Are Miller and Roberts consistent with 
Summers? 
 
Both Miller and Roberts were workers compensation cases rather than torts cases. The issue in 
such a case is whether there is substantial evidence in the record before the Industrial Commission to 
uphold its decision that the injury was work related. Should the difference in the forum lead to different 




(6)  Does Summers fall within the liability rule stated indraft Restatement (Third) § 46? Recall that the 
section states: 
 
An actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional disturbance to 
another is subject to liability to the other if the conduct: 
 
(a) places the other in immediate danger of bodily harm and the emotional disturbance 
results from the danger; .... 
RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 (Tentative Draft No. 5). 
Setting the workers compensation statute aside, would Summers be able to recover damages for 
her emotional distress under this section? Was she "in immediate danger of bodily harm"? The comments 
to this section notes that these cases are frequently denominated "zone- of-danger" situations. Was 
Summers within the zone of physical danger when her clothes became entangled in the machinery? Was 
her emotional distress a result of that danger? 
 
Note that the section does not require physical consequences. The Summers court, on the other 
hand, states in dicta that other jurisdictions have allowed "claims for recovery for negligently caused 
emotional trauma, ...only ...where there were physical manifestations of the injury." What role would be 
served by requiring physical manifestations? What are physical manifestations? 
 
(7)  Neal v. Neal: Thomas Neal filed for divorce after his wife, Mary, discovered that he was having 
an extramarital affair. Mary counterclaimed for divorce and also asserted tort claims against Thomas and 
Jill LaGasse. The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment; the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. Mary Neal petitioned for and was granted review by the supreme court. 
 
The court provided this description of Mary's claim: 
 
Mary Neal seeks to recover from Thomas Neal, under theories of negligent and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, for emotional distress resulting from the fear that she 
may have contracted a sexually transmitted disease. For purposes herein, we accept that 
Thomas Neal's sexual relationship with LaGasse subjected his wife to the risk of acquiring such 
diseases if carried by LaGasse. However, Mary Neal has not alleged that either Thomas Neal or 
LaGasse has any sexually transmitted disease nor has she alleged that she has in fact 
contracted any such disease. In fact, the record reveals that she does not have any such disease. 
 
Damages are recoverable for emotional distress claims resulting from the present fear of 
developing a future disease only if the mental injury alleged is shown to be sufficiently genuine 
and the fear reasonable. We hold that there can be no reasonable fear of contracting such a 
disease absent proof of actual exposure. [] 
 
Because Mary Neal has not even alleged actual exposure to any sexually transmitted 
disease, she cannot satisfy the requirement of a reasonable fear to recover for emotional 
distress. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed her cause of action in this regard. We 
further conclude that because Mary Neal cannot satisfy the reasonable fear requirement for 
recovery for emotional distress, we do not consider whether she has satisfied the additional 
requirement that her fear be sufficiently genuine. 
 
Neal v. Neal, 125 Idaho 617, 873 P.2d 871 (1994). If Mary could prove that she had been exposed to a 
disease, would she have been required to prove that she also suffered physical manifestations from her 
distress?                                ˙ 
 
Was Mary within the zone-of-danger situation in Restatement (Third) § 46? Was she "in 
immediate danger of bodily harm"? 
 
Does her relationship with her husband within § 46(b) "specified categories of ... relationships in 




of course, was intentional and thus is not covered by § 46. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress is noted below. 
 
(8)  Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc.: The day after Charles Brown died in a Logan, Utah hospital 
his wife, Ella, and his son, Michael, returned to their home in Montpelier, Idaho where they contacted 
defendant to arrange cremation and a memorial service. Matthews Mortuary arranged to have the 
cremation performed by Aultorest Crematorium of Ogden, Utah. Approximately three weeks after the 
memorial service defendant delivered a plastic box in a brown wrapper. The box remained unopened for 
nearly a year, until Michael took the remains to scatter in the Elk Valley area near Montpelier. When 
Michael removed the brown wrapper, the burial transfer certificate located inside bore the name of 
Michael Calvin Jackson. All of the parties concluded that Charles' remains had been lost. 
 
Ella and Michael filed a complaint against Matthews Mortuary and Aultorest Memorial 
Crematoriurm alleging that the defendants had negligently mishandled the cremated remains of Charles 
and as a result, plaintiffs suffered mental anguish. The supreme court reversed beginning its analysis with 
Summers: 
 
In order to recover damages for emotional distress, the well-established law in Idaho clearly 
requires that emotional distress be accompanied by physical injury or physical manifestations of 
injury. In Summers v. Western Idaho Potato Processing Co., 94 Idaho 1,479 P.2d292 (1970), the 
plaintiff had her clothing ripped off by machinery leaving her standing nude in front of her fellow 
employees. In an action against her employer she sought damages for pain, suffering, mental 
anguish and nervous shock. In Summers we held that a plaintiff could not recover for pure 
emotional distress absent an accompanying physical injury. We have continued to adhere to this 
rule in other cases. See Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint School Dist. No. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 
640 (1989) (physical symptoms such as severe headaches, occasional suicidal thoughts, sleep 
disorders, reduced libido, fatigue, stomach pains and loss of appetite were sufficient to withstand 
summary judgment); .... 
 
Relying on Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868, the 
court noted that there is an exception to "this general rule" where defendant negligently mishandles a 
corpse. The court quotes Prosser and Keeton’s rationale for the exception: "What all of these cases 
appear to have in common is an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from 
the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious. Where the 
guarantee can be found, and the mental distress is undoubtedly real and serious, there may be no good 
reason to deny recovery." 
 
The court concludes, however, that 
 
the case law clearly holds that the only person entitled to the exception outlined above is 
the person entitled to the proper disposition of the body. The 'primary and paramount rights to 
possession of the body of a decedent, and to control burial or other legal disposition of the body, 
are in the surviving spouse.' (] But see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868, comment g. 
Therefore, absent physical injury manifesting emotional distress, we hold that only the spouse, or 
next surviving kin, may bring a cause of action pursuant to this exception. 
 
....Under the exception to the general rule, which we now recognize, Ella Brown, 
as the surviving spouse, need not prove or show physical injury in order to recover for 
emotional distress arising out of the mishandling of her deceased husband's cremated 
remains. 
 
The court also emphasized that "we do not hold that a defendant in this type of case is 
strictly liable for a claim of mishandling of a body. Plaintiffs must still prove all of the elements of 
negligence and damages in order to recover. The mere fact that mishandling of a body has 




Furthermore, the court held, Michael is not the surviving spouse, or next surviving kin, 
and as such he does not come within the exception we recognize, and in order to recover 
damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress must show physical manifestations of injury. 
Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830,801 P.2d 37 (1990). 
 
Is Brown an example of the second category of "directly inflicting emotional disturbance"? 
Note that the supreme court in Brown did not require the decedents wife to prove that she had 
suffered any physical manifestations from the distress. 
 
What other "categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships" can you imagine "in 
which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional disturbance"? 
 
(9)  Intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage): The judicial hostility to claims for invasion of 
emotional tranquility is further demonstrated by the example of the nominate tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Normally intentional conduct is much more likely to lead to liability given the greater 
social stigma attached to intentional conduct. In Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 
606 P.2d 944 (1980), the Court was presented with a claim for both intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. It began by noting that "[t]he treatment of intentional infliction of emotional distress as 
a tort in itself, if the absence of a physical injury, is relatively new to the law." 
 
[C]ommentators have recognized the concern of the courts that a rule of law which allows 
recovery of damages for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury may lead to the 
pressing of fraudulent claims. [] For this reason, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress is generally held to lie only in the presence of outrageous intentional conduct on the part 
of the defendant which leads to severe emotional distress. By requiring both conduct of an 
"outrageous" nature and "severe" emotional distress this rule afford courts of means of limiting 
fictitious claims. 
 
The court was unwilling to conclude that the mortuary's conduct in Brown v. Matthews Mortuary was 
sufficient to give rise to an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It has generally been 
unwilling to find the requisite conduct or injury. See Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 682 P.2d 1282 (1984) 
(conduct failed to cause severe emotional distress); Yeend v. United Parcel Service, 104 Idaho 333,659 
P.2d 87 (1983) (employer's conduct in requiring an injured employee to continue working despite injuries 
insufficiently outrageous); Rasmuson v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 102 Idaho 95, 624 P.2d 1098 (1981) 
(breach of trust by a fiduciary insufficiently outrageous); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 
Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980) (action of auctioneer in selling skidder contrary to contract insufficiently 
outrageous); but see Gill v. Brown, 107 Idaho 1137,695 P.2d 1276 (Ct. App.1985) (reversing trial courts 
dismissing of claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where defendant shot plaintiff's donkey); 
see also Pounds v. Denison, 115 Idaho 381, 766 P.2d 1262 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 
(10) The torts of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress are discussed in Chapter 11 


















B. Percipient Witnesses 
 
 
CZAPLICKI v. GOODING JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 231 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640 (1989) 
 
HUNTLEY, J.- [Garrett Czaplicki, a six-year-old boy, was a kindergarten student. On the day he died, 
Garrett's mother, Rose, was working as a teacher's aide. She heard people running and someone fall in 
the classroom. She turned and saw it was Garrett who had fallen. Garrett rose to his knees and Rose 
went to him and asked, "Where does it hurt?" Garrett began to gesture with his right arm and then 
collapsed in unconsciousness into his mother's arms. She shouted for an ambulance. The school's 
principal, Richard Conley, instructed the school secretary not to call an ambulance and walked to where 
Garrett was. After briefly examining the child, Conley picked him up and walked back to the school office 
with Garrett and laid him on a bench. The sheriffs’ dispatcher log indicates that the school for an 
ambulance at 2:20p.m. Marie Klingler, the school librarian and a trained Emergency Medical Technician 
(EMT), was summoned to the office. She repositioned Garrett's head, covered him with a blanket, and 
elevated his legs. She testified that she observed that Garrett was breathing shallowly, and that every few 
seconds he would take a gasp of air. The EMT with the ambulance immediately performed an 
assessment of Garrett's condition and noted a complete absence of heartbeat and breathing. The EMTs 
began cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and Garrett was transported to Gooding County Memorial 
Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. Plaintiffs’ experts testified that "My opinion is that the interval 
from the time the problem first started to the time treatment was initiated was too long, and that once 
treatment was initiated, it was not appropriate treatment, and had appropriate treatment been given at the 
proper time, the child would be alive now." The expert also testified that in his medical opinion "had EMT 
assistance been provided even a minute sooner most likely it would have saved Garrett's life." Garrett’s 
parents brought an action for emotional distress.] 
 
It is beyond dispute that in Idaho no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
will arise where there is no physical injury to the plaintiff. Hathaway v. Krumery, 110 ldaho 515, 716 P.2d 
1287 (1986); Hatfield v. Max Rouse &Sons Northwest, 100 ldaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980). The 
"physical injury" requirement is designed to provide some guarantee of the genuineness of the claim in 
the face of the danger that claims of mental harm will be falsified or imagined. Hatfield. Physical 
manifestations of the emotional injury enable a plaintiff to posit a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. Hatfield. The Czaplickis' complaint alleges that defendants' actions have proximately caused 
"severe emotion and result in physical pain and injury to the plaintiff, Rose Czaplicki," and have "caused 
severe emotion and commensurate physical injury to plaintiff Russell Czaplicki." The Czaplickis describe 
various emotional injuries that have manifested themselves in physical symptoms such as severe 
headaches, occasional suicidal thoughts, sleep disorders, reduced libido, fatigue, stomach pains and loss 
of appetite. 
 
In Rasmuson v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., this Court stated: 
 
The plaintiff also appeals the district court's dismissal of her counts seeking recovery for 
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by negligent, bad faith and 
reckless trust management. This Court's recent opinion in Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons 
Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980), specifies the requirements to successfully bring 
these torts. Inasmuch as there were no allegations of physical manifestations involved in the case 
at bar, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress does not lie. 
 
Construing the facts in the existing record most liberally in the Czaplickis' favor, as is required of 
this Court in reviewing the district court's summary judgment decision, [], reveals at a minimum that a 






BISTLINE & JOHNSON, JJ., concur. 
 
SHEPARD, J. dissenting [on a different issue]. BAKES, C.J., dissented - .... 
 
[O]ur prior cases have required that any claim for damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress be 
accompanied with objective physical manifestations before any such claim is cognizable. Subjective 
claims of pain, injury or suffering are not sufficient. There must be objective physical manifestations. 
Complaints such as those raised by the plaintiffs in this case, such as loss of appetite, stomach pains, 
fatigue, reduced libido, sleep disorders, suicidal thoughts and headaches, are not the kinds of objective 
physical manifestations which our cases, and the cases from other jurisdictions around the country, have 
allowed recovery for under a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 
Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (1982) ("In order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
the plaintiff must allege and prove physical harm [which] must be manifested by objective symptomology 
and substantiated by expert medical testimony"); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Young, 384 So. 2d 69, 71 
(Miss. 1980) (no recovery allowed for mental distress without a showing of "objectively observable 
physical consequences"); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON 
ON THELAWOFTORTs 54 at364 (5th ed.1984) ("[T]he mental distress [must] be certified by some 
physical injury, illness or other objective physical manifestation"); Gill v. Brown, 107 Idaho 1137, 1138, 
695 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Ct. App. 1985) ("In order for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress to 
lie, the actions of the defendant must have caused some physical injury to the plaintiff which 





(1)  What is the source of the duty? Is the source of the duty in Czaplicki the same as that in Lindsay? 
Why is the interest in emotional integrity protected in this case? Why does the court limit the duty in the 
way that it does? 
 
Is Czaplicki distinguishable from Lindsay and Summers? Was Ms. Czaplicki the direct victim of 
the defendant's negligence? Are the reasons for restricting recovery for emotional distress even more 
persuasive when the claimant is a "sentient witness" rather than a direct victim? 
 
(2)  The second of the two sections in Restatement (Third) (Tentative Draft No. 5) on negligent 
infliction of emotional distress provides: 
 
§47. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Disturbance Resulting from Bodily Harm to a Third 
Person 
An actor who negligently causes serious bodily injury to a third person is subject to liability for 
serious emotional disturbance thereby caused to a person who: 
 
(a)  perceives the event contemporaneously, and 
(b) is a close family member of the person suffering the bodily injury. 
 
Would Rose Czaplicki be able to recover under this provision? Did the principal "cause serious 
bodily injury" to Garrett? Was Rose's emotional disturbance "serious"? Note that the section does not 
require physical consequences. Do the physical manifestations that the Idaho courts require provide proof 
that the emotional disturbance is serious? 
 
(3)  The role of physical manifestations: Despite the court's statement that "[i]t is beyond dispute that 
in Idaho no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress will arise where there is no 
physical injury to the plaintiff," Czaplicki is arguably the first case where the principle is actually necessary 





(a)  Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, which is cited by the Czaplicki court, offered a 
more extended discussion: 
 
the courts cited the difficulty of proving the presence of emotional distress and measuring the loss 
it caused in monetary terms, the resulting difficulty of tying the actions of the defendant 
proximately to the distress of the plaintiff, the presumed triviality of harm involved, and the 
possibility of a flood of fraudulent litigation.... [C]ommentators have recognized the concern of the 
courts that a rule of law which allows recovery of damages for emotional distress in the absence 
of any physical injury may lead to the pressing of fraudulent claims.... 
 
According to Dean Prosser, the infliction of minor emotional distress, so far from serious 
that it does no physical harm, is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and 
usually so trivial, that the courts have been quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff against 
mere negligence, where the elements of extreme outrage and moral blame which have 
had such weight in the case of the intentional tort are lacking. 
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 329 (4th ed. 1971). 
 
(b)  Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc. was a claim for wrongful death, physical injuries, 
and emotional distress that resulted from a vacation trip gone bad. Prior to leaving, Marisela took the 
family vehicle into Boise Tire to have the tires inspected and rotated. The next day, the 
right-rear wheel separated from the vehicle without warning while the vehicle was being driven at highway 
speeds. The driver was severely injured, his wife was killed, and their eighteen-month old daughter 
allegedly suffered emotional distress. The court offered the following analysis of the child's claim: 
 
We hold that, in the instance of a young child, lacking the capacity to verbalize regarding 
physical manifestations of emotional distress, the exposure to a negligently, inflicted violent 
contact, such as a car accident, coupled with evidence demonstrating emotional distress, is 
sufficient evidence to support an award of noneconomic damages. 
 
Due to the risk of fraudulent claims, the difficulty of proving causation, and the belief that 
some degree of emotional distress is a foreseeable fact of everyday life, courts have long 
conditioned recovery for emotional distress on plaintiffs' ability to offer tangible proof of emotional 
distress. See Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840,851,606 P.2d 944, 955 
(1980) (overruled on other grounds by Brown v. Fritz, ...); [] Thus, this Court held over forty years 
ago that a plaintiff who alleges emotional trauma as the result of another's negligence must 
demonstrate that she has physically manifested the distress. Summers v. Western Idaho Potato 
Processing Co., 94 Idaho 1, 2, 479 P.2d 292, 293 (1970). Our previous decisions recognize that 
there may be circumstances in which proof of a negligently inflicted physical impact is sufficient to 
support an award for resulting emotional distress. Hatfield, 100 Idaho at 851, 606 P.2d at 955) 
(characterizing Summers as holding that there is no right of recovery "for emotional distress in the 
absence of physical causes or manifestations ....") (emphasis added)). Given that eighteen-month 
old Nayeli was involved in a violent car accident during which the vehicle she was in rolled at high 
speed, resulting in serious injuries to her father and her mother's death, we hold that the 
experience of the car accident itself was a sufficient physical cause as to support a finding of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
 
Although multiple medical tests immediately after the accident revealed that Nayeli had 
not suffered an identifiable physical injury, there is evidence in the record to support the district 
court's finding that Nayeli displayed physical manifestations of emotional trauma. This Court has 
recognized physical manifestations of emotional distress as including sleep disorders, 
headaches, stomach pains, suicidal thoughts, fatigue, loss of appetite, irritability, anxiety, reduced 
libido and being "shaky-voiced." Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 837, 801 P.2d 
37,44 (1990); Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 332, 775 P.2d 
640,646 (1989); Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 35, 13 P.3d 857, 866 (2000). Here, the trial 
court found that following the accident, Nayeli regressed in development, appeared withdrawn, 
and suffered nightmares. Under our precedent, these physical manifestations are sufficient 
DUTY 
90 
to support recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741,274 P.3d 1256 (2012). 
 
The decision's rationale is ambiguous. Consider the following readings: 
 
(a) Nayeli's ''violent contact" in the car accident is a sufficient guarantor of genuineness of the 
emotional distress when it is "coupled with evidence demonstrating emotional distress. This suggests that 
both a physical impact and independent evidence is necessary. 
 
(b) The second iteration of the holding seemingly reduces the requirements: "the experience of 
the car accident itself was a sufficient physical cause to support a finding of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. [emphasis added] This statement suggests that the facts of the accident alone are 
sufficient to overcome the courts' traditional concerns with "fraudulent claims." Does this mean that the 
accident falls within the exception the court noted in Brown v. Fritz [n.4 following Lindsay]: "We leave to 
another day the carving out of conduct which ... might be conclusively presume to inflict emotional 
distress"? 
 
(c) The final paragraph notes that although Nayeli "had not suffered an identifiable physical 
injury," she suffered sufficient emotional distress "[u]nder our precedent," e.g., Czaplicki. Did the decision 
change the requirements for recovery of emotional distress? 
 
(4)  Proof of injury (pt. 2): Do "physical manifestations" as ephemeral as "severe headaches, 
occasional suicidal thoughts, sleep disorders, reduced libido, fatigue, stomach pains and loss of appetite," 
serve the function of screening out fraudulent claims? 
 
In Cook v. Skyline Corp., the plaintiffs purchased a manufactured house built by Skyline and sold 
and assembled by defendant Norwest Home Center, Inc. After delivery and assembly, the Cooks' 
concluded that the house was defective. When Norwest was unable to remedy the problems to the 
couple's satisfaction, they took their concerns to Skyline. Concluding that this did not remedy their 
problems, they filed suit alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, and Skyline's negligent selection 
of Norwest as a dealer. At trial the Cooks testified that living in and dealing with the problems arising from 
their defective home caused emotional distress. Sandra Cook testified that the situation was "very 
stressful," that the problems put distance between herself and her husband, that she felt ill just being in 
the house, and that she suffered from frustration, headaches and irritability. Sam Cook testified that he 
suffered from ulcers and anxiety, and that he was "shaky" and "shaky-voiced." Sam also testified that he 
was "not ashamed to say that [he] even cried." In its memorandum and order granting a new trial, the 
district court ruled it had previously erred in letting the jury consider emotional distress in awarding 
damages to the Cooks because the Cooks failed to support their emotional distress claims with expert 
testimony. 
 
The Cooks argue the district court erred in ruling that expert testimony was necessary to 
recover on a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, citing Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint 
School District No. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640 (1989). In Czaplicki, this Court held that a 
plaintiff's claim for emotional distress damages will survive summary judgment as long as they 
allege physical manifestations of the emotional distress, because such allegations reveal "at a 
minimum that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to the [plaintiff's] claims for the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress." Czaplicki, 116 Idaho at 332, 775 P.2d at 646. In a later case, this 
Court interpreted Czaplicki to hold the allegations asserted by the lay witnesses in their complaint 
''were sufficient to constitute an allegation of a manifestation of a physical injury to raise an issue 
of fact which required a trial on that issue." Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 218,796 
P.2d 87,95 (1990) (emphasis added). However, in Evans, this Court went on to hold that in order 
to "allege and prove a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress there must be both an 
allegation and proof that a party claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress has suffered a 
physical injury, i.e., a physical manifestation of an injury caused by the negligently inflicted 





.... It is clear from Evans that I.R.E. 701 affords the district court discretion to determine 
whether a lay witness may testify as to his or her opinion regarding certain matters, but testimony 
offered by a lay person relating to the cause of a medical condition 
should be disregarded. See Evans, 118 Idaho at 219, 796 P.2d at 96. 
Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 13 P.3d 857 (2000). 
 
Is expert medical testimony required in all cases in which plaintiff asserts that she suffered 
emotional distress? Is expert testimony required only when the emotional distress is not parasitic to some 
other claim? Is expert testimony required only when the emotional distress produces physical 
manifestations that lie outside the average juror's competence? 
 
  Carrillo v. Boise Tire also seems to cloud the Evans-Cook requirement that "proof that a party 
claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress has suffered a physical injury, i.e., a physical 
manifestation of an injury caused by the negligently inflicted emotional distress" and that the proof must 
come from a medical expert ("testimony offered by a lay person relating to the cause of a medical 
condition should be disregarded"). Although Nayeli's caretaker testified on her emotional problems 
following the accident, apparently no medical testimony was offered.ls this perhaps what the court alluded 
to when it wrote, "the experience of the car accident itself was a sufficient physical cause as to support a 
finding of negligent infliction of emotional distress"? Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741,274 
P.3d 1256 (2012).  
 
(5)  Tort and contract (pt. 2): Is Cook v. Skyline consistent with Brown v. Fritz in which the court 
held that damages for "emotional distress which arise from or have their roots in the breach of a 
contractual relationship" cannot be recovered and the plaintiff must instead seek punitive damages? Is 
Cook distinguishable from Brown v. Fritz? 
 
(6)  Proof of injury (p. 3): Plaintiffs' two-year old daughter was visiting Home Depot with her father 
when an employee using a high-lift loader attempted to remove a package of countertops manufactured 
by defendant from a high shelf. The package split, and the child was killed by falling debris. On appeal, 
defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the award for emotional distress to the 
parents. The court disagreed: 
 
The district judge ... presented a thorough analysis as to why the jury's verdict for Virgil was 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. In his decision he recounted the evidence of 
Virgil's physical manifestations of emotional distress, the testimony of a grief psychologist 
regarding the devastation that occurs when a parent loses a child and Virgil's testimony about his 
mental pain and suffering over the loss of his daughter and the horrifying experience of being 
present during the accident. 
Homer v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 141 P.3d 1099 (2006). 
 
(7)  Economic and noneconomic damages: Recall that in 1990, the legislature modified the 
damages available intort actions by capping noneconomic damages. The statutory provisions are set out 








(1) Idaho Code provides: 
 
§ 5-310: Action for injury to unmarried child- The parents may maintain an action 
for the injury of an (1) unmarried minor child, and for the injury of (2) a minor child who was 
married at the time of his injury and whose spouse died as a result of the same occurrence and 
who leaves no issue, and (3) a guardian for the injury of his ward, when such injury is caused by 
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the wrongful act or neglect of another, but if either the father or mother be dead or has 
abandoned his or her family, the other is entitled to sue alone. Such action may be maintained 
against the person causing the injury, or if such person be employed by another person, who is 
responsible for his conduct, also against such other person. 
 
§ 5-311: Suit for wrongful death by or against heir or personal representatives - Damages - (1) 
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his or her heirs 
or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the 
person causing the death, or in case of the death of such wrongdoer, against the personal 
representative of such wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the 
person injured. If any other person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect, the action 
may also be maintained against such other person, or in case of his or her death, his or her 
personal representatives. In every action under this section, such damages may begiven as 
under all the circumstances of the case as may be just. 
 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, "heirs" mean: 
(a) Those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the decedent 
according to the provisions of subsection (21) of section 15-1-2014, Idaho Code. 
 
(b)  Whether or not qualified under subsection (2)(a) of this section, the decedents spouse, 
children, stepchildren, parents, and, when partly or wholly dependent on the decedent for support or 
services, any blood relatives and adoptive brothers and sisters. It includes the illegitimate child of a 
mother, but not the illegitimate child of the father unless the father has recognized a responsibility for the 
child's support. 
1. "Support" includes contributions in kind as well as money. 
2. "Services" mean tasks, usually of a household nature, regularly performed by the decedent 
that will be a necessary expense to the heirs of the decedent. These services may vary according 
to the identity of the decedent and heir and shall be determined under the particular facts of each 
case. 
 
(c) Whether or not qualified under subsection (2)(a) or (2)(b) of this section, the putative spouse 
of the decedent, if he or she was dependent on the decedent for support or services. As used in this 
subsection, "putative spouse" means the surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage who is found by 
the court to have believed in good faith that the marriage to the decedent was valid. 
 
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to change or modify the definition of "heirs" under 
any other provision of law. 
 
§5-319: Death or transfer of interest- Procedure- Actions by or against public officers -An 
action or proceeding does not abate by the death or any disability of a party, or by the transfer of 
any interest therein, if the cause of action or proceeding survive or continue. In case of the death 
or any disability of a party, the court, on motion, may allow the action or proceeding to be 
continued by or against his representative or successor in interest. In case of any other transfer of 
interest the action or proceeding may be continued in the name of the original party, or the court 
may allow the person to whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the action or proceeding. 
An action or proceeding brought by or against any public officer in his official capacity and which 
action or proceeding is pending at the time of his death, resignation, retirement or removal from 
office does not abate. The court on its own motion or on motion for substitution may substitute the 
successor in office and allow the action or proceeding to be continue against such successor. 
[originally enacted 1881; amended 1931] 
 
                                                     
4 I.C. 15-1-201(21) defines "heirs" as "those persons, including the surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate 
succession to the property of a decedent. These statutes in tum provide shares to the following categories of persons, often 




§5-327: Personal injuries- Property damage- Death of wrongdoer. Survival of action. 
Causes of action arising out of injuryto the person or property, or death, caused by the wrongful 
act or negligence of another, except actions for slander or libel, shall not abate upon the death of 
the wrongdoer, and each injured person or the personal representative of each one meeting 
death, as above stated, shall have a cause of action against the personal representative of the 
wrongdoer; provided, however, the punitive damages or exemplary damages shall not be 
awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action; provided, however, that the injured person 
shall not recover judgment except upon some competent, satisfactory evidence corroborating the 
testimony of said injured person regarding negligence and proximate cause. 
[originally enacted 1949; amended 1965 and 1971] 
 
(2) The Uniform Model Survival and Death Act provides: 
(3)  




As used in this Act: 
(1)  "Actionable conduct" means an act or omission that causes the death of a person for 
which the person could have brought and maintained a personal injury action if he had not died; 
the term includes an act or omission for which the law imposes strict liability or liability for breach 
of warranty. 
 
(2) "Survivors of a decedent" means: 
(i) the surviving spouse, ascendants and descendants of the decedent, and 
(ii) individuals who were wholly or partially dependent upon the decedent for 
support and were members of the decedent's household or related to the decedent by 
blood or marriage. 
 
(3)  "Closely-related survivors" means the surviving spouse and ascendants and descendants 
of the decedent. 
 
§2: [Survival Actions] 
(a)  An action or a [claim for relief] [cause of action]: 
 
(1)  does not abate by reason of the death of a person to or against whom it accrued, 
unless by its terms it was limited to the person's lifetime; 
(2)  may be maintained by or against the personal representative of a decedent; and 
(3) is subject to all defenses to which it was subject during the decedent's lifetime. 
 
(b) Damages recoverable in behalf of a decedent under this section for an injury causing his 
death are limited to those that accrued to him before his death, plus reasonable burial expenses 
paid or payable from his estate. Damages so recovered become a part of the decedent's estate 
and are distributable in the same manner as other assets of the estate. This section does not 
affect the measure of damages allowable under the law for any other damages recoverable under 
any other [claim for relief] [cause of action]. 
 
§3: [Death Actions] 
 
(a)  With respect to any death caused by actionable conduct, the decedents personal 
representative, acting in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of the survivors of the decedent, 
may bring and maintain a death action against any person or the estate of any person 
legally responsible for the damages, including an insurer providing applicable uninsured 
or underinsured motorist coverage. The death action is subject to all defenses that might 




(b)  If no personal representative is appointed [within six months after decedent's 
death] the death action may be brought and maintained by a closely-related survivor 
acting in a fiduciary capacity. 
 
(c)  Any survivor having a potential conflict of interest with other survivors may be 
represented independently in the death action. 
 
(d)  In the death action, damages awarded to survivors of a decedent are limited to the 
following elements: 
 
(1)  Medical expenses incident to the injury resulting in death and reasonable 
burial expenses paid or payable by the survivors, to the extent that the 
decedent's estate could have recovered under Section 2 had the payments been 
made by the decedent or his estate; [and] 
(2)  The [present] monetary value of support, services and financial 
contributions they would have received from the decedent had death not ensued[.][; and] 
[(3) For closely-related survivors, [reasonable compensation for decedent's 
pain and suffering before death if not separately recovered under Section 2, and] 
reasonable compensation for mental anguish and loss of companionship [not exceeding 
the sum of$ ].] 
 
(e)  Punitive or exemplary damages [are not recoverable] [are recoverable only if they would 
have been recoverable by the decedent had death not ensued]. 
 
(f) The trier of fact shall make separate awards to each of the survivors entitled to damages. 
Conduct of a survivor which contributed to the death is a defense to the survivor's recovery to the 
same extent as in other actions. 
 
(g) The decedent's personal representative or a closely-related survivor qualifying 
under subsection (b)may compromise any claim arising under this section, before or after an 
action is brought, subject to confirmation by a judge of the court [in which the action is or could 
have been brought] (appointing the personal representative]. The personal representative or 
closely-related survivor shall apply to the court for confirmation by [petition], stating the terms of 
the compromise, the reasons therefor, and the names of all survivors having an interest in the 
distribution of the proceeds. The court, upon notice, shall hold a hearing which all survivors and 
their legal representatives may attend and shall confirm or disapprove the settlement. If the 
settlement is confirmed and any of the survivors or their representatives disagree with the 
distribution prescribed by it, the judge shall order any distribution a trier of fact may make under 
subsection (f). 
 
§4: [Joinder of Actions] 
 
Actions under Sections 2 and 3are separate actions but shall be joined for trial if they if the are 
based upon the same actionable conduct. Separate verdicts and awards shall be 
rendered in each action. 
 
(3)  Compare and contrast the Idaho wrongful death and survival statutes with the Uniform Survival 
and Death Act on the following points: 
 
(a)  What interests are protected in a survival action? 
(b)  What interests are protected in a wrongful death action? 
(c)  Who is entitled to bring each type of action? 
(d)  Who is entitled to participate in any recovery in each type of action? Why? 
(e)  What types of damages may be recovered in each action? 





To the extent that you cannot answer these questions from the text of the Idaho statutes, consider the 
following cases. It is important as you work through the Idaho statutory and caselaw to note the dates. 
 
(4)        The distinction between a survival action and a wrongful death action: 
A survival action is for the damages the deceased suffered and would have sued for had he 
survived, while a wrongful death action, in contrast, involves the damages suffered by 
the heirs of the decedent because of his death such as loss of guidance, support, etc. 
Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980). 
 
 
A Survival of Actions 
 
CRAIG v. GELLINGS 
 
Idaho Court of Appeals  
148 Idaho 192, 2119 P.2d 1208 (2009) 
 
lANSING, C.J.: This appeal challenges the district court's order dismissing Leann Craig's personal injury 





Craig, an unmarried woman, brought a personal injury action against Steven John Gellings, Deverl 
Wattenbarger, Bart Wattenbarger, Carol Wattenbarger, and Wattenbarger Farms ("Respondents") for 
damages arising out of an automobile accident. Before the action was concluded, Craig died from causes 
unrelated to the accident. The personal representative of Craig's estate thereupon moved to be 
substituted as the plaintiff, and the Respondents moved to dismiss the case, asserting that personal injury 
actions do not survive an unmarried plaintiff’s death. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and 
did not address the personal representative's motion. Craig's attorney appeals, challenging the dismissal 





A.   Survival of Personal Injury Claims for Economic Loss 
 
The question presented to this Court- whether Craig's claims for economic loss caused by 
personal injuries survive her death- is a question of law over which we exercise free review. [] 
 
Idaho has no statutory law governing the survival of a personal injury action after the 
death of an unmarried plaintiff. See Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,215,796 P.2d 87, 92 
(1990). In the absence of legislative enactment on a subject, Idaho Code § 73-116 specifies that the 
common law governs. It states: 
 
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the constitution 
or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state. 
 
It has long been recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court that at common law, a personal injury action 
abated with the death of either party. Stucki v. Loveland, 94 Idaho 621, 622, 495 P.2d 571,572 (1972); 
Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415,418, 184 P. 477,477-78 (1919). This common law rule has been modified 
to some extent, however, by the Idaho Legislature. First, I.C. § 5-311, authorizes wrongful death actions 
for heirs or personal representatives when the wrongful act or neglect of another caused the decedent's 
death. This statute does not allow a decedent's claims to survive but creates a new cause of action in 
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favor of heirs or personal representatives. Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 858, 736 P.2d 1309, 1312 
{1987). Second, LC. 
 
§5-327, expressly abrogates the common law rule that a personal injury action abates upon the 
death of the tortfeasor; it does not alter the rule as it applies to the death of the claimant. 
 
The Idaho Supreme Court found a third legislative modification of the common law rule in the 
enactment of Idaho's community property statutes. The Court held in Doggett v. Boiler Engineering & 
Supply Co., Inc., 93 Idaho 888, 892,477 P.2d511, 515 {1970), partially overruled by Evans, 118 Idaho at 
216, 796 P.2dat 93, that a married person's cause of action for personal injury is a community property 
right and therefore survives the death of the injured spouse so that damages accrued prior to the death 
may be recovered by the surviving spouse. The Doggett community property abatement exception was 
narrowed however, by the decision in Evans, where the Supreme Court held that general damages for 
pain and suffering, as distinguished from economic loss damages, are the injured spouse's separate 
property, not community property, and therefore do not survive the demise of the injured spouse. Evans, 
118 Idaho at 216, 796 P.2d at 93. 
 
No statute or Idaho Supreme Court decision has modified or overruled the abatement doctrine 
where, as here, the injured plaintiff is an unmarried person. To the contrary, the Supreme Court recently 
held that because the plaintiff died without leaving a surviving spouse, his claim for negligent medical 
care was extinguished and could not be pursued by the personal representative of his estate. Steele v. 
Kootenai Medical Ctr., 142 Idaho 919, 921, 136 P.3d 905, 907 {2006}. 
 
While acknowledging these precedents, Appellant argues that the common law abatement rule 
should no longer be followed. Appellant argues that there is inconsistency and injustice in the current 
state of Idaho's tort law that allows creditors, including tort claimants, to pursue their claims against a 
decedent's estate while disallowing the same estate from carrying forward the decedent's personal injury 
claim against a tortfeasor whose wrongful act has depleted the estate's assets. Appellant also argues that 
the interest of a surviving spouse, whose community interest in a personal injury claim was preserved by 
the Doggett decision, is functionally equivalent to the interest of an unmarried decedent’s estate when a 
personal injury resulted in economic damages to the estate. Because the abatement rule does not apply 
when community property was depleted, the argument goes, it should not apply when the estate of an 
unmarried person has been depleted. Appellant claims support for these arguments in comments made 
by the Supreme Court in its Doggett opinion. 
 
We must agree that the tone of the Doggett opinion is critical of the common law rule and 
seems to signal a willingness of the Supreme Court at that time to overrule the abatement 
doctrine in a Mure case. For example, the Court stated: 
 
[W]hen established things are no longer secure in a fast-changing world, the court should 
re-examine the precedents and determine if they provide a proper standing under present 
conditions. 
 
We have examined the precedents and the reasons for the rule of non-survivability of 
causes of action following the death of a plaintiff. We find the precedents unclear and 
unsatisfactory and the purported reasons for the rule virtually non-existent. We suggest therefore 
that a continuation of such a rule serves no purpose. 
 
Doggett, 93 Idaho at 892, 477 P.2d at 515. Nevertheless, overruling the abatement rule is not what the 
Supreme Court did either in Doggett or in its subsequent decisions. In Doggett, the Supreme Court issued 
a narrow ruling; it held only that the common law was impliedly modified by community property statutes, 




more recent decisions in Steele5 and Evans adhere to the common law abatement rule with respect to 
claims that do not belong to a marital community. 
 
This Court is not free to disregard precedents of the Idaho Supreme Court. Therefore, 
regardless of how persuasive the Appellant's arguments may be concerning the logic or fairness of the 





The judgment of the district court dismissing this action is affirmed. 
 





(1)  Kloepfer v. Forch: Plaintiff requested defendant, a druggist, to sell him sodium arsenite for use as 
a pesticide on his clover crop. Defendant instead sold plaintiff sodium arsenate. The arsenate destroyed 
the crop and plaintiff brought an action alleging that defendant "sold and supplied [plaintiff] with sodium 
arsenate and carelessly, negligently, falsely and fraudulently represented to [plaintiff] that it was sodium 
arsenite and [he] not knowing the difference between said chemicals, used the same upon [his] crops and 
thereby destroyed them." The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff 
appealed. 
 
       While the appeal was pending, Jacob Forch died. When a motion was made to substitute Rosina 
Forch, executrix of decedent's estate, as plaintiff, the issue became whether the cause of action survived 
Jacob's death. 
  As a general rule, in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, causes of action ex 
contractu survive while causes ex delicto do not. However, there are well-recognized exceptions 
to both branches of the rule. As was said by the supreme court of Virginia in Lee's Admr. v. Hill, 
87 Va. 497, 12 S.E. 1052: "The true test is, not so much the form of the action, as the nature of 
the cause of action. Where the latter is a tort unconnected with contract, and which affects the 
person only, and not the estate, such as assault, libel, slander, and the like, there the rule, Actio 
personalis, etc., applies. But where, as in the present case, the action is founded on a contract, it 
is virtually ex contractu, although nominally in tort, and there it survives."... 
 
We have no statutory provision abrogating the common-law rule of survival of causes of 
action above referred to. Applying that rule to this case it may be said that while the action is, in 
form, ex delicto, the cause is, in fact, ex contractu. The injury for which recovery is sought grows 
out of the contract of purchase of sodium arsenate represented by the vendor to be sodium 
arsenite, and the application thereof to the crops of plaintiff and his assignors whereby those 
specific pieces of property were destroyed. These facts distinguish this case from those where 
recovery is sought for injury to the person or for torts resulting in damage to the estate, generally, 
and make these claims assignable and cause them to survive the death of a party to the action. 
The motion to substitute Rosina Forch, executrix, for Jacob Forch as plaintiff herein is granted. 
Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919). 
 
(2)  Moon v. Bullock: On October 6, 1941, two automobiles collided at the intersection of Meridian 
and Ustick Roads. One car was driven by Arthur Bullock, the other by Benjamin Moon. Moon's father 
Edwin was a passenger in his car. Both Arthur Bullock and Edwin Moon died enroute to the hospital. 
Edwin Moon's wife brought a wrongful death action against Bullock's estate; Benjamin Moon brought an 
action for the damage to his automobile and for his medical bills. The trial court dismissed the action, 
                                                     
5       In Steele the Supreme Court remanded the case, however, to allow the decedent's personal representative a chance to amend 
the complaint to allege a claim for wrongful death. 
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concluding that the cause of action did not survive the death of the alleged tortfeasor, Arthur Bullock. The 
case was appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court which affirmed the trial court's decision: 
 
Under the common law the death of either party to a civil action causes the abatement of 
a pending action. In such an event the action is dead and cannot be continued by the substitution 
of a representative. The only way such an action can be revived is by the bringing of a new 
action; and only actions in which the cause of action survives can be thus revived. [] 
 
To prevent the delay and expenses incident to the bringing of a new action, our Code 
provides: 
 
"An action or proceeding does not abate by the death or any disability of a party, 
or by the transfer of any interest therein, if the cause of action or proceeding survive or 
continue. In case of the death or disability of a party, the court, on motion may allow the 




Clearly the only change that this statute has wrought in the common law, is that in the 
case of the death (the only contingency here pertinent) of a party to a pending action, the action 
may be continued by a substituted party, and it will not be necessary to commence a new action; 
provided, that only actions wherein the cause of action survives, may be so continued. The 
statute is not a general survival statute; it still recognizes the general common law rule that 
certain actions and causes of action die irretrievably with the death of a party. Kloepfer v. Forch, 
32 Idaho 415, 184P.477(1919); []. 
Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944). 
 
Following the decision in Moon, the legislature enacted I.C. § 5-327.Was the holding in Moon 
reversed prospectively by the legislature? Did the legislature do more than reverse Moon? 
 
 
B. Wrongful Death Actions 
 
RUSSELL v. COX 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944) 
 
AILSHIE, J.- This is an appeal from a judgment sustaining demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint and dismissing 
her action. The complaint alleges: 
 
That the plaintiff, Ruth Russell, is the mother, and the defendant, Marcus E. Cox, is the 
surviving husband of Lottie Melvina Cox, deceased; that the decedent died childless, and she 
was pre-deceased by her father; that the said plaintiff and the said defendant are all of the heirs 
at law of the said decedent. 
 
That the defendant, Marcus E. Cox, on or about the 16th of July 1942, with force of arms, 
did wrongfully shoot and mortally wound the plaintiffs’ daughter, Lottie Melvina Cox, of which 
mortal wound her said daughter, on the 16th day of July 1942, dies; **** 
 
The action was instituted under § 5-311, I.C.A., which reads as follows: 
 
When the death of a person, not being a minor, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages 
against the person causing the death; or if such person be employed by another person who is 




the preceding section, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case 
may be just. 
 
Respondent contends that "at common law a tort committed by one spouse against the person or 
character of the other does not give rise to a cause of action in favor of the injured spouse." It is further 
contended that "In action for death [§ 5-311] by wrongful act the act must have been such as would have 
entitled injured party to maintain an action therefor if death had not ensued." 
 
On the other hand, appellant contends that the statute (§ 5-311, I.C.A.) creates "a new cause of 
action ***for the benefit of a third person"; and that it did not accrue to the deceased in his lifetime but 
accrued only immediately following his death. 
 
We had the consideration of this statute before us in Whitley v. Spokane, Ry., 23 Idaho 642, 
132P. 121(1913), afl'd, 237 U.S.487 (1915), and held, among other things, that "The cause of action is 
not anything that ever belonged to the decedent or to his estate. It never accrued to the decedent." In the 
course of our discussion of the question involved, it was said: 
 
This brings us to a consideration of the nature of this cause of action and the status of respondent 
in the courts of Idaho. Section 4100 of the Rev. Codes [now § 5-311, I.C.A.] authorizes the 
prosecution of an action by the 'heirs of personal representatives; of a deceased person against a 
person wrongfully causing the death of such person, and any judgment obtained in such an 
action inures to the benefit of the heirs of the decedent, and in no case becomes a part of the 
assets of the estate of the deceased. Except for this statute, no such action could be prosecuted 
in this state and no such cause of action could accrue in this state. [] The legislature had this 
power to confer this right on any heir or representative it saw fit to name or withhold the authority 
altogether. [] The cause of action is not anything that ever belonged to the decedent or to his 
estate. lt never accrued to the decedent. The action is allowed upon the theory that the wrongful 
death of the ancestor works a personal injury to his heirs, in that it deprives them of some 
pecuniary or other benefit which they would have received except for the death of the ancestor. 
The statute confers this right of action on the heirs, and it gives it directly to them or a personal 
representative such as an executor or administrator, and when such representative prosecutes 
the action, he does so as trustee for the heirs. 
 
Here it is admitted that appellant and respondent are the only heirs of Lottie Melvina Cox, deceased. 
Appellant is, therefore, entitled under the statute (§ 5-311) to prosecute this action. It is not a survival 
action, but an action, the right to prosecute which did not accrue in the lifetime of decedent but only upon 
her death. In other words, this right of action did not accrue to Lottie Melvina Cox or her estate. At the 
time of the accrual of the present action, the relation of husband and wife (between Marcus E. Cox, 
respondent, and Lottie Melvina Cox) had been terminated and no longer existed. For that reason, it 
becomes wholly unnecessary for us to consider the contention made by respondent, that an action in tort 
can not be maintained in this state by a wife against her husband. The recovery, if any, from the action, 
can not be community property. 
 
The circumstance that, where death results from the wrongful act of another, the injured party may in his 
lifetime sue for damages or compromise his cause of action for personal injuries, does not in any way 
militate against the right of the heirs or personal representatives of the decedent to prosecute their 
independent action for her wrongful death. In other words, the cause of action, which accrued to the 
injured party during her lifetime, may be prosecuted or compromised by the injured party and the receipts 
inure to the benefit of her estate; whereas, the right of action, which accrues on the death of the injured 
party, can only be prosecuted by her "heirs or personal representatives" and does not benefit the estate. 
 
The contention, that our death statute provides a substituted and not a new right of action, is wholly 
untenable. [] 
 
It is true, as said by the Supreme Court in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 
440, that, "They [the heirs] claim under him [deceased], and they can recover only in case he 
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could have recovered damages had he not been killed, but only injured." That is to say, the cause 
of action arises out of the same state of facts, whether prosecuted by the injured party during his 
lifetime or by his heirs after his death; but the heirs must prove the additional fact, that the 
decedent died as a result of the wrongful or negligent act. Whether prosecuted by the injured 
party during his lifetime or by the heirs after his death, it must be shown, under our statute, that 
the injury was the result of a wrongful or negligent act. The right of action, however, in the one case 
arises in favor of the injured party and, in the other case, the right of action is conferred upon his "heirs or 
legal representatives." 
 
If the facts, out of which the right of action accrued to the injured party, (aside from capacity to sue) are 
not such as would have enabled him to prosecute an action in his lifetime, of course they would not be 
sufficient to authorize the prosecution of an action by his heirs after his death. In the one case, any 
judgment obtained would inure to the benefit of the injured party during his lifetime and enhance his 
estate on his death; whereas, a judgment obtained by his heirs would inure exclusively to their benefit 
and not to the benefit of the estate. 
 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with direction to overrule the 
demurrer and to take further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed. 
 





(1)  While the decision seems in accord with basic fairness, is the opinion consistent with Moon in its 
view of the proper roles of legislature and judiciary? Could the decedent have sued the defendant for her 
injuries if she had lived? If not, how can the court say that the heirs "claim under [the deceased], and they 
can recover only in case [the deceased] would have recovered damages had [the deceased] not been 
killed, but only injured"? At the time the decision was handed down, could one spouse sue another 
spouse in tort? 
 
 
BEVAN v. VASSAR FARMS, INC. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
117 Idaho 1038,793 P.2d 711 (1990) 
 
BOYLE, J. - In this wrongful death action brought by the parents of a deceased twenty-eight-year-old son, 
we are called upon to determine whether the jury's apportionment of fifty percent contributory negligence 
attributed to the decedent bars the parents' recovery. 
 
On September 27, 1985, Darrell Bevan was killed when a "com chopper" farm machine 
ran over him while he was attempting repairs. His parents, plaintiffs Wesley and Docia Bevan, hereafter 
"Bevans," brought this wrongful death action against Vassar Farms, the chopper's owner and Darrell's 
employer, pursuant to the Idaho wrongful death statute. I.C. § 5-311. Over Bevans' objection the jury was 
instructed to compare Darrell's negligence with that of Vassar Farms and impute Darrell's negligence to 
his parents. The special verdict form returned by the jury listed the negligence of decedent and Vassar 
Farms each at fifty percent. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict for defendant Vassar Farms 
and Bevans' appeal asserting that the Idaho wrongful death statute does not provide for such imputation 
of negligence. In addition, Bevans assert that they should be allowed full recovery, or in the alternative 
that their recovery should be diminished only by the percentage of negligence attributable to their son. 
 
The issue before us is whether I.C. § 5-311, Idaho's wrongful death statute, requires a decedent's 
contributory or comparative negligence to be imputed to his heirs, thereby precluding their cause of action 





I.C. §5-311 provides in [subsection (1)]. 
 
Bevans asserts that the absence of language in the statute, I.C. § 5-311, providing that 
heirs may maintain an action for wrongful death only whenever the wrongful act would have entitled the 
person injured to maintain an action if death had not ensued, demonstrates the legislature's intent not to 
require such to be a condition for recovery by a decedent's heirs. Bevans request that we overrule well 
established precedent and the long line of cases from this Court providing a different interpretation. 
Notwithstanding the absence of the suggested language in I.C. § 5-311, it is well established in this 
jurisdiction that " If the decedent's negligence would have barred his recovery against the defendant for 
injuries had he survived, then the decedent's heirs are barred from recovery in a wrongful death action." 
Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 822, 555 P.2d 144, 153 (1976); Clark v. Foster, 87 Idaho 134, 391 
P.2d 853 (1964); Hooton v. City of Burley, 70 Idaho 369,219P.2d651 (1950); Russell v. Cox,65 Idaho 
534, 148P.2d221 (1944); Hegelson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667,34 P.2d 957 (1934); Sprouse v. Magee, 46 
Idaho 622,269 P. 993 (1928). 
 
Bevans argue that in deciding Sprouse v. Magee, this Court incorrectly relied upon the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pacific Ry. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440 (1904), because that 
decision was based on facts where the defendant owed no legal duty to the decedent. In Northern Pacific 
Ry., the United States Supreme Court held where there is no legal duty owed to the decedent there can 
be no ''wrongful act." Therefore, the heirs in Northern Pacific Ry. had no action because "they claim under 
him, and they can recover only in case he could have recovered damages had he not been killed, but 
only injured." 192 U.S. at 450. 
 
In Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 269 P. 993 (1928) this Court held that it was reasonable to 
bar the heirs' recovery against a defendant if the deceased himself could not recover because such 
limitation existed in the Lord Campbell's Act, the original model for all wrongful death statutes. The Idaho 
legislature, in enacting I.C. § 5-311, adopted the substance of Lord Campbell's Act. 
 
Furthermore, the Idaho legislature, dating from the time of Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 
622, 269 P. 993 (1928), through the present, has been and continues to be aware of this Court's 
interpretation and application of I.C. § 5-311 and has not found it necessary to enact legislation to change 
or modify the wrongful death recovery law as interpreted by the decisions of this Court. 
 
In support of their argument that the decedent's contributor)' negligence is not intended 
to be imputed to the decedent's heirs, Bevans argue that the language in I.C. § 5-311, "[w]hen the death 
of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another' should be interpreted to mean that all that 
is needed for recovery under this statute is a "wrongful act of another'' which contributed to the death of 
the decedent. They contend that Vassar Farm's negligent maintenance of the machinery contributed to 
the death of the decedent, therefore the decedent's heirs have the right to recover under the statute 
regardless of the fifty percent apportionment of negligence to the decedent. To adopt such an 
interpretation would result in essentially a strict liability standard where recovery would be automatic in 
those cases where the heirs had no involvement in the events leading to the death of their decedent 
notwithstanding the extent of the decedent's negligence. Such an interpretation would allow the heirs in 
most cases to recover even though their decedent's negligence was equal to or greater than that of the 
defendant. We are not prepared to go so far. The position asserted by Bevans is clearly contrary to the 
intent of the wrongful death statute, I.C. § 5-311, and the contributory negligence statutes in I.C. § 6-801 
through § 6-807. 
 
The language of I.C. § 5-311 specifically states as a condition of recovery that the wrongful act of 
another must have caused the death of the decedent. In the present case, the jury found the defendant 
and Darrell Bevan equally responsible for his death. Furthermore, "wrongful act or neglect," as it is used 
in the statute, means a ''wrongful act or neglect" as against the deceased. It necessarily follows based on 
the well-established law in this jurisdiction that if a defendant is not liable for injuries to the decedent had 
death not ensued, then there is no basis for recovery by the decedent's heirs. If a defendant's conduct 
does not make him liable to an injured party, then that defendant cannot be held liable in the event of 
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death for damages resulting from the same conduct. Thus, there is no basis for recovery of damages by 
the heirs of the decedent in this case because fifty percent of the negligence was apportioned to him. 
 
[After examining the comparative fault statutes, the court concluded that plaintiffs' arguments] 
would render meaningless the long line of case authority interpreting and applying the wrongful death and 
comparative negligence statutes of this state. A wrongful death action "is allowed upon the theory that the 
wrongful death of the ancestor works a personal injury to his heirs, in that it deprives them of some 
pecuniary or other benefit which they would have received except for the death of the ancestor." Russell 
v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534,538, 148 P.2d 221 (1944). However, it has been held that the heirs claim under the 
decedent, Northern Pacific Ry. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440,450 (1904); Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667,34 
P.2d 957 (1934), and that a wrongful death action "arises out of the same state of facts, whether 
prosecuted by the injured party during his lifetime or by his heirs after his death." Russell v. Cox,65 Idaho 
534, 538, 148 P.2d 221, 222 (1944). 
In an action for personal injuries, a plaintiff cannot recover when it is proven by the evidence that 
his negligence was a proximate cause of his injury, and that his negligence was equal to or greater than 
the negligence of the defendant notwithstanding that the evidence may also show negligence on the part 
of the defendant. Since his parents' claim arises from the same facts, they should not be entitled to 
recover for losses and damages resulting from their son's death when he equally contributed to his own 
death. 
 
We continue to follow long standing and well-established precedent in the Idaho case law which 
construes the wrongful death statute and the comparative negligence statutes and hold that the plaintiffs 
can recover for wrongful death only when the wrongful act would have entitled the person injured to 
maintain an action if death had not ensued. Thus, if the decedent's negligence was not as great as that of 
the defendants, then decedent's heirs would be entitled to recover for their loss reduced by the 
percentage of decedent's negligence. However, where the decedent's negligence is equal to or greater 
than the defendant's negligence, then the decedent's heirs are barred from recovery as would be the 
injured party had he survived. Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144(1976); Fairchild v. Olsen, 
96 Idaho 338, 528 P.2d900 (1974); Clark v. Foster, 87 Idaho 134,391 P.2d853(1964); Hooton v. City of 
Burley, 70 ldaho 369, 219P.2d651 (1950); Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944); Hegelson 
v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667,34 P.2d 957 (1934); Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 269 P. 993 (1928). 
 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
 





(1)  The traditional description of a wrongful death action is that it is "derivative," that is, that the heirs 
have a claim only if the decedent had a claim. Given this derivative status of the action, what interest of 
the heirs is protected by a wrongful death action? Is it accurate to describe the interest as relational, that 
is, as an invasion of the relation between the decedent and his heirs since such a description would 
suggest that the decedent's contribution to the event was irrelevant- at least as long as the defendant's 
conduct was a cause of the event that led to the death? 
 
(2)  The condition precedent in the wrongful death statute: Russell v. Cox and Bevan both 
involve the prohibition on the heir's suit when the decedent would have been precluded from suing. The 
ability of the decedent to recover is considered a "condition precedent" to the heir's recovery. 
 
In Castorena v. General Bectric, plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions against various 
manufacturers of asbestos-containing products. Although each action was filed within two years of each 
decedent's death; each decedent, however, had been diagnosed with an asbestos-related illness more 
than two years prior to their deaths. The district court held that the heirs' claims were barred by the 
running of the statute of limitations on the decedents' claims: since decedents could not have brought the 




wrongful death statute, the supreme court concluded, "In line with well-reasoned and long-lasting 
precedent in case law, we find that Idaho's wrongful death act contains an implied condition precedent." 
The more "challenging issue," the court asserted, was the scope of the condition precedent. 
 
  [Defendants] argue that a wrongful death action is treated like a continuation of the right 
that the decedent had to bring a cause of action for his injury, and where the decedent would 
have been barred from bringing that action - for any reason - the decedent's heirs are likewise 
barred. A review of Idaho's case law on this issue demonstrates that Respondents' interpretation 
is unpersuasive. There is a distinction between requiring that the heirs or personal representative 
of the decedent may only recover where the harm done to the decedent was of such a character 
as would have entitled the decedent to relief, on the one hand, and requiring that the decedent 
must have been procedurally able to bring suit himself immediately prior to his death, on the 
other. Idaho's wrongful death action does not create a survival action, but an entirely new cause 
of action on behalf of a decedent's heirs and personal representatives. 
 
The implied condition precedent in I.C. § 5-311 allows a defendant to raise a defense of 
contributory negligence against the decedent's heirs where such a defense could have been 
brought against the decedent himself. [citing Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 625-26, 269 P. 
993, 994 (1928); Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038,793 P.2d 711 (1990); and Turpen 
v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247,985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999)]. 
 
In the[se] cases, this Court has consistently held that in order to bring a cause of action 
for wrongful death a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's wrongful act or omission, 
which led to the decedent’s injury and resulting death, constituted an actionable wrong, for which 
the decedent would have been entitled to relief had he brought suit. It has likewise consistently 
been held that those bringing an action for wrongful death are subject to the same defenses that 
could have been offered had the decedent himself filed suit, such as contributory or comparative 
negligence. In other words, the defendant must have been the cause of the decedent's injury 
such that he would have been liable to the decedent in a tort action. 
 
The court then turned to Russell v. Cox. After quoting most of the case, the court 
concluded, 'Thus, in Russell, when this Court was asked to consider a defense related to the 
decedent's personal standing to bring a claim, rather than to the wrongful nature of the injury 
itself, this Court found that the condition precedent did not apply." A similar conclusion was 
reached in Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785, 673 P.2d 385 (1983). 
 
The reason for this interpretation is simple, practical, and fair. The injury bringing about 
the entitlement to relief in an action brought by the decedent, prior to his death, or in an action by 
the decedent's heirs or estate representatives after the decedent's death, is identical. Where the 
injury was not actionable under traditional tort analysis, the heirs should not be permitted to 
recover where the decedent himself could not have recovered. However, the action created by 
Idaho's Wrongful Death Act is more than a mere survival action; it provides compensation for the 
harm that the heirs experience due to the decedents' death. In short, a wrongful death action is 
an independent action grounded in identical causation. The statute of limitations applies to each 
actionable wrong individually. As the actionable wrong for a wrongful death action is not complete 
until the death of the decedent, the statute of limitations does not begin running until that time. 
Therefore, we hold that the condition precedent does not apply to the statute of limitations, and 
the Appellants here filed their wrongful death actions in a timely fashion. 
Castorena v. General Electric, 149 Idaho 609,238 P.3d 209 (2010). 
 
(3)  An historical review: For a detailed historical account of the development of Idaho case law on 
§5-311 in its various incarnations, see the dissenting opinion by Justice Bistline in Nebeker v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 747P.2d 18(1987) (Bistline, J., dissenting). The issue in the case whether a 
child can recover for the death of a parent has been mooted by the 1984 amendment of § 5-311 to 






KELLY v. LEMHI IRRIGATION & ORCHARD CO. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
30 Idaho 778, 168 P. 1076 (1917) 
 
McCARTHY, D.J. -This is an action brought by Harry Kelly, as administrator of the estate of Ira 
L. Davis, deceased, against the Lemhi Irrigation and Orchard Company. It is charged in the complaint that 
the defendant wrongfully caused the death of the deceased while in its employ by providing the crew, of 
which he was a member, with a hay derrick which was unsafe and defective in certain particulars 
expressly set forth; that by reason of such defects said derrick fell and inflicted injuries upon deceased 
from which he died. The evidence shows that four married sisters and two older brothers are the sole 
heirs of the deceased. There is no evidence that any of said brothers or sisters were in any way 
dependent, financially, upon the deceased or had ever received any financial aid from him, nor does the 
evidence show any likelihood that they would have received any such aid in the Mure. In fact, the 
complaint does not contain any allegation that the heirs ever had received or ever expected to receive 
financial aid. The complaint alleges that the heirs were entitled to the society, companionship, help and 
advice of their brother and that by reason of the negligence of the defendant they have been deprived of 
his society, companionship, help and advice. The jury found a verdict for $2,500. Under the evidence the 
verdict must have been based upon the loss to the heirs of his companionship and society, as there was 
no evidence of any other loss. 
 
Appellant specifies as error that the damages are excessive, in that the evidence does not show that the 
collateral heirs suffered any damages, and that the court should have instructed the jury, as requested by 
appellant, that no damages could be recovered for the loss of the comfort and protection of the deceased. 
The statute under which the action is brought [current version at I.C. § 5-311] is as follows: 
 
When the death of a person, not being a minor, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages 
against the person causing the death; or if such person be employed by another person 
who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such other person. In every action under this 
and the preceding section, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the 
case may be just. 
 
In England and in some of the states the courts have held that under a statute creating liability for 
wrongfully causing death, recovery is limited to damages for a pecuniary injury, which we understand to 
mean an injury directly causing financial loss. In almost all of the states where this has been held the 
recovery is limited expressly by statute to pecuniary injury. No such express limitation is made by our 
statute; therefore, these decisions are not in point. In England and in some of the states such is the 
holding, even though the statute does not expressly limit recovery to pecuniary injury. In California, under 
a statute like ours, the court holds that recovery is limited to pecuniary injury. [] 
 
....This court has held, in case of a parent, recovery may be had for the loss of the society and 
companionship of a child. Anderson v. Great Northern Ry., 15 Idaho 513, 99 P. 91 (1908). As to whether 
this is to be considered a pecuniary injury, as said by the California court, this court did not expressly 
hold. Taking the words as meaning an injury which directly causes a financial loss, we do not see how it 
can be said that such an injury is a pecuniary injury. It is, however, a substantial, serious and material 
injury and should be compensated in damages, as held by this court .... If the loss of the society and 
companionship be a substantial loss which should be compensated, this should apply to any heir, if it can 
be shown that he has suffered such loss. The statute itself makes no discrimination in this respect. 
Suppose a brother and sister are left orphans a tan early age, with ample means, but with no other near 
relatives. If the brother is killed after they have grown up together and he has borne toward her the part of 
father as well as brother, then the loss of his society and companionship is a substantial and material loss 
to her, almost to the same extent as if he had been her father instead of her brother. ln the present case 




of his mother. A rule which bars collateral heirs, in all cases, from recovering damages for loss of society 
and companionship does not strike us as just or sensible, and we find no basis for such a rule in the 
statute. In the words of the statute, such damages should be allowed as under all the circumstances of 
the case may be just. Each case must stand on its particular facts. Under the usual conditions of life itis 
not probable that, in the ordinary case, a collateral heir can show any substantial damages because of 
loss of society or companionship. However, if in any case a collateral heir can prove there have been 
such close companionship and relations between himself and the deceased that he has suffered a 
substantial loss from the termination of that companionship, then the jury may be allowed to consider that 
fact as an element of damages, in a similar way, although perhaps not generally to the same degree, as it 
would be considered if the relationship had been in the direct line instead of collateral. Of course, no such 
companionship is implied from the mere relationship, it must be proved to have existed. If such fact be 
proved, then it may be considered as an element of damages in all cases which come under the statute. 
 
Applying the above rule to the evidence in this case, we conclude there is sufficient evidence of the close 
relations and companionship between the deceased and his sister, Mrs. Kelly, to warrant the jury in 
considering the loss of that companionship as a ground of substantial damage. We conclude there is not 
sufficient evidence of close relations and companionship between the deceased and the other heirs to 
warrant the jury in considering the loss of that companionship as a ground of substantial damage .... 
 
 
MORGAN & RICE, JJ., concur. 
NOTES 
 
(1)  What is the source of the duty in this case? Did defendant do anything to the plaintiff? That is, 
what interest of the plaintiff was damaged by defendant's conduct? 
 
(2)  Consortium claims in wrongful death actions: The cause of action in Kelly was predicated upon 
Idaho's wrongful death statute which provides that "[i]n every action under this and the preceding section, 
such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just." I.C. § 5-311(1). In 
Packard v. Joint School District No. 171, the Court of Appeals offered this summary of the law: 
Our Supreme Court recently noted, in Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 
(1980), that "the precise boundaries of damages allowable under the statute have never been 
completely delineated." What delineation now exists may be traced largely to Wyland v. Twin 
Falls Canal Co., 48 Idaho 789, 285 P.2d 676 (1930). In that case, our Supreme Court held that 
"just" damages under the statute included the value of a decedent's services in the care of his 
family and in the education of his children. The Court also referred, in dictum, to cases from other 
jurisdictions, construing substantially similar statutes to allow recovery for loss of companionship, 
protection, bodily care, intellectual culture, and moral training- but not for mental suffering or 
wounded feelings caused by the death of the deceased. [] 
This dictum subsequently was cited by the Supreme Court in Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 
240, 130 P.2d 859 (1942). The Court in Ader, apparently treating the Wyland dictum as settled 
law in Idaho, stated: 
Although the decisions are agreed that recovery may not be had for grief and 
anguish suffered by the surviving relatives of the deceased, it may be had, in Idaho, for 
loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, guidance, advice, intellectual training, 
etc. [] 
The preclusion against recovery for grief and anguish was reiterated in Checketts v. Bowman, 70 
Idaho 463, 220 P.2d682 (1950), Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980), and most 
recently in Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982). 
  The foregoing summary of Idaho authority discloses that exclusion of survivors' grief and 
mental anguish from the elements of "just" damages, under our statutes, has not been critically 
examined. It is the product of a dictum preserved through the decades by a series of cursory and 
passing references. More importantly, in none of the cases 
cited has it been held, or even suggested, that a jury must be given a prohibitory instruction- 




Packard v. Joint School District No. 171, 104 Idaho 604, 661 P.2d 770 (App. 1983). 
 
(3)  Consortium claims in actions other than wrongful death: As the court in Packard noted, 
consortium claims in wrongful death actions "are creatures of statute, authorized by I.C. § ...5-311." 
Consortium claims arising from death thus are limited by the requirement in § 5-311 that "such damages 
may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just." Consortium claims arising from 
nonfatal injuries lack this statutory basis. The Idaho courts have not, however, drawn a sharp line 
between claims for loss of consortium resulting from injury rather than death. 
 
(a)  Phillips v. Erhart:  Jim Phillips rented an office on the second floor of a commercial 
building in Meridian owned by Milt and Mary Erhart. The stairs to the second floor were on the outside of 
the building. The Emarts decided that the steps had become a hazard and that they should be replaced. 
Milt made the repairs. He encountered some difficulties with two of the treads (the vertical part of a step) 
and attached them on only one side of the bracket supporting the treads. Phillips fell while descending the 
stairs and was found lying face down on the concrete landing at the bottom of the stairs. The jury 
awarded Gale Phillips $556,200 in noneconomic damages for loss of consortium. The Erhart's appealed 
the jury verdict, arguing the award was disproportionate. In support of this argument, the Erharts 
summarize Mr. Phillips's injuries and resulting impairments as follows: 
 
  Phillips came to the emergency room with a closed head injury that caused a loss of 
consciousness, contusions on a leg, abrasions on his face and/or neck, a tom right rotator cuff 
ultimately requiring surgery, a disc problem, a broken jaw, and a broken tooth. He was agitated, 
anxious, and impenitently confused and forgetful. Phillips received large doses of morphine for 
his severe pain. Phillips suffered a traumatic brain injury and post-concussive syndrome, 
including problems with forgetfulness, decreased short-term memory, blurred vision, difficulty with 
light exposure, problems with sleeping, balance, dizziness, nausea, hot flashes, taste changes, 
trouble focusing and spelling, and personality changes. He would become emotional and irritable. 
Phillips suffered mild cognitive deficits and depression and a little PTSD. He was treated by a 
battery of physicians and therapists. He has been permanently placed on at least four 
medications. He has developed a nervous eye tick. At the time of trial, Phillips was still very 
nervous, anxious, and fidgety. Improvements notwithstanding, Phillips suffered permanent 
disabilities from the accident. 
 
  Lay witnesses testified about Phillips' condition. Work supervisor George Schendler 
stated that Phillips had significant memory issues requiring him to take notes and that he 
physically shook at work. Co-worker Ron Sundberg testified to Phillips' problems with memory 
and organization. Co-worker Angela Sisco testified that Phillips was no longer a funny, 
gregarious, and outgoing person. Phillips' performance ratings fell below expectations. 
 
Phillips became afraid of the water and could no longer dive for abalone, an activity he 
had enjoyed since his youth. He was uncomfortable driving his own boat, he would get easily 
disoriented on hunting trips and lost if left. He would get very frustrated and cry over mistakes. 
[Citations to the record omitted.] 
 
Virtually all of the long-term consequences of Mr. Phillips's injuries listed by the Erharts 
would also result in Mrs. Phillips losing "aid, care, comfort, society, companionship, services, 
protection and conjugal affection" of Mr. Phillips. The jury was instructed that a male of Mr. 
Phillips's age has a life expectancy of 42.7 years. Considering Mr. Phillips's life expectancy and 
the impact his permanent injuries will have on his relationship with Mrs. Phillips, the jury award to 
her does not indicate it was given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100,254 P.3d 1 (2011) 
 
(b).  Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co.: Plaintiff was injured when a tire he was mounting exploded. 
The jury awarded plaintiffs wife $74,895.81 for the loss of consortium. The trial court ordered remittitur of 





An award of damages for loss of consortium should be supported by substantial competent 
evidence of the loss of services, society, companionship, sexual relations, etc. [] However, we 
agree with plaintiffs that an award for loss of consortium damages may also be supported by 
circumstantial evidence such as the extent of the injury and hospitalization. In the present case, 
plaintiffs presented no direct evidence of the husband and wife relationship or the losses to that 
relationship. The loss of consortium damages could only be supported, if at all, by circumstantial 
evidence of the extent of the injury, hospitalization and an inference from Mrs. Vannoy's very 
limited testimony which states that "our home lifestyle changed after the accident. -˙" 
Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, 726 P.2d648 (1986). The court concluded that the trial court 
had not abuse its discretion in ordering remittitur. 
 ˙ 
(c).  Hayward v. Yost: The court approved an award for "the loss of protection, comfort, 
society and companionship" to the parents of a child who suffered brain damage as a result of being 
struck by an automobile. Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952). 
 
(4)  A condition precedent to consortium claims? Are consortium claims that are not brought under 
the wrongful death statute subject to a similar condition precedent? That is, are they derivative in the 
sense that they are subject to any defenses to which the injured person is subject? 
 
(a)  Runcom v. Shearer Lumber Products, Inc.: Plaintiff/husband was injured while repairing 
a boiler; the jury concluded that he was 10% responsible for his injuries. The court refused to reduce 
plaintiff/wife's award by the 10% negligence attributable to her husband. The Idaho Supreme court 
reversed: 
 
We now consider the defendant's assignment of error which raises the issue of whether a 
spouse's damages for loss of consortium should be reduced by the percentage of comparative 
negligence assigned to the injured spouse. The trial court refused the reduction. At the time when 
contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery, it was held in all American jurisdictions 
which ˙considered the question, that the contributory negligence of a spouse completely barred 
the non-physically injured spouse's claim for loss of consortium. []Although this Court never 
directly addressed the issue, we have no reason to believe that a different rule would have been 
adopted in Idaho. []While that rule was criticized by some writers on the basis that it was harsh, it 
was, nevertheless, the law. 
 
  Much of the harshness of the rule has been eliminated with the advent of comparative 
negligence in which slight contributory negligence does not act as a complete bar to recovery, 
and a spouse's claim for loss of consortium is similarly not completely barred. The issue has been 
considered by at least eight courts in comparative negligence jurisdictions such as Idaho, the 
majority of which have ruled that the loss of consortium damages should be proportionally 
reduced. [)We agree with the majority. The claim for loss of consortium is a wholly derivative 
cause of action contingent upon a third party's tortious injury to a spouse. We have held that a 
wife's claim for loss of consortium against a direct employer, because of its derivative nature, is 
barred by the exclusive remedies required by the workmen's compensation statutes. Coddington 
v. City of Lewiston, 96 Idaho 135,525 P.2d330 (1974).This rule is consistent with the lawin the 
analogous situation of an heir's action for wrongful death, in which the comparative negligence of 
the decedent is also considered. Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144(1976).The 
Restatement of Torts (Second) § 494 applies this same rule to both wrongful death actions and 
loss of consortium actions. It would be inconsistent "to hold that an injured party's negligence 
would bar or limit his recovery for direct injury, but would not affect his spouse's recovery for 
indirect injury." [] The present case is distinguished from an action in which a person is claiming 
damages for his or her own personal physical injuries, which claim is non-derivative and not 
dependent on the spouse's cause of action and negligence attributable to the spouse. See 
Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975). The derivative nature of a 
claim for loss of consortium, an interest in consistency in the law, and persuasive authority from 
other jurisdictions cause us to hold that the trial court erred in refusing to reduce Linda Runcom's 
damages by 10%, the percentage of negligence attributable to her husband. 
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Runcom v. Shearer Lumber Products, Inc., 107 Idaho 389,690 P.2d 324 (1984). 
 
(b)  Coddington v. City of Lewiston: Runcom announces a more general proposition: 
consortium claims are derivative. If the physically injured person could not recover, that person's spouse 
cannot. In Coddington, plaintiff's husband was injured when a trench he was excavating collapsed on him. 
The husband received workers compensation for his injuries. The wife brought a claim for consortium 
against his employer. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's summary judgment for defendant: 
From [plaintiff's] complaint it is apparent that her loss of consortium was caused by a personal 
injury to her husband .... Since the [plaintiff's] claim for loss of consortium arises out of the 
personal injuries to her husband which were compensated under the Workmen's [sic] 
Compensation Act, her separate claim for damages is barred by I.C. § 72-203 which provides: 
 
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee on account of personal injury for 
which he is entitled to compensation under this act shall exclude all other rights and 
remedies such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at 
common law or otherwise, on account of such injury. 




iv.       Aside: Wrongful Death and Economic Loss 
 
 
HORNER v. SANI-TOP, INC. 
 
Idaho Supreme Court  
143 Idaho 230, 141 P.3d 1099 (2006) 
 
TROUT, J.: This is a wrongful death case arising out of an accident that occurred in the Home Depot 
Store in Twin Falls, Idaho (Home Depot). Janessa Homer, who was two years old at the time, died after 
being struck by debris from a load of countertops which fell as a Home Depot employee removed them 
from a high shelf using a forklift. Defendant Sani-Top, Inc. (Sani-Top), the company that manufactured 
and packaged the countertops for shipment to Home Depot, appeals from a district court decision 
denying its post-trial motions to alter or amend the judgment and for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
After the accident, Janessa's parents Virgil Homer and Julie Homer-Cunningham (Virgil, Julie, or 
collectively the Homers) began negotiations with both Home Depot and Sani-Top. Initially, Home Depot 
voluntarily paid the Homers for Janessa's medical and funeral expenses incurred as a result of the 
accident. Ultimately, the Homers entered into a Settlement Agreement with Home Depot and fully 
released Home Depot from any further responsibility. Thereafter, the Homers, individually and on behalf 
of Janessa's sister, Hanna, filed a wrongful death action against Sani-Top, alleging Sani-Top had 
negligently designed and/or manufactured its packaging system for the countertops. 
 
After a seven-day trial, the jury awarded over $4 million dollars to the Homer family, primarily 
relating to noneconomic damages. On the verdict form, the jury was instructed to apportion liability, if any, 
to Home Depot as well as Sani-Top. The jury assigned 87% of the fault to Home Depot and 13% of the 
fault to Sani-Top. Based upon the percentage of fault assigned by the jury, the district judge multiplied 
each plaintiff's total award by 13% and then entered separate judgments against Sani-Top for Virgil, Julie 
and Hanna Homer. As a result, Virgil and Julie were awarded $221,000 each (representing $26,000 in 








A. Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment 
 
Sani-Top argues the district judge abused his discretion in denying its motion to alter or amend the 
judgment, alleging the following: ... (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the award for economic 
damages; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the award to Virgil for emotional distress. 
 
 
3.      Sufficiency of evidence to support economic damage award 
 
       Sani-Top argues there was insufficient evidence to support the award for economic damages to Virgil 
and Julie, which would be incurred by the Homers as a result of the loss of Janessa's financial support. 
The jury instructions defined economic damages to include: 
 
3. The plaintiffs' loss of financial support from the decedent, and the present cash value of 
financial support the decedent would have provided to the plaintiffs in the future, but for the 
decedent's death, taking into account the plaintiffs' life expectancy, the decedent's age and 
normal life expectancy, the decedent's earning capacity, habits, disposition and any other 
circumstances shown by the evidence. 
 
No direct factual evidence or expert testimony was presented to establish Janessa's potential 
earning capacity or the cash value of financial support she might have provided her parents in the 
future. And although Dr. Katz, a licensed psychologist specializing in grief and loss, discussed the loss of 
Janessa caring for and training Hanna, caring for her parents when sick, assisting in transportation and 
errands and the loss of assistance in taking care of her grandparents, these losses were spoken of in 
generalities and a review of the record reveals no evidence of any calculation of out-of-pocket expenses 
tied to these services. 
 
Relying on the following quote in Gardner v. Hobbs, the district judge upheld the 
economic damage award, concluding "the surviving plaintiffs need not prove the precise amount of loss 
[for special damages], which is presumed from the death itself:" 
 
It is not necessary, in this state, for a husband or wife, in order to recover for the death of the 
other, caused by wrongful act or negligence, to plead or prove damages arising from loss of 
services, food, clothing, shelter or anything else which may be measured in dollars and cents. 
The same rule applies in cases where a parent sues for the death of a child or the child for the 
death of a parent. Pecuniary loss, in cases of this kind, will be presumed upon proof of death, 
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of the defendant, and the relationship of husband and 
wife, or parent and child, existing between the plaintiff and the deceased. 
69 Idaho 288, 294, 206 P.2d 539, 543 (1949) (quoting Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 245-46, 130 P.2d 
859, 862 (1942) (emphasis added)). 
 
The Gardner Court's discussion of the Hepp case immediately preceding this quote clarifies that 
Hepp was dealing only with general damages: 
 
In Hepp v. Ader, a husband and daughter brought an action for the wrongful death of the wife and 
mother. The wife had been an invalid for 25 years and it was apparent that the husband suffered 
no financial loss by reason of her death. The court affirmed a judgment in favor of the husband 
based solely upon deprivation of "companionship," "society," "comfort," "love" and "affection" of 
the deceased. 
Gardner, 69 Idaho at 294, 206 P.2d at 543. 
 
  In Gardner, this Court reviewed earlier cases and noted that Idaho had departed from the rule in 
California, which required that recovery, including loss of society and companionship, be limited to 
"pecuniary injury, that is, an injury directly causing financial loss." Supra at 294, 206 P.2d at 543. The 
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Gardner Court then referred to Kelly v. Lemhi lrr. & Orchard Co., 30 Idaho 778, 168 P. 1076 (1917), and 
noted this Court has approved recovery for loss of society and companionship- an injury for which there 
was no specific measure of financial loss. Thus, the significance of the quote from Hepp above is that 
damages may be recovered in a wrongful death case, even though they are not tied to a financial or 
"pecuniary loss" - such a loss is presumed with respect to loss of society or companionship. It does not 
mean that if a plaintiff seeks special, or out-of-pocket, damages, there is no need to prove them with any 
specificity or tie them to a particular loss.6 
 
  To reiterate, the Hepp language relied on in Gardner means that a plaintiff may recover for 
general damages in a wrongful death action without pleading or proving special damages. In addition, 
general damages, such as loss of society and companionship, will be presumed upon death when the 
plaintiff is the spouse, parent or child of the decedent. While the language is admittedly not very precise, 
there is nothing in the Hepp line of cases that supports the district court's conclusion that a plaintiff does 
not need to prove special damages if that type of relief is requested. In fact, in each of the cases cited by 
Hepp where the sufficiency of the evidence to support special damages was challenged, this Court 
responded by identifying the evidence that could be used to support the award for special damages. See 
Butler v. Townsend, 50 Idaho 542, 298 P.375 (1931) (evidence showed daughter had contributed $5 a 
week to her parents); Wyland v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 48 Idaho 789,285 P. 676 (1930) (evidence of 
obligation to pay medical and funeral expenses); Willi v. Schaefer Hitchcock Co., 53 Idaho 367, 25 P.2d 
167 (1933) (evidence of decedent's earnings). 
 
These early cases are consistent with more recent case law, which holds that in order for an 
award of special damages to be upheld, the plaintiff must put on some type of proof to support the 
damage award. "[C]ompensatory awards based on speculation and conjecture will not be allowed." 
Moeller v. Harshbarger, 118 Idaho 92, 93,794 P.2d 1148, 1149 (1990). "More recent cases before this 
Court have mandated when considering an award of damages for future losses, the question is whether 
the plaintiff has proven the damages with reasonable certainty." Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 104 P.3d 
367 (2004) (internal citations omitted). In Mitton, this Court held that an award of lost wages was not 
based on hypothetical or speculative proof, but rather on substantial and competent evidence when 
"[e]vidence was submitted to the jury regarding what [Smith's] wages had been, what they were 
subsequent to the termination, and what they had become. Some hard numbers were given to the jury, 
some reasonable assumptions were also proposed." Id. at 900, 104 P.3d at 374 (emphasis added). The 
attorney presented a formula as to how to calculate Mure losses. Id. 
 
In this case, the jury must have some guidance in determining what it will cost the Homers to 
replace the loss of services referenced by Dr. Katz, for example, the loss of Janessa caring for her sister, 
parents and grandparents. Because there is no evidence in the record to support economic damages as 
they relate to the loss of Janessa's financial support, the district judge abused his discretion in denying 
Sani-Top's motion to alter or amend the judgment to eliminate the economic damages award. The 
applicable legal standard is that damages must be proved with reasonable certainty and cannot be based 
on mere speculation. 
 
4.  Sufficiency of evidence for emotional distress damages 
 
Sani-Top contends the district judge abused his discretion by denying its motion to alter or amend 
the judgment to reduce the emotional damages award to Virgil, arguing there is insufficient evidence to 
support the award. The district judge was in the best position to determine credibility and weigh the 
evidence. He presented a thorough analysis as to why the jury's verdict for Virgil was supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. In his decision he recounted the evidence of Virgil's physical 
manifestations of emotional distress, the testimony of a grief psychologist regarding the devastation that 
occurs when a parent loses a child and Virgil's testimony about his mental pain and suffering over the 
loss of his daughter and the horrifying experience of being present during the accident. Based on the 
substantial and competent evidence regarding Virgil's emotional distress, the district judge did not abuse 
                                                     




his discretion in denying Sani-Top's motion to alter or amend the judgment with respect to Virgil's 







.... This Court reverses the award of economic damages as they relate to the alleged loss of Janessa's 
financial support because the record provides no evidence to support such damages. 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE SCHROEDER AND JUSTICES EISMANN AND JONES AND JUSTICE PRO TEM 




(1)  What evidence could the plaintiffs have presented to justify a claim for economic loss caused by 
the wrongful death of their child? 
 
(2)  The decision in Homer qualifies the earlier decisions in this section by limiting their broad 
language to "general damages" as distinguished from "special damages. Both are classified as 
"compensatory damages" that are intended to return individuals to the position they were in prior to the 
injury. For example, if a person is injured in an automobile accident, she could seek damages to cover 
her past and future medical expenses, damage to the motor vehicle, and the loss of earnings now and in 
the future. She could also seek damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium. 
 
(a)  General damages are those that are presumed to result from the wrong. In the example, 
pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium are classified as general damages. General 
damages thus are for intangible losses that can be inferred from the facts surrounding the case. 
 
(b)  Special damages are the actual but not necessary result of the wrong; they are out-of-
pocket costs of the event. In the example, the medical expenses, damage to the motor vehicle, and the 
loss of earnings now and in the future are classified as special damages. Thus, special damages are 
based on measurable dollar amounts of actual loss. 
A third type of damages are: 
 
(c)  Punitive or exemplary damages are intended to punish the wrongdoer. They 
are available when the wrongdoer's conduct was aggravated the original wrong. 
 
Recall that the legislature in 1990 limited noneconomic damages. In doing so, it defined both 
"economic damages" and "noneconomic damages" so that the terms generally correspond to general and 
special damages. See I.C. § 6-1601{3), (5). The legislature also made it more difficult to obtain punitive 
damages. I.C. § 6-1604. The statutory language can be found in the notes at the beginning of the 
materials on emotional interests. 
 
(3)  Types of damages available: The statute provides that "such damages may be given as under 
all the circumstances of the case as may be just." What is included? 
 
(a) Emotional damages: Consortium is, of course, an emotional loss. 
(b) Economic damages: Homer v. Sani-Top discusses the availability of economic damages in a 
wrongful death action. 
 
In Pfau v. Comair Holdings, Inc., plaintiff's decedents were killed in a plane crash. Since Idaho 
law applied, the federal district court certified a question to the supreme court on the availability of 




Under Idaho's Wrongful Death Act and all related case and statutory law, are economic damages 
limited to the loss of support received or reasonably anticipated during the life of the decedent, or 
do they include damages for the loss of anticipated inheritance the claimants may have received 
after the natural death of the decedent, and/or the loss of the net accumulation of the decedent, 
and/or loss of earnings of the decedent? 
This is, the court asserts, a question of statutory construction -in which the court is to attempt to 
determine and give effect to the legislative intent. The court examines a handful of cases - including 
Wyland v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 48 Idaho 789,285 P. 676 (1930), Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d 
859 (1942), Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570,651 P.2d 11 (1982), and Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 
Idaho 918, 821 P.2d 973 (1991)- that demonstrate to the court that "[f]or the past century, Idaho courts 
have followed a loss of support theory of damages. This theory measures damages as the loss to the 
survivors of what the decedent would have contributed to them in the form of support if he or she had 
lived. Following this theory, our earliest cases define 'just damages to include recovery for loss of 
companionship, protection, bodily care, intellectual culture, and moral training 'providing is sufficiently 
appears that pecuniary damages resulted from such loss. Wyland v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 48 Idaho 789, 
796, 285 P. 676, 678 (1930)." 
 
(c)  Punitive damages: In Gavica v. Hanson, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that 
punitive damages were available in wrongful death actions. The court held that the language in §5-311 
authorizing "such damages ...as under all the circumstances of the case may be just" included punitive 
damages where such damages would otherwise be recoverable had the decedent survived: 
 
[Defendant argues that] a wrongdoer may be liable for punitive damages if he injures 
another, [but] that punitive damages should nevertheless be withheld if a wrongdoer so injures 
another as to cause death. We find no logic in such a conclusion. If wrongful conduct is to be 
deterred by the award of punitive damages, that policy should not be thwarted because the 
wrongdoer succeeds in killing his victim. To hold otherwise would violate the precept that this 
Court should avoid a statutory interpretation which produces an absurd result. 
Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980). 
 
 
b.  Economic Interests 
 
i.  What is "Economic Loss"? 
 
 
BRIAN and CHRISTIE, INC. v. LEISHMAN ELECTRIC, INC. 
 
Idaho Supreme Court 
150 Idaho 22, 244 P.3d 166 (2010) 
 
ERSMANN, C.J.: This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a claim for negligence in performing 
electrical work that caused a fire resulting in substantial damage to a restaurant and its contents. The 
district court dismissed this action on the ground that the claim was for purely economic damages and 
was barred by the economic loss rule. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Brian and Christie, Inc., d/b/a Taco Time, (Taco Time) owns and operates a Taco Time restaurant 
in Rexburg. In 1998, it engaged a general contractor to remodel the restaurant. The general contractor 
hired Leishman Electric, Inc., (Subcontractor) to perform the electrical work. 
 
Taco Time purchased two used neon signs, transformers, and wiring from a third party 
and contracted with a sign company to install them. That company repaired and rewired one of 
the signs and installed both of them, including the transformers, on the restaurant building. It did not 





protection in violation of the National Electric Code. The sign company did not connect the signs to 
electrical power.  
 
After the signs were installed, Subcontractor connected them to electrical power. Prior to 
doing so, it did not check the wiring performed by the sign company nor did it check to determine 
whether the transformers complied with the Electric Code. After Subcontractor connected the signs and 
transformers to electrical power, they caused a fire that resulted insubstantial damage to the building and 
its contents. 
 
Taco Time filed a lawsuit against the sign company and Subcontractor.  It amended its 
complaint to drop Subcontractor as a party and ultimately settled the lawsuit against the sign 
company. It then filed this lawsuit against Subcontractor on October 2, 2006. 
 
On June 5, 2007, Subcontractor moved for summary judgment on the ground that the 
economic loss rule barred recovery against it on a negligence cause of action. The district court granted 




A.  Did the District Court Err in Holding that Taco Time's Cause of Action Was Barred by the 
Economic Loss Rule? 
 
Taco Time's complaint alleges a cause of action against Subcontractor for the negligent 
performance of electrical work. Taco Time contends that Subcontractor connected the neon signs and 
transformers to electrical power without first ascertaining that the signs were properly grounded and that 
the transformers complied with the National Electric Code; that such omission constituted negligence; and 
that such negligence caused a fire that damaged the restaurant and its contents. The district court held 
that Taco Time's cause of action was barred by the economic loss rule. 
 
We first addressed the economic loss rule in Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 
581 P.2d 784 (1978). We noted, "The economic expectations of parties have not traditionally been 
protected by the law concerning unintentional torts." Id. at 335, 581 P.2dat 793. In explaining the 
considerations underlying the distinction between the recovery of damages in tort for physical injuries to 
person or property and the recovery of purely economic loss for breach of warranty or contract, we 
quoted from Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151(Cal. 1965), as follows: 
 
He [a manufacturer] can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by 
defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that 
create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products 
in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the 
consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with 
bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can, however, be 
fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations unless the 
manufacturer agrees that it will. 
 
Clark was a products liability case. The plaintiff contended that the tractor he had purchased was 
negligently designed, resulting in breakdowns and a lack of power that caused him to lose profits in his 
custom farming operation. In addressing the manufacturer's duty, we explained: 
 
The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a tractor that 
does not harm person or property. If the defendant fails to exercise such due care it is of 
course liable for the resulting injury to person or property as well as other losses which 
naturally follow from that injury. However, the law of negligence does not impose on 
International Harvester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough and breaks down 
infrequently enough for Clark to make a profit in his custom farming business. This is not 
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to say that such a duty could not arise by a warranty express or implied by agreement of the 
parties or by representations of the defendant, but the law of negligence imposes no 
such duty. 
99 Idaho at 336, 581 P.2d at 794. 
 
In Clark, the negligence in designing the tractor that the plaintiff had purchased did not cause any 
injury to person or property. It simply caused the tractor not to perform properly in plaintiff's business. The 
resulting purely economic losses incurred by the plaintiff were not recoverable under a negligence cause 
of action because the manufacturer had no duty to design and manufacture a tractor that would plow fast 
enough and break down infrequently enough for the plaintiff to make a profit in his custom farming 
business. In essence, manufacturing an inferior product does not breach any duty imposed under 
negligence law where the product does not cause harm to person or property. 
 
".... However, in Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197, 983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999), we stated, ''The 
economic loss rule applies to negligence cases in general; its application is not restricted to products 
liability cases." 
 
ln Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,544 P.2d 306 
(1975), we provided a definition of economic loss. The issue in Salmon Rivers was whether one could 
recover damages against a manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty in the absence of privity of 
contract. While deciding that issue, we stated that the difference between property damage and economic 
loss was: "Property damage encompasses damage to property other than that which is the subject of the 
transaction. Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the 
subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits 
or use." Id. at 351, 544 P.2d at 309. 
 
We have since applied that definition to cases involving the purchase of defective personal 
property and real property. See Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,41,740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987) 
(purchase of three defective duplexes); Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007,895 P.2d 
1195, 1200 (1995) (purchase of defective seed potatoes); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196, 983 P.2d 
848, 850 (1999) (purchase of a defective airplane); Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 
108 P.3d 996, 1000 (2005) (purchase of a defective house); Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 
Idaho 785, 790, 215 P.3d 505, 510 (2009) (purchase of an allegedly defective milking system). In 
reaching its decision, the district court used this same definition, even though Taco Time's claim against 
Subcontractor did not involve the purchase of defective property. The district court's attempt to apply this 
formulation of the rule to a case involving the rendition of services illustrates why it does not apply to such 
cases. 
 
First, the Salroon Rivers definition states, "Economic loss includes costs of repair and 
replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction ...."97 Idaho at 351,544 
P.2d at 309. In applying that definition to this case, the district court held that "the subject of the 
transaction with which [Subcontractor] was involved was the remodel project" and that it was "the 
restaurant/building, not the services provided via remodeling, that was the subject of the transaction." In 
doing so, it misquoted the Salmon Rivers definition of economic loss. 
 
Correctly quoted, that definition states, "Economic loss includes costs of repair and 
replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction...." Id. (emphasis added). 
In its analysis, the district court omitted the word "defective." Taco Time did not contend that it 
suffered economic loss because Subcontractor sold it a defective restaurant. The restaurant was not 
defective property. It did not spontaneously combust. Rather, Taco Time's claim is that Subcontractor's 
negligence in connecting the signs to electrical power caused a fire that extensively damaged the 
restaurant and its contents. In this case, there was no defective property which was the subject of the 
transaction.7 
                                                     





Second, the district court misunderstood what economic loss is. In its decision denying 
reconsideration, it wrote, "All of [Taco Time's] damage claims arise from restaurant property 
damaged by the fire, and such damages constitutes economic loss." It therefore held that Taco Time 
could not recover for damage to "the building, its contents, and the profits derived from the building's use 
that were damaged by the fire." Economic loss is not simply damages that can be measured monetarily. 
"Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the 
transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." 
Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft, Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 
(1975). It includes costs to repair and replace the "defective property which is the subject of the 
transaction." As discussed above, the restaurant and its contents were not defective property. 
 
In Oppenheimer Industries, Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 423, 426, 732 P.2d 661, 
664 (1986), we rejected the contention that the loss of cattle due to the negligence of the deputy brand 
inspector was merely economic loss. In doing so, we stated, "It is also black-letter law that a cause of 
action in negligence is available for one whose chattel is lost or destroyed through the negligence of 
another." Id. The damage to Taco Time's restaurant and its contents was no more economic loss than 
was the loss of the cattle in Oppenheimer. 
 
The district court's analysis shows the confusion that can occur by attempting to apply the 
Salmon Rivers definition of economic loss to a transaction not involving the purchase of defective 
property. The definition of economic loss stated in Salmon Rivers and utilized in Tusch Enterprises v. 
Coffin; Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n; Ramerth v. Hart; Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc.; and Aardema v. 
U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc., does not apply in cases involving the negligent rendition of services because 
such cases do not involve the purchase of defective property.8 
 
For example, in Just's, Inc. v. Anington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978), we 
did not use the Salmon Rivers definition of economic damages when deciding whether a contractor 
performing a construction project in a business district could be liable for economic damages suffered by 
a business allegedly due to the contractor's negligence. The contractor and a city had entered into a 
contract for an extensive construction project that included removing and replacing the streets, sidewalks, 
sewer and water lines, electrical services, and traffic control devices in the downtown business district. 
The contract required the contractor to take certain actions to minimize the disruption to the businesses 
within the project area. A business brought an action contending that it was a third-party beneficiary of the 
contract and that it was entitled to recover lost profits resulting from a decreased flow of customers 
allegedly caused by the contractor's negligence. The business did not contend that contractor had 
harmed the business's property. 
 
We characterized the business's claim as follows, ''The damages claimed by the plaintiff, lost 
profits, are purely economic losses allegedly suffered as a result of the defendant's negligent diversion of 
prospective customers of the plaintiff." Id. at 468, 583 P.2d at 1003.We then stated, "As a general rule, no 
cause of action lies against a defendant whose negligence prevents the plaintiff from obtaining a 
prospective economic advantage." Id. The reason for that general rule is that "a contrary rule, which 
would allow compensation for losses of economic advantage caused by the defendant's negligence, 
                                                     
8 Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 983 P.2d 848 (1999), can be read as holding that the negligent performance of services causing 
damage to the property being worked on is merely economic loss for which there is no recovery. Such a reading is incorrect. In 
Ramerth a mechanic was alleged to have negligently performed maintenance on an airplane, causing damage to its engine and 
airframe. Applying the Salmon Rivers definition of economic loss, the Court held that "the damages to the aircraft and engine 
alleged in this case were purely economic and, therefore, subject to the economic loss rule." Id. at 197,983 P.2d at 851. That holding 
must be read in context of its facts. The mechanic performed the services for Morris, who later sold the airplane to 
Ramerth before the negligent work or any damage was discovered. Morris and Ramerth agreed to sue the mechanic together to 
recover damages for his negligence, and during the litigation Morris assigned to Ramerth any tort claim he may have. Ramerth was 
the purchaser of defective property (the airplane) that had not caused any damage to him or to any of his property. In that 
circumstance, the economic loss rule applied. The airplane's value was less than he thought when he purchased it. "Economic loss 
includes ...commercial loss for inadequate value...? Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft, Co., 97 Idaho 348, 
351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975). Morris had sold the airplane before the damage was discovered. At that point he did not have a 
cause of action against the mechanic because he had not suffered any loss from the mechanic's negligence. There was no 
allegation that the sale price of the airplane was reduced because of such negligence. 
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would impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden on the defendant’s conduct." Id. at 470, 583 P.2d at 
1005. We noted that if the business could recover such losses, so could "not only all the other businesses 
in the area, but also their suppliers, creditors, and so forth, Ad infinitum [sic]." Id. We concluded: "If the 
[contractor's] liability were extended to all those who suffered any pecuniary loss, its liability could 
become grossly disproportionate to its fault. Such potential liability would unduly burden any construction 
in a business area." Id. Although Just's was decided three years after Salmon Rivers, we did not use the 
Salmon Rivers definition of economic damages. Because Just's did not involve the purchase of defective 
property, such definition did not apply. 
 
The economic loss rule does not limit the damages recoverable in a negligence action. "Unless 
an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic losses in a negligence 
action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another." Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 
Idaho 296, 300, 108 P.3d 996, 1000 (2005) (emphasis added). Damages from harm to person or property 
are not purely economic losses. "[E]conomic loss is recoverable intort as a loss parasitic to an injury to 
person or property." Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995). 
As we stated in Just's, Inc. v. Anington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462,469, 583 P.2d 997, 1004 n. 
1(1978): 
 
This case in which the plaintiff seeks recovery for purely economic losses without alleging any 
attending personal injury or property damage must be distinguished from cases involving the 
recovery of economic losses which are parasitic to an injury to person or property. It is well 
established that in the latter case economic losses are recoverable in a negligence action. 
 
Rather, the economic loss rule limits the actor's duty so that there is no cause of action in 
negligence. ''The elements of common law negligence have been summarized as (1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that 
duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual 
loss or damage." Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). The seller has no 
duty under the law of negligence to design, manufacture, or sell property that will conform to the buyer's 
economic expectations. 
 
Thus, in Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 336, 581 P.2d 784, 794 (1978), this 
Court noted, ''The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a tractor that 
does not harm person or property." We denied recovery, however, because "the law of negligence does 
not impose on International Harvester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough and breaks down 
infrequently enough for Clark to make a profit in his custom farming business." Id. (emphasis added). This 
Court acknowledged that such a duty could be created by contract, "but the law of negligence imposes no 
such duty." Id. Likewise, in Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P.2d997, 
1003 (1978), the plaintiff sought to recover "purely economic losses allegedly suffered as a result of the 
defendant’s negligent diversion of prospective customers of the plaintiff." In deciding whether the plaintiff 
had a cause of action to recover purely economic losses under a negligence cause of action, we 
identified the issue as "whether the alleged negligent conduct of the defendant invaded an interest of the 
plaintiff to which the law of negligence extends its protection." Id. We stated, "We are concerned here with 
the duties imposed by the Jaw upon the defendant with respect to the plaintiff’s business, not with the 
duties imposed by the construction contract.  Id. (emphasis added). We ultimately concluded that 
defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty to refrain from negligently interfering with plaintiffs’ prospective 
economic advantage. 
 
In order to recover for common law negligence, there must be "a duty, recognized by law, 
requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct." Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 
617,619,619 P.2d 135,137 (1980). Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to 
injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him, and to do his work, render 
services or use his property as to avoid such injury." Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188,418 P.2d278, 
285 (1966). "In circumstances involving the rendition of personal services the duty upon the actor is to 
perform the services in a workman-like manner. Id. Hoffman v. Simplat Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 




Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933,935, 523 P.2d 536,538 (1974). If the actor negligently damages 
another's property in performing those services, the actor is liable for such damage. S.H. Kress & Co. v. 
Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973) (if repairman called to start the boiler fire in a store 
negligently failed to check whether the steam pressure relief valve was operating properly, and such 
negligence was a proximate cause of the boiler's explosion, repairman could be liable for the resulting 
damage to the store and its contents). 
 
In this case, Taco Time alleges that Subcontractor negligently performed services in connecting 
the neon signs and transformers to electrical power and that such negligence caused a fire that damaged 




We vacate the judgment and the order denying Taco Time's motion to file an amended complaint, 
and we remand this case for further proceedings that are consistent with this opinion. 
 





(1)  Defining economic loss: What is economic loss? In one sense, of course, everything is economic 
loss since tort law provides compensatory damages, i.e., dollars, for all losses. The court in Brian and 
Christie, however, explicitly rejects this, noting that "[e]conomic loss is not simply damages that can be 
measured monetarily." Traditionally, damages are divided broadly into personal injuries, i.e., physical and 
emotional injuries to the person, property damage, and economic loss. Although the distinction between 
personal injury and other losses is clear- both factually and ethically - the line between property damage 
and economic loss is more problematic because the two types of loss may overlap - sometimes 
substantially. 
 
The most significant area of overlap involves injury to a product. For example, if a delivery truck is 
destroyed in a single-vehicle accident caused by the failure of its own brakes, is the 
damage "property damage" or" economic loss" in a suit against the product seller? In other words: 
does the existence of a contract between the parties affect the characterization of the type of loss? If the 
delivery truck had been a car would the claim be for property damage? That is: does the fact that the 
property is held to produce income rather than for personal use, affect the characterization of the type of 
loss? What is the justification if such external factors affect the characterization of the type of loss? 
 
(2)  "pure" economic loss: The court in Brian and Christie is also careful to note that economic loss, 
e.g., lost wages or profits, can be recovered in torts if the claimant also suffers physical harm, i.e., 
personal injury or property damage. The court quotes Duffin for the proposition that "[E]conomic loss is 
recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or property." 
 
(3)  Duty: The court notes repeatedly that it is deciding a duty question. The court returns to Clark, 
noting that, although negligence imposes a duty of due care not to harm person or property, it does not 
impose a duty to ensure that the purchaser of a product can makes a profit 
by using the product. The court also quotes Just's for the same proposition. [if 23] 
 
(4)  "transactional property"': In Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft, 
Co., the court offered the following definition: 
 
Although personal injuries stand distinctly apart from the [property damage, and economic loss], a 
delineation between the latter two is necessary. Property damage encompasses damage to 
property other than that which is the subject of the transaction. Economic loss includes costs of 
repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as 




Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975). The 
court in Salmon Rivers thus drew the line between property damage and economic loss based on the 
identity of the property: if the property that is damaged is the subject of the transaction -the delivery truck 
that crashes due to brake failure- the loss is "economic." See also Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 
37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987) (a rental unit with substantial structural problems); State v. Mitchell 
Construction Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349(1984) (a roof coating that failed to perform); Clark v. 
International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978) (an underpowered tractor). 
 
Although the court enunciated a bright-line rule, its subsequent decisions have dimmed 
the distinction. ln G& M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.-plaintiff purchased an irrigation system that failed to 
deliver the necessary volume of water; plaintiff suffered reduced crop yields. The damage, thus, was to 
non-transactional property - the growing crops - rather than to the transactional property- the irrigation 
system. Nonetheless, the court asserted that this was an economic loss and refused to allow a 
negligence claim. G & M Fanns v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). See also 
Myers v.A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, 114 Idaho 432, 757 P.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1988) (review denied) 
(milk production at a dairy farm was reduced by problems with a feed storage and delivery system); 
Oppenheimer Industries, Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1987) (loss of property 
was property damage rather than economic loss). 
 
But, as the court noted in Brian and Christie, transactional property is not the only type of 
economic loss. In Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., the court focused not on distinguishing 
between property damage and economic loss, but on the fact that plaintiffs claim was for "lost profits .... 
allegedly suffered as a result of the defendant's negligent diversion of prospective customers of the 
plaintiff." Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978). 
 
(5)  A matrix?: The court discusses three main cases, Clark v. International Harvester Co., Salmon 
Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft, Co., and Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co. Note 
how the court characterizes each of the cases. Do the court's characterizations of the cases create a 
matrix? The court's opinion discusses the cases in this order: 
 
       (a)  Clark: the court's discussion of Clark focuses on the distinction between a risk of physical 
harm, i.e., risk of "injury to person or property" and a risk of nonphysical injury in this case "economic 
expectations." [8] The risk physical harm, the court states, is protected by a tort duty; the risk to economic 
expectations, one the other hand, is governed by contracts and the seller must warrant the product 
(caveat emptor). 
 
(b)  Salmon Rivers: the court described Salmon Rivers as providing a line between between 
property damage and economic loss. Physical harm to property, the court stated, was economic loss 
rather than property damage when the damaged property was "the subject of the transaction" between 
the parties. Thus, damage to non-transactional property was "property damage"; damage to transactional 
property was "economic loss." Does Clark fall into either category? 
 
(c)  Just's: the court discusses Just's as an economic loss case that did not involve 
transactional property. The court noted that the plaintiff had not alleged that any physical property was 
damaged. Instead, the court defined Just’s loss as deprivation of "prospective economic advantage." Is 
Clark an example of the loss of prospective economic advantage? 
 
(6)  Dale D. Goble, “ALL ALONG THE WATCHTOWER: ECONOMIC LOSS IN TORT (THE IDAHO 









A.  Rationales for the Economic Loss Rule: A Lifeline9 
 
 
CLARK v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. 
 
Idaho Supreme Court 
99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978) 
 
BAKES, J.: This is a products liability case in which the plaintiffs seek to recover consequential damages 
for economic losses resulting from an allegedly defective tractor manufactured by defendant International 
Harvester Company and sold to the plaintiffs by defendant McVey's, Inc., an International Harvester Co. 
dealer. The plaintiffs alleged a breach of implied and express warranties and negligent design and 
manufacture of the tractor.... 
 
Plaintiff Raymond W. Clark is a custom farmer in the Twin Falls, Idaho .... Custom farmers 
contract to plow or preplant (a fertilizer application) farmland and are generally compensated according to 
the number of acres plowed or pre-planted. They generally work intensive 10 to 15-hour work days but 
work only during the spring and fall. [In early January 1972, Clark purchased an International Harvester 
turbodiesel tractor from McVey's. The transmission of this tractor was equipped with a "torque amplifier" 
(TA). When the tractor is driven in the TA mode, the tractor is designed to develop more torque, or pulling 
power, at a sacrifice of speed. Clark began using the tractor in his custom farming business in March 
1972.Between April 1972, and May 1973, Clark experienced several breakdowns because of bent or 
broken push rods in the engine. After each breakdown, McVey's repaired the tractor free of charge under 
the warranty. Because of these breakdowns Clark alleged he lost 11-1/2 days of work. In early fall of 
1973, Clark noticed a loss of power in the tractor while pre-planting afield covered with potato vines, 
weeds and other debris. Pre-planting was impossible under these conditions. Clark believed this problem 
was caused by the inability of the tractor to pull the applicator with sufficient speed to vibrate the shanks 
of the applicator and thereby cause the debris to feed back through the shanks. McVey's tested the 
tractor and determined that there was no significant loss of horsepower at the PTO shaft. Nonetheless, 
Clark concluded that the tractor was notable to plow a sufficient number of acres per hour for it to be 
economically practical to operate the tractor that season. Clark investigated the possibility of renting a 
substitute tractor for the 1973fall season but determined that it would be too expensive. Because field 
conditions were better in the spring of 1974, Clark was able to operate the tractor on a limited basis for 
14days, but at a slower speed than he had operated the tractor previously. At the trial Clark testified that 
he was only able to cover eight acres per hour when he felt he should have been able to cover twelve 
acres per hour. 
 
[In December of 1973, Clark, through his attorney, had contacted Dr. Rudolf Limpert, an 
associate research professor of mechanical engineering at the University of Utah. Over the next 
six months, Limpert conducted several tests on the tractor and concluded that something was slipping in 
transmitting the power from the engine to the draw bar in the TA mode. Under Limpert's supervision, 
theTA unit was disassembled at a tractor repair shop in Twin Falls, Idaho. Upon disassembly, Dr. Limpert 
noted eccentric wear in a clutch shaft and had the TA unit replaced. Limpert tested the tractor after repair 
and determined that it was performing satisfactorily. 
 
[Clark sued McVey's and International Harvester in October 1974, alleging negligent design and 
manufacture and breach of implied and express warranties. The defendants' motions for summary 
judgment were granted on the warranty claims and denied on the negligence claim.] 
  
                                                     
9 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). 
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II. APPEAL OF DEFENDANT INTERNATIONAL HARVESIER 
 
The defendant on appeal has made numerous assignments of error. They can be summarized as follows: 
...4. The trial court erred in awarding consequential damages for purely economic loss in a tort action.... 
We first consider assignment of error No.4, which concerns the recovery of damages for 
economic loss in a negligence action, because, in our view, that is dispositive of the negligence issue. 
The specific question presented by this assignment of error is best demonstrated by distinguishing this 
case from those of our earlier and somewhat related cases. This case is not like Shields v. Morton 
Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 859 (1974), in which the plaintiff sought damages for economic 
loss as a result of seeds which were damaged by the defendant's chemicals. In the instant case the 
plaintiffs have not alleged that their economic losses were the ˙ result of any property damage caused by 
the defendants. This case is not like Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 96 Idaho 752,519 P.2d 421 (1974), in which 
the plaintiff sought damages for profits lost as a result of a personal injury. In the instant case the plaintiffs 
have not alleged any personal injury. The negligence issue in this case is not like Salmon Rivers 
Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975), in which the plaintiffs 
sought damages for economic loss for breach of an implied warranty. In that case we did not rule whether 
such damages were recoverable in a negligence action but held that a plaintiff who was not in privity of 
contract with the defendant could not recover economic losses based on a breach of an implied warranty. 
In this case it is conceded that there is privity. 
 
In this action the plaintiffs seek recovery only of lost profits due to alleged "down time" and the 
costs of repairing and replacing allegedly defective parts. The instant case presents the very narrow 
question whether the purchaser of a defective product who has not sustained any property damage or 
personal injury, but only suffered economic losses, can recover those losses in a negligence action 
against the manufacturer. 
 
This Court has not previously considered this issue. The majority of jurisdictions which have 
considered the issue have not permitted the recovery of purely economic loss in a products liability action 
sounding intort. [] However, a small minority of jurisdictions allow the recovery of purely economic losses 
in strict liability actions. [] 
 
One of the most fully articulated discussions of the considerations underlying this rule is found in 
Justice Traynor's majority opinion in Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965), which we 
cited approvingly in Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 
P.2d 306 (1975). In Seely the plaintiff sought to recover lost profits and a refund of the purchase price of a 
defective truck. The California Supreme Court ruled that such damages, although recoverable in a breach 
of warranty action, were not recoverable in strict liability in tort. The following passage from the majority 
opinion is pertinent to this case: 
 
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty 
recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having 
an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the 
nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can 
appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to 
match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. 
He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless 
he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands. A consumer should 
not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he 
buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product 
will not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in 
actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and 
there is no recovery for economic loss alone. [) 
 
We believe the rule advanced by the majority of the jurisdictions and by the Restatement is sound 
for the reasons articulated by Justice Traynor in Seely. Since the tum of the century the law of tort has 




the commercial, marketing and manufacturing practices of this era. However, we recognize that the courts 
have not been alone in working to develop laws appropriate to the field of products liability. The 
legislature has enacted the Uniform Commercial Code. I.C. §§ 28-1-101 through -10-104. Chapter2 of 
that act, I.C. §§ 28-2-101 through -2-725, contains a comprehensive and finely tuned statutory 
mechanism for dealing with the rights of parties to a sales transaction with respect to economic losses. In 
the continuing development of the tort law of this state, it is important that we be cognizant of the 
legislature's actions in this area .... 
 
The Idaho legislature, and indeed the legislatures of nearly every state in the Union, have 
adopted the UCC which carefully and painstakingly sets forth the rights between parties in a sales 
transaction with regard to economic loss. This Court, in the common law evolution of the tort law of this 
state, must recognize the legislature's action in this area of commercial law and should accommodate 
when possible the evolution of tort law with the principles laid down in the UCC. 
 
The economic expectations of parties have not traditionally been protected by the law concerning 
unintentional torts. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978). We do not 
believe that any good purpose would be achieved by undermining the operation of the UCC provisions by 
extending tort law to embrace purely economic losses in product liability cases. Moreover, the UCC 
provisions provide the Court with ample room for the exercise of wide judicial discretion to ensure that 
substantial justice results in particular cases. See, e. g., §§ 2-302 and 2-719(3) (concerning 
unconscionable clauses and contracts), and §1-203 (imposing a general obligation of good faith). 
 
.... Rather than obscure fundamental tort concepts with contract notions of privity, we believe it is 
analytically more useful to focus on the precise duty of care that the law of negligence, not the law of 
contract or an agreement by the parties, has imposed on the defendant International Harvester. The law 
of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a tractor that does not harm person or 
property. If the defendant fails to exercise such due care, it is of course liable for the resulting injury to 
person or property as well as other losses which naturally follow from that injury. However, the law of 
negligence does not impose on International Harvester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough 
and breaks down infrequently enough for Clark to make a profit in his custom farming business. This is 
not to say that such a duty could not arise by a warranty- express or implied- by agreement of the parties 
or by representations of the defendant, but the law of negligence imposes no such duty. Accordingly, the 





(1)  Why was there no duty in tort? What rationale does the court offer to support its conclusion that 
"pure" economic loss is not an interest protected in negligence? 
 
(2)  How does the rationale in Just's differ from that in Clark? Consider which of the rationales apply 
to the cases in the following typology of economic loss cases. 
 
(3)  Torts and contracts as risk allocation mechanisms: Both negligence (torts, generally) and 
contracts can be viewed as risk allocation mechanisms. Consider the Brian and Christie court's excerpt 
from Clark v. International Harvester.   
 
The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a tractor that does not 
harm person or property. If the defendant fails to exercise such due care, it is of course liable for 
the resulting injury to person or property as well as other losses which naturally follow from that 
injury. However, the law of negligence does not impose on International Harvester a duty to build 
a tractor that plows fast enough and breaks down infrequently enough for Clark to make a profit in 
his custom farming business. This is not to say that such a duty could not arise by a warranty 
express or implied by agreement of the parties or by representations of the defendant, but the law 
of negligence imposes no such duty. 
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Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). To what type of risk does each 
apply? That is, who bears the risk of injuries to person or property? To economic expectations? Who 
makes the decision on how these risks are to be allocated between the parties? Can these risk 
allocations be reallocated by the parties? 
 
Do these risk allocation differences shed light on the rationale for the economic loss rule? 
 
 
B. Rationales for the Economic Loss Rule: The Problem of Limits 
 
 
JUSTS, INC. v. ARRINGTON CONSTRUCTION CO. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978) 
 
BAKES, J. -In 1972defendant respondent Arrington Construction Company and the City of Idaho Falls 
entered into a contract for the renovation of a five and one-half block portion of the downtown Idaho Falls 
business area in accordance with Project No.4B-42, of Local Improvement District (LID) No.42. The work 
to be done included the removal and replacement of all streets and sidewalks; the location, removal and 
replacement of all sewer and water lines; the removal and replacement of electrical services; the removal 
and replacement of light and traffic control systems; and the addition of trees, shrubs, and other 
beautification devices. The contract required the defendant to take certain precautions to limit the 
disruption to the businesses within the area to be renovated. The plaintiff appellant Just's, Inc., operated a 
retail business in leased premises located within the renovation area. 
 
The plaintiff brought this action alleging in Count I of its complaint that it was a third-party 
beneficiary of the contract and that its business had been damaged by the defendant's failure to complete 
the project in a timely manner and to provide continuous access to plaintiff’s business as required by the 
terms of the contract. The second count of the complaint alleged similar damage because of the 
defendant's negligent performance of the contract. The district court initially denied the defendants motion 
to dismiss Count I, ruling that the plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the contract. However, when the 
district court later learned that the plaintiff was a lessee and not an owner of property within the LID, it 
dismissed Count I. After denying defendant Arrington's motion for summary judgment on Count II, the 
negligence issue was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, plaintiff 
assigns as error the dismissal of Count I of its complaint, and as to the trial of Count II, the refusal to 
admit certain items into evidence and the giving of certain jury instructions. 
 
[Parts 1-111 of the opinion consider Plaintiff's contract claim. The court held:] We conclude 
therefore that this plaintiff is a member of the class of third persons intended to be benefitted by 




The plaintiff also seeks a new trial of Count II, its negligence theory of recovery, because of 
certain errors which it alleges occurred at the trial. However, we do not reach the merits of these 
assignments of error because we conclude that Court II fails to state a claim for relief, as the defendant 
asserted unsuccessfully in the district court. Court II of the complaint alleges in pertinent part: 
 
That defendant has carelessly and negligently and with total disregard for the property 
of plaintiff, failed to provide continuous access to and from plaintiff's place of business, failed to 
as rapidly as possible complete said project with as minimal disruption of plaintiff's business as 
possible, failed to limit the under-construction status of the block in which plaintiff's business is 
located to no more than thirty (30) continuous calendar days and failed to complete all portions of 





The plaintiff claims that the defendant’s negligent performance and breach of its contractual 
duties interfered with the flow of customers into the plaintiff's store, thereby decreasing its sales and net 
profits. In essence, the plaintiff claims that because of the defendant’s negligence it lost business 
and its profits suffered as a result. 
 
At the outset we emphasize that negligent conduct and breach of contract are two distinct 
theories of recovery. Ordinarily, breach of contract is not a tort, although a contract may create the 
circumstances for the commission of a tort. Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 483 P.2d 664 (1971). See 
also McAlvain v. General Insurance Co., 97 Idaho 777,554 P.2d 955 (1976). A tort requires the wrongful 
invasion of an interest protected by the law, not merely an invasion of an interest created by the 
agreement of the parties. Taylor v. Herbold, supra.... Accordingly, the threshold question we must 
consider is whether the alleged negligent conduct of the defendant invaded an interest of the plaintiff to 
which the law of negligence extends its protection. We are concerned here with the duties imposed by the 
law upon the defendant with respect to the plaintiff's business, not with the duties imposed by the 
construction contract. The damages claimed by the plaintiff, lost profits, are purely economic losses 
allegedly suffered as a result of the defendant's negligent diversion of prospective customers of the 
plaintiff. 
 
As a general rule, no cause of action lies against a defendant whose negligence prevents the 
plaintiff from obtaining a prospective economic advantage. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 
1974); []. In Clark v. International Harvester Co10., 99 Idaho 581 P.2d 784 (1978), a companion to this 
case, we applied this general rule to deny the recovery of economic losses sustained by a plaintiff who 
claimed a tractor he purchased was negligently manufactured. Dean Prosser has summarized the rule 
which we adopted in Clark, stating: 
 
Certain types of interests, because of the various difficulties which they present, have been 
afforded relatively little protection at the hands of the law against negligent 
invasions. Thus, interests of a pecuniary nature, such as the right to have a contract performed, 
the expectation of financial advantage, or the integrity of the pocketbook which may be damaged 
by reliance upon a representation, all present special problems. *** In general, however, it may be 
said that the law gives protection against negligent acts to the interest in security of the person, 
and all interests in tangible property. In other words, negligence may result in liability for personal 
injury or property damage. 
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §54 (4th ed. (1971). With specific reference to 
interference with a prospective economic advantage, Prosser states: 
 
The cause of action has run parallel to that for interference with existing contracts. Again, the tort 
began with "malice," and it has remained very largely a matter of at least intent 
to interfere. Cases have been quite infrequent in which even the claim has been advanced that 
the defendant through his negligence has prevented the plaintiff from obtaining a prospective 
pecuniary advantage; and the usual statement is that there can be no cause of action in such a 
case. There are, however, a few situations in which recovery has been permitted, all of them 
apparently to be justified upon the basis of some special relation between the parties. In all 
probability, as in the case of interference with existing contracts, liability for negligence is not 
impossible, but it must depend upon the existence of some special reason for finding a duty of 
care. No case has been found in which intended but purely incidental interference resulting from 
the pursuit of the defendant's own ends by proper means has been held to be actionable. 
 
As applied by the courts, however, the rule has been expressed in different ways and its result 
explained on various grounds. For example, some courts have simply ruled that the defendant owes no 
                                                     
10 This case in which the plaintiff seeks recovery for purely economic losses without alleging any attending personal injury or 
property damage must be distinguished from cases involving the recovery of economic losses which are parasitic to an injury to 
person or property.  It is well established that in the latter case economic losses are recoverable in a negligence action. [] See, e.g., 
Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974) (loss of profits resulting from 




duty to plaintiffs seeking compensation for such purely economic losses. See e.g., Mandal v. Hoffman 
Const. Co., 270 Or. 248, 527 P.2d 387 (1974) (contractor for a city denied recovery of economic losses 
resulting from another contractor's negligent performance of its contract with the city). Other courts have 
reached the same result by applying the doctrine of proximate cause. See, e.g., Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 
23 N.J. Misc. 89, 41 A.2d 267 (1945) (denying merchant on island recovery for lost profits caused by 
negligent destruction of only bridge connecting mainland with island). Still other courts have found such 
economic losses to be too remote to permit recovery. See, e.g. Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191,43 S.E. 419 
(1903) (denying recovery by printer who lost profits because contractor had negligently broken power line 
supplying electricity to his presses). Courts have also denied recovery of purely economic losses on the 
ground that they were too speculative. See, e.g., Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 112P.686(1910) (plaintiff 
denied recovery of profits lost because of lost use of negligently injured jockey); Dunlop Tire & Rubber 
Corp. v. FMC Corp., 53 A.D.2d 150, 385 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1976) (recovery of lost profits resulting from plant 
shutdown caused by explosion in neighboring chemical plant denied). This general rule has also been 
applied in product liability cases to deny recovery of purely economic losses in negligence and strict 
liability in tort actions. [] 
 
Though the rule as been expressed indifferent ways, the common underlying pragmatic 
consideration is that a contrary rule, which would allow compensation˙ for losses of economic advantage 
caused by the defendant's negligence, would impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden on the 
defendant's conduct. The United States Court of Appeals in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, supra, referring to 
the rule, stated: 
 
[The general rule] has strength. It rests upon the proposition that a contrary rule, which 
would allow compensation for all losses of economic advantages caused by defendant's 
negligence, would be subject the defendant to claims based upon remote and speculative injuries 
which he could not foresee in any practical sense of the term. 
 
This plaintiff is surely not the only person who may have suffered some pecuniary losses as a 
result of the downtown renovation project. For example, others who may have suffered pecuniary losses 
could conceivably include not only all the other businesses in the area, but also their suppliers, creditors, 
and so forth, ad infinitum. In contrast to the recognized liability for personal injuries and property damage, 
with its inherent limitations of size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercussions of a 
negligent act would be virtually open-ended. Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio App. 
1946). If the defendant's liability were extended to all those who suffered any pecuniary Joss, its liability 
could become grossly disproportionate to its fault. Such potential liability would unduly burden any 
construction in a business area. 
 
However, there are exceptions to this rule against the recovery of purely economic losses, and 
the rule need not be applied mechanically. But such exceptions generally involve a special relationship 
between the parties, []; cf. MeAlvain v. General Ins. Co., supra (insurance agent), or unique 
circumstances requiring a different allocation of risk. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, supra 
(commercial fishing grounds damaged by negligent oil spill). However, neither situation is present in this 
case. We conclude, therefore, that the better result in this case is reached by applying the general rule 
which limits the recovery of economic losses in negligence actions to those situations involving personal 
injury or property damage. Since Count II of plaintiff’s complaint sought recovery for economic loss only, it 
should have been dismissed. [] 
 
The order dismissing Count I of the plaintiff’s complaint is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
trial on the merits of Count I. The judgment entered in favor of the defendant on Count II of the plaintiff’s 
complaint is affirmed. 
 
BISTLINE, J., concurs. 
 
McFADDEN, J., concurs in Parts I, Ill and IV. 
 






(1)  Why was there no duty in tort? What rationale does the court offer to support its conclusion that 
"pure" economic loss is not an interest protected in negligence? 
 
(2)  Special relationships: What exceptions to the general rule against recovering economic loss in 
tort actions does the court acknowledge? What is a "special relationship"? The "special relationship" 
rubric will appear again. It is generally used to limit liability. 
 
(3)  "Unique circumstances": The other exception noted by the court is where "unique circumstances 
requir[e] a different allocation of risk." What does this suggest? The only discussion of the exception is in 
Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc.: 
 
  Although this Court has recognized the existence of the unique circumstances exception 
to the economic loss rule, it has never applied the exception. Just's Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 
[]. In Just's Inc., the lessee of a business in a local improvement district brought an action against 
a contractor engaged in renovating the district, for negligent diversion of the lessee's prospective 
customers. After explaining the economic loss rule, this Court stated the unique circumstances 
exception involves "unique circumstances requiring a different allocation of risk." Just's Inc., []. 
This Court then stated the exception did not apply. Id. The exception was also mentioned in 
Duffin: 
 
Economic loss might also be recovered in tort where the occurrence of a unique 
circumstance requires a different allocation of the risk. [Citations omitted]. However, the 
certification of seed potatoes is not a "unique circumstance" requiring a re-allocation of 
the risk, and the Duffins do not so contend. Therefore, this exception is ... not implicated. 
Duffin, [] The purchase of a residential house is an everyday occurrence and does not create the 
type of unique circumstances required to justify a different allocation of risk, particularly where it 
appears there may be other defendants available to respond in contract damages. 
Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 108 P.3d 996 (2005). 
 




(1)  Taylor v. Herbold: Plaintiff was a potato grower/seller who brought a breach of contract action 
against a purchaser of some of his potatoes. Defendant had contracted to purchase 7000 cwt. of potatoes 
out of an undifferentiated pile of some 10.300cwt. Defendant never took delivery of any potatoes covered 
by the contract. In addition to alleging a breach of contract, he also claimed ''tortious damages arising 
from said breach of contract." Plaintiff argued that, because defendant never took delivery of his portion of 
the potatoes, no other buyer was willing to buy the remainder since there was a risk that the new buyer 
was purchasing a lawsuit. 
 
Plaintiff instituted this action for the value of the 7,000 cwt. potatoes covered by the contract (the 
breach of contract action) and for the value of the 3,300 cwt. potatoes remaining unsold and not covered 
by the contract (the tortious damages claim). The plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of defendants' 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the second count. The supreme court affirmed: 
 
The law governing the ability to obtain remedies for breach of contract, as well as tortious 
behavior, is confusing, with few, if any, court decisions on the subject. Ordinarily, a 
breach of contract is not a tort. A contract may, however, create a state of things which 
furnishes the occasion for a tort. [] If the relation of the plaintiff and the defendants is such 
that a duty to take due care arises therefrom irrespective of contract and the defendant is 
negligent, then the action is one of tort. To find an action in tort, there must be a breach 
of duty apart from the nonperformance of a contract. [] .... 
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The United States Supreme Court in the case of Atlantic & P. Rwy. v. Laird, 164 U.S. 393 (1896), 
quoting Kelley v. Rwy. Co., 1Q.B. 944 (1895), stated: 
 
The distinction is this: If the cause of complaint be for an act of omission or nonfeasance, 
which, without proof of a contract to do what has been left undone, would not give rise to 
any cause of action (because no duty apart from contract to do what is complained of 
exists), then the action is founded upon contract, and not upon tort. [If, on the other hand, 
the relation of the plaintiff to the defendants be such that a duty arises from that 
relationship irrespective of contract, to take due care, and the defendants are negligent, 
then the action is one in tort.] 
 
An exception to the rules above stated appears to be those situations in which 
misfeasance rather than nonfeasance was the issue. The authorities cited by plaintiff fall 
into such category and therefore are not applicable to the case at bar. While there are 
certain other exceptions, primarily involving cases in which one of the parties was 
engaged in a public calling or public transportation, those exceptions are not applicable to 
the facts in the case at bar. 
Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133,483 P.2d 664 (1971). 
 
Which of the rationales offered by Just's and Clark is applicable to Taylor? 
 
What exceptions to the no liability rule does the court cite? 
 
(2)  Other sale-of-goods cases include: 
(a)  Tusch Enters. v. Coffin: negligence claim for shoddily constructed rental 
housing units did not state a cause of action because plaintiff suffered only economic loss. Tusch 
Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,40-41, 740 P.2d 1022, 1025-26 (1987). 
 
  (b) Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co.: plaintiff cannot rely upon negligence in seeking 
to recover for the construction of a prefabricated building when the negligence caused neither personal 
injury nor property damage. Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 411, 690 P.2d 341,346 
(1984). 
 
(c) G & M Faims v. Funk Irrigation Co.: an irrigation system that failed to provide sufficient 
water volume because of an allegedly negligent design was not actionable intort. G & M Fanns v. Funk 
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 527, 808 P.2d 851, 864 (1991). 
 
(d) State v. Mitchell Construction Co.: the cost of repairing or replacing an allegedly 
defective roof on a new building could not be recovered in negligence or strict liability. 
State v. Mitchell Construction Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1984). 
 
(3) The court has reached the same no-duty conclusion when the purchaser of goods sues a remote 
manufacturer alleging pure economic loss. Given the complexity of the distribution chain for most 
products, this is a common category of cases. Purchasers are unlikely to be in privity of contract with the 
actual manufacturer or assembler of a product. 
 
For example, Ronald Corrado contracted with Adkison Corporation (a building contractor) to 
construct a building to house his aircraft mechanic business. Adkison in tum contracted with Rural 
Systems, Inc. (RSI), the dealer for American Building Company (ABC), to provide a cut-to-order metal 
building. ln placing the order with ABC, RSI made a mistake and the building was not what Corrado 
needed. Corrado and Adkison eventually sued ABC in both contract and tort for the economic losses they 
suffered. 
 
  Noting that "it is the view of this Court that the law of contracts should control actions for purely 
economic losses and not the law of torts," the court summarily affirmed a directed verdict 





Plaintiffs contend that ABC should be held liable for plaintiffs' economic losses based on 
ABC's negligence. We have previously denied recovery in negligence for purely economic 
losses from the manufacturer of a defective product. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 
[99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978)]. The district court correctly ruled that a negligence 
claim for economic damages was not proper and, accordingly, we affirm the order of the 
district court in directing a verdict on this count. 
Adkison Corp. v. American Building Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984). 
 
 
ii. Exceptions to the Economic Loss Rule 
 
  A recurrent legal pattern is a general rule and its exceptions. The supreme court in Brian and 
Christie based its decision on the inapplicability of the "economic loss rule" because the property that was 
damaged was not "transactional property." The decision also discussed two cases- Clark and Just's- that 
provided rationales for barring recovery of pure economic losses in negligence and product liability cases. 
These cases in turn indicated that there are exceptions: most significantly, when there is a "special 
relationship" between the parties. 
 
What is a "special relationship"? As you work through the following cases, construct a list of 
recurring factual elements of the relationship. 
 
 




(1)  Just as shoddy products can cause economic loss, so can poor service. Furthermore, service 
contracts present factual patterns that are superficially very similar to those in the sale of shoddy goods: 
plaintiff and defendant have a contract; defendant breaches the contract; plaintiff seeks to recover not (or 
not only) in contract but (also) in tort. Again, this is a situation in which the boundary between tort and 
contract is at issue: the relationship between the parties has its origin in contract and the losses suffered 
are exclusively economic. 
 
Despite the seeming similarities, the differences between sales and service contracts are 
significant. Most fundamentally, the difference between the sale/purchase of a product and the 
sale/purchase of a service is the difference between the mass-produced and the personal. The purchaser 
of a product seldom obtains it directly from the manufacturer; the purchaser of a service, on the other 
hand, is quite likely to deal directly with the provider. While the personal element in service contracts is 
declining with the rise of the service economy- and a concomitant increasing scale of service providers 
that is approaching something akin to mass-production - nonetheless, service contracts remain more 
personal and idiosyncratic: even taking a mass-produced VCR into the franchised warranty service 
provider requires a level of personal interaction that the purchaser of a product seldom has with its 
manufacturer. 
 
These differences - as imprecise as they are - appear to lie at the core of the court's differing 
treatment of sales and service contracts - a difference that the court has often stated as a conclusion that 
service contracts can form the basis for a relationship between the parties that is sufficiently "special" to 










1. Public Callings 
 
 
STRONG v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
18 Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910) 
 
SULLIVAN, C.J. -This action was brought by the appellants, as plaintiffs, to recover damages in the sum 
of $581.17, alleged to have been sustained by reason of an error in the transmission of a telegraphic 
message delivered by appellants to respondents at the town of Soda Springs, Idaho, on or about March 
6, 1907, to be transmitted to parties in Denver, Colo. 
 
The principal issue made by the pleadings was whether the defendant was liable because of a 
mistake made in the transmission of said telegram. The action was tried by the court and a jury, and at 
the close of plaintiffs' evidence, counsel for defendant moved for a nonsuit, which motion was granted by 
the court and judgment of dismissal was entered. The appeal is from said order and the judgment. 
 
The following facts, among others, appear from the record: [The message plaintiff sent 
to the buyer was written on a blank form provided by defendant. The form contained a lengthy 
disclaimer of liability for mistakes or delays in transmission of messages unless the sender paid 
an additional fee to have the message retransmitted from the receiving station. Plaintiff did not choose to 
have the message retransmitted for verification. 
 
[The message was: 
 
"Soda Springs, Idaho, March 6th, 1907. 
''To Colorado Live Stock & Commission Co., 
Denver Stock Yards, Denver, Colorado. 
"Will you honor draft of W.L. White on you in payment of 84 head of steers at three ninety-five per 
hundred two per cent shrink weighed here. 
"STRONG & STARK” 
 
The telegram as delivered to the Colorado Live Stock & Commission Company quoted a price of $3.25 
per hundred weight. The Company replied by telegraph:  
 
"Denver, Colorado, 3, 6, 1907. "To Strong & Stark, Soda Springs, Idaho. 
"Will honor draft as per telegram if cattle are billed to us. 
"COLORADO LIVESTOCK & COMMISSION C0.” 
 
 
Following this exchange, plaintiff shipped the steers to the company which paid for them 
at the rate of $3.25 per hundred-weight and refused to pay $3.95 per hundred.] Upon that state of facts, 
the question is presented whether the telegraph company is liable for the difference of seventy cents per 
hundred-weight. 
 
The respondent does not deny that a mistake was made, but contends that it is not liable, 
for the reason that the telegraph blank contained a certain printed stipulation to the effect that the 
telegraph company should not be liable for a mistake or delay in transmission or delivery of the 
message.... 
 
       There appears to be considerable conflict in the various decisions upon the question of the validity of 
the printed stipulation upon a telegram blank limiting the liability of the company for mistakes and delays 
in transmission of messages. In some of the decisions it is held that such stipulations are valid, and in 





Counsel [for defendant] cites Camp v. Western Union Tel. Co., 1Met (Ky.) 164, where it was held 
that a person desiring to send a message is admonished by the notice printed across said message that 
to guard against a mistake in transmission it should be repeated. The court said: "He is also notified that if 
a mistake occurs, the company will not be responsible for it unless the message be repeated. There is 
nothing unreasonable in this condition." 
 
Counsel also cites Western Union Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15Mich. 525. The court there holds 
that it would be extremely unjust, considering the small amount of compensation for sending a message, 
and would effectually put an end to this method of correspondence, to hold them liable for the entire 
correctness of all messages transmitted or to hold them responsible for all damages which may accrue 
from an error, especially when only a single transmission, without repeating, is relied upon or paid for; or 
to deny them all power to make rules and regulations to limit their liability even in the case of repeat 
messages, and the court says it would be equally unreasonable to require them to repeat a message 
when they are paid only for a single transmission. Some of the courts have based their decisions on the 
rule laid down in those cases. 
 
The last two decisions were rendered, one in 1858 and the other in 1867, when telegraphy was in 
its infancy and in a very imperfect, uncertain condition, and messages could not be sent or received with 
the correctness and accuracy with which they are sent in the present day with the improved telegraphic 
machinery and appliances and greater expertness of operators. The court in the latter case refers to the 
small amount paid for the transmission of a message, and it was evidently in the mind of the court that 
telegraph companies were poor, struggling corporations; but experience and history now bears out the 
statement that telegraph companies have become immensely rich on the "small stipend" charged for 
sending messages, which would indicate that they are charging a great deal more than it actually costs to 
transmit such messages and to give them a fair return upon the capital invested in the business. The 
Michigan court, it seems, was mistaken when it suggested that to hold them liable "would effectually put 
an end to this method of correspondence," as it is shown that a number of states have held telegraph 
companies liable and it has not "effectually put an end to this method of correspondence," as it used a 
great deal more at the present time than it ever was before, regardless of the courts holding it liable for 
damages arising because of its negligence. 
 
Telegraphy has been so perfected with its improved machinery, instruments, equipment 
and appliances that with competent and careful operators’ telegrams may be sent with accuracy. That 
being true, telegraph companies should be held to a higher degree of care, fidelity and diligence than 
could reasonably have been required of them at the dates when the last above cited opinions were 
rendered, and they should be held to a higher degree of care in sending and delivering telegrams that 
involve the property rights of either the sender or receiver than perhaps they would be in social telegrams, 
or telegrams that do not involve property rights and others of particular interest to the sender or receiver. 
While under the decision of the United States Supreme Court above cited, a telegraph company is held 
not to be a common carrier, it is, however, a corporation doing business for the public, and must be held 
liable for damages arising from its own carelessness and negligence or the carelessness and negligence 
of its agents. While it may make rules and regulations in regard to the conduct of its business, the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of such rules must be determined with reference to public policy, 
precisely as in the case of common carriers. Public policy is that principle of law under which freedom of 
contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the good of the community- the public good. [] A 
stipulation in a contract which exempts the corporation from damages for its own negligence is void when 
applied to a telegraph company as well as when applied to a common carrier. 
 
Owing to the fact that many of the decisions which hold that the stipulation under consideration is 
valid and binding are based upon the decisions of Camp v. Western Union Tel. Co., decided in 1858, and 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Carew, which was decided in 1867, and long before telegraphy had reached its 
present state of efficiency and accuracy, this court is not inclined to follow that line of decisions. Since 
telegraph companies are public agents, exercising a quasi-public employment, carefulness and fidelity 
are essentials to its character as a public servant, and public policy forbids that it should be released by 
its own rules or regulations from damages occasioned by its carelessness and negligence. It is chartered 
for public purposes: it has the power of eminent domain; the public are compelled to rely absolutely on 
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the care and diligence of the company in the transmission of messages, and by reason of those powers 
and the relation it sustains to the public, it is obligated to perform the duties it is chartered to perform with 
the care, skill and diligence that a prudent man would, under like circumstances, exercise in his own 
affairs, and if it fails to do so, it is liable in damages for such failure, and cannot restrict its liability by rule 
or regulation which attempts to excuse it for its own negligence. It is a public servant, and must serve the 
people impartially, carefully and in good faith. We do not hold that the company is an insurer against 
mistakes or delays arising from causes beyond its own control, but it is liable for damages arising from the 
use of defective instruments of want of skill or care on the part of operators. A stipulation exempting it 
from liability for its own negligence would be contrary to public policy. 
 
.... Where a telegraph company fails to transmit a message correctly, the proof of that fact is 
prima facie evidence of the company's negligence; so proof by the plaintiff of the contract, which may be 
implied by the delivery of the message to be transmitted and its acceptance by the defendant's agent, and 
of the breach, makes out a prima facie case, and the plaintiff need not go further and show any further 
negligence or omission of the defendant. [] If the failure was not the result of negligence, the means of 
showing that fact is almost invariably within the exclusive possession of the company, and for the courts 
to require the sender to prove the negligence, after showing the mistake, would be in many cases to 
require an impossibility, not infrequently resulting in enabling the company to evade a just liability. [] 
 
We conclude that when the sender delivers a message to the agent of a telegraph company for 
transmission and it is received by him for transmission, it is clearly implied and understood that the 
message must be correctly sent, and upon proof that it was not correctly sent, a prima facie case is made. 
Then if the mistake was not occasioned by incompetent operators or defective instruments and was 
occasioned by the elements or some matter or thing over which the company had no control, it devolves 
upon the company to prove that as a matter of defense. Therefore, when the plaintiff proved that said 
message was delivered to the agents of the company for transmission and that they accepted it and 
made a mistake in its transmission, the plaintiff had made a prima facie case and the court erred in 
granting a nonsuit and entering a judgment of dismissal. 
 
The judgment is reserved, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with 
the views expressed in this opinion. 
 





(1)  What was the source of the duty? What was the scope of the duty? What interest was invaded by 
defendant's conduct? 
 
(2)  Why was plaintiff not left to his contractual rights? Plaintiff received precisely what he had 
contracted for: an unrepeated and, therefore, unguaranteed message. Is it fair to allow plaintiff to pay a 
lower charge for an unrepeated message and then - by suing in tort - to recover as though he had paid 
the higher fee for a repeated message? 
 
(3)  Public callings: If the breach of a contract is not generally a tort, what distinguishes Strong from 
Taylor or Just's? Note the court's language in Strong: 
 
telegraph companies are public agents, exercising a quasi-public employment, carefulness and 
fidelity are essentials to its character as a public servant, .... It is chartered for public purposes: it 
has the power of eminent domain; the public are compelled to rely absolutely on the care and 
diligence of the company in the transmission of messages, and by reason of those powers and 
the relation it sustains to the public, it is obligated to perform the duties it is chartered to perform 





One of the earliest sources of duty extending beyond contract involved the so-called "public 
callings." At the common law, common carriers, innkeepers, and the like had tort duties of due care 
imposed on them beyond any duties they may have assumed in contract. The "public calling" category - 
businesses in which there is a "duty of public service" - is not completely closed. An historical examination 
concluded: 
 
The duty to serve was the first distinguishing characteristic of the class of businesses known 
today as "public callings." The classification was made, not upon some inherent characteristic of 
the business itself, but upon a factor outside the business which varied as times changed .... This 
factor was economic conditions, which determined those upon whom the duty to serve was 
placed, or in other words, the importance of the business to the public. 
 
Norman Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (1927). 
 
Public callings include several categories of businesses that hold themselves out to the public- such as 
the common carriers (Clark v. Taff) and innkeepers (McGill v. Frasure). Are there others? 
 
(4)  Lee v. Sun Valley: Plaintiff was thrown from a rented horse when his saddle slipped, and the 
horse reared. The primary issue was the effect of an exculpatory clause releasing defendant from liability 
to a guest for the outfitter's negligence. In determining whether the clause should be given effect, the 
court noted 
The general rule that "express agreements exempting one of the parties for 
negligence are to be sustained" is subject to exceptions where: "(1) one party is at an obvious 
disadvantage in bargaining power; (2) a public duty is involved (public utility companies, common 
carriers)." Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co. Plaintiff concedes that he had no disadvantage 
in bargaining power but argues that the second exception applies on the theory that the statutes 
regulating outfitters and guides impose a public duty upon Sun Valley. Utilities and carriers were 
named in the Rawlings case as obvious examples of parties owing a public duty, but there may 
be others who also owe a public duty in Idaho. The idea of a public duty is closely related to the 
idea of public policy and it is within the domain of the legislature, elected by the public, to 
determine such duties and policies. 
 
Conceding that outfitters are subject to state licensing requirements, the court concluded 
that licensing in itself was insufficient to create a public duty: 
 
We do not attempt to articulate a general rule applicable to all statutes. However, we do 
hold that where the legislature has addressed the rights and duties pertaining to personal 
injuries arising out of the relationship between two groups, i.e., employers/employees, 
outfitters and guides/participants, and has granted limited liability to one group in 
exchange for adherence to specific duties, then such duties become a "public duty" within 
the exception to the general rule validating exculpatory contracts. Therefore, while the 
agreement between Sun Valley and plaintiff does absolve Sun Valley from common law 
liabilities, it does not absolve Sun Valley from liability for possible violation of the public 
duty imposed by I.C. § 6-1204. 
Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984) 
 
(5)  Lane v. Oregon Short Line R.R.: Plaintiff shipped lambs with defendant railroad. The contract 
provided that plaintiff would, "at his own risk and expense, load, unload, care for, feed and water the stock 
until delivery." En route to their destination, the lambs were unloaded for feeding into pens defendant 
provided. Plaintiff left the lambs unattended over night in the pens. The following morning 38 lambs were 
missing. Noting that "the gates were found closed and in the same condition in which they had been left 
the night before," the court began its analysis with the statement that 
 
[i]t is the duty of a carrier transporting livestock to furnish reasonable and proper facilities 




 It is claimed that the failure to provide the gates with patented locks was negligence. No 
inference of negligence can be drawn from such failure, unless there was a showing of such 
circumstances that a prudent person would have provided locks, as, for example, that others in 
the community locked their pens and corrals in which livestock was kept at night, or that sheep or 
other livestock had escaped from the pens previously, or that it was customary for railroad 
stockyards to be provided with lock. [] 
 
The court therefore reversed a jury verdict for plaintiff, noting that "the carrier is not an insurer, and its 
duty is performed when it furnishes suitable yards in proper condition and reasonably secure." Lane v. 
Oregon Short Une R.R., 34 Idaho 37, 198 P.671 (1921). 
 
 
2. Professional Service Providers 
 
 
McALVAIN v. GENERAL INSURANCE CO. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
97 Idaho 777,554 P.2d 955 (1976) 
 
BAKES, J.-Adams County Abstract Company, a corporation, appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict 
finding it liable for its negligent failure to issue sufficient insurance to plaintiff Douglas McAlvain on the 
inventory at his retail store, the Council Electric Furniture and Appliance Store. It contends that it owed no 
duty to McAlvain which would subject it to liability in tort for its negligence. We affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
 
In the summer of 1969, McAlvain purchased Council Electric as an ongoing business, entering 
into a real estate contract with the seller which required that the property involved be adequately insured. 
The purchase price was contingent on the results of a final inventory of the business which was to be 
taken in July 1969; the inventory when completed disclosed that at the time of the sale the store 
contained $45,000.00 in inventory. 
 
The Adams County Abstract Company acted as real estate agent in this transaction, through its 
president and principal real estate officer, Ferd Muller. Adams County Abstract Company is a small, 
closely-held corporation of which Muller is controlling shareholder, dealing in real estate and insurance 
business in the Council area. It is the local agent for General Insurance Company of America (SAFECO), 
which held the existing contract for insurance on the inventory at Council Electric at the time of sale. 
Thus, Adams County Abstract handled both the real estate transfer and the transfer of insurance to the 
plaintiff McAlvain in 1969. The existing policy had a $30,000.00 coverage on inventory. Shortly after 
taking over the business, McAlvain metwith the principal insurance agent for Adams County Abstract, 
Rosemary Kilborn, to negotiate a package insurance plan for Council Electric. He requested sufficient 
insurance to fully cover the business, including the inventory. Although the results of the final inventory 
had been delivered to Adams County Abstract so that Muller could complete the paper work on the real 
estate transfer, thus giving Adams County Abstract the information that the inventory at Council Electric 
was valued at $45,000.00 at that time, the three-year insurance policy written by Kilborn covered 
inventory only to the extent of $30,000.00. 
 
In November 1970, during the second year of the policy, McAlvain was in the Adams County 
Abstract office on an unrelated matter when he first became aware that his inventory was underinsured. 
He testified that he told Muller that the present level was grossly inadequate and that his inventory 
insurance should be around $50,000.00. Adams County Abstract did not immediately increase McAlvain's 
inventory coverage, and the reason for its failure to do so was a matter of dispute in this lawsuit. McAlvain 
claimed that as of that date Adams County Abstract had committed itself by an oral binder to insure his 
inventory to $50,000.00. Adams County Abstract countered that there was no agreement at that time, but 





On December 10, 1970, the Council Electric store was gutted by fire, and the inventory almost 
totally destroyed. An inventory taken shortly thereafter based on invoices and the discernible remains of 
the furniture and appliances, etc., was $43,625.00, but as of the night of the fire the inventory at Council 
Electric was only insured to $30,000.00. 
 
McAlvain sued both Adams County Abstract and the General Insurance Company on the 
following alternative theories. In his third cause of action McAlvain claimed that Adams County Abstract 
Company had been negligent in its initial failure, in August 1969, to provide the plaintiff with adequate 
insurance coverage of the inventory at Council Electric and he claimed as damages the difference 
between $43,625.00 and $30,000.00, less $4,071.00 salvage (or $9,554.00). In his fourth cause of action, 
against General Insurance Company, he claimed that the conversation with Muller in early November 
1970, constituted an oral binder contract to insure for $50,000.00 which would be binding on General 
Insurance Company. 
 
The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and against Adams County Abstract Company on 
McAlvain's third cause of action that the Adams County Abstract Company had acted negligently in failing 
to initially issue sufficient insurance to cover the full inventory of the Council Electric store. However, the 
jury found against the plaintiff on his claim against General lnsurance Company that an oral binder to 
insure the inventory to $50,000.00 resulted from the conversation between McAlvain and Muller in 
November of 1970. 
 
Adams County Abstract Company contends that it cannot be held liable in tort for its failure to 
issue sufficient insurance to McAlvain because the only duties it owed to McAlvain were contractual. It 
argues that the mere failure to carry out contractual duties does not give rise to an action in tort, Taylor v. 
Herbold, 94 Idaho 133,483 P.2d 664 {1971}, and that under our holding in Benner v. Farm Bureau Mutual 
Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 31,528 P.2d 193{1974}, McAlvain cannot obtain a judgment against the insurance 
agent. We disagree. 
 
The plaintiff urged two alternative theories of liability to the jury, each of which centered upon a 
separate incident in his dealings with Adams County Abstract Company. The third cause of action was 
based upon his claim against the insurance agency for its alleged negligence in 1969 when his insurance 
policy was originally written. The fourth cause of action was his claim that the agency had bound the 
insurer, General Insurance Company, by an oral contract to increase his insurance based upon 
McAlvain's conversations with Muller in November 1970.The plaintiff phrased these claims in the 
alternative and the jury verdict forms instructed the jury, erroneously we believe, that if it found liability 
under plaintiffs’ tort theory, it could not reach the issue contained in plaintiff's fourth cause of action 
against General Insurance Company. The reason for this approach was apparently to avoid the possibility 
of a double recovery, although it is possible that the jury could have found in McAlvain's favor on both 
theories, i.e., that the insurance agency was negligent in August 1969 and also that it had bound the 
insurer, General Insurance Company, in November 1970. Nevertheless, because of the manner in which 
these issues were submitted to the jury, and the jury's finding against McAlvain on Count 4 from which he 
has not appealed, we do not consider issues of liability arising out of the November 1970, incident. Our 
sole concern in this appeal is whether an insurance agency which is requested to provide complete 
coverage and knows or should have known the amount of insurance necessary to effect complete 
coverage, but thereafter under-insures its insured, can be held liable intort for its negligence. We think 
that it can. 
 
We must first consider appellant's argument that McAlvain's causes of action must be grounded, 
if at all, in contract rather than tort. The weight of authority is that the insured may recover under either 
theory. [] 
 
A person in the business of selling insurance holds himself out to the public as being experienced 
and knowledgeable in this complicated and specialized field. The interest of the state that competent 
persons become insurance agents is demonstrated by the requirement that they be licensed by the state, 
I.C. § 41-1030; pass an examination administered by the state, I.C. § A1-1038; and meet certain 
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qualifications, I.C. § 41-1034. An insurance agent performs a personal service for his client, in advising 
him about the kinds and extent of desired coverage and in choosing the appropriate insurance contract 
for the insured. Ordinarily, an insured will look to his insurance agent, relying, not unreasonably, on his 
expertise in placing his insurance problems in the agent's hands. [] When an insurance agent performs 
his services negligently, to the insured's injury, he should be held liable for that negligence just as would 
an attorney, architect, engineer, physician or any other professional who negligently performs personal 
services. 
 
Our holding in Taylor v. Herbold, does not mandate a contrary result. In that case, the wrong 
complained of was non-performance by the defendant of a contract in which the defendant agreed to buy 
plaintiff's potatoes and remove them from plaintiff’s potato cellar. The plaintiff had attempted to take 
advantage of the broad damages rules of tort law by arguing that the non-performance of this contract 
was a tort, but we rejected that argument and limited the plaintiff's remedy to breach of contract. That 
case did not involve the rendering of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and 
experience, nor did it involve issues of negligence in the performance of contractual duties. 
 
In Wallace v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 32 Idaho 481, 174 P. 1009 {1918}, a case in which an 
insurance agent agreed to obtain insurance coverage for the plaintiff but subsequently failed to do so, this 
Court affirmed a finding that the insurance company and its agent were liable in tort for the agent's 
negligence: 
 
Where the only relation between the parties is contractual, the liability of one to the other 
in an action of tort for negligence must be based upon some positive duty, which the law 
imposes because of the relationship, or because of the negligent manner in which some act 
which the contract provides for is done. 
 
... The jury found that Adams County Abstract Company through its employees was negligent in 
failing to initially procure sufficient insurance in July of 1969 to cover McAlvain's inventory (apparently 
concluding that the plaintiff himself was not guilty of any negligence, which would have barred recovery) 










{1)  What was the source of the duty? What was the scope of the duty? What interest is protected by 
the duty? Is the duty based upon the interest invaded by defendant's conduct? Is it based upon the status 
of the defendant? If the duty is status-based, what is defendant's status that justifies the creation of a tort 
duty? 
 
{2)  Why is plaintiff allowed to sue in tort rather than being left to his contractual remedies? Shouldn't 
people be allowed to make contracts on whatever terms they choose? Once individuals have contracted 
shouldn't courts restrict their role to enforcing the contracts as written? 
 
{3) An early English legal treatise stated that: 
 
if a Smith prick my horse with a nail, &c. I shall have my action of the Case against him, without 
any warranty by the smith to do it well. ...For it is the duty of every Artificer to exercise his art 
right, &c. truly as he ought. 





{4) Wallace v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.: In another failure-to-insure case, the court stated the 
substance of the action was that the defendant "agreed to insure respondent's property; that 
the[respondent/plaintiff] relied upon their agreement and did not procure insurance; ˙ that his property 
was destroyed by fire, and that, by reason of the negligence of appellants, in that they failed to issue the 
policy and insure the property, he has been damaged." The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff. 
Wallace v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 31 ldaho 481, 174 P. 1009 (1918). Cf. Hillock .v. Idaho Title & 
Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 P. 612 (1912) (negligent preparation of an abstract of title to real property is 
a tort); Anderson v. Title Insurance Co., 103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82 (1982) (plaintiff who purchased title 
insurance for real property did not have an action intort where the title insurer failed to discover that part 
of the land had already been sold to a third party); Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co., 115 
Idaho 56, 764 P.2d423 (1988) (plaintiff who purchased title insurance for real property did not have an 
action intort where the title insurer failed to discover that the land had been encumbered as security for 
loan). 
 
{5)  White v. Unigard Insurance Co.: Defendant refused to settle an insurance claim, contending 
that plaintiff had been responsible for the fire. The federal district court certified the following question to 
the Idaho Supreme Court: does Idaho recognize a tort action, distinct from an action on the contract, for 
an insurer's bad faith in settling the first party claims of its insured? 
 
Justice Bistline began by noting that there is a duty of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every 
contract; the question, therefore, is not whether a duty of "good faith" exists, but rather whether a breach 
of this duty will give rise to an independent action in tort. While noting that, "ordinarily [the] mere breach of 
contract [is] not a tort," the court concluded that "the contract between insurer and insured is no 'ordinary' 
contract, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is no 'mere' breach." 
 
An action in tort provides a remedy for harm done to insureds though no breach of an 
express contractual covenant has occurred and where contract damages fail to adequately 
compensate insureds.... [T]he requirement that contract damages be foreseeable at the time of 
contracting, [], in some cases would bar recovery for damages proximately caused by the 
insurer's bad faith. The measurement of recoverable damages intort is not limited to those 
foreseeable at the time of the tortious act; rather they include "[a] reasonable amount which will 
compensate plaintiff for all actual detriment proximately caused by the defendant's wrongful 
conduct." []... Thus, an insured person whose business goes bust as a result of an insurer's bad 
faith would be able to recover whether the bust was foreseeable or not. For example, an insured 
who takes out a second mortgage on her business property after purchasing her policy, and who 
could not make her combined payments when the insurer delayed settlement, would recover at 
tort, but not at contract. To deny an action in tort would deny such recovery and consequently 
encourage insurers to delay settlement. In contrast, an action in tort will provide necessary 
compensation for insureds and incentive for insurers to settle valid claims. See IDAHO CONST., 
art. 1, § 18 f'[A] speedy remedy s] afforded for every injury. ***").... 
 
The court held that "imposition of liability in tort for bad faith breach of an insurance 
contract is further warranted when one considers the special relationship which exists between insurer 
and insured. 'The insurance contract has long been recognized as giving rise to a special relationship 
between insurer and insured [] which requires that the parties deal with each other 
fairly, honestly, and in good faith []."' Justice Bakes dissented, arguing that: 
 
[i]t has long been the law in this state that non-performance of contractual obligations 
does not give rise to an action in tort.... It is readily apparent that the sine qua non of plaintiff’s 
claim against Unigard is the non-performance of a contractual obligation, i.e., failure to pay 
benefits allegedly due under the contract for which plaintiff has paid premiums. While it has been 
said that "every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement," [], such a duty does not exist independent of the contract 
itself. The duty of "good faith and fair dealing" acquires meaning only when considered in the 





Thus, any breach of this duty, which is nothing more than a breach of an implied 
contractual covenant, gives rise to an action on the contract. It does not give rise to an action in 
tort. 
White v. Unigard Insurance Co., 112 Idaho 94,730 P.2d 1014 (1986). Is White distinguishable from 
McAlvain? 
 
(6) Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chartered:  In the spring of 1983, John Runft 
contacted Aaron Jones, a former client, concerning a potential investment in a business venture- the 
North Idaho Jockey Club (NIJC)- of two other clients, Richard Sigismonti and John Kundrat. After a 
meeting between Runft, Jones, and Sigismonti, Jones indicated that he was willing to loan NIJC $420,000 
if the loan was adequately secured and "if Runft thought it would fly." Runft put together a loan proposal 
that included an assignment for security purposes of Sigismonti's and Kundrat's partnership interests in 
Pinecrest Hospital. Jones agreed to the proposal. Subsequently, Runft directed Jones to send him a 
check for the loan and stated that Runft would place "all" documents in trust with the escrow company 
pending closing of the deal. Runft was present at the closing and the escrow company disbursed the 
funds despite the fact that the partnership interests in the hospital had never been assigned as security. 
NIJC eventually defaulted on the loan, Sigismonti and Kundrat declared bankruptcy, and Jones brought 
suit against Runft and his law firm. Plaintiff alleged that "Runft breached an assumed duty to act in 
Jones's best interests by modifying portions of the escrow instructions to allow release of the loan 
proceeds without the Pinecrest assignment." The trial court granted defendants summary judgment and 
plaintiff appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court began by noting that plaintiff’s complaint 
 
refers to a breach of an "assumed duty or contract." A claim for breach of an assumed duty is a 
negligence action where the duty of care arises from a voluntary undertaking. Bowling v. Jack B. 
Parsons Companies, 117 Idaho 1030, 793 P.2d 703 (1990). A voluntary duty is distinct from any 
other duty the party may have as a result of another undertaking or relationship. The law firm 
argues that there are no facts to support a determination that the law firm assumed any duty 
towards Jones. In support of this assertion, the law firm submitted evidence that Jones [was] 
aware that Runft was acting as NIJC's attorney and that [he] knew Runft was not acting as [his] 
attorney. Runft's status as NIJC's attorney, however, does not entitle the law firm to summary 
judgment on a claim for breach of an assumed duty, if there is a genuine issue of fact whether 
Runft undertook a separate duty on the behalf of Jones. We conclude that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact concerning this claim. 
 
Jones argues that Runft assumed a duty to act on behalf of Jones "contractually or 
otherwise." The August 5 letter [which instructed Runft to handle the transaction in Jones's best 
interests] and Runft's failure to repudiate the direction in this letter for Runft to act in Jones's best 
interest create a genuine issue of material fact whether Runft contractually assumed a duty. 
 
The statement in the August 5 letter can be viewed as an offer for Runft to enter a 
unilateral contract. Although the breach of an assumed duty claim sounds in tort, evidence to 
support the existence of an assumed duty can be contractual in nature. A contract may ...create a 
state of things which furnishes the occasion for a tort. If the relation of the plaintiff and the 
defendants is such that a duty to take due care arises therefrom irrespective of contract and the 
defendant is negligent, then the action is one of tort. 
Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138 483 P.2d 664, 669 (1971). 
Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin, & Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 873 P.2d 861 (1994). 
 
(7)  McAlvain has been described as "emphasiz[ing] the fact that an insurance agent holds himself 
out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and that, by so doing, the agent 
induces reliance on his superior knowledge and skill." This rationale is generally applicable to 
professionals and the court has consistently applied tort standards of liability to a broad range of 
professionals -accountants, Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986); Streib v. 
Veigel, 109 Idaho 174,706 P.2d 63 (1985); Owyhee County v. Rite, 100 Idaho 91, 593 P.2d 995 (1979); 




E.g., Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 838 P.2d 293 (1992); Fitzgerald v. Walker, 113 Idaho 730, 747 
P.2d 752 (1987), following remand, 121 Idaho 589, 826 P.2d 1301 (1992); Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 
11, 813 P.2d 350 (1991); Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleism, & Slavin, 113 Idaho 822, 748 P.2d 406 (Ct. App. 
1987); surveyors, Williams v. Blakely, 114 Idaho 323, 757 P.2d 186 (1988); notary publics, Osborn v. 
Mrens, 116 Idaho 14,773 P.2d282 (1989); and title companies, Merrill v. Fremont Abstract Co., 39 Idaho 
238, 227 P. 34 (1924); Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 P. 612 (1912) -despite the 
contractual source of the relationship between the parties and the fact that the loss is purely economic. In 
such cases, the contract forms the basis of the relationship. 
 
(8)  Not all white-collar or professional services give rise to special relationships. For example, in 
Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, plaintiff sought loans from the bank to 
expand and remodel its business. Following protracted negotiations, the bank refused to make the loans 
plaintiff sought. Plaintiff responded by filing suit alleging that defendant had made an oral contract to loan 
the funds and that it had also breached several tort duties. After concluding that there was no contract, 
the court turned to plaintiff’s tort claims which were partially predicated upon the argument that the 
relationship between the bank and a customer was analogous to that between an insurer and an insured. 
The court disagreed. The relationship between a bank and its customers was not a special relationship 
because it lacked the "personal" and "non-commercial" nature that characterized the relationship between 
insurer and insured; "[r]ather, the transaction here was a commercial one, which would have created a 
debtor-creditor relationship." The lack of the "personal" element was fatal to the claim. Black Canyon 
Racquetball Club, Inc. v. ldaho First National Bank, 119 Idaho 171,804 P.2d 900 (1991). See also 
Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 848 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1992) (review denied (1993)); Idaho First 
National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991). 
 
 




(1)  Although the court has stated that "[t]he 'special relationship' exception generally pertains to 
claims against professionals who perform personal services, such as physicians, attorneys, architects, 
engineers and insurance agents," Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 408, 848 P.2d 984, 992 (Ct.App. 
1992) (citations omitted) (review denied (1993)), the court's application of the "special relationship" 
category has been broader than the traditional meaning of the term "professionals." The court has found a 
special relationship not only when physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers and insurance agents are 
involved, but also when the service provider is a well driller, Knoblock v. Arguena, 85 Idaho 503, 380 P.2d 
898 (1963) but see Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co., 153 Idaho 735, 291 P.3d 418 (2012); 
a pump repairer, Chenery v. Agri-UnesCorp., 106 Idaho 687, 682 P.2d640(Ct.App. 1984)(review denied); 
an automobile repairer, Dick v. Reese, 90 Idaho 447, 412 P.2d 815 (1966); see also Beare v. Stowes' 
Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 317,658 P.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1983); a boiler repairer, S.H. Kress & Co. 
v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614,515 P.2d 561 (1973); a water-heater installer, Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 
Idaho 912,655 P.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1982); an aircraft mechanic, Hoffman v. Simplat Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 
32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975); a plumber, Mica Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 
415, 546 P.2d 54, 61 (1975); and a title company., Hillock v. 













B. Service vs. Misrepresentation 
 
DUFFIN v. IDAHO CROP IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
126 Idaho 1002,895 P.2d 1195 (1995) 
 
TROUT, J.- The action giving rise to this appeal was initiated by the appellants, Eric and Melanie Duffin, 




The sale of certified seed in Idaho is subject to statutory regulation. The responsibility for 
administering the certification program is granted to the University of Idaho (UI). I.C. § 22425. Ul has, 
pursuant to I.C. § 22-429, delegated the day-to-day management of the program to the Idaho Crop 
Improvement Association (ICIA), a private, non-profit corporation organized under the Cooperative 
Marketing Act (I.C. §§ 22-2601 to -2628). ICIA is granted responsibility for conducting the program in 
accordance with regulations (the Rules of Certification) adopted by Ul to govern the certification process. 
ICIA has also engaged in marketing activities, promoting the purchase of certified seed for the benefit of 
its members. 
 
The goal of the certification program is to maintain genetic purity of commercial seed and to help 
ensure that the seed certified is free of the presence of certain diseases and insects within established 
tolerances. The process for the certification of potato seed entails two visual field inspections, a "winter 
grow-out" test where seed is taken to California during the winter months and actually planted, an 
inspection of storage conditions, and a shipping point inspection conducted by the State of Idaho, 
Department of Agriculture, Federal-State Inspection Service (FSIS). 
 
The Duffins own and operate a farm near Aberdeen, Idaho. Willard Bell, the president and 
principal shareholder of Crater Farms, Inc. (CFI), approached the Duffins with an offer to sell seed 
potatoes for the crop year 1988.The Duffins agreed verbally to purchase seed from CFI so long as it was 
certified. The seed in question was grown on a 270-acre lot as part of CFI's 1987 crop. This lot was 
designated by ICIA as "lot 87-803" and was listed in the ICIA Grower Directory as being eligible for 
certification. 
 
 In late March of 1988, CFI began delivery of seed to the Duffins. This seed was inspected by the 
FSIS and found to be within tolerances for the absence of disease. FSIS inspectors, therefore, placed 
tags on the trucks delivering the seed which designated that seed as "certified." The Duffins finished 
planting the seed around May 6, 1988. 
 
On April 29, 1988, approximately three weeks after the Duffins received their last load of CFI 
seed, an FSIS inspector discovered the presence of what proved to be bacterial ring rot (BRR) in one of 
the remaining seed potatoes from lot 87-803. ICIA notified CFI that no further shipments from the lot 
could be sold as "certified" seed. At this time, 61,000 cwt. of seed from the lot had already been sold. 
Neither CFI nor ICIA made an effort to notify the Duffins of the problem. 
 
Potatoes grown by the Duffins from CFI seed were tested and found to be infected with BRR. The 
Duffins claim the seed was infected when they received it and, as a result, they suffered substantial 
losses. The losses claimed consist of (1) the excess of the price paid for the seed because it was 
"certified;" (2) lost revenues which resulted from reduced yields; and (3) lost revenues which resulted from 
having to sell the crop immediately upon harvest, rather than by way of more lucrative contracts the 
Duffins had already negotiated, or by waiting until the open market prices were higher. 
 
The Duffins seek to recover damages from CFI for breach of express and implied 
warranties arising from the contract for the sale of certified seed potatoes, and from ICIA and 





II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
[FSIS and ICIA moved for summary judgment on the ground that their claims were barred 
because the losses claimed were purely economic. The district court agreed, holding that recovery was 
not permitted under a negligence theory. 
 
[CFI's motion for summary judgment was denied.] 
 
Ill. THE ECONOMIC LOSS ISSUE 
 
The first issue is whether the district court erred in its application of the so-called "economic loss 
rule." ICIA and FSIS both moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Duffins' negligence claims 
were barred because purely economic loss cannot be recovered intort. The district court agreed and 
granted both motions. The Duffins now contend that the district court erred. 
 
In Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978), a case involving 
claims for breach of implied and express warranties and for negligence, we addressed "the very narrow 
question [of] whether the purchaser of a defective product who has ... only suffered economic losses, can 
recover those losses in a negligence action against the manufacturer." [] We answered the question in the 
negative, reasoning that a contrary holding would undermine the comprehensive structure of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and that the economic expectations of parties have traditionally not been protected by 
tort law. [] 
 
In Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978), the plaintiff 
sought to recover economic losses by way of claims for breach of contract and for negligent interference 
with prospective economic advantage. With regard to the tort claim, we held that economic loss was not 
recoverable under a negligence theory. The foundation for that holding was that the defendant's conduct 
did not invade an interest of the plaintiff to which the law of negligence extends its protection. Further, 
allowing the recovery of economic loss would "impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden on [a] 
defendant's conduct." [] 
 
Following Justs, this Court has adhered to a general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely 
economic losses in all negligence actions. See, e.g., Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 41,740 
P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987) (defending the rule that "purely economic losses are not recoverable in 
negligence"). Based solely on the application of this general rule, the district court's analysis regarding the 
recovery of economic loss intort would be correct; ordinarily a party would owe no duty to exercise due 
care to prevent the type of loss suffered by the Duffins. However, there are exceptions to the general rule 
of non-recovery. 
 
First, economic loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or property. 
E.g., Just's at 468, 583 P.2d at 1003. We have defined "economic loss" as including "costs of repair and 
replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for 
inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975) (citations omitted), rev'd on other 
grounds. Conversely, "property loss" encompasses "damage to property other than that which is the 
subject of the transaction." Id. See also Tusch Enterprises v.  Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 41, 740 P.2d 1022, 
1026 (1987); State v.  Mitchell Construction Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1984); Clark 
v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 332, 581 P.2d 784, 790 (1978). Since the losses claimed 
here are purely economic, this exception is inapplicable.11 
                                                     
11 In Oppenheimer Industries, Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1986),the plaintiff claimed that negligence 
on the part of the State Brand Board resulted in the theft of its cattle. This Court took a literal view of the term "property loss" and 
allowed the plaintiff to recover. In distinguishing Clark, the Court held that, "[u]nlike the plaintiff in Clark Oppenheimer is not still in 
possession of defective goods.  Rather, Oppenheimer has suffered the loss of its property (i.e. the cattle).." [] emphasis in original).  





Economic loss might also be recovered in tort where the occurrence of a unique circumstance 
requires a different allocation of the risk. See Just's at470,583 P.2dat 1005 (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 
501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974)). However, the certification of seed potatoes is not a "unique circumstance" 
requiring a re-allocation of the risk, and the Duffins do not so contend. Therefore, this exception is also 
not implicated. 
Finally, an exception to the economic loss rule is applicable incases involving a "special 
relationship" between the parties. Just's at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005 (citing McAlvain v. General Insurance 
Co.,97 Idaho m,554 P.2d955 (1976)). The Duffins contend that such a relationship exists between 
themselves and both ICIA and FSIS. With regard to the relationship between the Duffins and ICIA, we 
agree. 
 
We recognized the existence of a "special relationship" exception to the economic loss rule in 
Just's. However, in that case we were not required to define the parameters of that exception; this is a 
task we undertake today. We have held that a party generally owes no duty to exercise due care to avoid 
purely economic loss. E.g., Clark at 336, 581 P.2dat 794.The term "special relationship, therefore, refers 
to those situations where the relationship between the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose 
such a duty. In other words, there is an extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence 
extends its protections to a party's economic interest. 
 
In McAlvain v. General Insurance Co., cited by this Court in Just's, we held that the relationship 
between an insurance agent and his insured is such that the agent should be liable when he performs his 
function negligently to the injury of the insured. [] In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized the fact that 
an insurance agent holds himself out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, 
and that, by so doing, the agent induces reliance on his superior knowledge and skill. [] 
 
Although McAlvain dealt with the existence of a professional or quasi-professional relationship, 
we do not limit the "special relationship" exception exclusively to such cases. ICIA has held itself out as 
having expertise in the performance of a specialized function; it is the only entity which can certify seed 
potatoes in the state of Idaho. ICIA knows that seed is sold at a higher price based on the fact that it is 
certified. Indeed, it has engaged in a marketing campaign, for the benefit of its members, the very 
purpose of which is to induce reliance by purchasers on the fact that seed has been certified. Under such 
circumstances, ICIA occupies a special relationship with those whose reliance it has knowingly induced. 
See also Glanzer v. Shepard, 135N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922) (where public weighers held themselves out as 
having special skill and undertook the performance of their function with the purpose of shaping the 
conduct of purchasers of beans, they had a duty to perform their function carefully). 
 
Because a special relationship existed between ICIA and the Duffins, if ICIA was in fact negligent 
in the performance of its function, it should be liable for any injury proximately caused by that negligence. 
Therefore, the order of the district court granting ICIA's motion for summary judgment on this issue is 
reversed. 
 
With regard to the FSIS, there is no evidence in the record from which we can conclude that it 
has actively sought to induce reliance on the part of purchasers of certified seed. Therefore, unlike ICIA, it 
does not occupy a special relationship vis-a-vis those purchasers. Accordingly, the Duffins' negligence 
claim against it is precluded because the damages sought are purely economic and there is no applicable 
exception to the operation of the economic loss rule. The order of the district court granting summary 
judgment to FSIS on this issue is affirmed. 
 
                                                     
. Oppenheimer distinguishable from the facts of this case. The Duffins, like the plaintiff in Clark, inremained in possessiion 
of the defective or damaged property, that is, the defective seed. It was only the product of that defective seed which they sold and 
from which they suffered a loss of profits, not property. Althou.gh the existence of BRR in the seed may have resulted in a reduced 
crop y1eld, terming this loss a property loss" would be the same as saying that the plaintiff in Clark suffered a property loss because 
the use of his defective tractor also resulted in reduced crop yields. See also G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 











(1)  What is the source of the duty? What is the scope of the duty? What interest is protected by the 
duty? When should pure economic loss - economic loss unaccompanied by either personal injury or 
property damage - be protected in tort? 
 
Did the Duffins have a contractual relationship with ICIA or FSIS? Was there any evidence that 
either ICIA or FSIS was aware of the existence of the Duffins? Is there any limit to the potential liability of 
FSIS and ICIA under the court's analysis? 
How would you describe the conduct that was negligent? Did the defendant do something that 
created a risk that befell plaintiff? That is, is the conduct analogous to driving a car? Is the conduct that 
caused harm actually a representation? 
 
(2)  The court states that it undertakes the task of defining the parameters of the "special 
relationship." Does its definition provide guidance for the future? Does its definition take into consideration 
the cases that were excerpted above in the materials on duties arising from defendant's relationship to 
plaintiff and to third parties? 
 
(3)  Note footnote 5 and its importance to the court's discussion of the crucial distinction between 
"property loss" and "pure economic loss." Oppenheimer is excerpted above. Would the case be better 
understood as a different exception to the no-recovery-for-economic-loss rule? For example, when a 
statute imposes a duty on one person to act affirmatively to protect another person's interests, should it 
matter whether those interests are personal injuries, property damage, or economic loss? 
 
(4)  Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc: Plaintiffs toured the house that the Gyslings had constructed on a 
lot purchased from the various Smith entities who had developed the land for a subdivision.  During the 
tour, they noted that there was a crack in the concrete slab in the basement of the house. The Blahds 
hired Briggs to conduct a visual inspection of the crack. Briggs concluded that the crack was a shrinkage 
crack and that slab was in a stable condition. 
 
The Blahds subsequently purchased the house. The cracking became worse and a subsequent 
inspection by a new engineering form concluded that the house was sinking because the .30-feet of fill on 
which the house had been built was improperly compacted by the Smiith entities. 
 
The supreme court affirmed summary judgments for defendants, because "[u]nless an 
exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic losses is a negligence 
action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another." The exception that the court 
examined was for "special relationships," which 
 
refers to those situations where the relationship between the parties is such that it would be 
equitable to impose such a duty. In other words, there is an extremely limited group of cases 
where the law of negligence extends its protections to a party's economic interest. Duffin, []. 
There are only two situations in which this Court has found the relationship exception applies. 
One situation is where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal services. McAlvain 
v. General Ins. Co., 97 Idaho 777,780,554 P.2d 955,958 (1976) ... 
 
The other situation involving a special relationship is where an entity holds itself 
out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly 
induces reliance on its performance of that function. Duffin, [] In Duffin, the Idaho Crop 
Improvement Association was the only entity in Idaho authorized to certify seed potatoes. The 
Association held itself out to the public as having expertise in seed certification and induced 
reliance on that expertise. The Federal-State Inspection Service also inspected seed for 
DUTY 
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diseases. A farmer relied on the Association's expertise and bought the certified seed. Later, it 
was discovered the seed was defective and the farmer suffered economic losses. This Court held 
a special relationship existed between the farmer and the certifying Association because the 
Association had "engaged in a marketing campaign ...to induce reliance by purchasers on the 
fact that seed ha[d] been certified." 
Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 108 P.3d 996 (2005). Is the court's description of the 
holding in Duffin accurate? Doesn't every advertising campaign seek "to induce reliance by purchasers" 
on the product being sold? 
 
(5)  Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co.: Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land on which they intended to 
build a house. After meeting building contractor (Steinbruegge) at a fair, they contracted with him to 
design and to obtain the materials to build the house. The contractor ordered panels from building 
materials designer and fabricator (IBP), which retained engineer and owner of wholesaler of building 
materials (Wicher) to review the plans. Steinbruegge purchased additional materials from a building 
materials supplier (Anderson), which delivered the materials to plaintiff’s parcel. Plaintiffs submitted an 
application for a building permit and a copy of the plans to Freemont County, which issued a permit 
indicating that the county's building inspector had reviewed the plans. After plaintiffs completed the 
house, the building inspector informed them that the house did not meet snow-load requirements. 
Plaintiffs were required to employ an engineer and reinforce the house. The landowners sued all of the 
other participants. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants. The court of appeals 
affirmed. 
 
Since plaintiffs' losses were pure economic loss, they can recover only if they fall within an 
exception to the general rule that such losses cannot be recovered in negligence. There are, the court 
noted, "two exceptions to this general rule are where a special relationship exists, and the occurrence of a 
unique circumstance requires a different allocation of risk." To avoid application of the rule, plaintiffs 
argued that they had a special relationship Wicher and IBP. The court disagreed: 
 
.... A special relationship may exist where a party holds itself out to the public as 
performing a specialized function and induces reliance on superior knowledge and skill. 
Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
 
In Duffin, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a special relationship existed between an 
entity which certified seed potatoes and a farmer who bought seed which was certified but 
defective. The seed certification entity was the only such entity in the state. The entity held itself 
out to the public as having expertise in seed certification and induced reliance on that expertise. 
Furthermore, the farmer was obligated to utilize the entity. Due to this specialization and induced 
reliance on the seed certification entity's expertise, the Supreme Court gave the farmer the ability 
to recover for pure economic loss based upon a special relationship. However, the Supreme 
Court explained in its holding that this principle only applies to an "extremely limited group of 
cases" in which it is equitable to impose a duty to exercise due care to avoid the pure economic 
loss of another. Id. 
 
The Nelsons asserted at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment that 
they relied upon the expertise of Anderson, Wicher, and IBP for the production of the engineered 
blueprints. The district court held that a special relationship did not exist between the Nelson and 
Anderson because Anderson only sold lumber and building materials to Steinbruegge. The 
district court also concluded that a special relationship did not exist between the Nelsons and 
Wicher and IBP because IBP only sold a wall panel system to Steinbruegge and Wicher only 
reviewed the wall panel designs. 
 
While IBP did sell a blueprint for the wall panel system to Steinbruegge and Anderson did 
provide a draft of a flooring system to Steinbruegge, this is insufficient to establish the existence 
of a special relationship with the Nelsons. Unlike the facts in Duffin, the Nelsons were not 




negotiations with IBP or Anderson. Steinbruegge completed the negotiations and purchasing of 
the materials and subsequently sold the materials to the Nelsons. 
 
  Additionally, if IBP had induced reliance on the expertise of the blueprints, it induced 
reliance only upon the designs and construction of the wall panel system. A disclaimer on the 
blueprints unequivocally states that the designs are for purposes of IBP's wall panel system only 
and that other aspects of the cabin, including the foundation, floor system, interior walls, and roof 
system are to be supplied by others. The Nelsons do not allege that the failure of the cabin's 
structure to meet the snow load requirements was caused by defective designs regarding the wall 
panel system. Therefore, if IBP induced reliance upon its expertise, it was for its expertise of the 
wall panel system and not for any other defect which may have caused the cabin structure to not 
meet the snow load requirement-the basis for the Nelsons' negligence claim. 
 
With respect to Wicher, at no time did the Nelsons or Steinbruegge have any contact with 
Wicher. Wicher, a licensed engineer, was hired by IBP to review the Nelson's cabin plans. There 
was no relationship at all between Wicher and the Nelsons. Thus, there is no special relationship 
between Wicher and the Nelsons similar to that found in Duffin. With consideration of the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Duffin that a special relationship only applies to an extremely limited 
group of cases, we decline the invitation to expand that principle to the facts of this case. 
Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 99 P.3d 1092 (Ct.App. 2004). Is Nelson as different from 
Duffin as the court of appeals argues? Did the Duffins negotiate with ICIA? Did the Duffins have any 
contact with ICIA? 
 
 
IDAHO BANK & TRUST CO. v. FIRST BANCORP 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
115 Idaho 1082, n2 P.2d 720 (1989) 
 
SHEPARD, C.J. --This case presents the question of the liability of a certified public accounting firm to a 
person not a party to the auditing contract. Main Hurdman contracted with First Bank & Trust to examine 
and give an opinion on the financial statements of First Bank & Trust. That audit was completed, and an 
opinion provided to First Bank & Trust. At a later time, as a result of a buy out, Bancorp gamed control 
over First Bank &Trust. In connection with that transaction, Bancorp obtained a loan from Idaho Bank & 
Trust. In connection with that loan, Bancorp provided Idaho Bank & Trust With the aforesaid audit report 
prepared by Main Hurdman. 
 
Thereafter, First Bank & Trust was placed in receivership, and Bancorp defaulted upon its loan 
payments to Idaho Bank & Trust. The present action was brought by Idaho Bank & Trust against Bancorp 
and Main Hurdman. Upon motion, Main Hurdman was dismissed as a party: that order of dismissal was 
certified for appeal, and the only matter before this Court is the liability, if any, of Main Hurdman to Idaho 
Bank & Trust. 
 
The decision of the district court may be viewed as presenting other bases for its decision, 
but nevertheless, the issue here is stated by the appellant as "[s]hould an independent accountant, who 
certifies an audit of an entity, be liable to those who detrimentally rely upon the audit?" Thus, we are 
presented with a question which falls within a classic pattern, and presents the question originally treated 
in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255N.Y.170, 174N.E.441 (1931). In Ultramares a certified public 
accountant examined and audited the financial statements of a customer and failed to discover that an 
account receivable exhibited on those statements was nonexistent. The certified statements indicated the 
customer's net worth of over one million dollars, when in fact the customer was insolvent. The plaintiff, 
relying on that statement, loaned money to the firm. The firm later filed for bankruptcy. The New York 
court refused to hold the auditor liable to all persons who foreseeably would rely on the negligently 




If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery 
beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability 
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of 
the business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may 
nor exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences. 
 
The rule as stated in Ultramares, has been applied by other courts. [] Other jurisdictions 
have departed from the doctrine of Ultramares, holding that public accountants may be liable to 
third parties, not always precisely identifiable, but who belong to a limited class of persons whose 
reliance on the accountants’ representations is specifically foreseen. White v. Guarantee, 43 
N.Y.2d 356 (1977). 
 
More recently the New York court, in Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,65 N.Y.2d 
536,493 N.Y.S.2d435, 483 N.E.2d 110(1985), has reaffirmed the basic principles articulated in 
Ultramares, but has interpreted the Ultramares doctrine to include noncontractual parties when certain 
other prerequisites are satisfied, i.e., 
 
1. the accountants must have been aware that the financial reports were to be used for a 
particular purpose or purposes; 
2. in the furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and 
3. there must have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that party or 
parties, which evinces the accountants' understanding of that party or parties' reliance. [] 
 
Hence, the New York court has expanded its traditional rule set forth in Ultramares. We agree 
and adopt the extension of the traditional rule as expounded in Credit Alliance. Plaintiff urges this Court to 
adopt the imposition of liability in accordance with the Restatement and Restatement (and) of Torts. 
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts limits the liability of a professional who has made a 
negligent misrepresentation for loss suffered: 
 
2(a)  by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he 
intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and 
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or 
knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction. 
 
When applied to an audit, the Restatement thus limits the person or persons to whom the auditor 
owes a duty to intended identifiable beneficiaries and to any unidentified member of the intended class of 
beneficiaries. Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983). We decline to adopt the 
Restatement standard. [] 
 
Insofar as we have been advised by the parties, the instant case is one of first impression before 
this Court. Hence, in the instant case the district court was not aware of the standards which would be 
applied by this Court in a case of accounting malpractice, i.e., the previous set forth standards of Credit 
Alliance. Hence, we remand to the district court to apply the standards of Credit Alliance, and in its 
discretion permit the submission of additional facts necessary to such complication. 
 
The cause is remanded to the district court. 
 





(1)  Why was there no duty in tort? Is Idaho Bank & Trust consistent with Just's and Taylor? 
 
(2)  Merrill v. Fremont Abstract Co.: Plaintiff purchased real property after defendant prepared an 




property to a third party by warranty deed. When the outstanding mortgage was discovered, plaintiff was 
required to remove the encumbrance. Plaintiff brought an action against the abstract company when it 
refused to reimburse him for the loss. On appeal from a jury verdict for plaintiff, defendant argued that 
plaintiff had no cause of action because it had prepared the abstract for the person who sold the property 
to plaintiff. Since there was no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant, defendant had no 
contractual liability to plaintiff; "neither can the action be converted into an action intort since the duty to 
make the abstract correctly was created solely by contract and its breach is therefore merely a breach of 
contract." The court began by acknowledging that the "general rule would seem to be that the liability of 
an abstracter *** depends upon the privity of contract so that the abstracter furnishing an abstract to one 
person is not held liable to another using the same, for omissions or negligence, where the abstracter had 
no notice or knowledge that the abstract was for anyone other than the person ordering it." In the instant 
case, however, the court held that an Idaho statute requiring abstracters to post bond ''for the payment *** 
of *** all damages that may accrue to any party *** by reason of any error*** in any abstract" imposed 
liability upon the abstracter to anyone who purchases property in reliance upon the abstract if the abstract 
contains errors "attributable to a lack of proper care." Merrill v. Fremont Abstract Co., 39 Idaho 238, 227 
P. 34 (1924). 
 
(3)  Estate of Becker v. Callahan: Decedent inherited three parcels from her parents, including a 
parcel on which the family home was located. Defendant, an attorney, was asked to prepare a will for 
decedent (who was near death) by the decedents sister who was a tenant in common on one of the 
parcels (not the home parcel). Plaintiff (decedents husband), defendant, and decedents sister met to 
review the will; the decedent was too sick to attend. Defendant subsequently took the will to decedent's 
home to be signed. When questioned, decedent said that she wanted her daughter to inherit the home 
parcel. Decedent signed the will. She died two days later. Under the will, plaintiff received a life estate in 
the home parcel. After plaintiff suffered a nervous breakdown, decedent's sister became the personal 
representative. The parties agreed to set aside the will and to distribute the assets in accordance with a 
settlement agreement. Plaintiff appealed the district court's summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's 
negligence claim. The supreme court affirmed: 
 
  Mr. Becker urges the extension of a duty to a surviving spouse by the attorney who 
drafted the deceased spouse's will. We have recently ruled upon the issue of whether a direct 
attorney-client relationship is required to exist in order for the intended beneficiary of 
testamentary instruments to sue the attorney who drafted the instruments for malpractice. 
Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004). In that case we addressed the 
issue of whether, or in what circumstances, a person who was not a client of the defendant 
attorney could have a malpractice claim against the attorney. 
Id. This Court held: 
 
A direct attorney-client relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and the 
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action except in this very narrow circumstance. 
An attorney preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named 
or identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the testator to have 
them properly executed, so as to effectuate the testator’s intent as expressed in the 
testamentary instruments. lf, as a proximate result of the attorney's professional 
negligence, the testator’s intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments is 
frustrated in whole or in part and the beneficiary's interest in the estate is either lost, 
diminished, or unrealized, the attorney would be liable to the beneficiary harmed even 
though the attorney did not have a direct attorney-client relationship with that beneficiary. 
Id. "The attorney has no duty to ensure that persons who would normally be the objects 
of the testator’s affection are included as beneficiaries in the testamentary instruments ...The 
attorney likewise has no duty to see that the testator distributes his or her property among the 
named beneficiaries in any particular manner." Id. This Court further stated that an attorney could 
not be held liable to beneficiaries for the preparation and execution of documents that revoke or 
amend testamentary instruments based upon the beneficiaries' claim that the testator would not 




In the present case, that of suing an attorney regarding his drafting of a will, Mr. 
Becker has no independent cause of action for negligence outside that of professional 
negligence. Here Callahan's duty was with his client, Ms. Becker. That duty is not extended to 
non-clients except in the narrow circumstance described above in Harrigfeld. Callahan had 
absolutely no duty to Mr. Becker with regard to what share, if any, he received from his wife's 
estate, except to properly draft and execute the testamentary instrument(s) so as to effectuate the 
testator’s intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments. Callahan prepared Ms. Becker 
swill according to the instructions relayed to him on her behalf by Williams. He reviewed the 
document with Williams and with Mr. Becker. He confirmed with Ms. Becker that she wanted her 
property to go to her daughter Charliann prior to Ms. Becker signing the will, in the presence of 
Mr. Becker, Williams, and the witnesses. He fulfilled any duty to the beneficiaries in giving effect 
to Ms. Becker’s intent as expressed in the will. He owed no further duty to Mr. Becker. 
Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 96 P.3d 623 (2004). 
 
       Was the husband foreseeably at risk if the attorney mis drafted the will? Why did the attorney not 
owe a duty to act with care given the foreseeability of harm? 
 
 (4)  Hudson v. Cobbs: Defendant obtained a loan to finance the construction of an office building. 
The loan agreement required pre-leasing of a minimum amount of the building. Defendant entered into 
contract to sell the land and building to plaintiff that required defendant to satisfy the pre-leasing 
requirements. Defendant entered into sham leases with a third party to meet the pre-leasing 
requirements. Plaintiff’s knowledge of the nature of the leases was disputed. Defendant managed the 
premises for plaintiff. When it failed to make payments, plaintiff sued. The jury found for plaintiff on the 
negligent misrepresentation claim. The trial court granted a judgment on the ground that Idaho did not 
recognize negligent misrepresentation. The Idaho Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that in 
Idaho Bank & Trust Co. the court had recognized negligent misrepresentation in the context of an 
accountant's liability to a third party. Here, the trial court held that defendant's only duty to plaintiff arose 
from the contract and the proper cause of action therefore was contract rather than tort. The court 
concluded that this was correct: 
 
the facts of this case were not sufficient to show the duty necessary to make out a prima facie 
case for negligent misrepresentation. The duty of Cobbs and Kennevick allegedly breached was 
a duty created by contract. In Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America, 107 Idaho 717, 692 P.2d 
361 (1984), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that it is well 
settled that: 
 
an alleged failure to perform a contractual obligation is not actionable in tort .... "To find 
an action in tort, there must be a breach of duty apart from non-performance of a 
contract." [Quoting Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133,483 P.2d 664 (1971)] ***Mere 
nonfeasance, even if it amounts to a willful neglect to perform the contract, is insufficient 
to establish a duty in tort. 
 
[] See also Steiner Corp. v. American District Telegraph, 106 Idaho 787, 683 P.2d 435 (1984); 
Browns Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co., 115 Idaho 56, 764 P.2d 423 (1988).                            
  
 As noted by the district court, neither Cobbs nor Kennevick, nor the Cobbs/Kennevick 
partnership had any affirmative duty to Hudson other than the d ty created by their lease 
agreement. Thus, while Hudson could have sued Cobbs/Kennevick in contract for breach of their 
lease agreement, he had no cause of action in tort. 
Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 797 P.2d 1322 (1990). 
 
(5)  Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Association (redux: In addition to their negligence claim, 
the Duffins also included a negligent misrepresentation claim in their action against the Idaho Crop 





We need not reach any of the Duffins' arguments, as this Court has strictly limited the cause of 
action for negligent misrepresentation and it is not viable in this case. In Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 
Idaho 474, 797 P.2d 1322 (1990), we stated that negligent misrepresentation as recognized in 
Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of ldaho, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989), is not a 
viable cause of action. [] To further clarify the matter, we expressly hold that, except in the narrow 
confines of a professional relationship involving an accountant, the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho. Accordingly, the Duffins may not maintain a cause 
of action for negligent misrepresentation against ICIA .... 
Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Association, 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 
(1995). 
 
What was the allegedly negligent conduct in Duffin? Is the court correct in characterizing ICIA's 
conduct as something other than a misrepresentation? 
 
 




(1)  A day at the races: In mid-October 1907, Norman Vollmer took the family greyhound to the 
annual fair at Lewiston. Among the events was a series of horse races. Vollmer failed to maintain 
sufficient control of the dog which decided to join the race with a decidedly unpleasant result for Benjamin 
McClain. McClain sued both Vollmer and the Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Association for his 
injuries. A jury verdict for plaintiff- including recovery for lost future wages was affirmed by the supreme 
court on appeal. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Association, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 
(1909). 
 
McClain was only an apprentice jockey. Under the contract of apprenticeship, agreed to provide 
McClain with room, board, medical care, and transportation and to pay his father $15 per month for the 
first year and $20 per month for the second and third years. McClain's master, William Cain, also brought 
suit for the profits he lost as a result of injuries to his apprentice. The court affirmed a verdict for 
defendants, emphasizing the distinction between the master's action for lost profits and the jockey's 
action for personal injury and loss of earning capacity: 
 
In this case the one seeking damages is a race-horse man -- one who follows the races 
and enters his horses and ... depends on making his money by winning prizes in the various 
races. That there is a wide difference between the nature and character of damages asked in 
each of these cases cannot escape the attention of anyone. The one is direct; the other is 
proximate and dependent upon innumerable secondary and intervening causes. The jockey 
earned a salary and certain sums for "outside mounts" whether he won the race or not. This was 
his earning capacity. On the other hand, the jockey alone cannot win the race; he must have a 
fleet horse ... and upon the whole these imaginative profits may dwindle into real losses. 
 
The profits it is claimed appellant would have realized depend on so many intervening 
circumstances and contingencies, the unfavorable happening of any of which dissipate these 
prospective gains. We are fully satisfied that prospective profits to a race-horse man for races 
that have never been run and race meets and associations that have never been held and 
against all contestants, is entirely too remote, uncertain and indeterminable to be allowed. 
Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910). 
 
Does this mean that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of due care? That the 
interest asserted by defendant was not protected in tort? See also H.J. Woods v. Jevons, 88 




Are the difficulties in determining the income of a horse racing-man significantly greater than 
those involved in computing the lost earnings of a first-year law student wrongfully killed in 
an automobile accident? Are there other distinguishing factors? 
 
(2)  When a person is killed or injured in an automobile accident, the decedent's business partners 
may well suffer economic loss as a result of the death or injury. Such economic interests generally are not 
recoverable in tort. In Everett v. Trunnell, for example, the court summarily rejected such a claim, noting 
that "a partnership has no right to recover for the negligent injury to a partner." Everett v. Trunnell, 105 
Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983). Cf. Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson, & Tucker, Chartered, 131 Idaho 




SOME FINAL NOTES 
 
(1)  Economic loss is a rapidly evolving area of tort law in Idaho. Are the cases on economic loss 
consistent? What role did the plaintiff’s apparent reliance upon the defendant’s expertise play in the 
creation of the duty in McAlvain? What role did the defendant's status as a "professional" play in the 
decision? What role did defendant's status play in the creation of the duty in strong? Why do contracts 
such as those in Knoblock give rise to a tort duty while those in Clark do not? 
 
(2)  Note the shift that has occurred: in the paradigm negligence action for personal injuries, the duty 
issue turns upon whether the defendant was engaged in affirmative conduct that gave rise to a 
predictable risk of harm. When the loss is solely economic, however, Just's demonstrates that affirmative 
conduct alone is insufficient to create a duty of due care no matter how predictable the harm. When the 
loss is solely economic, something more is required. What is that "something" more in McAlvain? In 
Strong? In Knoblock? 
 
(3)  Are the courts variously saying simply that it is the source of the duty which distinguishes tort and 
contract? That a contract duty is created by and (largely) limited by the parties' consensual agreements 
while a tort duty is created by the law which imposes a communitarian obligation independent of any 
voluntary consent? Why was this dividing line-between situation in which the court will impose a duty 
intort and those in which it will respect the agreement of the parties as to the allocation of losses -
chosen? Since negligence reflects community values - reasonableness under the circumstances - does 
the different treatment accorded personal injuries and property damage on the one hand and economic 
losses on the other suggest differing perceptions on what is acceptable behavior in each area? 
 
(4)  Policies and rationales: The caselaw can be viewed as reflecting two dominant policy concerns. 
On the one hand, the court has sought to preserve contract against the encroachment of tort. The 
prohibition against recovering pure economic loss in tort serves this goal: 
 
The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a tractor that does not 
harm person or property. If the defendant fails to exercise such due care, it is of course liable for 
the resulting injury to person or property as well as other losses which naturally follow from that 
injury. However, the law of negligence does not impose on International Harvester a duty to build 
a tractor that plows fast enough and breaks down infrequently enough for Clark to make profit in 
his custom farming business. 
Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 337, 581 P.2d 784, 795 (1978). 
 
On the other hand, the court has also expressed repeated concern over the potential for unlimited 
liability inherent in pure economic loss situations. Again, the prohibition against recovering pure economic 
loss in tort serves this policy goal: 
 
[A] rule, which would allow compensation for losses of economic advantage caused by the 




defendant's conduct.... In contrast to the recognized liability for personal injury and property 
damage, with its inherent limitations of size, parties and time, liability for all the 
economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually open-ended. 
Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978) (citations 
omitted). 
 
The sometimes-conflicting, sometimes-reinforcing interaction of these phases on the underlying 
rationales for tort and contract liability accounts for at least part of the court's apparent scatter-shot 
approach to pure economic loss cases. 
 





[B] NONFEASANCE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
 
1. NONFEASANCE: ACTS AND RISKS 
 
 
FAGUNDES v. STATE 
 
Court of Appeals of Idaho  
116 Idaho 173, 774 P.2d 343 (1989) 
 
HART, JUDGE PRO TEM: This is a wrongful death case. Frank Fagundes died shortly after a helicopter 
he had been piloting crashed. Fagundes was an employee of Pinebelt Helicopters, Inc. The State of 
Idaho had hired Pinebelt to fly state employees over wilderness areas so that the state employees could 
count game animals. There are two issues presented in this case. The first is whether the state owed a 
duty of care to Fagundes, an employee of independent contractor Pinebelt, due to the control the state 
exercised over the work to be performed.... The district court held that the state did not owe a duty to 
Fagundes and granted summary judgment in favor of the state. For the reasons explained below, we 
affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 
[The state hired Pinebelt Helicopters, Inc. to fly state employees over wilderness areas so that the 
state employees could count wildlife.  On April 17, 1987, the helicopter carrying Fagundes and two state 
employees crashed in a wilderness area. The crash occurred at approximately 7:00p.m. in a steep 
mountainous canyon. Fagundes was severely injured in the crash. He died in the early hours of the day 
after the crash. The crash was caused by equipment malfunction; there was no pilot error. The helicopter 
did not have a homing beacon. If a homing beacon had been on board, rescuers might have been able to 
locate the downed machine earlier than they did. Although the helicopter had a radio and the state 
employees had a hand-held radio, the crash survivors were unable to communicate with anyone beyond 
the canyon in which they had fallen. This inability to initiate long distance communication hampered 
rescue efforts. The helicopter did not carry medical supplies. If medical supplies had been available at the 
crash site it is possible that Fagundes' life could have been saved. A third state employee stayed at the 
helicopter's base camp. This third employee attempted to contact the helicopter for several hours after the 
crash, without success. The next day this third employee initiated the rescue that eventually saved the 
two surviving men. If the rescue attempt had begun on the day of the crash, it is possible Fagundes could 
have been saved.] 
 
Fagundes' survivors filed suit alleging the state was negligent in not requiring that the helicopter 
contain a homing beacon, in not requiring that radio communications be workable in the event of a crash, 
in not providing adequate medical supplies to save Fagundes and m not starting the rescue operations 
earlier. Fagundes' survivors did not allege that the state was responsible for the equipment malfunction 
that caused the crash. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state.... 
 
Fugundes' survivors contend that the state's negligent conduct consisted of failures to act rather 
than acts. The Restatement § 284(b) recognizes that "[n]egligent conduct may be ... a failure to do an act 
which is necessary for the protection or assistance of another and which the actor is under a duty to do." 
However, Restatement § 314 states that "[t]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on 
his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such 
action." According to the Restatement then, even if the state realized or should have realized that it was 
necessary for the state to require that Pinebelt's helicopters contain homing beacons, powerful radio 
transmitters, and medical supplies for the aid or protection of Fagundes, it was not therefore under a duty 
to require such equipment. Similarly, even if the state realized or should have realized that Fagundes 
needed to be rescued on the day of the crash, it was not therefore under a duty to rescue him. 
 
Accordingly, the summary judgment of the district court in favor of the state is affirmed. 
 










(1)  When can one person be required to act to confer a benefit on another person? Fagundes states 
the traditional common-law rule: harm resulting from inactivity would not support a suit intort; the 
defendant must act to be liable. Although socially undesirable activity can be the basis for civil liability, 
equally undesirable inactivity is usually not deemed tortious. The continued reliance upon the rule-even in 
such extreme instances as Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H.257, 44 A. 809 (1897) (eight-year old had his 
hand mangled in machinery while his brother was demonstrating how the machinery worked. The Court 
denied recovery, stating: "There is a wide difference - a broad gulf - both in reason and in law, between 
causing and preventing an injury.... The duty to do not wrong is a legal duty. The duty to protect against 
wrong is, generally speaking ... a moral obligation only.) or Handiboe v. McCarthy, 114 Ga. App. 541, 151 
S.E.2d 905(1966) (noliabilityforfailuretorescuefour-yearoldfromswimmingpoolcontainingonlythree feet of 
water) -suggests that it reflects fundamental policies. What are these policies? What is the "broad gulf"?
 . 
 
(2)  LeDeau v. Northern Pacific Ry.: Plaintiff was injured when a rock came through the window of 
the train in which he was riding. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that defendant was not liable: 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the accident did not occur by reason of anything which the appellant or 
its agents or employees did, nor did it occur through any defect in the appliances which appellant 
was using, or the instrumentalities it was employing as a common carrier. The only theory on 
which appellant could be held for the results of this accident would be that it owed to respondent, 
and to all of its passengers, an active duty to employ such means as were necessary and 
sufficient to either clear the mountain-side of loose and overhanging rock and stone, or else to 
construct along its right of way such retaining walls or barriers as would be likely to prevent rock 
and stone form rolling down the mountainside onto its track. To require such an active duty ... 
would be imposing upon the company a duty that would be burdensome and might sometimes 
prove prohibitive .... 
LeDeau v. Northern Pacific Ry., 19 Idaho 711, 115 P. 502 (1911). Why wasn't the act of constructing the 
railroad a sufficient act to take the case out of the nonfeasance category? 
 
(3)  Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc.: Regulus was a sawmill operator and owner of timber rights. 
It employed Haynes Logging to cut the timber. Peone, an employee of Haynes, was injured when he was 
struck by a snag. Peone sued Regulus, claiming that it had negligently employed an incompetent 
contractor. On appeal from summary judgment for defendant, the supreme court held that Regulus owed 
no duty to Peone. It began its analysis by noting that the was a diversity of opinion among jurisdictions 
over the question of whether a landowner was liable to an employee of an independent contractor. After 
examining several of the conflicting opinions, the court focused on the knowledge of the parties about the 
risks: 
 
Regulus is a sawmill operator. Haynes logging is a logging contractor .... The logging contractor is 
in a better position that the sawmill operator to assess this risk [of a falling snag]. The logging 
contractor, when removing timber will most always be faced with problems if dead and diseased 
trees which create a danger to anyone working in the area. The contractor is able to consider 
these risks and the necessary costs to insure against them when negotiating a contract price. A 
sawmill operator, simply by having timber rights on someone else's land, does not have special 
knowledge about the risks of falling snags on that land. 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court, in reaching the conclusion that no duty is owed by the third-




... the rationale [for liability is] most soundly based on issues of knowledge and secondary 
or indirect costs of avoiding accidents. The decision to place liability on one group of 
potential defendants stems from the recognition that, because of greater knowledge 
about or ability to reduce safety risks, the placement of liability on this group will keep the 
number and costs of accidents, both in economic and human terms at a minimum. [] We 
conclude that Haynes Logging is in a better position to reduce the risks of injury from 
falling snags.... 
Peone v. Regulus Stud Mill, Inc., 113 Idaho 374,379,744 P.2d 102, 107 (1987). 
 
Do differences in knowledge explain Fagundes? 
 
To what extent should abstract concerns such as cost minimization play a role in determining 
duty issues? To the extent that economics is relevant, does Haynes have a significant incentive to guard 
against risks- given the presence of workers compensation which shields the company from liability for its 
negligence? 
 
(4) § 37    No Duty of Care with Respect to Risks Not Created by Actor 
An actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical harm to another has no duty of care to 





c.    Misfeasance and nonfeasance: Misfeasance and nonfeasance have a long history of 
concepts that explain the distinction between affirmatively creating risk and merely failing to 
prevent harm. However, this distinction can be misleading. The proper question is not whether an 
actor's specific failure to exercise reasonable care is an error or commission or omission. Instead, 
it is whether the actor's entire conduct create a risk of physical harm. For example, a failure to 
employ an automobile's brakes or a far lure to warn about a latent danger in one's product is not 
a misfeasance governed by the rules in this Chapter [§§ 37-44], because in those cases the 
entirety of the actor's conduct (driving an automobile or selling a product) created a risk of harm. 
This is so even though the specific conduct alleged to be a breach of the duty of reasonable care 
was itself an omission. 
 
e. Rationale. Several justifications have been offered for the no-duty rule provided 
in this Section. The most common relies on the distinction between placing limits on conduct and 
requiring affirmative conduct. This distinction inturn relies on the liberal tradition of individual 
freedom and autonomy. Liberalism is wary of laws that regulate conduct that does not infringe the 
freedom of others. Some commentators have argued that mandating a duty to rescue might 
cheapen acts of Good Samaritans. !n addition, it might be difficult to limit an affirmative duty to aid 
others in peril from becoming  a general duty of self-sacrifice. Sometimes there may be many 
potential rescuers and no basis for choosing one on whom to place a rescue duty. In addition, 
one may doubt that a duty of easy rescue would have any significant impact on the incidence of 
such rescues given the effect of nonlegal influences to engage in such rescues. Finally, factual 
causation tends to be more difficult when the tortious act entails a failure to prevent harm from 
occurring. 
 
On the other hand, by not imposing a duty to rescue, the Jaw may be understood to 
convey a message that it condones an actor's failure to assist others in mortal peril when the 
actor could do so at little or no cost, a proposition that is morally repugnant. The tension between 
the no-duty rule and these values about humanitarian conduct is reflected in exceptions to the no-
duty rule that are addressed in §§ 38-44. 
 






TURPEN v. GRANIERI 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
133 Idaho 244, 985 P.2d 669 (1999) 
 
TROUT, C.J.: Valrena Turpen (Valrena) appeals from the trial court's ruling granting Douglas Pecha's 
(Pecha) motion for summary judgment on her claim for the wrongful death of her son, John Turpen 
(Turpen). 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
[In November 1994, Turpen died of alcohol poisoning while a guest at a home owned by Pecha 
but leased to two North Idaho College (NJC) students, Matt Paulsen and Christian LaRese. Because 
Pecha lived out of state, his father, a wrestling coach at NJC, managed the property for him. Paulsen, 
LaRese, and Turpen were all members of the NIC wrestling team. Turpen, who was of legal age, was 
attending a party at the house when he died. 
 
[Affidavits filed in the case revealed that neighbors had complained about parties at the home. A 
neighbor, Hana Oldham, asserted that she had complained to Pecha about loud, all night parties prior to 
the time Paulsen and LaRese became tenants. According to Odham, Pecha responded that there was 
nothing he could do and that the tenants were his friends. Other neighbors, June Browning and Sheila 
Goeke also witnessed parties being held at the house. Browning stated that at one point she complained 
directly to Pecha and, on the night in question, called the Coeur d'Alene police two or three times. Goeke 
claims to have called the police, the city attorney, the president of NIC, and the NJC wrestling coach to try 
to stop the parties. Neither Browning or Goeke, however, stated that they had complained directly to 
Pecha specifically about Paulsen and LaRese.] 
 
In November 1996, Valrena brought a wrongful death suit claiming that Pecha, knowing that the 
residence had a reputation as a party house, negligently rented the home to college students and 
negligently failed to monitor and control his tenants' and their guests' activities, thus, causing Turpen’s 
death. Pecha filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that he had neither the ability nor the duty to 





A.       General Duty to Exercise Ordinary Care 
 
Valrena argues that Pecha breached his duty of ordinary care by renting the home to Paulsen 
and LaRese. She argues that Pecha knew the home had gained a reputation as a party house for NIC 
students, NIC wrestlers in particular, and that "dangerous" parties had been held there in the past. 
Valrena contends that Pecha, nonetheless, rented the home to NIC student wrestlers, Paulsen and 
LaRese, and in doing so, breached his duty of care causing Turpen's death. 
 
.... Every person, in the conduct of his business, has a duty to exercise ordinary care to "prevent 
unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Sharp v. WH. Moore Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 
P.2d 506, 509 (1990). In determining whether a duty will arise in a particular context, the Court has 
identified several factors to consider. 
 
The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury 
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future 
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing 
a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence 
of insurance for the risk involved. 
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Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (1995) (quoting Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial 
Hospital, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653, 658 (1985)). 
 
The Court, in Sharp, outlined the role of foreseeability in determining whether a duty 
exists in a particular case. 
 
Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the circumstances of each case. 
Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively 
low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the 
burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required. Thus, 
foreseeability is not to be measured by just what is more probable than not, but also includes 
whatever result is likely enough in the setting of modem life that a reasonable prudent person 
would take such into account in guiding reasonable conduct. 
Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300-01, 796 P.2d at 509-10. Moreover, foreseeability relates to the general risk of 
harm rather than "the specific mechanism of injury." Id. at 301, 796 P.2d at 510. 'We only engage in a 
balancing of the harm in those rare situations when we are called upon to extend a duty beyond the 
scope previously imposed, or when a duty has not previously been recognized." Rife, 127 Idaho at 846, 
908 P.2dat 148.While we have previously recognized that a landlord may have responsibilities for 
assuring that the rented premises are safe, we have imposed that duty only as to the physical premises. 
Here, we are asked to impose a responsibility for activities taking place on the rented property which in no 
way implicate the physical condition of the house or surrounding property. 
 
Pecha stated in his affidavit that he had received no complaints about the existing lessees, 
Paulsen and LaRese, or their guests. Valrena does not contradict this. While he had in the past been told 
of some parties at the home involving alcohol, all Pecha can be charged with knowing is that neighbors 
had complained about parties held by prior tenants who were NIC students and that Paulsen and LaRese 
were also NIC students. Under the facts presented here, there is no indication that Pecha could foresee 
that by renting to Paulsen and LaRese a social guest would be killed by virtue of the guest's own lawful 
actions. 
 
While the harm to Turpen was undoubtedly great, Pecha's only ability to prevent the harm would 
be by refusing to rent the premises at all. In examining the other policy considerations relating to the 
imposition of a duty, we find no basis for imposing a duty on Pecha to thoroughly screen tenants or refuse 
to rent the premises to college students. Therefore, we hold that Pecha had no duty under the very limited 
facts presented here. 
 
For the above reasons, we affirm the decision of the district judge granting Pecha's motion for 
summary judgment. 
 





(1)  What is the source of the defendant's alleged duty? why did the court hoi that defendant did not 
have a duty to the decedent? How does Turpen differ from Wilson, McKinley, and Gibson? What is 
missing? Did the landlord fail to act? That is, if the court had held that the landlord had a duty, would he 
have been liable for failing to act or for acting Jess than reasonably carefully? Did the landlord create the 
risk? 
 
(2)  What is the role of the Rife factors in guiding the court's decision to create a duty? What role did 
they play in this case? 
 
(4) Bromley v. Garey: Bromley and Sholder went hunting with a shotgun Sholder had borrowed 
from Garey. Sholder dropped the shotgun, which discharged and struck Bromley. The shotgun 




The supreme court reversed. Garey, the court held, had "a duty to disclose any information 
regarding a dangerous malfunction.... [I]f Garey knew that the shotgun he loaned to Sholder had 
a tendency to misfire, fire late, and fire when smacked on the butt, he had a duty to Sholder and 
other foreseeable users to disclose this information." As the court subsequently stated: "This case 
implicates the duty to disclose information about a hidden defect that would make the gun far 
more dangerous than would be expected from a property functioning shotgun. The fact that 
Sholder and Bromley eventually discovered, by using the gun, that it malfunctioned does not 
discharge Garey's duty.... Garey's duty must be judged at the time that he loaned the gun to 
Bromley; the duty existed and was breached at that point, or not at all." Bromley v. Garey, 132 
Idaho 807, 814, 979 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1999). 
(5)  
Can Bromley be distinguished from Turpen? 
 
(4) Boots exrei. Boots v. Winters: A renter owned two dogs, a white one and a brown one. As the 
juvenile plaintiff and his brother were walking to school, they noticed that the white dog was in the alley. 
When they returnedthe dogto the backyard, plaintiff was attacked by the brown dog. The brother ran to 
get the mother who was then attacked by the brown dog. They sued the renter and his landlord. The court 
of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the landlord. The court began with the recognition that a 
landlord may have a duty in negligence to third parties. 
 
In determining whether a duty will arise in a particular context, our Supreme Court has 
identified several factors to consider. Turpen, 133 Idaho at 247, 985 P.2dat672.The factors 
include the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered 
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, 
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the 
extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to 
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved. Id.; Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,846,908 P.2d 143, 148 (1995). 
Where the degree or result of harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low 
degree of foreseeability is required. Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2dat 673; Sharp {v. WH. 
Moore, Inc.,] 118 Idaho [297,] 300-01, 796 P.2d [506,] 509-10 [(1990)]. Conversely, where the 
threatened injury is minor but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of 
foreseeability may be required. Turpen, 133 ldaho at 248, 985 P.2d at673; Sharp, 118 ldaho at 
301, 796 P.2dat 510.We engage in a balancing of the harm only in those rare situations when we 
are called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed or when a duty has not 
previously been recognized. Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673. 
 
We again find Turpen instructive. As noted above, the family of a decedent in that case, 
contended that the decedent's landlord was negligent with respect to known partying activities of 
his renters and their guests. The decedent was a college student who died of alcohol poisoning 
while a social guest at a home the landlord had leased to two other college students. The landlord 
had been told of some parties held at the house by past tenants who had been students at the 
college. The landlord, however, had received no complaints about the existing lessees or their 
guests. The Supreme Court concluded that, although the harm to the social guest was 
undoubtedly great, the landlord's only ability to prevent the harm was by refusing to rent the 
premises at all. Id. at 248, 985 P.2d at 673. The Court held that there was no basis for imposing a 
duty on the landlord to thoroughly screen tenants or refuse to rent the premises to college 
students. Id. The Court further held that the landlord therefore had no duty under the very limited 
facts presented. Id. 
 
In the present case, we are aware of no Idaho authority imposing a duty on a landlord to 
protect third persons from a tenant's dog and, therefore, we must determine whether a duty 
should be recognized on the facts presented. Based on Jack Winters' affidavit and Martinez's 
deposition testimony, Martinez never informed the Winterses of any dangerous propensities of 
the brown dog. Martinez asserted during the deposition that the fence between the backyard and 
the alley was in good repair at the time of the attack. Additionally, the police officer's affidavit 
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indicates that Jason Boots provoked the brown dog by kicking the fence and swinging his jacket 
at the dog. The dog attacked Landon Boots only after he climbed over the fence to retrieve 
Jason's jacket, which the dog had pulled into the backyard. Carolyn Boots also climbed over the 
fence prior to being attacked in the backyard. The harm suffered by Landon and Carolyn appears 
to have been great. The degree of foreseeability, however, was very low because the Winterses 
had no knowledge of any dangerous propensities of the brown dog, the initial attack on Landon 
appears to have been provoked, and both attacks occurred only after the victims climbed the 
fence which confined the dog to the rented property. Furthermore, requiring landlords to 
investigate whether a lessee's pet is dangerous prior to allowing the lessee to keep the pet on the 
rented premises would impose a heavy burden on landlords and impede the ability of tenants to 
own pets. We decline the Bootses' invitation to adopt such a requirement as the public policy of 
the State of Idaho. On the facts presented at summary judgment, we hold that the Winterses did 
not owe a general duty to protect the Bootses from Martinez's brown dog. 
Boots ex ref. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 
If the court of appeals had held that the landlord had a duty, would the landlord have been liable 




2. LAND ENTRANTS AND OCCUPIERS: BOTH THIS AND THAT 
 
 
KELLER v. HOLIDAY INNS, INC. 
 
Court of Appeals 
105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 112 (1983) 
affirmed on other grounds, 
107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984) 
 
BURNETT, J.- We are asked to decide whether a property owner who rents space in a building to a 
business lessee Lessee, and who authorizes the lessee to bring unsafe appliances upon property, may 
be liable to the lessee's employees for harm caused by the appliances. The principal parties claiming 
injury are Gil Keller and her sister, Joan Keller Burman. When the alleged injuries occurred, the Keller 
Sisters were employed by the proprietor of a gift shop located upon leased space within the Holiday Inn of 
Boise. The appliances in question were large iron security gat s fabricated and placed on the premises by 
the gift shop proprietor. The gates surrounded the gift shop when it was closed; but when the gift shop 
was open, the gates were folded, moved on wheels, and stored elsewhere in the motel. The gates were 
known to be unstable and prone to collapse. Each of the Keller sisters has alleged that she was 
physically injured by the security gates while attempting to move them to or from their place of storage. 
 
The Keller sisters sued Holiday Inns, Inc., and certain affiliated entities. The Holiday Inn group 
moved for summary judgment against the sisters' claims. The group contended that the motel, as a 
lessor, owed no duty of care to the lessee's employees; and that, even if such a duty were owed, it would 
not extend to the known risk presented by the unsafe security gates. The district court granted the motion. 
We reverse. 
 
Part I of this opinion contains an overview of negligence liability. We identify the elements 
of negligence liability and the general grounds upon which one person may be said to owe a duty of care 
to another. In Part II we examine the duties imposed upon land possessors to protect entrants upon the 
property from dangerous conditions and from the harmful activities of third persons. We adopt the modem 
view that a land possessor's duty is not entirely excused, but liability may be limited, when an invitee 
encounters a known risk on the property. In Part Ill, we apply this view to the instant case, focusing upon 




sisters a duty of care and that the extent of liability, if any, flowing from alleged breach of this duty must 
be resolved at trial upon remand. 
 
The elements of a cause of action for negligence are familiar. They consist of a duty, recognized 
by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; a breach of the duty; a causal 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs injuries; and actual loss or damage flowing 
from those injuries. E.g., Brizendine v. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, 97 Idaho 580, 583, 548 P.2d 
80, 83 (1976). When these elements are established, the defendant is subject to liability. Actual liability 
will be imposed if the defendant has no defense to the plaintiffs’ cause of action. [] 
 
Our initial focus is upon the question of duty. Duty is a requirement that one conduct himself in a 
particular manner with respect to a risk of harm. [] The scope of the duty is defined by the nature of the 
risk and by the persons endangered by it. A risk may arise from a number of sources, including the actor's 
own conduct, the conduct of others, or a condition on the actor's property. 
 
Every actor has a general duty to use due care not to injure others by his own conduct. E.g., 
Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536 (1974). In such cases the actor's conduct has brought 
him into close contact with the risk and the persons endangered. However, an actor's duty to protect 
others from the conduct of third parties or from conditions on property is more limited. The scope of duty 
in such cases is measured by the knowledge which the actor had or should have had concerning the risk, 
and the control which the actor should or could have exercised over the source of the risk and the 
persons endangered. Where the risk is created by the conduct of third parties, the criterion of control is 
emphasized. [] In such cases, the courts customarily inquire into the existence of a special relationship 
between the actor and the third party or between the actor and the persons endangered. E.g., Joyner v. 
Jones, 97 Idaho 647, 551 P.2d 602 (1976); Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1931). Conversely, 
in cases involving conditions on land, the knowledge criterion often is emphasized. [] The courts have 
treated a land possessor's superior knowledge of dangerous conditions on his property as the basis for 
imposing upon him a duty to protect others entering the property. E.g., Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 
Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1980).     
                               
The criteria of knowledge and control often are closely related. ln a case involving unsafe 
conduct of a third party, one's special relationship to the third party or to the persons endangered may 
provide both superior knowledge of the potential harm and a way to control it. Similarly, in a case 
involving conditions on land, the landowner's possession of the property may afford him superior 
knowledge of a danger as well as the ability to control it. However, the question of duty becomes more 
nettlesome when the criteria of knowledge and the control are not coextensive. The courts confront this 
problem when the landowner could control the unsafe conduct of a third party on his land, or an unsafe 
condition on the land, but the landowner's knowledge of the danger is not superior to that of other persons 




We recognize at the outset that there is no single duty owed by a land possessor to all persons 
entering his land. The law traditionally has imposed varying duties, depending upon the nature of the visit 




A person who enters the property of another with passive permission or as a mere social guest 
traditionally has been held to understand that he must take the land as the possessor uses it. This 
entrant, classified by the law as a licensee, is expected to be alert and to protect himself from the risks he 
encounters. Accordingly, the duty owed to a licensee with respect to such risks is narrowly restricted. The 
possessor is required simply to share his knowledge of dangerous conditions or dangerous activities with 
the licensee. When such a warning has been given, the possessor's knowledge is no longer superior to 
that of the licensee, and the possessor's duty extends no farther. [ 1 Of course, the possessor must avoid 
willful and wanton injury to the licensee. But ordinarily negligence allowing an unsafe condition or activity 
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on the property is insufficient, by itself, to impose liability to a licensee. Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 
347 P.2d 341 (1959). 
 
However, the law has adopted a more protective view toward an invitee. An invitee is a person 
who enters upon the land for a purpose connected with the business conducted there, or for a visit which 
reasonably may be said to confer or to anticipate a tangible benefit to the possessor. Wilson v. Bogert, 
supra. The invitee is not required simply to take the property as the possessor uses it. Rather, the invitee 
is entitled to assume that the property has been made safe for him to enter. Accordingly, the possessor 
has not only a duty to disclose dangerous conditions, but also the duty to exercise reasonable affirmative 
care to keep the premises safe for an invitee. Feeny v. Hanson, 84 Idaho 236, 371 P.2d 15 (1962). 
 
We acknowledge that this traditional distinction between the duties owed to licensees and 
invitees has been the subject of persistent criticism. [] A few jurisdictions have abandoned or limited the 
rigid distinctions among duties owed to different categories of entrants upon land. E.g., Rowland v. 
Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); []. However, our Supreme Court on several recent occasions has 
declined invitations to do so. Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 612 P.2d 142 (1980); Springer v. 
Pearson, 96 Idaho 477, 531 P.2d 567 (1975); Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676,471 P.2d 63 (1970). 
 
Consequently, we deem ourselves constrained to accept the distinction between a licensee and 
an invitee, and to identify the relevant category in this case. Holiday Inn rented space in its building to the 
gift shop proprietor for a business purpose. The employment of personnel by the gift shop proprietor 
clearly was within the purpose. Consequently, we hold that these employees were invitees. Our inquiry is 




The broad duty owed an invitee has not always been fully understood. ln many cases, an invitee's 
voluntary encounter with a known danger has been characterized not only as a defense to the 
possessor's liability for breach of a duty owed to the invitee, but also as an exception to the duty itself. 
Thus, in Splinter v. City of Nampa, 70 Idaho 287, 215 P.2d 999 (1950), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld 
judgment against an invitee injured by an obvious risk which he had voluntarily encountered. The Court 
did not specify whether the property owner's nonliability was due to absence of a duty to protect the 
invitee, or to the presence of a defense against breach of that duty. ln Alsup v. Saratoga Hotel, Inc., 71 
Idaho 229,229 P.2d 985 (1951), the Supreme Court held both that an invitee assumes ordinary risks of 
harm upon the property, and that the owner owes the invitee no duty to obviate dangers from known or 
obvious risks. The Supreme Court reiterated in later cases that an owner has no duty to protect an invitee 
from open and obvious dangers. Baker v. Barlow, 94 Idaho 712,496 P.2d 949 (1972); Tafoya v. Fleming, 
94 Idaho 3, 479 P.2d 483 (1971). Cf. Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 518 P.2d 1194 (1974), 
and Giles v. Montgomery Ward Co., 94 Idaho 484, 491 P.2d 1256 (1971) (owner need warn only against 
hidden or concealed dangers). The original Restatement of Torts (1934) ... took a similar approach.... The 
notion expressed in the First Restatement and in Idaho cases cited above, that an invitee's knowledge of 
a risk entirely excuses the land possessor's duty of care, has been severely disapproved by legal 
scholars. [] This notion also has come under fire from two perspectives by other courts. First, it has been 
criticized for blurring the distinction between a land possessor's duty of care and a defense which may 
limit his liability for breach of that duty. [] 
 
Secondly, the courts have observed that, in some circumstances, an invitee might reasonably 
encounter a risk which was obvious. An example is furnished in Offs v. Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 409 P.2d95 
(1965). There, our Supreme Court recited the traditional rule, that a possessor owed no duty to an invitee 
with respect to an obvious danger; but the Court said that a jury question remained as to whether the 
invitee's conduct was reasonable because his attention to the danger may have been distracted by other 
activity on the premises. 
 
Thus, the traditional rule, that a land possessor's duty is entirely excused by a known or obvious 
danger has become discredited. The Second Restatement now contains enumerations of duty which do 




created by third persons on the property and to risks posed by conditions on the property. Both forms of 
duty are germane to the instant case. The unsafe security gates may be viewed either as the products of 
an unsafe activity conducted on the motel premises by the gift shop proprietor, or as an unsafe condition 




In deciding the scope of duty applicable to the present case, we must choose between the 
traditional notion, that a known or obvious danger excuses a land possessor's duty, and the modem view 
that knowledge or obviousness of a danger does not excuse duty but may limit liability. This choice is 
framed by two recent decisions of our Supreme Court. In one case, the Court adopted the Second 
Restatements formulation of limited liability for a known or obvious risk, and the exception where the land 
possessor "should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." See Ryals v. Broadbent 
Development Co., 98 Idaho 392, 565 P.2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion), overruled on other grounds, 
Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186,579 P.2d 683 (1978). In Ryals the Court upheld a jury instruction taken 
almost verbatim from 343A, noting that this section "has been widely accepted since its adoption ... and 
we find no error." (] However, the Second Restatement and Ryals were not mentioned by the Court's 
subsequent opinion in Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1,607 P.2d 1055 (1980).in Tommerup 
the Court, upholding a judgment against a grocery store customer who had been injured on the premises, 
reverted without explanation to the traditional rule. The Court said that a proprietor's duty to keep 
premises safe for an invitee did not extend to dangers known to the invitee or which, by the exercise of 
ordinary care, should have been observed by the invitee. [] 
 
In our view, a known or obvious danger should be treated as a limitation upon liability, rather than 
as an excuse of duty. This view recognizes the difference between existence of a duty on one hand and 
the availability of a defense for breach of that duty, on the other hand. Our view also brings the land 
possessor's duty toward invitees into greater conformity with the scope of his knowledge and the extent of 
his control over the danger. Under this view, a duty to protect mVJtees anses when the possessor knows 
or should know about a danger posed on his land by a condition or a third party within his control. The 
duty is not restricted to situations where the land possessor's knowledge is superior to that of his invitees. 
 
There is also a statutory reason in Idaho to treat an invitee's knowledge or the obviousness of a 
danger as a limitation of liability rather than as an excuse of duty. Since 1971, Idaho has been a 
comparative negligence state. I.C. § 6-801 provides that the plaintiffs contributory negligence does not 
bar recovery in a negligence action, so long as his negligence is not as great as the negligence of the 
person against whom recovery is sought. Rather, any damages awarded to the plaintiff are reduced in 
proportion to the amount of causal negligence attributable to him. 
 
Prior to the advent of comparative negligence, contributory negligence was an absolute bar to 
recovery. Thus, it made little difference whether a known or obvious condition excused a land possessor's 
duty to an invitee, or simply insulated the possessor from liability for any breach of such duty. In either 
event, the injured invitee could not recover. But under the comparative negligence system, the difference 
is profound. If duty is not excused by a known or obvious danger, the injured invitee might recover, albeit 
in a diminished amount, if his negligence in encountering the risk is found to be less than the   land 
possessor's negligence in allowing the dangerous condition or activity on his property. In contrast, if the 
invitee's voluntary encounter with a known or obvious danger were deemed to excuse the landowner's 
duty, then there would be no negligence to compare- and, therefore, no recovery. The effect would be to 
resurrect contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery in cases involving a land possessor's 
liability to invitees. 
 
The Oregon Court of Appeals recently expressed a similar view concerning the comparative 
negligence laws of that state. In Woolston v. Wells, 663 P.2d408 (Or. App. 1983), the court held that an 
invitee's negligence in confronting a known danger must be weighed against the owner's negligence in 




Accordingly, we adopt the modem view. We hold that the obviousness, or an invitee's knowledge, 
of a dangerous activity or condition does not excuse the land possessor's duty of care toward the invitee. 
Such knowledge or the obviousness of the danger may be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of 
protective measures undertaken by the possessor; and it may be considered in evaluating a defense of 
contributory negligence, which may limit the land possessor's liability. If this defense is raised, the 
invitee's negligence in encountering the danger should be compared to the land possessor's negligence 




As noted, Second Restatement § 343A limits the liability of a land possessor for a breach of duty 
to protect an invitee from unsafe conduct of third persons or unsafe conditions, on the land. The section is 
itself subject to a limitation where the land possessor "should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge 
or obviousness." Comment f to § 343A explains that a possessor may have "reason to expect that the 
invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his 
position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk." Illustration 5 to comment f 
suggests that this limitation may arise from the invitee's employment: 
 
A owns an office building, in which he rents an office for business purposes to B. The only 
approach to the office is over a slippery waxed stairway, whose condition is visible and quite 
obvious. C, employed by Bin the office, uses the stairway on her way to work, slips on it, and is 
injured. Her only alternative to taking the risk was to forgo her employment. 
 
A is subject to liability to C. 
 
This employment limitation has been recognized by the courts... Just as a known or obvious 
danger does not entirely excuse a land possessor's duty to an m tee, neither does the employment 
limitation to §343A wholly excuse the invitee's duty to exercise reasonable caution for his own safety. 
Rather, the invitee's employment may be considered in weighing the reasonableness of his voluntary 




We now return to the instant case. This is an appeal from a summary judgment. 
 
The facts framing the question of duty are not in dispute.... We believe the trier of fact in this case 
reasonably could infer Holiday's knowledge of the following: that the Keller sisters were employed at the 
gift shop, that their duties included moving the security gates, and that the gates were unsafe. In addition, 
the trier of fact reasonably could infer that Holiday was in a position to control the movement and storage 
of the gates, and to control the month-to-month existence of the gift shop itself. 
 
These undisputed facts, and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn from them, are 
sufficient to make a prima facie showing that Holiday owed a duty of care to the Keller sisters as invitees. 
This duty may be recognized regardless of whether the gates are viewed as products of an activity by the 
former employer, or as conditions on the motel premises. If the gates are treated as products of a third 
party's conduct, a trier of fact, applying Second Restatement § 318, [], reasonably could find that 
Holiday's management was "present" on the motel premises, that Holiday knew or had reason to know 
that it could control the gift shop proprietor's use of the security gates, and that Holiday knew or should 
have known that exercise of such control was necessary to prevent harm to invitees on the premises. 
Conversely, if the gates are viewed as a condition on the property, the duty arises under Second 
Restatement § 343, []. A trier of fact applying this section reasonably could find that Holiday knew of the 
danger posed to invitees by the gates; that the risk of harm was unreasonable; and that the Keller sisters 
would not protect themselves against the risk because their jobs required them to move the gates. 
 
Assuming the existence of a duty, the next question is whether a limitation of liability has been 




that the sisters acted unreasonably by encountering the known risk. We believe a genuine issue exists on 
this point. Moreover, even if contributory negligence were deemed established, such negligence would 
not necessarily preclude recovery but would be weighed against any negligence by Holiday. The process 
of comparing negligence turns closely upon the facts developed at trial, and ordinarily is inappropriate for 
summary judgment. E.g., Robinson v. Westover, 101 Idaho 766, 620 P.2d 1096 (1980); McKinley v. 
Fanning, 100 Idaho 189, 595 P.2d 1084 (1979). 
 
Of course, this weighing process might be obviated if a plaintiff’s negligence so dominated a 
case, and was so unforeseeable, that as a matter of law it severed the proximate, causal link between the 
defendant's alleged negligence and the injury claimed. See, e.g., Joyner v. Jones, 97 Idaho 647, 551 
P.2d 602 (1976). However, we believe a trier of fact reasonably could find that the Keller sisters' conduct 
in this case was foreseeable. We conclude that Holiday should not have been granted summary judgment 
on the ground that the risk was known or obvious..... 
 





(1)  What is the source of the duty? Did defendant create the risk of harm? Is the case more 
analogous to McKinley v. Fanning or to Turpen? What is the scope of the duty? What interest is protected 
by the duty? Are the court's statements in paragraph 31 consistent with its earlier statements in 
paragraphs 19-20? If plaintiffs conduct should be treated as a limitation on liability in regard to duty, why 
should it not also be treated as a limitation on liability in regard to scope of liability issues? 
 
(2)  Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc. (pt. 2): Following the court of appeals' decision, the Idaho Supreme 
Court accepted review. While the supreme court also reversed the trial court's summary judgment, it did 
so on much narrower grounds. After examining the decision in Ryals v. Broadbent Development Co., 98 
Idaho 392, 565 P.2d 982 (1977), the court stated: 
 
The common theme in Ryals and the present case is the difficult position of an employee when 
directed by the employer to perform work which involves a dangerous condition or activity on the 
landowner’s premises. In these cases, the landowner has reason to expect that the employee will 
proceed to encounter the dangerous condition in order to keep his or her job. Since the employer 
is shielded by the workman's compensation laws, the e cases will necessarily involve the 
employee/invitee and the landowner. We hold that m these situations, a landowner is not relieved 
of the duty of reasonable care which the landowner owes to the employee/invitee for his or her 
protection even _though e dangerous condition is known and obvious to the employee. 
Therefore, Holiday Inn did owe a duty of reasonable care to plaintiffs. 
Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984). 
 
(3}  Knowledge and control: Is the court's discussion of the. relevance of control and knowledge to 
the imposition of duty helpful? Control, the court writes, is most apparently relevant to situations involving 
risks created by the conduct of a third party and courts are, therefore, generally required a special 
relationship between the defendant and the third party before imposing a duty on the defendant. 
Knowledge, the court notes, is more relevant in the land entrant/land occupier situations. In Keller, did the 
land entrant or the land occupier have more knowledge of the risk? In general, however, would a land 
entrant be likely to have more knowledge about the condition of the premises than the entrant? Should 
rules - such as the different degrees of care owed the entrant depending upon her status - be based upon 
assumptions about probabilities? 
 
(4}  Harrison v. Taylor (open and obvious danger}: The Idaho Supreme Court finally abolished the 
open and obvious danger rule in Harrison v. Taylor. Plaintiff and her husband made a business visit to 
Gloria's House in Bloom, operated by defendant, to pickup a floral arrangement. The sidewalks were dry 
that day. While approaching Gloria's House in Bloom, Ms. Harrison encountered what she described as a 
hole: a slab had been removed and gravel remained. Ms. Harrison stated in her deposition that she 
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successfully negotiated the hole when entering the floral shop by stepping into the middle of it. When 
leaving plaintiff saw the hole and stepped over it with her right foot. Her left foot, however, caught the lip 
of the hole and she fell, breaking both arms. The trial judge granted defendants' motion for summary 
judgment based on the open and obvious doctrine. The supreme court reversed, following the court of 
appeals' earlier rationale: 
 
Although it is apparent that Section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was adopted and 
applied in Ryals and Keller, we base our decision today on a broader reading of our cases and of 
the legislative intent derived in Idaho's comparative negligence statute. We do not today simply 
extend the Ryals/Keller employee exception from the open and obvious danger doctrine to the 
facts of this case. Instead, as explained below, we simplify the standard of care applicable to both 
owners and occupiers of land, and to the invitees who come upon the premises. Fundamental to 
our decision is the legislative mandate that comparative negligence shall apply in all negligence 
actions. I.C. § 6-801. 
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989). 
 
(5} Retaining the common-law entrant classifications: As the court of appeals noted in Keller, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently refused to reconsider the wisdom of the tripartite entrant 
classifications. See Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 612 P.2d 142 (1980); Springer v. 
Pearson, 96 Idaho 477, 531 P.2d567 (1975); Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676,471 P.2d 63 (1970). 
 
(6} Rehwalt v. American Falls Reservoir District# 2: While the court was unwilling to reject the 
tripartite entrant classifications, it has also refused to extend them into related areas of property law. In 
Rehwalt, the question before the court was the proper standard of care owed by the owner of an 
easement to the owner of the servient estate: 
 
While this Court has recently refused to abolish the legal categories of licensee, invitee 
and trespasser, in favor of a general negligence standard, ...we do not favor an expansion of the 
use and application of the licensee-invitee-trespasser categories, originally developed to protect 
and immunize the land owner or occupier, to measure the standard of care owed by an easement 
owner to the owner of a servient estate. In their critique of the licensee-invitee-trespasser 
categorization, Harper & James note that the rationale for his limited immunity was originally 
based on lack of foreseeability. They state that it would be consistent with this rationale to extend 
the protection to easement owners. However, they then argue that since the common justification 
for granting limited immunity to owners is unsatisfactory it should not be so extended. 
 
And if immunity originated in an overzealous desire to safeguard the right of ownership 
as it was regarded under a system of landed estates, then there seems to be no reason for 
extending special tenderness beyond the scope required by precedent, or for enlarging the class 
of defendants exempted from the duty generally owed all men to use reasonable care towards 
everyone likely to be hurt by their carelessness." 2 Harper & James 1434.We agree with the 
conclusions of Harper &James and decline to expand the use of the licensee-invitee-trespasser 
categories. Rather, we hold that American Falls is to be held to the general standard to use 
ordinary care in the management of the easement property. 
Rehwalt v. American Falls Reservoir District# 2, 97 Idaho 634, 550 P.2d 137 (1976). If the 
traditional rules represent "an overzealous desire to safeguard the right of ownership" as it existed in the 
medieval period and if this should not be expanded, why should the rule as applied to land occupiers be 
allowed to stand? 
 
(7)  When land occupier is sued by a land entrant, the primary duty issue is the scope of the duty 
owed to the entrant. Under the traditional common-law analysis, the scope of the duty varies with the 
status of the entrant: for example, more care is owed to an entrant classified as an invitee than to an 
entrant who is a licensee. 
 
As the supreme court has commented: ''The distinction between trespassers, licensees, and 




landowners to entrants. See Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 612 P.2d 142{1980)." O'Guin v. 
Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 72 P.3d 849 (2003). The remaining materials in this section will examine 
(1) the definition of the three land entrant classifications and (2) the scope of duty owed to each of the 
three traditional classifications. Do any of the scope standards correspond to the general, reasonable-








(1)  Definition of "trespasser"': "Anyone who goes upon the private property of another without lawful 
authority or without permission or invitation, express or implied, is a trespasser to whom the landowner 
owes no legal duty until his presence is discovered." Bicandi v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 55 Idaho 
543,44 P.2d 1103 (1935). 
 
IDJI 3.19.1 defines "trespasser'' as 
 
A trespasser is a person who goes or remains upon the premises of another without 
permission, invitation or lawful authority. Permission or invitation may be express or 
implied. 
 
(2)  Definition of "trespasser"' (pt. 2): When is a trespasser not a ''trespasser"? 
 
(a) Keim v. Gilmore & Pittsburgh R.R.: Recall that in Keim, plaintiff was taking a shortcut across 
defendant's land when he was struck by a protrusion from a car being pulled down the track. The Idaho 
Supreme Court concluded: 
 
It has been argued that the respondent was a trespasser on appellant's station grounds 
and that the company owed him no such duty as it owes to those who are invited to its station on 
business with the company. It is well settled that a railroad company is not under the same duty 
to look out and take precautions for the care and safety of a trespasser that it is under to those 
whom it invites to its stations and grounds for business purposes. It is settled, however, in this 
state that they are liable to a trespasser for reasonable care and precaution even before their 
negligence reaches the stage where it may be designated as wanton or willful negligence. [] They 
have no right to injure or kill a trespasser. To our minds, the care and precaution which the 
company took in this case in operating this car could not be termed ordinary care.... The evidence 
discloses that Keim was at least a licensee on these premises. Witnesses testify that there was a 
path from Junction to the markets at Leadore that had been traveled at least ever since the 
railroad was constructed, and that the course Keim was taking on this occasion was along the 
course of that path, and that this had been traveled continuously by pedestrians between the two 
towns ever since the construction of the road. It is well settled that where such a custom or 
practice prevails, the railroad company is chargeable with notice that licensees or trespasses, if 
you please, may be on or along the track at such places. [] It should be remembered that 
respondent was at a place where the appellant might always expect licensees and employees, 
and where it was the duty of the company to maintain a lookout for persons who might rightfully 
be on the premises, and even though the respondent were himself a trespasser at that place, the 
appellant, on the other hand, would be chargeable with a greater duty even to him at that place 
than it would have been at some remote or isolated place where it was not chargeable with the 
duty of looking out for those it might expect upon its premises and about its tracks. 
Keim v. Gilmore & Pittsburgh R.R., 23 Idaho 511, 131 P. 656 (1913). See also Reardon v. Union Pacific 
R.R., 93 Idaho 833, 475 P.2d 370 (1970) (it is unnecessary to determine the status of plaintiff who injured 
while crossing defendant's tracks). Denbeigh v. Oregon-Washington R.R. &Navigation Co., 23 Idaho 663, 
132 P. 112 (1913) (the operators of a train have a duty to sound a warning where a person is walking 
along a railroad track in an area where the company tolerates such use of its tracks). Fleenor v. Oregon 
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Short Une R.R., 16 Idaho 781, 102 P. 897 (1909) (the court is "not going to examine into the location very 
...minutely to determine whether he was in fact a trespasser or traveling at a place where he had a right ... 
to go. The duty of the railroad company would be substantially the same in either event, because it could 
not, within a distance of eight feet, materially change its attitude with reference to diligence in operating its 
locomotive.... In other words, the necessary diligence and precaution that would have saved the 
...decedent on the F Street crossing would have ...saved ...him at a distance of eight feet farther ahead."). 
Anderson v. Great Northern Ry., 15 Idaho 513, 99 P. 91 (1908) (while the majority rule is that a 
trespasser is owed no duty other than to avoid "willful or wanton injury," a "better considered line of 
authority" rejects status as determination and instead imposes a duty "to exercise special care and 
watchfulness at any point upon its track where people may be expected"). 
 
(b)       Ellis v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power Co. was subsequently described by the court: 
In Ellis v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power Co., 41 Idaho 106,238 P. 517 (1925), this Court held that 
the evidence showed what the Court referred to as "wanton negligence." There a nine-year old 
girl was instantly killed by coming in contact with a high-tension transmission line that had been 
constructed on the bank of a canal that was private property. The wire with which the child came 
in contact was only five feet four inches from the ground. There were no warnings, barriers, 
fences or other obstructions to protect the public from the line. There were piles of loose dirt on 
the canal bank that were "above the level of the surrounding country and would necessarily be 
somewhat prominent and afforded a view for quite a distance." [] The power company "knew of 
the dangerous construction of the secondary line and the condition of the country, and in general, 
the adjacent population, the number of school children and that the road ***upon which the 
children traveled to school, extended immediately by the spoil bank upon which the line was 
constructed."  [] The deceased girl trespassed on the canal bank and was electrocuted by the 
sagging power line. The jury awarded the parents of the deceased girl $10,000 for her death. In 
affirming the judgment this Court approved an instruction that "stated that if the defendants 
maintained a dangerous agency and knew that children or others were accustomed to frequent or 
go on the ground, then if the dangerous appliance were unprotected, and if by reason of 
defendants' negligence injury resulted, the defendants would be liable." [] The Court concluded 
that this instruction was evidently framed for the purpose of further indicating the jury what 
conditions should necessarily obtain before the defendants would be guilty of wanton negligence. 
[] 
Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrurn, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736 (1988). See also Pittman v. Sather, 68 Idaho 
29, 188 P.2d 600 (1947) ("they were lulled into security in entering [the almost-completed-but-not-
formally-opened highway] by the appearance of the way and the l ck of barricades or other warnings .... 
Therefore, they cannot, under their evidence, be considered trespassers."); Lindquist v. Albertson's, Inc., 
113 Idaho 830, 748 P.2d 41 (Ct. App. 1987) ("there was no showing of ... frequent or general entry into 
the abandoned freight-loading are of the premises where Lindquist was injured" and he thus was a 
trespasser); Peterson v. Romine. 131 Idaho 537, 541, 960 P.2d 1266, 1270 (1998) ("The fact that the 
Landowners were trying to promote their business does not create an inference that customers for other 
downtown businesses were invited to park in a parking lot specifically marked for the use of the 
respondents' customers."). 
 
(c)       IDJI3.17 --Duty once presence is discovered 
 
Once an [owner] [occupant] discovers a visitor of any status proceeding on a co rse, which 
probably will result in harm because of a dangerous condition of the premises, which is known to 
the [owner] [occupant] but not known to the visitor, the [owner] [occupant] owes a duty to use 
reasonable means to warn the visitor of the dangerous condition. The failure to do so amounts to 
reckless conduct. 
 
Would this instruction have been appropriate in Keim v. Gilmore & Pittsburgh R.R.? In Ellis v. Ashton & 
St. Anthony Power Co.? 
 
(3)  Definition of "trespasser" (pt 3): attractive nuisance: One recurrent defense to the 




(a)  York v. Pacific Northern Ry.: Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action for the death of 
their four-year-old son who was crushed in a railroad turntable. The railroad appealed a jury verdict, 
arguing in part that the decedent was a trespasser. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the argument, 
noting that 
 
It is not shown that there was any reason for anyone to think that it was a trespass to go upon this 
turntable any more than to walk upon the track of appellant. It is shown that there were no 
obstructions to anyone going upon the turntable, and that there were no signs warning people of 
danger. It is also shown that people were in the habit of going upon the turntable and using it as a 
merry-go-round, and that it was an attractive place for children. 
 
Therefore, "[i]t is clearly the duty of appellant or any other corporation or individual to protect life 
and property in all reasonable ways." York v. Pacific Northern Ry., 8 Idaho 574, 69 P.2d 1042 (1902). The 
court has subsequently cited York as adopting the attractive nuisance doctrine. E.g., Bass v. Quinn-
Robbins Co., 70 Idaho 308, 216 P.2d 944 (1950). Given the court's emphasis on "people" rather than 
"children," it is at least arguable that the court in York did not actually intend to adopt such a limited 
exception. 
 
(b)  Davis v. McDougall: Plaintiff, a three-year-old tenant in defendant's apartment house, 
was injured when her hand was caught in the wringer of a washing machine. The trial court granted the: 
landlord a summary judgment after concluding that a washing machine could not be an attractive 
nuisance. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed: 
 
The attractive nuisance doctrine has been recognized in this jurisdiction for well over six 
decades. See York v. Pacific & Northern Ry., 8 Idaho 574, 69 P. 1042 (1902). Under this doctrine 
iit has been held that the object or condition must be of an unusual nature and character so as to 
render it peculiarly attractive and alluring to children. Anneker v. Quinn-Robbins Co., 80 Idaho 1, 
323 P.2d 1073 (1958); Bass v. Quinn Robbins Co., 70 Idaho 308, 216 P.2d 944 (1950). While this 
is still the rule in Idaho where the alluring quality of the injuring agency can be shown the 
"attractive nuisance': doctrine does not satisfactorily conclude the inquiry in this case. 
 
In most states, the attractive nuisance doctrine has either been replaced by, or has 
evolved into, a set of criteria which in essence are within the consideration of negligence 
generally. []                
                         .                            .           . 
An inflexible rule that a common household item such as a washing machine cannot be 
an attractive nuisance, such as the trial court announced here, ignores reality and the reason for 
having a special rule for injured children originally. This approach fails to account for the greater 
lack of judgment among younger children and does not allow for the practical fact that very young 
children have only scant understanding of the most common articles even if highly dangerous. 
The more rational solution is to consider both the injuring mechanism and the age and 
sophistication of the child .... Whether a child three and on-half years old should or does 
understand dangers attendant to a washing machine is a question which should have been 
considered by the jury. 
Davis v. McDougall, 94 Idaho 61, 480 P.2d 907 (1971). 
 
(c)      Hughes v. Union Pacific R.R.: Plaintiff, a thirteen-year-old boy, was injured when his foot 
was caught in a coupler as he crossed through defendant's switching yard. Relying upon Bass v. Quinn-
Robbins Co., the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
 
To render the owner liable the structure or condition maintained or permitted on his property, 
must be [1] peculiarly or unusually attractive to children; [2] the injured child must have been 
attracted by such condition or structure; [3] the owner must know, or the facts be such as to 
charge him with knowledge, of the condition, and that children are likely to trespass and be 
injured; [4] the structure or condition must be dangerous and of such a character that the danger 
is not apparent to immature minds. 
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The court affirmed the trial court's holding that plaintiff was aware of the risk. Hughes v. Union Pacific 
R.R., 114 Idaho 466, 757 P.2d 1185 (1988). Should plaintiff’s awareness of the risk remain a relevant 
issue after Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989)? Is it, in short, simply a disguised 
application of the open and obvious danger doctrine? 
 
Other Idaho cases applying the doctrine include: Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 
768 P.2d 736 (1988); Daniels v. Byington, 109 Idaho 365, 707 P.2d 476 (Ct. App. 1985); Bicandi v. Boise 
Payette Lumber Co., 55 Idaho 543,44 P.2d 1103 (1935). 
 
(d)  O'Guin v. Bingham County: Three children who were enrolled in summer school took a 
shortcut home by crossing a county landfill, which they entered through an unlocked gate. The two 
younger children dallied despite warnings by the older brother. They were found lifeless at the bottom of 
the pit; they had been crushed when a wall gave way. 
 
The [plaintiffs] argue that the opening in the fence on Ridge Street at the canal was an 
open and obvious access point, which was not restricted. This argument, however, which 
suggests an "implied invitation" to enter into the property, does not alter the boys' status as 
trespassers but may be relevant to the landowners' duty to the children. See United Zinc & 
Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922} (an invitation to children may be implied from 
knowingly exposing something which attracts them on the land, but the principle, if accepted, 
must be very cautiously applied). Therefore, the facts before the district court support the court's 
conclusion that the boys were trespassing at the time of the accident. 
 
The attractive nuisance doctrine under Idaho law applies only to children who were 
attracted onto the defendant's premises by a dangerous object or condition. Ambrose v. Buhl 
Joint School Distr., 126 Idaho 581, 585,887 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Ct. App. 1994). A plaintiff asserting 
attractive nuisance must prove: 
 
(1) a structure/condition on the defendant's premises which the defendant knew or should 
have known in the exercise of due care, involved a reasonable risk of attraction and harm 
to children; (2) the structure or condition maintained or permitted on the property was 
peculiarly or unusually attractive to children; (3)the structure/condition was such that the 
danger was not apparent to immature minds;  and  (4)  the   plaintiff  was   attracted   
onto  the   premises   by  such structure/condition. 
Bass v. Quinn-Robbins Co., 70 Idaho 308, 216 P.2d 944 (1950). If any one of these elements IS not 
established, a claim of attractive nuisance fails. Nelson By and Through Nelson v. City of Rupert, 128 
Idaho 199,911 P.2d 1111 (1996). 
 
The evidence in the record indicates that the boys first entered the County property as a 
shortcut to the school. Once on the premises, the boys were attracted into the area of the landfill 
pit, specifically the slopes of the pit, when they saw other boys throwing rocks to undermine the 
slopes and dislodge gravel and dirt. The O'Guin boys descended into the pit to get into the shade 
provided by the slope and started to dig into the slope, which collapsed on them. The district court 
determined that the plaintiffs had not established that the boys were attracted onto the landfill 
property by the open pit or the piles of debris. The district court was not persuaded to distinguish 
the boys' entry into the two, arguably distinct sections of the County property. We agree with the 
district court's conclusion that the dangerous condition that caused harm to the boys was only 
discovered after they had entered the property. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the 
attractive nuisance claim. 
O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 72 P.3d 849 (2003). 
 
(e)  Defense or theory of recovery? Traditionally, the attractive nuisance doctrine has been 
treated as an exception to the limited duty owed to a trespasser: a child attracted into the property by a 
dangerous condition is not required to prove that the land occupant acted with recklessness. She will be 




akin to a theory of recovery. Note the final sentence in the excerpt from O'Guin: ''we affirm the dismissal 
of the attractive nuisance claim." 
 
A five-year-old girl and an eight-year-old boy were lured into a city shed by a fourteen? year-old 
boy, who taped them to chairs and sexually assaulted the girl. The supreme court affirmed the dismissal 
of the children's action for attractive nuisance. 
 
The district court ruled from the bench that the claim failed because the shed itself was 
not dangerous and did not cause the injury. The district court was correct in its analysis. The shed 
was not dangerous; it did not cause the injury. The children were not attracted to the premises by 
the condition or the structure. They were lured there by Wetherell. 
Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337, 160 P.3d 1272 (2007). 
 
(f)  IDJI 3.20 is applicable when a plaintiff asserts the attractive nuisance doctrine: The 
plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
 
1. A structure or condition existed on the defendant’s premises that was peculiarly or 
unusually attractive to children; 
2. The structure or condition on the property was such that it presented a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of injury to any children who might go onto or into the premises; 
3. The structure _or condition on the property was such that the danger or risk of harm it 
presented to children would not be readily apparent to a child of the age, experience and maturity 
of the plaintiff; 
4. The defendant was aware, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have been aware, 
of the attractiveness of the premises to children and of the risks of harm to children that it 
presented; The plaintiff was attracted onto the defendant's property by such structure or 
condition; 
6. The plaintiff was injured; 
7. The structure or condition was a proximate cause of the injury; and 
8. The nature and extent of the injuries, the elements of damage, and the amount thereof. 
 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
 
Was the defendant negligent in maintaining or permitting an attractive nuisance on his 
property, which negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
 
. . . If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions in this 
instruction has been proved, then you should answer the question "yes". If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should 
answer the question "no." 
 
(4)  Scope of the duty owed a trespasser: As the court noted in Bicandi, "the landowner owes no legal 
duty until [the trespasser's] presence is discovered." After that, "the duty of the defendants, as owners or 
tenants, was to refrain from willful or wanton acts which might cause injuries." Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 
101 Idaho 299,612 P.2d 142 (1980). What is ''willful and wanton"? 
 
(a)  IDJI 3.19 defines the duty owed to a trespasser: 
 
The [owner] [occupant] owes no duty to a trespasser whose presence on the premises 
is unknown or could not reasonably have been anticipated. But, if the presence of the 
trespasser becomes known or reasonably could have been anticipated, the [owner] 
[occupant] has a duty not to injure the trespasser by any intentional or reckless act. 
 




(b)  Gallup v. Bliss: Plaintiff was injured when the vehicle in which he was riding struck fence 
posts that defendant had placed on land that the public had long used as a street. Defendant argued that 
she was entitled to fence her property. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed - but with an important caveat: 
 
Conceding that the territory so used as a thoroughfare was her private property and that all travel 
there over was a trespass, she was invested with no right to place thereon an instrumentality that 
might injure the trespasser without notice. While the landowner may resist a trespasser with all 
necessary force, he may not lay a trap or pitfall for him. Much less can he lay a trap for one 
unconscious of trespassing. The defendant knew that this strip was being commonly traveled; 
that at night there was nothing to apprise the traveler of her private rights; and she should have 
known that a collision with the unlighted posts would be sooner or later inevitable. Knowing such 
facts, her duty was unquestionable. 
 
Thus, "[d]efendant's right to resist the city's encroachment could not relieve her of her duty to the traveling 
public." Gallup v. Bliss, 44 Idaho 756, 262 P.154 (1927) 
 
(c) Recall the discussion of recklessness in the introductory chapter. 
 
(5)  Trespassing cows: The standard applicable to human trespassers is also applicable to 
trespassing cattle: 
 
[T]he owner of unenclosed land is not liable for injury to the livestock of another, ranging on his 
premises, resulting from the condition of the premises or some dangerous agency thereon, 
unless the injury is caused willfully or recklessly. [] 
 
. . We conclude that respondents would not be liable unless they willfully and io intentionally 
caused the death of the cow or, actually seeing her, recklessly felled the tree in disregard of her 
safety. Whether the evidence shows any negligence on the part of respondents in felling the tree 
may be a debatable question, but it entirely fails to show that the death of the cow was caused by 
any willful, intentional or reckless act of respondents. 
Gould v. Reed, 34 Idaho 618, 203 P. 284 (1921). See also Strong v. Brown 26 Idaho 1140 p 773 (1914).                                                                                       
 
 




( ) . Definition of "licensee": The most satisfactory definition is to distinguish "licensee" and "Invitee": 
 
(a)  Wilson v. Bogert: 
 
[A social guest, though specifically invited, stands in the legal relationship to his host of a 
licensee, to whom the host owes the duty of reasonable and ordinary care only.... The fact that 
the guest may be rendering a minor, incidental service to the host does not change the 
relationship.... 
 
Nor is the relationship changed by the fact that the guest and the host may have a mutual 
or common interest m the purpose of the visit, such as the service of a church, lodge, or political 
purpose, or an intangible social benefit to the host.... Where a person enters upon the premises 
of another for a purpose connected with the business there conducted, or the visit may 
reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible 
benefit to the occupant, the visitor is held to be an invitee. In the case before us no monetary, 
material or tangible benefit was conferred or intended to be conferred upon the defendants by the 
presence and participation of the plaintiff in the shower given in their home. The benefits, if any, 
conferred or intended to be conferred, were purely social. 




(b)  Mooney v. Robinson: The distinction may not always be apparent. In Mooney, plaintiff 
was injured when she fell down an unlighted stairway whale spending the night at the defendant's house. 
Although the purpose of the visit was to deliver a poodle - which the defendant had purchased from the 
plaintiff at a "substantial" price-the court concluded that the plaintiff was a social guest since "[t]he 
rendition by a social guest of an incidental economic benefit will not change the licensee's status to that of 
an invitee." Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676, 471 P.2d 63 (1970). 
 
(c)  IDJ13.15.1-Definitionof"licensee": 
 
A licensee is a person who goes upon the premises of another m pursuit of the visitor’s purpose, 
with the consent of the [owner] [occupant]. The consent of the [owner] [occupant] may be implied 
from the circumstances under which the visitor enters the premises. 
 
(d)  IDJI3.15.2- Licensee- social guest:                                     
 
A social guest is a licensee upon the premises of his host. Where the purpose of the visit 
is social, rendering minor incidental services or economic benefit does not change the 
relationship. 
 
(2)  Scope of the duty owed a licensee: 
 
(a)  Gowen v. Davis: "The legal status of the plaintiff was that of a licensee only, as 
to whom the defendant owed no duty other than to avoid willfully or wantonly injuring him, and to refrain 
from knowingly exposing him to dangerous hazards or instrumentalities on the premises, and which were 
unknown to the plaintiff." Gowen v. Davis, 85 ldaho 221,377 P.2d 950 (1963). 
 
(b) Holzheimer v. Johannesen: "The duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only 
required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land." 
Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 871 P.2d 814 (1994). 
 
(c)  IDJI3.15- Duty to warn a licensee: 
 
The [owner] [occupant] owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dangerous existing hazards on the 
land that were known to the [owner] [occupant] and unknown to and not reasonably discoverable 
by the licensee. 
 
(3)  The "fireman's rule": What is the status of an entrant such as a fireman who is on the premises in 
an emergency capacity an invitee? Presumably preventing the destruction of the premises confers a 
tangible benefit on the land occupier. 
 
(a)  Pincock v. McCoy: Plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, was injured when he fell into an open hatch 
while making an arrest. Although plaintiff argued "with much force and earnestness" that as a police 
officer "he was not only invited but commanded by the state to go upon the premises" and that the 
plaintiff, "being a part and portion of the state and interested as any other citizen in the preservation of its 
peace and dignity, united in that direction and command," the court concluded that the plaintiff was only a 
licensee because "[o]ne on the premises by invitation, express or implied, is an invitee, whereas one who 
is there merely by permission or toleration is a mere licensee." Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227, 281 P.2d 
371 (1929). This holding- the so-called fireman's rule- has been rejected recently by some courts. See, 
e.g., Christensen v. Murphy, 296 Or. 610,678 P.2d 1210 (1984). 
 
(b)  Winn v. Frasher: The Idaho Supreme Court has expanded the doctrine beyond the land 
entrant/land occupier context, holding that, because "[t]he very nature of police work and fire fighting is to 
confront danger," the rule applied to police and fire fighters who responded to a toxic chemical spill on a 
public highway. The court inexplicably concluded, nonetheless, that the adoption of the doctrine did not 
necessarily preclude plaintiffs' recovery. The opinion, authored by Johnson, was joined by Shepard and 
Huntley. McDermott- sitting pro tern. -: dissented _on the ground that, "[g]iven the significant ramifications 
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to policemen and firemen ...public policy demands such a rule be implemented, ...the proper body to 
enact such a rule would be the Idaho State Legislature." Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, n7 P.2d 722 
(1989). 
 
Do the rationales for limiting the scope of the duty owed by land occupiers apply to transporters of 
hazardous chemicals? In other words, is the doctrine a land-based theory? 
 
(c)  Nichols v. Sonneman: The court in Winn made no mention of an earlier Idaho that 
seemingly reaches the opposite conclusion. ln Nichols v. Sonneman, 91 Idaho 199,418 P.2d 562 (1966), 
plaintiff was an Idaho Falls police officer. He was making measurements at the scene of an earlier 
automobile accident when he was struck by an automobile driven by defendant. Defendant argued that 
plaintiff had been contributorily negligent because he had been in the street at the time he was struck. 
The supreme court rejected this contention: 
 
[D]efendants contention that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of Iaw, the record 
establishes that plaintiff’s presence upon the street was required by the dutres of his office as a 
city policeman. The measurements he was taking were for the purpose of fixing the location of 
the point of impact in the prior collision. This he was required to do. Surrounding conditions were 
such that it became reasonably necessary for plaintiff to go to the point on the highway where he 
was struck, in order to locate by measurement, the point of impact sought. While so doing it was 
his duty to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. However, his position is not to be 
compared to that of a pedestrian jay-walking or loitering on the street. 
 
The court approved a jury instruction that stated: 
 
You are instructed that at the time and place in question the plaintiff, Ronald J. Nichols, was a 
policeman engaged in his official capacity as such inworking upon a highway in the process of 
investigating an accident, and that as such, his conduct must be judged by a more liberal 
standard than an ordinary pedestrian in that such an officer is not required to use the same 
degree of care in looking for approaching vehicles as an ordinary pedestrian, and he is entitled to 
assume that an oncoming motorist will observe him and avoid running him down without warning. 
He may assume that motorists will use reasonable care for the safety of those working in the 
street proportionate to the danger of the situation. He is not required to keep a constant lookout 
for approaching motorists, but he has the duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances to 
avoid being run over; that is, such care and caution as are dictated by the exigencies of the 
particular situation, and that might be expected of an officer engaged in similar duties. In short, he 
has the duty of exercising such care as a reasonably prudent or careful person would exercise 
under the same circumstances. 
Nichols v. Sonneman, 91 Idaho 199, 418 P.2d 562 (1966). 
 
Can the decision in Winn be squared with the decision in Nichols? Which is the preferable result? 
 
 
(d)  Ruffing v. Ada County Paramedics: Plaintiff, a fireman and defendant's employee, a 
paramedic, were stationed at the same fire station. Both fire fighters and medics responded to a call. After 
medical assistance to the patient, she was loaded onto an ambulance. Plaintiff was assisting defendant's 
employee in backing the ambulance; the employee hit a parked vehicle, pinning plaintiffs leg between the 
ambulance and the car. Ada County argued that fireman's rule precluded plaintiffs claim. The supreme 
court reversed: 
 
As _stated in Winn, neither a firefighter nor a police officer may recover in tort when his injuries 
are caused by the same conduct that required his official presence. See Winn, ]. Although the 
EMT units and firefighters were clearly involved in a joint safety operation, the particular conduct 
that caused Ruffing's injury falls outside the ambit of the rule stated in Winn. It was a call to 
respond jointly to a medical emergency which required both Ruffing's and McPherson's presence 




of a woman in Chili's restroom. McPherson's backing of the ambulance, which caused Ruffing's 
alleged injury, was not the "same conduct" that required his official presence. In order for the 
fireman's rule to reach the circumstances here, we would have to expand the rule stated in Winn, 
and we are not inclined to do so. Therefore, we find the fireman's rule does not bar Ruffing s 
claim here. The decision of the district court to the contrary is overruled. 
Ruffing v. Ada County Paramedics, 14 Idaho.  3, _188 P.3 85 (208). 
 
Is the court persuasive? What IS the distinction that it is drawing? 
 
(c) IDJI3.15.7- Licensees- police officers and firemen: 
 








{1) Definition of "invitee":        
                                                               
(a) Carr v. Wallace Laundry." A person who s] invite[d] to come upon his premises 
upon a business in which both are concerned." Carr v. Wallace Laundry, 31 Idaho 266, 170 P. 107 
(1918). 
 
(b)  Curtis v. DeAtley: A business customer is the most common example of an invitee. What 
is the status of an employee? "The plaintiff was employed [as a housekeeper], and because she 
conferred a material or tangible benefit upon the occupants, she would be considered an invitee." Curtis 
v. DeAtley, 104 Idaho 787, 791, 663 P.2d 1089, 1093 (1983). 
 
(c)  What is the status of a person on the premises as an employee of an independent 
contractor? In both Carr v. Wallace Laundry Co., 31 Idaho 266, 170 P. 107 (1918), and Gagnon v. St. 
Maries Light & Power Co., 26 Idaho 87, 141 P. 88 (1914), the plaintiff was an employee of a contractor 
hired to paint the defendant's building. The court in both cases concluded that the painters were invitees 
of the land occupier. 
 
(d)  IDJI3.13- Definition of "invitee": 
 
An invitee is a person who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected 
with business there conducted, or whose visit may reasonably be said to confer or 
anticipate a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the [owner] [occupant]. 
 
(2)  The Grays (pt. 1): Recently, the court seems to be somewhat inconsistent in the standard it 
employs to determine whether an entrant is an invitee or a licensee: 
 
(a) Holzheimer v. Johannesen: Holzheimer and Johannesen were orchardists in Emmett. It was 
the practice among the industry to provide fruit boxes to a grower who was short on the assumption that 
they would be able to expect the same in return. Holzheimer was injured when he was at Johannesen's to 
pick up boxes. He argued that "he was an invitee because he was visiting the Johannesen fruit farm for 
the purpose of acquiring boxes, which is a business purpose connected with the Johannesen's fruit farm 
business, and that his visit to the Johannesen farm rendered a benefit to Johannesen." The court 
disagreed: 
 
Holzheimer's argument that he was an invitee simply because he was purchasing or 
borrowing fruit boxes, which is arguably connected with the Johannesen fruit farm business, is 




Evidence was adduced at trial that was sufficient to warrant the district court instructing 
the jury on licensee status and the standard of care owed to a licensee. Both Johannesen and 
Holzheimer, as well as two other witnesses engaged in the fruit business, testified that loaning or 
selling boxes at cost to neighboring fruit farmers in the Emmett area was customary. The farmers 
loaned boxes to one another in the spirit of cooperation, and in hopes that favors would be 
returned when needed. Johannesen testified that he expected Holzheimer to either purchase the 
boxes at cost or replace them. Johannesen testified that he made no profit on the sale of boxes 
and in fact the sale may have cost him money once the cost of labor unloading the boxes and 
breaking up a pallet of boxes was included. The testimony reflected that this was in actuality more 
of a benefit to Holzheimer since he would have either had to buy an entire pallet, which he didn't 
need, or pay more than Johannesen's cost to buy a partial pallet. Arguably there was a business 
transaction between Johannesen and Holzheimer. Equally supportable is the assertion that the 
transaction between Johannesen and Holzheimer was the minimal type of service between a 
landowner and visitor referred to in Wilson [v. Bogert, supra b.(1)(a)], which does not alter their 
relationship a landowner and licensee. 
 
There was sufficient evidence adduced at trial from which the jury could reasonably 
conclude that Holzheimer was a licensee … Thus, we find no error in the court's decision to 
instruct the jury both as to the status of licensee and invitee. 
Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 ldaho 397, 871 P.2d 814 (1994). 
 
(b) Tomich v. City of Pocatello: In Tomich, on the other hand, the court appears to have 
relaxed the requirement that the entrant confer a material or tangible benefit upon the occupant." In 
Tomich v. City of Pocatello, plaintiff kept his plane at a municipal airport. When the plane was destroyed, 
the landowner argued that the pilot was a licensee rather than an invitee because the plane was used 
solely for recreation. The court disagreed: 
 
Tomich used the airport to fly his plane, which is the "business there conducted" at an 
airport, and therefore Tomich was an invitee. The fact that an individual has a personal 
or recreational reason for entering the premises of another is irrelevant to whether that 
individual meets the definition of an invitee. The relevant inquiry is whether the individual enters 
the premises for a purpose connected with the business conducted on those premises. Tomich 
used the airport in exactly the manner for which it was intended, designed, and commonly used, 
thereby benefiting the city. Therefore, Tomich was an invitee. 
Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 901 P.2d 501 (1995). Since Tomich did not rent the tie-down 
space from the city, what was the benefit he conferred? 
 
Can Holzheimer and Tomich be reconciled? 
 
(3)  The Grays {pt. 2): Scope of the duty owed to an invitee: 
 
(a)  Otts v. Brough: "Owners or persons in charge of property owe to an invitee or business 
visitor the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn the invitee of hidden or 
concealed dangers of which the owner or one in charge knows or should know by exercise of reasonable 
care, in order that the invitee be not unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger." Otts v. Brough, 
90 Idaho 124,409 P.2d 95 (1965). 
 
(b) Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc.: "The law is well settled in this state that, to hold an owner 
or possessor of land liable for injuries to an invitee caused by a dangerous condition existing on the land, 
it must be shown that the owner knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the 
existence of the dangerous condition.... 'The true ground of liability is the proprietor's superior knowledge 
of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going on the property.'" Tommerup v. 




(c) Harrison v. Taylor: "Henceforward, owners and occupiers of land will be under a duty of 
ordinary care under the circumstances towards invitees who come upon their premises." Harrison v. 
Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,595,768 P.2d 1321, 1328 (1989). 
 
(d)  Morgan v. State Department of Public Works: "The State cites Harrison v. Taylor, 115 
Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989), for the proposition that the standard of care which landowners owe to 
invitees is ...simply one of reasonable care under the circumstances. [Thus, t]he State contends that ... it 
is erroneous to instruct the a jury that landowners have a duty to warn invitees of concealed defects on 
their property. We reject the state's assertion, noting that seven months after Harrison, the Court issued 
Walton v. Potlatch Corp., 116 ldaho 892,781 P.2d 229 (1989), which reconfirmed the rule that'[u]nder 
Idaho law a landowner owes an invitee a duty to keep its premises in a reasonable safe condition and to 
warn of hidden or concealed dangers which the owner knows or should know of by exercise of 
reasonable care." Morgan v. State Department of Public Works, 124 Idaho 658,664,862 P.2d 1080, 1086 
(1993). 
 
(e)  Johnson v. K-Mart Corp.: "It is well settled in Idaho that owners and occupiers of land 
owe a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances toward invitees who come upon their premises. 
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,596, 768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989); Otts v. Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 
131,409P.2d95, 102(1965)." Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316, 882 Idaho 971 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 
(f) Cates v. Albertson's, Inc.: "Cates was a business invitee on land owned and 
occupied by Albertson's. As the owner/occupier of that land, Albertson's owed Cates a duty of due 
care." Cates v. Albertson's, Inc., 126 Idaho 1030, 1034, 895 P.2d 1223, 1227 (1995). 
 
(g) Ball v. City of Blackfoot "Beginning with Harrison, we thus established that owners and 
occupiers of land will be under a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances toward invitees who come 
upon their premises.' ... [Invitees owe a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances." Ball v. City of 
Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 273 P.3d 1266 (2012). 
 
(h) IDJI 3.09 - Duty to invitee: 
 
An [owner] [occupant] owes a duty of ordinary care under all the circumstances towards 
invitees who come upon the premises. This duty extends to all portions of the premises 
to which an invitee may reasonably be expected to go. 
 
The comment to the instruction stated: "Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 
(1989). This case seems to suggest that specific instructions pertaining to duty to warn, duty to inspect, 
duty to remedy, etc., are all subsumed within this instruction. Further reference to specific duties within 
the instructions become unnecessary. Counsel may argue such in the application of this instruction. But 
cf., Walton v. Potlatch, 116 Idaho 892,781 P.2d229 (1989), where Court held that instruction on 
numerous separate duties was proper." 
 
(i) IDJI 3.11 - Specific duty- duty to inspect: 
(ii)  
The [owner] [occupant] owes a duty to exercise ordinary care in inspection of the premises for the 
purpose of discovering dangerous conditions. 
 
Are these various statements consistent? 
 
(3) Physical limitations on invitee status: 
 
(a)  Feeny v. Hanson: The duty imposed upon a land occupier "to keep the premises safe for 
an invitee extends to all portions of the premises which it is necessary and convenient for the invitee to 
visit or use in pursuing the course of business for which the invitation was extended and at which his 
presence should reasonably be anticipated or to which he is allowed to go." Feeny v. Hanson, 371 P.2d 
15 (1962). See also Williamson v. Neitzel, 45 Idaho 39,260 P. 689 (1927). 
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(b)  IDJI3.13.1 -Invitee- scope of invitation: 
 
A visitor may bean invitee for limited purpose or the invitation may be restricted in scope. 
If the visitor enters any part of the premises or makes any use of it beyond the scope of the 
invitation or remains on the premises after the expiration of the time within which to accomplish 
the purpose of the invitation, the visitor's status as an invitee may end and the visitor may 
become a licensee or trespasser as is defined in other instructions. 
 
 
d. Miscellaneous Land-Based Relationships 
 
 
FORBUSH V. SAGECREST MULTI FAMILY PROP OWNERS’ ASS’N  
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
162 Idaho 317, 316 P.3d 1199 (2017) 
 
BURDICK, CJ. - Travis Forbush and Gretchen Hymas, individually and as natural parents of McQuen C. 
Forbush and Breanna Halowell (Appellants), appeal the Ada County District Court's grant of summary 
judgment to Sagecrest Multifamily Property Owners' Association, Inc., and its President, Jon Kalsbeek 
(Respondents). Forbush and Halowell were overnight guests of a tenant who leased a unit at the 
Sagecrest Apartment Complex (Sagecrest). During the night, hazardous levels of carbon monoxide filled 
the unit, killing Forbush and injuring Halowell. Appellants brought tort claims against Respondents after 
the incident. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents. We affirm in part, reverse in 
part, and remand. 
 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
This appeal concerns an incident in which a vent on a water heater clogged and caused the 
emission of hazardous levels of carbon monoxide in unit 4624 at Sagecrest on November 10, 2012. The 
incident killed eighteen-year-old Private First-Class McQuen C. Forbush, a U.S. Marine; and injured 
eighteen-year-old Breanna Halowell. Forbush and Halowell were overnight guests of unit 4624's tenant 
Adra Kipper. 
 
Sagecrest consists of forty-eight separate buildings, each containing four apartments. When 
Sagecrest was built, Sagecrest Development, LLC, recorded the Declarations of Covenants, Conditions, 
and Restrictions (CCRs). The CCRs instruct that individuals or entities hold fee title to the separate 
buildings, each containing the four apartments. The CCRs grant these individuals or entities the 
"exclusive right" to maintain the interiors of the apartments they own. The unit owners are shareholders in 
the Sagecrest Multifamily Property Owners' Association (POA), a non-profit corporation. The CCRs task 
the POA with maintaining the exterior grounds at Sagecrest, including the sidewalks, landscaping, 
common areas, and fences. By contrast, the CCRs task unit owners with maintaining the "entire interior" 
of the units they own. To meet these maintenance duties, the CCRs require both the POA and unit 
owners to employ the same property management company. To that end, the POA and unit owners 
entered into maintenance contracts with First Rate Property Management (FRPM) in March 2010. 
 
In spring 2011, carbon monoxide concerns emerged at Sagecrest. Evidently, some tenants had 
reported smelling gas inside of their units. Intermountain Gas was contacted about these concerns and 
explained the problem was due to certain water heaters' venting systems. Two types of water heaters 
were used at Sagecrest. Venting on one type had "a metal screen around the bottom of the tank." Venting 
on the second type "d[id]n't have a screen that goes around, but one in the middle on the bottom." 
Venting on the second type was prone to clogging, which, in turn, caused carbon monoxide to emit. After 
meeting with Intermountain Gas about the problem, FRPM surmised that "we just need to clean/vacuum 




Nonetheless, carbon monoxide concerns grew more serious that summer. In July 2011, 
Intermountain Gas was again contacted after another tenant reported smelling gas inside of her unit. 
Intermountain Gas described the carbon monoxide level as "deadly" and attributed it to the unit's water 
heater. That same month, a professional plumber, Ben Davis, inspected the water heaters at Sagecrest, 
identified the problematic venting system, and advised that "these issues be solved before any tenants 
suffer health problems or death." Thereafter, FRPM reasoned that more than just cleaning or vacuuming 
the screens was necessary, concluding "the only way to fix this problem without modifying the water 
heater is to replace them completely." 
 
Although the POA knew of the carbon monoxide concerns, it did not move to modify or replace 
the water heaters. As the POA's President Jon Kalsbeek explained, "the water heaters are interior items 
of each unit" and, therefore, "an owner’s [sic] choice on how to handle this situation." Even so, the POA, 
primarily through Kalsbeek, became involved with the carbon monoxide issue in several ways. Although 
the CCRs give unit owners the "exclusive right" over unit interiors, Tony Drost, FRPM's President, 
testified that the POA, through Kalsbeek, controlled "global issues" that were complex-wide, which 
included the water heaters. For example, the POA instructed FRPM to conduct carbon monoxide testing 
inside of the units every three months. To that end, the POA issued two sets of procedures governing 
carbon monoxide testing. Those procedures also governed the installation of hard-wired carbon 
monoxide alarms. And, in September 2011, the POA enlisted an engineering firm in an effort to explore 
solutions short of replacing the water heaters. According to the engineering firm, the various solutions 
were to (1) increase "fresh air intakes"; (2) replace existing water heaters; and (3) replace "the smoke 
detectors with CO/Smoke detector combination sensor[s.]" 
 
In November 2011, FRPM relayed the engineering firm's findings to unit owners. Matthew 
Switzer, who owns the building in which unit 4624 sits, responded that he was unaware of any carbon 
monoxide issues with his units. FRPM clarified that Switzer's units had "checked in good during the CO 
detecting." FRPM further indicated that it would contact Switzer if later testing revealed carbon monoxide 
concerns with his units. 
 
Under the POA's directive, FRPM conducted carbon monoxide testing on March 9, 2012. That 
testing revealed a high level of carbon monoxide in several units, including unit 4624. However, that 
testing was later contradicted. When Intermountain Gas tested unit 4624 on March 12, 2012, it reported 
normal, non-hazardous levels of carbon monoxide. In any event, although FRPM had stated it would 
contact Switzer if testing revealed carbon monoxide concerns with his units, Switzer was never contacted 
about the high levels discovered on March 9, 2012. 
 
Warnings were distributed to tenants following the high levels of carbon monoxide discovered on 
March 9, 2012. The warning, placed on unit 4624's front door, informed tenant Adra Kipper that her unit's 
water heater was emitting "higher levels of carbon monoxide than we would like to see." The warning 
further informed Kipper that her water heater would be "replaced next week." A battery-powered carbon 
monoxide alarm was provided along with the warning because, although FRPM had begun to install hard-
wired alarms under the POA's directive, a hard-wired alarm had not yet been installed in unit 4624. 
 
Kipper's water heater was never replaced. And, although Kipper used the battery-powered 
carbon monoxide alarm initially, she eventually removed the alarm's batteries and placed it in a closet 
after it started beeping, apparently due to low batteries. Consequently, when Kipper had two overnight 
guests—Forbush and Halowell—staying over on November 10, 2012, no alarm sounded when the vent 
on Kipper's water heater clogged and caused the emission of hazardous levels of carbon monoxide. The 
incident killed Forbush and injured Halowell. 
 
Appellants filed their initial complaint on March 7, 2013, and eventually filed four amended 
complaints. They named several parties as defendants, including the POA and Kalsbeek, Respondents in 






II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
1. Did the district court properly grant summary judgment to the POA? 
 
2. Did the district court properly grant summary judgment to Kalsbeek? 
 
3. Should we award attorney fees on appeal? 
 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
This Court reviews a summary judgment order under the same standard the district court used in 
ruling on the motion. Kolln v. Saint Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 
(1997). That is, summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). We construe disputed facts in 
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be 
drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Major v. Sec. Equip. Corp., 155 Idaho 199, 202, 307 P.3d 1225, 
1228 (2013). Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho 81, 84, 369 P.3d 299, 302 (2016). 
 
The main issues in this appeal trigger negligence, which consists of four elements: "(1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that 
duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual 
loss or damage." Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 691, 302 P.3d 26, 31 (2013) (citation 
omitted). More specifically, this appeal centers on whether a duty existed, which is generally a question of 
law over which this Court has free review. See Gagnon v. W. Bldg. Maint., Inc., 155 Idaho 112, 115, 306 
P.3d 197, 200 (2013). However, whether a duty existed becomes a question of fact if it requires resolution 






The three main issues raised on appeal are whether (A) summary judgment was properly granted 
to the POA; (B) summary judgment was properly granted to Kalsbeek; and (C) Respondents are entitled 
to attorney fees on appeal. We discuss each below. 
 
 
A. Did the district court properly grant summary judgment to the POA? 
 
Appellants contend the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the POA because 
triable issues of fact surround whether the POA (1) owed a premises liability-based duty of care; (2) owed 




1. Premises liability 
 
Appellants first argue the POA owed a premises liability-based duty of care to Forbush and 
Halowell. As a threshold matter, we note that the POA neither owned nor occupied unit 4624. Instead, 
Switzer owns unit 4624, and tenant Adra Kipper occupied unit 4624. We must therefore decide whether a 
premises liability-based duty of care can be imposed on a party who neither owns nor occupies the 
property at issue. 
 
Appellants correctly inform us that "the general rule of premises liability is that one having control 




261, 245 P.3d 1009, 1013 (2011) (quoting Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 713, 8 P.3d 
1254, 1256 (Ct. App. 2000)). Appellants maintain that the POA had control over unit interiors under the 
CCRs and, regardless of the CCRs, actually exerted control over unit interiors. Consequently, Appellants 
assert it is irrelevant that the POA neither owned nor occupied unit 4624. 
 
Appellants' position overlooks how our premises liability cases are limited to actions involving 
owners or occupiers of land and their agents. E.g., Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 171, 
296 P.3d 373, 377 (2013) ("The duty owed by owners and possessors of land depends on the status of 
the person injured on the land . . . ." (emphasis added)); Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 590, 591-92, 272 P.3d 
562, 563-64 (2012) (analyzing premises liability claim against owner of property); Harrison v. Taylor, 115 
Idaho 588, 595, 768 P.2d 1321, 1328 (1989) ("Henceforward, owners and occupiers of land will be under 
a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances towards invitees who come upon their premises."). Thus, 
we reject Appellants' premises liability argument and reaffirm our case law holding that a premises 
liability-based duty of care may be imposed only on owners or occupiers of land and their agents. 
 
The dissent, however, maintains that status as an owner or occupier is irrelevant. The dissent's 
analysis wholly forgets that premises liability furnishes a fundamental tripartite framework, under which 
land entrants are defined as an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser. E.g., Stiles v. Amundson, 160 Idaho 
530, 532 n.3, 376 P.3d 734, 736 n.3 (2016). The dissent's analysis renders the well-established tripartite 
framework inapplicable. A stranger who neither owns nor occupies the land at issue could not request an 
invitee to visit the land so as to confer a benefit on the land to the stranger, given that the stranger has no 
right to the land in the first place. Similarly, a stranger is without authority to authorize a licensee to enter 
land to which the stranger has no right. Finally, it cannot be said that a trespass occurs when a person 
enters land to which the stranger has no right simply because the stranger did not authorize that person's 
visit. Nevertheless, the dissent's analysis would permit these scenarios to be litigated under the rubric of 
"premises liability." 
 
In the dissent's view, control is the essential test. While the dissent creates several hypothetical 
scenarios that are irrelevant to this case in an attempt to show that some degree of control, by itself, 
should be sufficient to trigger premises liability, this Court has never resolved a premises liability case in 
such a manner. Three of our cases firmly reinforce that premises liability does not extend beyond owners 
or occupiers of the premises and their agents, and that control determines which party, as between the 
owner or occupier and their agents, had control of the premises during the relevant time. First, in Otts v. 
Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 131, 409 P.2d 95, 98 (1965), superseded on other grounds by I.C. § 6-801, we 
explained: 
 
Owners or persons in charge of property owe to an invitee or business visitor the duty to keep the 
premises in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn the invitee of hidden or concealed dangers of which 
the owner or one in charge knows or should know by exercise of reasonable care, in order that the invitee 
be not unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger. 
 
Otts concerned the duty owed by a general contractor to a subcontractor. Id. at 131-32, 409 P.2d 
at 98-99. The general contractor occupied the worksite at issue, as he "stated that he was continually on 
the job site; that every day he supervised the entire work of the construction of the building[.]" Id. at 132, 
409 P.2d at 99. We reversed summary judgment that had been granted to the general contractor, 
concluding triable issues of fact surrounded the general contractor's liability. Id. at 135-36, 409 P.2d at 
101-02. Otts, therefore, forecloses the dissent's assertion that our ruling today would allow "a general 
contractor or construction manager, who exercises the requisite control over the premises, [to] escap[e] 
liability . . . because he does not neatly fit within the categories elucidated today." As demonstrated in 
Otts, a general contractor or construction manager is regularly in occupation of the premises at issue. 
Additionally, the general contractor or construction manager is frequently an agent of the owner or 
occupier. But even supposing premises liability were for some reason inapplicable, the dissent 
embellishes the notion of a tortious general contractor or construction manager "escaping liability." 
Premises liability is not the exclusive path to liability. 
Similarly, in Jones, as the dissent acknowledges, this Court stated that "the general rule of 
premises liability is that one having control of the premises may be liable for failure to keep the premises 
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in repair." 150 Idaho at 261, 245 P.3d at 1013 (quoting Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 
713, 8 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Ct. App. 2000)). Our clear holding in Jones, however, was that the district court 
properly found premises liability did not apply because the injury occurred "on a public sidewalk or street, 
and not on [the defendant's] property." Id.; see also Heath, 134 Idaho at 714, 8 P.3d at 1257 (affirming 
summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff's vague assertion that she "may well have been" on 
property the defendant owned did not raise a triable issue of fact). Jones illustrates that, if premises 
liability indeed applies, the issue becomes which party, as between an owner or occupier of the land and 
their agents, had control over the premises. We did not hold, nor even suggest, in Jones that a stranger 
who neither owns nor occupies the property can be sued in premises liability merely by exercising some 
degree of wrongful or rightful control over the property. 
 
We reaffirmed these principles in our recent case of Stiles v. Amundson, 160 Idaho 530, 531, 376 
P.3d 734, 735 (2016), which concerned a "premises liability action brought against . . . the owner of a 
piece of property[.]" In Stiles, the issue raised was "who, between a landlord and a tenant, owes the 
relevant duty of care to a tenant's social guests." Id. at 533, 376 P.3d at 737. In resolving that issue, we 
explained that "[e]xisting case law demonstrates it is the entity having control over the property that bears 
the burden of warning social guests and licensees of dangerous conditions on the property." Id. In 
affirming summary judgment for the property owner, we reasoned that: 
 
[T]enants are liable to injured third parties, including the tenant's social guests, as if they were the 
owner of the property. This stands to reason, because the tenant, as the possessor of the property, is in 
the best position to eliminate dangers or to make those dangers known to third parties. Landlords, on the 
other hand, are not in a comparable position because they do not have possessory control over the land. 
Likewise, they do not have control over the guests hosted by the tenants, and they likely will not even be 
aware when a tenant's social guest is on the premises. 
 
Further, landlords, who do not generally have unfettered access to the premises, cannot 
reasonably be expected to be aware of all potential hazards on the property while the tenancy is in effect, 
especially in the event that the tenant creates the hazard. It would create an unfair burden on landlords to 
give them a responsibility to warn social guests to whom they have no connection of dangers of which 
they have no way of learning. Id. at 533-34, 376 P.3d at 737-38. Very similar to Jones, Stiles reinforces 
that, if premises liability applies, the issue becomes which party, as between an owner or occupier of the 
premises and their agents, had control over the premises during the relevant time. 
 
Nevertheless, the dissent "cannot square the . . . decision today with the Court's recent decision 
in McDevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc., 151 Idaho 280, 255 P.3d 1166 (2011)." McDevitt involved a 
plaintiff who sued a tenant for injuries sustained on a sidewalk outside the tenant's retail store. Id. at 281, 
255 P.3d at 1167. Specifically, the plaintiff tripped over a recessed sprinkler box on the sidewalk. Id. The 
landlord had hired Idaho Scapes, Inc. to install the sprinkler box. Id.at 282, 255 P.3d at 1168. At some 
point after Idaho Scapes installed the sprinkler box, it sunk about an inch below the sidewalk, and the 
plaintiff tripped on it. Id. When the case came before us on appeal, we affirmed that summary judgment 
was properly granted to the tenant because it owed no duty of care to keep the sidewalk, which was not 
part of the leased premises, reasonably safe or to warn of hazards. Id. at 281, 255 P.3d at 1167. As the 
dissent correctly observes, we first analyzed whether the tenant occupied the sidewalk, ultimately 
concluding the sidewalk "was not part of the leased premises." Id. at 285, 255 P.3d at 1171. We then 
addressed arguments concerning whether the tenant controlled the sidewalk outside its retail store. Id.  
 
Regarding that inquiry, we emphasized that "[n]o Idaho case has confronted a fact pattern such 
as the one at issue here, where the area over which the tenant allegedly has control is not a part of the 
leased premises." Id. In looking to other jurisdictions, we explained that, "absent a contractual obligation, 
a tenant in a multi-tenant shopping mall does not have control over common areas, and therefore has no 
duty to keep them safe for invitees." Id. (listing cases). We then concluded the tenant owed no duty of 
care to keep the sidewalk outside its retail store reasonably safe or to warn of hazards because the 
commercial lease and CCRs "imposed the duty to maintain the common areas on the landlord . . . ." Id. at 
286, 255 P.3d at 1172. Accordingly, McDevitt did not expand the confines of premises liability. Rather, we 




requisite control to trigger premises liability. Thus, McDevitt aligns with our analysis today. In fact, it is the 
dissent's analysis that McDevitt does not support. The dissent's analysis would suggest that Idaho 
Scapes, the entity that merely installed the sprinkler box, could be held liable in premises liability. That 
issue was never presented to us in McDevitt, and we never suggested that an entity like Idaho Scapes 
could be sued in premises liability. But once again, the dissent overlooks that, even if premises liability is 
for some reason inapplicable, it does not represent the exclusive path to liability in tort law. 
 
The above holdings illustrate that premises liability concerns the duties owed by owners and 
occupiers of land and their agents. Secondary sources are in accord. See, e.g., 2 Premises Liability 3d § 
36:1 (2016) ("Premises liability stems from the law of negligence and constitutes the body of law that sets 
the guidelines involving duties owed by an owner or occupier of real estate . . . ." (emphasis added)); 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 51 (2012) (summarizing the duties that possessors 
of land owe). Thus, contrary to the dissent's assertion, our ruling in this regard is aptly supported by 
current law. Premises liability does not contemplate imposing a duty of care on a stranger who neither 
owns nor occupies the premises at issue merely because the stranger may have exercised some degree 
of wrongful or rightful control over the premises. Indeed, like we explained in Stiles, ascribing a premises 
liability-based duty to a party who is without "unfettered access" to the premises would create an unfair 
burden, as that party "cannot reasonably be expected to be aware of all potential hazards[.]" 160 Idaho at 
533-34, 376 P.3d at 737-38. 
 
Declining to deviate from the above principles, we hold that a premises liability-based duty of care 
cannot be imposed on the POA since it neither owned nor occupied unit 4624. 
 
 
2. Voluntary undertakings 
 
The parties dispute (a) whether this argument is preserved; and (b) if so, whether it creates triable 
issues of fact. 
 
(a) Is the voluntary undertakings argument preserved? 
 
The POA argues Appellants did not preserve their voluntary undertakings argument for appeal 
because, although Appellants made voluntary undertakings arguments below, those arguments differ 
from what Appellants now assert on appeal. According to the POA, below Appellants argued tenant Adra 
Kipper relied on the POA's alleged voluntary undertakings, but on appeal, Appellants argue FRPM—not 
Kipper—relied. 
 
The POA's preservation argument is unavailing. Appellants made broad reliance arguments 
before the district court, stating that "[b]ecause the POA exerted absolute control over the property 
manager's operation and management at the property, First Rate did not even seek owner input on 
issues . . . the POA made the call." As a result, the district court reasoned that Appellants' arguments 
triggered the inquiry of whether the POA "undertook a duty and that Kipper, or even some other party, 
relied on [the] POA . . . ." That inquiry led the district court to conclude "no party presented any evidence 
that [the] POA represented to anyone, including First Rate, Switzer, or Kipper, that it, and not the owners, 
would provide and install carbon monoxide detectors or new water heaters." The district court further 
explained that FRPM did not rely on the POA's voluntary undertakings, if any, because FRPM understood 
that unit owners had exclusive control over unit interiors. Given that adverse ruling, Appellants' voluntary 
undertakings argument is preserved for this appeal. 
 
(b) Did the POA owe a duty of care as a result of voluntary undertakings? 
 
This Court has recognized that if "one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior 
duty to do so, the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner." Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi 
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 400, 982 P.2d 300, 312 (1999). That duty, however, "is limited to the duty 
actually assumed." Beers v. Corp. of Pres. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 
688, 316 P.3d 92, 100 (2013) (citation omitted). "[M]erely because a party acts once does not mean that 
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party is forever duty-bound to act in a similar fashion." Id. This duty arises "when [i] one previously has 
undertaken to perform a primarily safety-related service; [ii] others are relying on the continued 
performance of the service; and [iii] it is reasonably foreseeable that legally-recognized harm could result 
from failure to perform the undertaking." Id. (citation omitted). We discuss each element below. 
 
 
i. Specific undertakings 
  
Appellants contend the POA specifically undertook to control (1) the installation of hard-wired 
carbon monoxide alarms; (2) preventative maintenance; and (3) carbon monoxide warnings. 
 
 
1. Hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms 
 
Appellants argue triable issues of fact surround whether the POA voluntarily undertook to control 
the installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms. That argument centers on how the POA, through 
Kalsbeek, issued two sets of procedures governing the installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide 
alarms. 
 
The POA issued its first set of procedures in March 2012 after learning of carbon monoxide 
concerns. Under the POA's procedures, hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms were to be installed during 
"turnovers, preventative maintenance, lease renewals, or faulty smoke detectors . . . ." Thus, the 
procedures contemplated piecemeal installation. The procedures were amended after a tenant's carbon 
monoxide alarm sounded in October 2012. The tenant called the fire department, which tested the unit 
and found the water heater was emitting high levels of carbon monoxide. After that incident, FRPM 
contacted the POA to request immediate installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms, seeking 
authorization for a maintenance man to visit "every unit and check and make sure the CO detectors that 
we installed are in working condition. The units that do not have CO detectors I would like him to install 
one." Kalsbeek responded on behalf of the POA, stating that he would talk "to the board and see how the 
board wants to proceed." FRPM's request for immediate installation was further discussed at the POA's 
annual meeting in October 2012, where it became clear that many units lacked hard-wired carbon 
monoxide alarms. After that meeting, the POA, through Kalsbeek, amended the procedures, stating that 
hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms were to be installed "continuously." 
 
The POA argues it acted as nothing more than a "sounding board" for issues affecting multiple 
owners and, thus, did not exercise control over the installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms. As 
an issue concerning unit interiors, the POA maintains that unit owners had exclusive control over the 
installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms. On the one hand, in November 2011, FRPM sent an 
email to unit owners concerning hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms, seeking unit owners' approval for 
installation. Yet, eleven months later, Kalsbeek indicated that the POA's procedures governed, stating 
that "[t]here is absolutely nothing about owners' . . . approval" with respect to the installation of hard-wired 
carbon monoxide alarms. The POA asserts that Kalsbeek merely meant that FRPM did not need unit 
owners' approval because FRPM already had authority to make repairs costing less than $250 under 
FRPM's maintenance contracts with unit owners, and hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms cost less than 
$250. While the record provides only indirect support for that assertion, its veracity is irrelevant. Even if 
that assertion is true, a jury could still reasonably find that the POA, through Kalsbeek, undertook to 
control the installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms by issuing the two sets of procedures. 
 
The district court concluded issuing the two sets of procedures was not an undertaking that would 
"create a duty to repair or replace the water heaters or to install carbon monoxide detectors inside the 
units." While the district court is correct that this undertaking would not create a "duty to repair or replace 
the water heaters or to install carbon monoxide detectors inside the units," that conclusion overlooks 
whether this undertaking would create a duty to nevertheless control the installation of hard-wired carbon 
monoxide alarms. We find triable issues of fact surround that issue. 





The second voluntary undertaking Appellants cite concerns preventative maintenance and arises 
from a string of emails sent on April 15, 2011. That day, FRPM reported to the POA that certain 
maintenance needed to be performed, explaining that: 
 
Intermountain [G]as came out today and inspected an empty unit to try to find out what is causing 
the gas smell from the water heaters. He said the problem is with the venting. There are two 
different kinds of water heaters here, some have a metal screen around the bottom of the tank, 
the others don't have the screen that goes around, but one in the middle on the bottom. Those 
get clogged with lint, hair, debris very easily and if there is not adequate air flow from the bottom 
then the water heater cannot release exhaust. He said we just need to clean/vacuum off the 
screens and it will be fine. I think we should add this to the turn over spreadsheet under Typical 
Items for [the maintenance man] to vacuum out the bottom area and screens. Let me know if this 
is ok . . . . 
 
Before the POA responded, another email from FRPM clarified that a professional plumber 
should be hired, explaining: 
 
No. Please do not have [the maintenance man] vacuum these. This is something the 
plumber needs to do. I already asked them when I went and had my "plumbing training" at their 
shop. In order to clean it properly some things have to be taken apart so it can get cleaned from 
both sides or it would be pointless and/or could cause more problems. I will be in Meridian shortly 
and will explain. This will be a common problem since the units are located next to the dryers. 
 
Later that day, the POA, through Kalsbeek, communicated disagreement with FRPM's idea that a 
plumber should be hired, citing cost concerns: 
 
This seems to be a very expensive solution to have a plumber come out and vacuum vents for 
water heaters. Why not have [the maintenance man] learn what needs to be done to do it correctly at a 
lower cost? Are these only going to be done at turnovers? The vents need to be cleaned at least annually 
for preventative maintenance to be effective, is this something that if regularly vacuumed will not require a 
labor-intensive process? These could be done at the same time as the filter changes maybe? 
 
Three days later, FRPM sent the POA information on the cost to hire a plumber and requested 
guidance as to what next steps should be taken. The POA, through Kalsbeek, responded that "[l]et us 
review this and get back to you next week." The POA never responded, and the maintenance was never 
performed. As a result, Appellants contend the POA undertook to control the above preventative 
maintenance and is to blame for the fact that it was not performed. 
 
We note that the district court never addressed this undertaking, although it was raised below. On 
appeal, the POA argues Kalsbeek's "alleged non-response is not an affirmative act creating an 
assumption of duty to install detectors. Indeed, it was FRPM who was contractually obligated to have 
preventative maintenance performed on #4624 bi-annually at the expense of the owner . . . ." Although 
that argument boasts logical appeal, the undisputed facts do not support it. Instead, the above 
demonstrates that a jury could reasonably find that the POA voluntarily undertook to control preventative 
maintenance, regardless of any contractual obligations between FRPM and unit owners. 
 
 
3. Carbon monoxide warnings 
 
The third voluntary undertaking Appellants cite concerns carbon monoxide warnings. Appellants 
point to two warnings. First, in July 2011, FRPM wanted to distribute a warning it had received from a 
professional plumber, Ben Davis, who inspected the water heaters after carbon monoxide concerns 
emerged. Davis's letter detailed the scope of the carbon monoxide threat and advised that "these issues 
be solved before any tenants suffer health problems or death." The POA, through Kalsbeek, intervened 
and instructed FRPM to not distribute Davis's letter. Sheila Thomason, FRPM's maintenance supervisor, 
testified that Kalsbeek's instruction was the sole reason why Davis's letter was not distributed. As 
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Thomason testified, Kalsbeek wanted to be "in charge of distributing this type of information to the 
individual - individual owners at Sagecrest." 
 
Second, in March 2012, FRPM contacted Kalsbeek concerning warnings to distribute to unit 
owners and tenants and provided a draft warning. The warning "stated different levels of CO levels and 
what the . . . symptoms were experienced at those levels." Kalsbeek reviewed the warning and instructed 
FRPM to not distribute the warning, insisting it was irrelevant. FRPM, however, clarified that the warning 
had already been distributed. 
 
The district court found that "no one presented any evidence that [the] POA undertook the duty to 
warn tenants about carbon monoxide issues . . . ." The POA similarly argues the above facts do not 
concern "acts to warn the tenants of the dangerous condition on the property previously . . . ." Neither the 
district court's finding nor the POA's argument persuades us. To be clear, the district court and the POA 
are correct insofar that the above facts do not show that the POA undertook to warn unit owners and 
tenants; rather, the above facts illustrate that FRPM undertook to warn unit owners and tenants. But that 
conclusion overlooks whether the POA undertook to exercise control over warnings by intervening, or 
attempting to intervene, with regard to the two warnings above. Exercising control over warnings is a 





According to Appellants, FRPM relied on the POA with regard to the three voluntary undertakings 
explored above. The district court, by contrast, concluded no party relied on the POA and explained that: 
Other than argument, no party presented any evidence that Sagecrest POA represented to 
anyone, including First Rate, Switzer or Kipper, that it, and not the owners, would provide and 
install carbon monoxide detectors or new water heaters. In fact, the only evidence is that Kipper 
did not even know who or what Sagecrest POA was. The only evidence in the record is that both 
Sagecrest POA and First Rate always recognized that First Rate needed Switzer's consent, as 
the owner of the unit, to repair or replace the water heaters if the cost was over $250. 
 
The record before us on appeal causes us to disagree. First, as to the installation of hard-wired 
carbon monoxide alarms, the POA issued two sets of procedures governing that undertaking. The POA's 
procedures appear mandatory, as they instruct that the "procedures shall be followed . . . ." FRPM 
referred to the POA's procedures as "Jon's procedures or Jon's way." Specifically, "[h]e came into town . . 
. and said, '[t]his is what the procedures are going to be.' He laid them out for [FRPM]." And, the POA 
refused to deviate from those procedures. For instance, although FRPM requested to make immediate 
installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms in October 2012, the request was never granted. 
Indeed, Lizz Loop, FRPM's general manager, explained that immediate installation was not performed 
because FRPM was "following the procedures." Thus, triable issues of fact surround whether FRPM 
relied on the POA with respect to this voluntary undertaking. 
 
Triable issues of fact also surround whether FRPM relied on the POA with respect to preventative 
maintenance. As discussed, FRPM proposed hiring a plumber to perform preventative maintenance, 
provided information on the cost to do so, and requested guidance. The POA, through Kalsbeek, objected 
to FRPM's proposal, citing cost concerns, but indicated the POA would nevertheless review that 
information and "get back . . . next week." But the POA never did so, and the preventative maintenance 
was never performed. Given that the POA represented it would provide guidance, a jury could reasonably 
find that FRPM relied on the POA regarding this voluntary undertaking. 
 
Finally, triable issues of fact surround whether FRPM relied on the POA with respect to the 
distribution of Ben Davis's letter. As noted, FRPM sought to distribute Davis's letter in July 2011. Because 
Kalsbeek's instruction prohibited FRPM from doing so, as Thomason testified, a jury could reasonably 
find that FRPM relied on the POA with respect to the distribution of Davis's letter. Conversely, reliance 
cannot be shown as a matter of law regarding the warning issued in March 2012. The key undisputed fact 




could intervene. While Kalsbeek instructed that the warning should not be issued, his instruction came too 
late. In sum, although reliance fails as a matter of law regarding the March 2012 warning, triable issues of 
fact surround whether FRPM relied on the POA with respect to Davis's letter. 
 
The POA tries to rebut the above by arguing FRPM could not rely on the POA with respect to 
undertakings FRPM had contracted to perform on behalf of unit owners. The undisputed facts do not 
support that argument. Based on the above, the record is replete with factual disputes showing that a jury 
could reasonably find that FRPM relied on the POA. In fact, this case is similar to Baccus v. Ameripride 
Services, Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 179 P.3d 309 (2008). In Baccus, an employer hired a contractor to place 
safety mats at workplace entryways. Id. at 351-52, 179 P.3d at 314-15. On at least one occasion, the 
contractor failed to do so, and as a result, an employee slipped and became injured. Id. The employee 
sued the contractor in negligence. Id. When the case came before us on appeal, we explained with 
regard to reliance: "[s]o, [the contractor] induced [the employer's] reliance on [the contractor's] promise to 
replace the safety mats, which increased the risk that . . . [an] employee such as plaintiff could slip, fall, 
and sustain injury were the promise not kept." Id. at 352, 179 P.3d at 315. Here, like Baccus, a jury could 
reasonably find that the POA induced FRPM's reliance with regard to hard-wired carbon monoxide 
alarms, preventative maintenance, and carbon monoxide warnings, all of which were matters with the 
potential to increase the risk of harm to Sagecrest tenants and guests. Therefore, we conclude triable 





"[N]ormally, the foreseeability of a risk of harm, and thus whether a duty consequently attaches, is 
a question of fact reserved for the jury." Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. #25, 149 Idaho 679, 686, 239 
P.3d 784, 791 (2010). We find that to be true in this case. We cannot say as a matter of law that 
Forbush's death and Halowell's injuries were or were not foreseeable. Instead, we find it proper for a jury 
to decide. 
 
In sum, triable issues of fact surround whether the POA acquired a duty of care as a result of the 
voluntary undertakings explored above. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in this regard and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We emphasize 
that if the POA is found to have acquired a duty of care as a result of these voluntary undertakings, any 
duty imposed must be limited to the scope of the actual undertaking. Cf. Beers v. Corp. of Pres. of Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 688, 316 P.3d 92, 100 (2013) ("[A]lthough a party 
may assume a duty by undertaking to act, that duty is limited to the scope of the undertaking."). 
 
 
3. Vicarious liability 
 
Finally, Appellants argue triable issues of fact surround whether the POA is vicariously liable for 
the torts of its agent, FRPM. "A principal is liable for the torts of an agent committed within the scope of 
the agency relationship." Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 303, 796 P.2d 506, 512 (1990). An 
agency relationship arises when the principal: 
 
    (1) [E]xpressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or her behalf; (2) 
impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions which are necessary to complete 
those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3) apparently grants the agent authority to act 
through conduct towards a third party indicating that express or implied authority has been 
granted. 
Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095 (2016)."This Court has previously viewed 
the question of whether an agency relationship exists as a question of fact for the jury to determine." Id. at 
735 n.2, 366 P.3d at 1095 n.2. But, to be clear, "[w]hether facts sufficient to constitute an agency 
relationship exist is indeed a question of fact for the jury, however, whether a given set of facts are 





The district court rejected Appellants' agency argument, concluding Appellants lacked authority 
over unit interiors. That conclusion rests on the authority granted to the POA under the CCRs, which the 
district court found was limited to unit exteriors. We agree insofar that the CCRs do not grant the POA any 
authority over unit interiors, and hence, the CCRs cannot give rise to an agency relationship over unit 
interiors. Indeed, the CCRs clearly and unambiguously delineate authority between the POA and unit 
owners. CCR § 3.3 gives the POA authority over unit exteriors and unit owners authority over unit 
interiors. CCR § 3.5 reinforces that delineation of authority, as it provides that "[e]ach Owner shall have 
the exclusive right to paint, repair, tile, wash, paper or otherwise maintain . . . the interior portions of their 
Four Plex . . . ." Because the CCRs do not give the POA any authority over unit interiors, they cannot give 
rise to an agency relationship over unit interiors. 
 
However, the district court overlooked how authority bestowed by a contract, like the CCRs, is not 
dispositive when determining whether an agency relationship exists. E.g., Thornton v. Ford Motor Co., 
2013 OK CIV APP 7, 297 P.3d 413, 419 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) ("If the facts show actual control by the 
principal, an agency is established regardless of the contract language."); Hylton v. Koontz, 138 N.C. 
App. 629, 532 S.E.2d 252, 257 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("It is not dispositive that a contract denies the 
existence of an agency relationship, if in fact the relationship was that of agent-principal."); Tomlinson v. 
G.E. Capital Dealer Distrib. Fin., Inc., 624 So. 2d 565, 567 (Ala. 1993) ("[T]he language of this provision is 
not conclusive and will not preclude the finding of agency if there is independent evidence of a retained 
right of control."). We have long instructed that the "important factor is the control or right of control 
reserved by the [principal] over the functions and duties of the agent." Koch v. Elkins, 71 Idaho 50, 57, 
225 P.2d 457, 462 (1950). 
 
In this case, we find triable issues of fact surround whether an agency relationship existed as a 
result of control the POA actually exerted over FRPM with regard to unit interiors. As a general matter, the 
record shows that the POA exercised financial leverage over FRPM. As Appellants assert, Sagecrest was 
FRPM's largest account, and FRPM was therefore required to stay in the POA's "good graces" to keep 
Sagecrest. CCR § 6.6A supports that assertion, as it required unit owners to employ the same property 
management company the POA selected to employ for its duties. Further, the POA controlled FRPM's 
rate of compensation. FRPM's compensation at Sagecrest was twofold: (1) a $150 monthly management 
fee, paid by the POA; and (2) five percent of monthly gross rental receipts, which, although paid by unit 
owners, was contingent on the rental rates that the POA and FRPM set. Finally, the POA paid the wages 
of FRPM's employees who were "fully assigned" to Sagecrest. The POA therefore oversaw those 
employees' overtime requests. For example, in October 2012, the POA requested FRPM to clarify in 
which units hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms were installed. In response, FRPM's employee requested 
to stay late, working overtime, to gather the information. The POA denied the overtime request. 
 
The POA maintains that the above arguments are "completely irrelevant to the issues of control 
of the interiors of the units." The POA elaborates that "Switzer had a contract with FRPM to manage his 
unit #4624. Switzer granted authority to FRPM over his residential lot and, as a non-party to the contract, 
the SMPOA Board could not alter this agreement in any way." We decline to find Switzer's contract with 
FRPM dispositive. Despite that contract, we find triable issues of fact surround whether the above 
leverage allowed the POA to exert control over FRPM and unit interiors. Tony Drost, FRPM's President, 
testified that the POA, through Kalsbeek, controlled "global issues" that were complex-wide. Drost 
testified that global issues extended to unit interiors and consisted of "the CO testing"; "the water 
heaters"; "leaks with the windows, stairwells, light bulbs." According to Drost, FRPM was required to "run 
any global issue through [Kalsbeek] . . . ." Sheila Thomason, FRPM's Maintenance Supervisor, further 
testified that Kalsbeek "was in charge." She explained that Kalsbeek led FRPM to believe that "he spoke 
on behalf of the owners." Thus, Switzer's contract with FRPM does not resolve whether the POA exerted 
actual control over FRPM and unit interiors. 
 
Moreover, as explained above, triable issues of fact surround whether FRPM relied on the POA 
regarding (1) the installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms; (2) preventative maintenance; and 
(3) carbon monoxide warnings. See supra Part IV(A)(2)(b). Based on the record before us on appeal, 




with respect to those voluntary undertakings. Consequently, we cannot say as a matter of law that no 
agency relationship existed as a result of actual control. We therefore reverse summary judgment on this 
issue and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
B. Did the district court properly grant summary judgment to Kalsbeek? 
 
Appellants contend triable issues of fact surround whether Kalsbeek owed a duty of care he 
acquired as a result of voluntary undertakings. To make this argument, Appellants rely on the same 
contentions explored above concerning the POA. See supra Part IV(A)(2)(b). Here, however, Appellants' 
arguments implicate Kalsbeek as an individual, not as the POA's President. Thus, Appellants seek to hold 
Kalsbeek personally liable. 
 
"A director who personally participates in a tort is personally liable to the victim, even though the 
corporation might also be vicariously liable." Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 
(Ct. App. 1992). The same is true for corporate officers. See, e.g., 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1609 
(2016) ("A director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts . . . unless he or 
she has participated in the wrong, had direct personal involvement . . . or authorized or directed that the 
wrong be done."). "A contrary rule would enable a director or officer of a corporation to perpetrate flagrant 
injuries and escape liability behind the shield of his or her representative character even though the 
corporation might be insolvent or irresponsible." Id. 
 
In granting summary judgment to Kalsbeek, the district court applied the same logic to Kalsbeek 
as it applied to the POA and concluded Kalsbeek did not acquire a duty of care as a result of voluntary 
undertakings. That conclusion represents error. Based on the above, triable issues of fact surround 
whether the POA acquired a duty of care as a result of voluntary undertakings. And, as noted, Kalsbeek 
directed those undertakings. Kalsbeek promulgated the POA's two sets of procedures governing the 
installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms. FRPM even referred to those procedures as "Jon's 
procedures." Kalsbeek objected to FRPM's preventative maintenance proposal and instructed FRPM that 
the POA would provide guidance, but he failed to do so. Kalsbeek intervened in an effort to control the 
warnings issued to unit owners and tenants, and as FRPM explained, Kalsbeek was the sole reason why 
Ben Davis's letter was not distributed. 
 
Kalsbeek concedes his involvement in these matters, but he contends it does not give rise to a 
duty of care. He emphasizes how CCR § 7.2 designates him as the "the authorized representative of the 
[POA] to give and receive notices, approvals, and instructions hereunder." Simply that the CCRs may 
authorize Kalsbeek's involvement is irrelevant. Even if his involvement were authorized, that authorization 
would not resolve whether he acquired a duty of care as a result of voluntary undertakings and could 
therefore be subject to personal liability if he personally participated in tortious conduct. 
 
Thus, we conclude triable issues of fact surround whether Kalsbeek acquired a duty of care for 
the same reasons identified above. See supra Part IV(A)(2)(b). We therefore reverse summary judgment 
granted to Kalsbeek. 
 
 
C. Should we award attorney fees on appeal? 
 
Appellants do not request fees. Kalsbeek and the POA request fees under Idaho Code section 
12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1), and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Fees are properly awarded 
to the prevailing party "if the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation." Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 633, 329 P.3d 1072, 
1081 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
As to Kalsbeek, he is not the prevailing party on appeal and is therefore not entitled to fees. As to 
the POA, it prevails on appeal on the premises liability issue, but Appellants prevail on the issues of 
whether the POA may have acquired a duty of care as a result of voluntary undertakings, and whether the 
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POA may be vicariously liable for FRPM's conduct. Although the POA is the prevailing party on the 
premises liability issue, Appellants did not bring or pursue that argument frivolously, unreasonably, or 





We affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's summary judgment order. We affirm that 
summary judgment was properly granted as to whether the POA owed a premises liability-based duty of 
care. However, summary judgment was improperly granted as to whether the POA and Kalsbeek 
acquired a duty of care as a result of voluntary undertakings, and whether the POA is vicariously liable for 
FRPM's conduct. We therefore remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 
decline to award attorney fees on appeal. We award Appellants costs against Kalsbeek on appeal 
because they prevail against him, but not against the POA. 
 
Justices, EISMANN, JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
 
 
Concur by: BRODY (In Part) 
 




BRODY, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. 
 
I respectfully dissent from Part IV.A.1. of the Court's opinion, because I disagree with the 
majority's conclusion that premises liability can only be imposed on an "owner" or "occupier" of land or 
their agents. This bright-line rule is inconsistent with our prior case law and may allow some responsible 
parties to escape liability. 
 
The majority begins its analysis with the statement "[a]ppellants correctly inform us that 'the 
general rule of premises liability is that one having control of the premises may be liable for failure to keep 
the premises in repair.' Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 261, 245 P.3d 1009, 1013 (2011) (quoting 
Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 713, 8 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Ct.App. 2000))." The majority 
then limits this principle by stating that our case law demonstrates that premises liability is limited to 
owners or occupiers or their agents. The majority contends that the issue of control only comes into play 
when there is a dispute between owners and occupiers as to whom actually owes a duty to the injured 
party. I disagree with the majority's analysis. To begin with, none of the cases cited by the majority 
actually address whether someone other than an owner or occupier or their agents can be held 
responsible under a premises liability theory. The first case the majority cites is Rountree v. Boise 
Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 296 P.3d 373 (2013). In Rountree, the plaintiff was a patron at a Boise 
Hawks baseball game. Id. at 169, 296 P.3d at 375. He was seated in the executive section of the stadium 
when he was hit in the face with a baseball during the game. Id. He lost an eye. Id. He sued a number of 
parties, including the baseball team and the owner of the stadium. Id. Rountree contains this statement: 
"[t]he duty owed by owners and possessors of land depends on the status of the person injured on the 
land . . . ." Id. at 171, 296 P.3d at 377. The majority quotes this language, but it is important to recognize 
that Rountree does not actually address whether someone other an owner or possessor of land can be 
held responsible under a premises liability theory. The issues actually decided in Rountree were whether 
Idaho should adopt the so-called "baseball rule" (a rule which limits owner liability to protect against foul 
balls) and whether the patron assumed the risk of being hit. Id. at 170-75, 296 P.3d at 376-81. 
 
The majority also cites Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 590, 272 P.3d 562 (2012). Stem involved a 
forklift accident. Id. at 591, 272 P.3d at 563. The plaintiff lost his leg after being pinned underneath a 
forklift that toppled over when it broke through a water meter cover in the floor. Id. The plaintiff sued the 




the weight of the forklift. Id. The only issue decided by the Court was whether the landowner was not 
responsible because there was no evidence that he knew that the water meter cover created a dangerous 
condition. Id. at 593-94, 272 P.3d at 565-66. The Stem decision does not address whether a premises 
liability can be brought against a tortfeasor who is not a landowner or occupier. 
 
The final case cited by the majority is Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989). 
The plaintiff in Harrison brought suit against a building owner and tenant when she fell in a hole in a 
sidewalk in front of the business. Id. at 589-90, 768 P.2d at 1322-23. The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants based on the "open and obvious" doctrine. Id. at 590, 768 P.2d at 
1323. This Court reversed, finding that the doctrine was inconsistent with Idaho's comparative negligence 
laws. Id. at 595-96, 768 P.2d at 1328-29. Like Stem and Prouty, the Harrison decision did not address in 
any fashion whether a premises liability action could be brought against someone other than an owner or 
occupier or their agents. 
 
The earliest case where the Court addressed premises liability in the context of a non-owner 
appears to be Otts v. Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 409 P.2d 95 (1965), superseded on other grounds by I.C. § 
6-801. In Otts, the plaintiff was injured when he fell into a framed opening in a concrete floor. Id. at 128-
29, 409 P.2d at 96-97. The plaintiff was a subcontractor who had been hired to do the ceiling insulation in 
a new school building that was being constructed in Rexburg. Id. The plaintiff sued the general contractor 
for failing to guard and warn against the danger created by the opening in the floor. Id. at 129, 409 P.2d at 
97. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the general contractor, holding that the claim 
was barred by the defense of assumption of risk. Id. This Court reversed, holding that there were genuine 
issues of material fact which precluded summary judgment. Id. at 134-36, 409 P.2d at 100-02. In 
addressing the duty owed by the general contractor, the Court held: "Owners or persons in charge of 
property owe to an invitee or business visitor the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition, or to warn the invitee of hidden or concealed dangers of which the owner or one in charge 
knows or should know by exercise of reasonable care, in order that the invitee be not unnecessarily or 
unreasonably exposed to danger." Id. at 131, 409 P.2d at 98 (emphasis added). 
 
The majority contends that Otts can be squared with their holding today because there is 
evidence that the general contractor "occupied" the worksite. While I agree that there is evidence in Otts 
from which a reasonable jury could reach that conclusion, the "persons in charge of property" language in 
Otts is a better test for determining whether premises liability should attach than the "occupier" label used 
by the majority. A simple example illustrates my point. 
 
Suppose I hire a contractor to remodel my kitchen. The contractor works at my house a few days 
a week while my family and I are still living in the home. One day, my mother comes to visit. She is 
helping me cook dinner. She steps inside the pantry to get an ingredient and is injured when she falls into 
a hole in the floor. I had no idea the hole was there and there was no warning or barricade. Can the 
contractor be held responsible for her injuries under a premises liability theory for creating a dangerous 
condition on the premises? Under the majority's decision today the answer would likely be no since the 
contractor does not "occupy" the house. My family and I do. If the analysis were "does the contractor 
control the premises" -- as I advocate the legal test is in Idaho -- the answer would much more likely be 
yes. Imposing premises liability on a contractor in a situation like this makes sense because he created 
the hazard and was in a position to remedy it or guard against it. 
 
The majority's decision to include "agents" within the categories of persons who can be held 
liable under a premises liability theory, while a step in the right direction, does not go far enough to 
address my concerns. Another example illustrates my point. 
 
Suppose a local school district hires a general contractor to build a new science wing at its high 
school. The general contractor enters into a contract with a construction manager to oversee the project. 
A student is injured when he falls into a hole that has been covered with a flimsy piece of plywood. Can 
the general contractor and/or the professional construction manager be held responsible under a 
premises liability theory as "agents" of the school district? The majority says yes, asserting that general 
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contractors and professional construction managers are "frequently" the agents of the landowner. My 
experience tells me differently. 
 
This Court explained nearly 100 years ago that "[a]gency is the relationship which results from 
the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to 
his control, and consent by the other so to act." Gorton v. Doty, 57 Idaho 792, 798, 69 P.2d 136, 139 
(1937) (emphasis added). When a school district hires a general contractor to build a new science wing, it 
usually does so because the district does not have the knowledge, skills, tools, or time to do the work. 
The general contractor is an independent contractor who exercises its own judgment about how to do the 
work and provides the tools and skills to get it done. There is a contractual relationship between the 
district and the general contractor, but that contractual relationship does not necessarily mean there is an 
agency relationship. 
 
Similarly, the construction manager in my example cannot be the school district's agent. The 
school district did not even contract with the construction manager so there is no consent by either party 
and the school district would have no control over anything the construction manager does. The general 
contractor might control the construction manager depending on the contractual relationship, but a 
professional construction manager may also be an independent contractor. While I would agree that it is 
the landowner who typically contracts with a construction manager and that an agency relationship is 
more likely to exist in that scenario, construction projects are carried out in many different ways and one 
cannot assume that a construction manager will always be the landowner's agent. Given the complex 
nature of modern business entities and real estate transactions, it is possible to imagine the prospect of a 
general contractor or construction manager, who exercises the requisite control over the premises, 
escaping liability under the majority's rule because he does not neatly fit within the categories elucidated 
today. 
 
Other jurisdictions have dealt with this issue and have concluded that construction contractors 
share in premises liability, even though they are neither owner nor occupier. See Worth v. Eugene Gentile 
Builders, 697 So.2d 945 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that contractors may share premises liability 
for job site injuries when the premises are under the contractor's control); see also 62 AM. JUR. 2D 
Premises Liability § 6 (2005); 13 AM. JUR. 2D Building and Construction Contracts § 136 (2009); 4r § 
384. In Maine, premises liability for other parties has arisen in the context of whether a national fraternity 
is liable for sexual assault perpetrated by one of its members. In Brown v. Delta Tau Delta, 2015 ME 75, 
118 A.3d 789 (2015), the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the national fraternity organization had a 
premises-liability-based duty to its collegiate chapters' social invitees, even though the national fraternity 
did not own or occupy the premises in question, because the assault was forseeable, the national 
fraternity had authority to control its members and actually exercised that control, and because it had a 
sufficiently close relationship with its local chapters and individual members. 
 
I cannot square the majority's decision today with the Court's recent decision in McDevitt v. 
Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc., 151 Idaho 280, 255 P.3d 1166 (2011). In McDevitt, the plaintiff was injured 
when she slipped or tripped over a recessed irrigation box in a sidewalk outside of Sportsman's 
Warehouse in Twin Falls. Id. at 281, 255 P.3d at 1167. The primary issue presented in the case was 
whether Sportsman's could be held liable under a premises liability theory for the alleged dangerous 
condition. Id. at 283, 255 P.3d at 1169. In answering this question, this Court engaged in a two-step 
analysis. Id. at 284-86, 255 P.3d at 1170-73. First, it explained that a tenant "occupies" land. Id. This 
Court then analyzed whether the sidewalk was part of Sportsman's leased premises and determined that 
it was not. Id. This Court's analysis did not, however, stop there. Even though the Court concluded that 
Sportsman's was not an "occupier" of the sidewalk (i.e., it did not fit within one of the categories of 
persons defined by the majority today), this Court then went on to analyze whether Sportsman's 
controlled the sidewalk. Id. at 285-86, 255 P.3d at 1171-72. While the plaintiff in McDevitt was ultimately 
unsuccessful in demonstrating Sportsman's control, all I am saying is that the majority should have 
applied the same legal analysis to this case. 
In this case, the record contains evidence that the POA exercised some control over the interior 
of the apartment units, regardless of the content of the CC&R's. FRPM's President testified that POA 




heaters. These global issues were not restricted to the exterior of the units, as the CC&R's seemed to 
contemplate. For instance, the POA ordered the FRPM to conduct carbon monoxide testing inside each 
unit every three months. They also issued two sets of procedures for handling carbon monoxide issues 
related to the faulty water heaters, including directing the installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide 
alarms inside the units. From my perspective, this evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact about whether the POA exercised sufficient control to incur premises liability. For that 
reason, I believe that summary judgment on this issue was not proper. The issue should have been 




(1)  Scope of the duty owed by a landlord to a tenant: What is the scope of the duty owed by a 
landlord to her tenant? Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 233 P.3d 1(2008); Stevens v. Fleming, 116 Idaho 
523,777 P.2d 1196 (1989); McKinley v. Lyco Enterprises, Inc., 111 Idaho 792, 727 P.2d 1120 (1986); 
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249,678 P.2d 41 (1984); Worden v. Ordway, 105 Idaho 719, 672 P.2d 
1049 (1983). See also I.C. § 6-320. 
 
(2)  Scope of the duty owed by a landlord to a land entrant other than a tenant: What is the scope of 
the duty owed by a landlord to a land entrant other than a tenant? Boots ex rei. Boots v. Winters, 145 
Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008); Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 985 P.2d 669 (1999); Sharp 
v. WH. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990); Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 749 P.2d486 
(1988); McKinley v. Fanning, 100 Idaho 189,595 P.2d 1084 (1979); Olin v. Honstead, 60 Idaho 211,91 
P.2d 380 (1939). 
 
{3) Lessees, contractors, subcontractors, and the like: When one person leases land to another who 
is legally responsible for maintaining the premises?  
 
In Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316,882 P.2d971 (Ct. App. 1994), plaintiff slipped and fell 
on ice in parking lot. The trial court granted summa judgment bas d on defendant's argument that its 
lease did not include control over the parking lot and thus it owed plaintiff no duty of care to maintain the 
lot in a safe condition. The court of appeals reversed. It initially construed the lease as granting K-Mart 
nonexclusive control over the parking lot. It then concluded that, "although the covenant to maintain the 
parking lot may have fixed the obligations as between K-Mart and its landlord, this covenant did not 
operate to absolve K-Mart of its common-law duty to maintain its leased premises in a reasonably safe 
condition for its invitees." 
 
(4)  Scope of the duty owed to land entrants for "non-conditions": Does the land occupier have a 
duty to protect a land entrant from other land entrants? Does the answer depend upon the status of the 
entrant? Norman and Genevieve Vollmer brought their greyhound with them to watch the horse racing at 
the Lewiston Interstate Fair. The dog, apparently wishing to participate, ran onto the race track and into a 
horse that plaintiff was riding. Plaintiff was thrown and suffered permanent injuries. The Fair Association 
had a rule prohibiting dogs on the premises and the Vollmers had been informed of the rule. Plaintiff 
brought an action against the Fair Association: 
 
The fair association had authorized and licensed the plaintiff to ride in a speed contest upon its 
ground. The evidence shows that it was a rule generally, and of this association, not to permit 
dogs upon the fair ground without any restraint upon the part of those in whose company he was 
or the fair association. The fair association knew the dog went upon the fair grounds and took no 
steps to restrain the dog or see that he did not become a dangerous agency but relied upon 
Norman Vollmer and his sister to take proper care and properly restrain the dog. In such case the 
association was responsible for the acts of Norman Vollmer. Under all of the of these 
circumstances we are satisfied that it was the duty of the fair association not to permit dogs or 
any other dangerous agencies to go upon the racetrack where the plaintiff had a right to presume 
safety; and that it was negligence on the part of the association to permit the dog to go 
unrestrained upon the fair grounds and the racetrack, and the jury were warranted in concluding 
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that it was negligence, and that they were liable as well as the other defendant for the injury 
resulting from the acts of such dog. 
McClain v. Lewiston lnterstate Fair & Racing Association, 17 Idaho 63, 104P. 1015(1909). See also 
McGill v. Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 790 P.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1990); Joyner v. Jones, 97 Idaho 647, 551 P.2d 
602 (1976). 
 
(5} Scope of the duty owed to a person off the premises: Does a land occupier owe any duty to 
protect a person who is not located on the premises from a hazard that originates on the premises? See 
Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Inslow, 110 Idaho 615, 717 P.2d 1033 (1986); Boise Car & Truck Rental 
Co. v. WACO, Inc., 108 Idaho 780,702 P.2d 818 (1985); Splinter v. City of Nampa, 70 Idaho 287,215 
P.2d 999 (1950). 
 
(6} Scope of the duty owed to an entrant for conditions off the premises: In Heath v. Honker's Mini-
Mart, Inc., plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on a vacant lot adjacent to defendant's business. 
Although the defendant had no interest in the lot, plaintiff argued that patrons to the min-mart frequently 
parked on the lot. The court rejected the argument since the business owner had no legal right to assume 
control and maintenance over the premises where e accident occurred. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 
134 Idaho 711, 8 P.3d 1254 (2000). Since the business benefited from the lot, why is it not appropriate 




2. BEYOND NONFEASANCE: THE DUTY TO ACT 
 
a. Assumption of Duty 
 
KUNZ V. UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO. 
526 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1975) 
 
 
CHOY, C.J.: Bear Lake lies on the border between Idaho and Utah. Bear River which rises in the Uinta 
Mountains of Utah flows into Idaho before turning south back into Utah, does not naturally enter Bear 
Lake. In 1917, however, Utah Power dammed the river and diverted its flow into the lake, allowing it to be 
used for water storage. Plaintiffs if are ranchers whose lands lie along the Bear River channel 
downstream from the lake. Prior to 1917, these lands were devoted to wild hays which were dependent 
upon flooding from the spring runoffs. The installation of the water storage system in 1917 harnessed the 
spring runoffs and stopped the flooding, so the ranchers converted their operations to alfalfa and cereal 
crops, which will not tolerate floods. 
 
Because of heavy winter snows and spring rains, the spring runoff in 1971and 1972 was 
exceptionally large and the ranchers' properties were flooded for several months. They brought an action 
for damages resulting from the flooding, contending that Utah Power had been negligent in its operation 
of the Bear River-Bear Lake storage system. Utah Power appeals a jury verdict for the ranchers, arguing 
that "it had no affirmative duty of flood control and so could not be held negligent for downstream flooding 
since it did not add to the natural flow of the river during the time in question." The court disagreed: 
 
In general, the law does not require one person to act affirmatively to prevent harm to 
another unless he has himself brought about the condition which threatens the harm. Courts have 
often found an exception to this rule, however, when one person has voluntarily undertaken to 
assist another. He is then required to exercise reasonable care to protect the other's interests. 
Thus, when a railroad voluntarily provides a flagman at an intersection, a relationship with 
motorists is established which creates a duty of care. In cases in which such liability has been 
found, the plaintiffs condition usually was worsened by his reliance on the defendant's action, 
though such detrimental reliance has not always been required. []





The line between "malfeasance" and "nonfeasance" is very thin and frequently almost 
imperceptible. The same conduct can often be described as either an act, for which there is 
liability, or a failure to act, for which there is none. Prosser has defined the issue of duty and 
liability in terms of the relationship between the parties and the nature of the plaintiff’s 
dependence: 
 
The question appears to be essentially one of whether the defendant has gone so far m 
what he has actually done and has gotten himself into such a relationship with the 
plaintiff, that he has begun to affect the interests of the plaintiff adversely, as 
distinguished from merely failing to confer a benefit upon him. 
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 340 (4th ed. 1971). 
 
Utah Power insists that the storage system was not intended to be a flood-control project 
and that it was not held out as such. Its employees admitted, however, that Utah Power had in 
the past attempted to eliminate or minimize flooding by maintaining sufficient capacity m Bear 
Lake to handle the spring runoffs and that Utah Power employ es had consulted with ranchers 
downstream, including the Landowners, concerning water-release and flood problems. Though 
perhaps not as its primary duty, Utah Power has voluntarily undertaken flood-control efforts in its 
operation of the Bear River-Bear Lake system. And whether intentionally for flood-control reasons 
or in furtherance of its other purposes, Utah Power has materially altered the water-flow patterns 
of the area by regularly storing the annual spring runoffs. 
 
The Landowners have reasonably relied on such storage. As described above, they 
changed the nature of the farming operation on their lands after the water storage system was 
constructed in 1917. They replaced crops which depended on the spring runoff and which could 
survive flooding with crops which could not. It may be true that their lands would have flooded 
anyway had the storage system not been inexistence, but in that case, they would have still been 
growing the grasses and wild hays that might have survived the highwater. In its installation and 
operation of the water storage system, Utah Power established a relationship in which the 
landowners had to rely on Utah Power to control the spring run-offs.         
                                                        
Under these circumstances, Utah Power must carry the responsibility for avoiding 
damaging floods. We do not say that it is absolutely liable for flooding, but it must recognize the 
dependent position in which downstream ranchers have been placed and act accordingly to try, 
consistent with its other duties, to control floods. Utah Power, therefore, had a duty of care on 




(a)  What was the source of the company's duty? What did it do that led the court to impose a 
duty? Had it impliedly agreed to control the water flow? Had it "voluntarily undertaken to assist" the 
ranchers? What is the role of reliance in the creation of duty? Is the fact that plaintiff relied upon the 
defendant's actions relevant? What policies are advanced by imposing a duty on the company? Which 
rationales for tort liability best explain the result? What was the scope of the duty? What interest is 
protected by the duty? 
 
(b) Notice that the defendant sought to characterize its conduct as nonfeasance. Did the 
court determine whether the conduct was nonfeasance or misfeasance? At what point ought the court to 
begin consideration: before the water control devices were installed? after they had been installed? What 
was the appropriate status quo ante? 
 
(c)  This decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is one of the antecedents to the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision in Kunz v. Utah Power & Light, 117 Idaho 901, 792 P.2d926 (1990), excerpted 




(2) Recall the decision in Wilson v. Boise City, 6 Idaho 391,55 P. 887 (1899), in which the city was 
held liable to a landowner for negligence is re-routing a stream. Are the cases distinguishable? See also  
Dunn v. Boise City, 48 Idaho 550, 283 P. 606 (1929) (city potentially liable for altering drainage pattern of 
seasonal stream); Axtell v. Northern Pacific Ry., 9 Idaho 392, 74 P. 1075 (1903). 
 
 
UDY v. CUSTER COUNTY 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
136 Idaho 386,34 P.3d 1069 (2001) 
 
WALTERS, J.: This is an appeal from the district court's decision granting summary judgment in a 
negligence action in favor of Respondents Custer County and Sheriff Mickey Roskelley. The district court 
held that Sheriff Roskelley did not have a legal duty to remove or warn of rocks on 
a State highway. We affirm. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On March 1, 1998, David Udy was driving his truck on Highway 75 approximately two miles north 
of Clayton in Custer County. Roy Chivers and Roxanna McDonald were passengers in Udy’s truck. While 
driving, Udy encountered a large rock in the road. Udy was unable to avoid hitting the rock as another 
vehicle was approaching in the opposite lane. Udy's vehicle struck the rock, blowing out the right front tire 
and causing Udy to lose control. The truck subsequently rolled, causing injuries to Udy and his 
passengers. 
 
On the night before the accident, Custer County Sheriff Mickey Roskelley and his wife had 
traveled on Highway 75 to Clayton to serve some papers. Roskelley admitted that on his return from 
Clayton, he observed several small rocks on the fog line approximately one-third of a mile from the scene 
of Udy's subsequent accident Sheriff Roskelley did not remove the rocks or notify other deputies or the 
Idaho Transportation Department (ITO) of the presence of the rocks. 
 
On January 8, 1999, Udy filed a complaint against Sheriff Roskelley and Custer County alleging 
that Roskelley observed and negligently failed to remove from the highway the rock Udy later struck with 
his vehicle. The Chivers and McDonalds also filed a complaint against Roskelley and the county alleging 
injuries as a result of Roskelley's negligence in leaving the rock on the highway. The defendants 
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. On February ˙ 2000 the district court granted the 
defendants' motion, ruling that as a matter of law, Sheriff Roskelley owed no duty to remove or warn of 
the rock struck by Udy's vehicle. Udy, the Chivers, and the McDonalds appeal the district court's decision. 
The question presented on appeal is whether Sheriff Roskelley owed a duty of care to the Appellants to 








2. Duty Under the Common Law 
 
No liability arises from the law of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. See 
Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975). Generally, the question whether a duty 
exists is a question of law, over which we exercise free review. [) This Court follows the rule that "one 
owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in 
any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might 
result in such injury." Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,619, 619P.2d 135, 137(1980). Further, there is a 
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"general rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to 
others." Sharp v. WH. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297,300,796 P.2d 506,509 (1990). However, one also owes 
no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect another absent unusual circumstances, which justify 
imposing such an affirmative responsibility. See Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,399, 
987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). With these principles in mind, we next examine whether Sheriff Roskelley 
owed a common law duty to warn of or remove the rocks from Highway 75. 
 
a. Voluntary Assumption of Duty 
 
The Appellants first assert that the district court erred in finding that Sheriff Roskelley did not 
voluntarily assume a duty. They contend that because Sheriff Roskelley testified that it was his practice to 
remove or contact someone to remove obstructions from the highway, Sheriff Roskelley assumed a duty 
to remove the rocks, even if he did not have a statutory duty to do so. We disagree with the Appellants' 
argument. 
 
This Court has recognized that it is possible to create a duty where one previously did not exist. 
"If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to perform 
the act in a non-negligent manner." Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840,843, 875 P.2d 
937,940 (1994) (citing Bowling v. Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 793 P.2d 703, 705 (1990)). 
liability for an assumed duty, however, can only come into being to the extent that there is in fact an 
undertaking. See Bowling, 117 Idaho at 1032, 793 P.2d at 705.Although a person can assume a duty to 
act on a particular occasion, the duty is limited to t e discrete episode in which the aid is rendered. [] In 
other words, past voluntary acts do not entitle the benefited party to expect assistance on future 
occasions, at least in the absence of an express promise that future assistance will be forthcoming. (] 
 
Thus, while Sheriff Roskelley may have voluntarily removed rocks and other debris from the 
State's highways on prior occasions, the Court concludes that Sheriff Roskelley, by way of these prior 
actions, did not voluntarily assume a duty to remove the rocks from Highway 75 the night before the 
accident. There is nothing in the record indicating that Sheriff Roskelley increased the risk created by the 
rocks on Highway 75; instead, the risk created by the rocks remained unchanged. As the court noted in 
Santee, "nonfeasance which results in failure to eliminate a preexisting risk is not equivalent to 
nonfeasance which increases a risk of harm." [City of Santee v. County of San Diego, 259 Cal. Reporter. 
757,762 (1989)]. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that Sheriff Roskelley, despite evidence of prior acts of removal or 
notification, did not voluntarily assume a duty to remove the rocks he observed on Highway 5 the night 
before Udy's accident. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to holding that Sheriff Roskelley had a 
permanent duty to remove obstructions from the highway. 
… 
       For the above reasons, we affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Mickey 
Roskelley and Custer County. 
 
TROUT, C.J., AND SCHROEDER AND EISMANN, JJ., CONCUR. 
 
KIDWELL, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING: The analysis of the majority opinion appears to reflect the law 
of Idaho and probably most other jurisdictions. To be more specific, no common law ... is owed or due to 
the plaintiffs in this case under the facts presented. Therefore, I have no alternative, but to concur. 
 
However, I am concerned that the factual situation in the present case could be cited as 
precedent for the proposition that a public official has no civil duty, no matter how hazardous the situation, 
to take any action to prevent possible injury to members of the public. An example is appropriate to 
illustrate my concerns: a sheriff in his patrol car sees a hazardous rockslide around a blind curve. 
Although his radio works, he does not use it to notify those charged with maintaining the roadway. A 
person is killed or seriously injured because the rockslide was not removed from the road. ln this 
situation, a question arises as to whether the legal system should impose some minimal duty on a public 
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official charged with a caretaking responsibility. The question of whether there should be a duty looms 
larger when the hazard is great and the action necessary to rectify the problem is minimal  
 
The concept of when the legal system does or should impose a legal duty is elusive: There is a 
duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution, is what we make it. Duty is only 
a word with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability. In the decision 
whether or not there is a duty, many factors interplay: the hand of history, our ideas of morals and 
justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where loss should 
fall. 
William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953) (footnote omitted). 
 
By analogy, Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the majority in a classic tort case, provides some 
guidance. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). The facts of this case are well known: two 
tugboats lost their barges and cargoes during a predicted storm in the Atlantic Ocean. Had the tugs been 
equipped with working radios, the tug masters would have known about the storm and could have likely 
avoided it. At issue in the case was whether the tugboat owners had a duty to equip the tugs with working 
radios. Although at the time, only one tugboat line equipped its tugs with radios, the court held that not 
using available technology to avoid the storm was a cause of the injury sustained by the companies. 
Therefore, a duty to use the means available to avert an accident existed. 
 
In the present case, if Sheriff Roskelley had used a communication device to inform the 
Department of Transportation that a hazard existed on the road, the accident and subsequent litigation 
could have been prevented. It seems that placing a duty upon Sheriff Roskelley to make a very brief 





(1)  Why was there no duty? What is required to conclude that one person has assumed a duty 
toward another person? If Roskelley had stopped and removed some but not all of the rocks from the 
road, would he have assumed a duty? Does Roskelley have to know that Udy is approaching the spot? 
 
What favors ought to be sufficient to find that one person has assumed a duty to protect another 
from a risk that the first person did not create? What factors are present in the following cases? Is there a 
single, short list of factors or is it a shifting group? 
 
(2)  Carter Packing Co. v. Pioneer Irrigation District: Plaintiffs land was bordered by a drainage 
ditch maintained by Pioneer Irrigation District. The ditch ran through a culvert beneath railroad tracks 
owned by Union Pacific Railroad. Due to a combination of snow, heavy rain, and a chinook wind, the ditch 
rapidly filled with water. Despite the railroad's efforts, the culvert became clogged with debris, flooding 
plaintiffs land. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of its claim against the railroad. The court affirmed, holding 
that the railroad's "voluntary assistance on the day in question, in an effort to protect its railroad tracks 
near the point of overflow," did not impose any duty to protect plaintiff’s property. Carter Packing Co. v. 
Pioneer Irrigation District, 91 Idaho 701, 429 P.2d 433 (1967). How specifically must the conduct be 
directed to the plaintiff before defendant can be said to have assumed a duty? Is the fact that plaintiff 
relied- or did not rely? upon the defendant's actions relevant? Is Carter consistent with Udy? Or, is the 
date of the decision the most important factor? 
 
 
COGHLAN v. BETA THETA PI FRATERNITY 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
133 Idaho 388, 987 P.2d 300 (1999) 
 
SILAK, J.: This is a tort action filed by a University of Idaho student who was injured when she fell, while 
intoxicated, from the third-story fire escape of her sorority house. 




I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A.        Facts 
 
On August 19, 1993, Rejena Coghlan was an eighteen-year-old freshman at the University of 
Idaho who had recently been notified of her admission to the Alpha Phi Sorority. At that time, the 
University of Idaho and campus fraternities and sororities were celebrating the end of "Rush Week," 
which is an event sponsored and sanctioned by the University in conjunction with campus fraternities and 
sororities. On that day, Coghlan attended an Alpha Phi house meeting where she learned that the Alpha 
Phi members were invited to attend several parties sponsored by campus fraternities celebrating the end 
of "Rush Week." At the meeting, Alpha Phi's alcohol policy prohibiting underage drinking was briefly 
discussed, and Coghlan was assigned a "guardian angel" by the sorority. The "guardian angel" was an 
active member of the sorority who was supposed to provide Coghlan with assistance during the night's 
activities. Afterward, however, Coghlan's "guardian angel" allegedly told Coghlan that she would not be 
"hanging out" with her that night. 
 
Later that evening, Coghlan attended two fraternity parties: one jointly sponsored by the 
Sigma Alpha Epsilon (SAE) and Pi Kappa Alpha (PKA) Fraternities which was held at the SAE 
Fraternity house and entitled the "Jack Daniels' Birthday'' party, and the other held at the Beta Theta Pi 
(BTP) Fraternity house entitled the "Fifty Ways to Lose Your Liver'' party. Two University of Idaho 
employees, both Greek advisors for the University, were in attendance at the BTP party. Coghlan alleges 
that one of the employees saw Coghlan at the BTP party and congratulated her for pledging Alpha Phi 
Sorority. Coghlan alleges that she was served beer and whiskey at the SAE/PKA. party, and she was 
served mixed hard alcohol at t e BTP party. She did not have any identification in her possession, and 
she was not asked at either party for identification prior to being served. 
 
As a result of Coghlan's drinking at the fraternity parties, she became intoxicated and 
distraught. Coghlan was eventually escorted home by a sorority sister and put to bed in the third 
floor sleeping area of the Alpha Phi Sorority house. She later fell thirty feet from the third-floor fire 
escape platform to the ground below. Coghlan was discovered a short time later lying in some bushes 
below the third-floor fire escape landing. She was taken into the house and paramedics were called. As a 





B. The Trial Court Erred In Dismissing Coghlan's Claim Against The University Defendants. 
 
The appellants appeal from the district court's order granting the University defendants' motion to 
dismiss....The district court ... held that the actions of the University. In this case do not constitute acts 
sufficient to support a duty based on a voluntary assumption of duties. 
 
 
3. Assumed duty 
 
This Court has recognized that "it is possible to create a duty where one previously did not exist. 
If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to perform 
the act in a non-negligent manner." Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 843, 875 P.2d 937, 
940 (1994) (citing Bowling v. Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 793 P.2d 703, 705 (1990)). 
Generally, the question whether a duty exists is a question of law. See, e.g., Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 
555, 808 P.2d 1300 (1991).in this case, appellants have alleged that two University employees were 
present to provide supervision at the BTP party attended by Coghlan. Appellants also have alleged that 
the University employees knew or should have known that BTP was serving intoxicating beverages to 
underage students and should have taken action at the time they were present in the BTP Fraternity 
house prior to Coghlan's injury. The appellants further have alleged that the University employees knew 
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or should have known that Coghlan was intoxicated and should have acted at the time they saw her prior 
to her injury. These allegations support an inference in favor of Coghlan that the University defendants 
assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard the underage plaintiff from the criminal acts of 
third persons, i.e., furnishing alcohol to underage students, of which the University employees had 
knowledge. Therefore, we hold that the pleadings in this case sufficiently state a claim for relief against 
the University defendants, and that the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss at this stage 
of the proceedings. In so holding, we do not conclude as a matter of law that an assumed duty exists and 
remand this issue for further litigation.... 
 
C. The Trial Court Erred In Holding That Alpha Phi Sorority Owed No Duty To Coghlan. 
 
Appellants challenge the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of Alpha Phi 
Sorority asserting that the district court erred in finding that Alpha Phi ...did not assume a duty of care 




3. Assumed duty 
 
Appellants argue that Alpha Phi assumed a duty which renders it liable to Coghlan for her 
injuries. As discussed above, [I]f one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do 
so, the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner." Featherston v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
125 Idaho 840, 843, 875 P.2d 937, 940 (1994). Appellants argue that Alpha Phi took numerous actions 
which fairly constitute undertakings sufficient to create a duty to act in a non-negligent manner. Appellants 
assert that selecting Coghlan as a sorority pledge and inviting her to attend the fraternity parties with 
knowledge that alcohol would be served there and encouraging her to drink was a sufficient undertaking 
to create a duty for Alpha Phi to supervise and protect Coghlan. The appellants also argue that Alpha 
Phi's assignment of a "guardian angel" to supervise Coghlan during the fraternity parties was a sufficient 
undertaking to create an affirmative duty which was breached when the assigned guardian angel left 
Coghlan to attend the parties on her own. Finally, appellants contend that Alpha Phi, involuntarily taking 
Coghlan back to the sorority house and putting her to bed on the third floor in her intoxicated state, 
undertook a duty to supervise and protect her until she was no longer in danger of physical harm due to 
her intoxication. 
 
Liberally construed, the record supports inferences that Alpha Phi invited newly selected 
sorority members to attend various fraternity parties and knew or should have known that alcohol would 
be served to underage newly selected sorority members at the parties. The record also demonstrates that 
Alpha Phi appointed a "guardian angel" sorority member to accompany and assist Coghlan during the 
activities on the date of Coghlan's injuries. Further, the record supports the inference that Alpha Phi 
undertook to care for Coghlan after she became intoxicated by taking her back to the Alpha Phi Sorority 
house and leaving her in bed unattended in the third floor sleeping area of the house. After construing the 
facts in favor of Coghlan, we find that a material issue of fact exists as to whether the Alpha Phi Sorority 
voluntarily assumed a duty of reasonable care to supervise and protect Coghlan until she was out of 
danger of harm due to her intoxication. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of Alpha Phi Sorority. 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE TROUT, JUSTICES SCHROEDER AND KIDWELL, CONCUR. JUSTICE WALTERS 











(1)  What facts led the court to hold that the University may have assumed a duty to Coghlan? What 
was University's ''voluntar{y] undertaking)" that was a sufficient "act"? If you were University counsel, how 
would you advise your client to handle the next fraternity and sorority rush? 
What facts led the court to hold that the sorority may have assumed a duty to Coghlan? 
 
(2)  Bowling v. Jack B. Parson Companies: Carl Bowling was killed in the course of his 
employment with Bannock Paving Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Parson Companies. The two 
corporations have interlocking directorates and management. Bowling was killed when he was crushed 
by a truck being driven in reverse without an audible reverse warning device or an observer, in violation of 
OSHA safety regulations. Parson Companies employed a risk manager, Dave Langrock, to investigate 
accidents, make safety inspections, insure compliance with OSHA regulations and coordinate insurance 
coverage. Plaintiffs argued that Langrock had undertaken a risk management program and had done so 
negligently, causing Bowling's death. 
 
The supreme court disagreed. Although acknowledging that "[ I]t is, of course, possible to create 
a duty where one previously did not exist. If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an 
act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner." This was 
not the case, however: 
 
In this case, Langrock's function in relation to Bannock Paving was to periodically inspect 
the premises. Parson Companies' reason for doing so lay in its capacity as sole shareholder of 
Bannock Paving, and in aid of the procurement of insurance for the entirety of its operations, 
including Bannock Paving. During these inspections Langrock found various equipment 
problems, including the failure of backup warning devices which he noted in his reports. Langrock 
passed on these findings to Bannock Paving: 
 
Appellant alleges that these inspections amount to an undertaking by Parson Companies 
to provide safety inspections and safe working conditions on the Bannock Paving premises. 
However, we hold that the acts of Langrock and Parson Companies did not create a duty as to 
Parson for inspecting or monitoring. A sole shareholder undeniably has the right to inspect its 
corporate holdings.... No duty is created when the shareholder inspection is done for the 
purposes of procurement of its own insurance. The exercise of this right by Parson Companies 
did not amount to undertaking Bannock Paving's duty of inspecting the work site for safety 
purposes. 
Bowling v. Jack B. Parson Companies, 117 Idaho 1030, 793 P.2d 703 (1990). 
 
Note that the parent company provided management services to its various subsidiaries- 
including risk management services relating to compliance with OSHA regulations, the violation of which 
is the alleged cause of decedent's death. Should defendant be able to structure its internal relationships 
contractually and thus avoid tort liability? Stated differently: should the contractual relationship between 
the parent and its subsidiaries affect the potential tort liability of a stranger to the contract? 
 
Is Bowling merely another example of the proposition the court offered in Carter Packing Co. v. 
Pioneer Irrigation District that "voluntary assistance on the day in question, in an effort to protect its 
[property]" did not impose any duty to protect plaintiff? Must the purpose of the defendant's action be the 
protection of the plaintiff? 
 
(3)  Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc.: Plaintiff worked in a building owned by defendant. Defendant 
-through its property manager Security Investments -- employed a security agency to provide protective 
patrols of the building. Plaintiff was assaulted and raped on a Sunday morning by an unknown assailant 
who gained entrance to the building through an unlocked third floor fire escape door. Relying upon the 
"familiar proposition that one who voluntarily assumes a duty also assumes the obligation of due care in 




A landlord, having voluntarily provided a security system, is potentially subject to liability 
if the security system fails as a result of the landlord's negligence. [] While the landlord/tenant 
relationship does not in and of itself establish a duty to keep doors locked, once Moore and 
Security Investments had initiated a locked door policy and had employed a security service with 
the intent of keeping the doors locked, they undertook a duty and are subject to liability if they 
failed to perform that duty with a reasonable standard of care. 
 
Justice Bakes dissented. While agreeing that the summary judgment in favor of the landlord 
should be reversed because it owed plaintiff a duty, he argued that the defendants did not assume a duty: 
 
The Court's opinion recognizes the contractual relationship between Moore and Security 
Investments (the property manager) and between Security Investments and Security Police (who 
provided the periodic daily inspections). However, the Court makes no 
analysis of how Security Investments and Security Police breached any tort duties owed to Sharp 
or, for that matter, contractual duties to the plaintiff Sharp. While indeed Security Investments 
may have breached its contractual duties to Moore, and Security Police may have breached its 
contractual duties to Security Investments, neither Security Investments nor Security Police 
breached either a contractual or a tort duty to the plaintiff Sharp, and accordingly summary 
judgment was appropriate in favor of those two defendants. 
Sharp v. WH. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990). 
 
Should the contractual relationship between the landlord and the property management firm 
affect the potential tort liability of a stranger to that contract? How does Sharp differ from Carter Packing? 
Was this just "voluntary assistance on the day in question, in an effort to protect its [property]"? Must the 
purpose of the defendant's action be the protection of the plaintiff? 
 
(4)  Martin v. Twin Falls School District# 411: Two students were struck by a pickup when they 
crossed the street on the way to grade school. The crossing -which was two blocks from the school- had 
been designated a school crossing and had been marked with signs, flashing lights, and painted lines on 
the highway. The students brought an action against the city, the school district, the driver, and his 
employer. The school district's motion for summary judgment was granted by the district court. The 
supreme court affirmed: 
 
Absent a duty to provide crossing guards wherever they are needed, the School District had no 
obligation to adopt regulations to direct how it performs that duty. As this Court held in Rife[ v. 
Long, 127 Idaho 841, 908 P.2d 143(1995)), by providing crossing guards at so e school 
crossings, a school district does not assume the duty of providing crossing guards at any other 
places. When a party assumes a duty by voluntarily performing an act that the party had no duty 
to perform, the duty that arises is limited to the duty actually assumed. Udy v. Custer County, 136 
Idaho 386,34 P.3d 1069 (2001) (by voluntarily removing rocks and other debris from the highway 
on other prior occasions, the county sheriff did not assume the duty of doing so on the night in 
question); Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 903 P.2d 73 (1995) (by helping some troubled 
students in the past, teacher did not assume the duty of helping a particular student who later 
committed suicide).                                         . 
Martin v. Twin Falls School District#411, 59 P.3d 317, 138 Idaho 146 (2002). 
 
(5)  Brooks v. Logan: Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action for the death of their fourteen-year -
old son, a student at Meridian High School. The son had been asked by his English teacher to make 
entries into a daily journal as part of an English composition assignment. He did this beginning in 
September of 1990 and continued on to the end of December 1990. The following January he committed 
suicide at his home. The journal "contains some passages in which he alludes to death or depression, but 
there is no definite statement that he was contemplating suicide." Plaintiffs argued that the teacher had 
assumed a duty to their son, a duty that "arose out of Logan's actions of helping troubled students in the 
past." The supreme court rejected their claim: 
 
When alleging an assumed duty, plaintiff must prove that the defendant volunteered to 
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help the plaintiff and then failed to exercise due care. That allegation is missing in this case. 
Nothing in the record supports a finding that Logan volunteered to help Jeff and thus assumed a 
duty of care for him. Quite the opposite, the evidence in the record indicates that Logan never 
approached Jeff regarding his journal entries, and at least advised Jeff that she would not read 
the entries. Further, the record does not reflect that Logan ever volunteered to assist Jeff with his 
alleged personal turmoil or depression. Based upon the record below, the trial court correctly 
found that Logan's occasional past actions of helping troubled students did not result in her 
assuming a duty in this case. 
Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 489, 903 P.2d 73, 78 (1995). 
 
(6)  Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chartered:  In the spring of 1983, John Runft 
contacted Aaron Jones, a former client, concerning a potential investment in a business venture- the 
North Idaho Jockey Club (NIJC)-of two other clients, Richard Sigismonti and John Kundrat. After a 
meeting between Runft, Jones, and Sigismonti, Jones indicated that he was willing to loan NIJC $420,000 
if the loan was adequately secured and "if Runft thought it would fly." Runft put together a loan proposal 
that included an assignment for security purposes of Sigismonti's and Kundrat’s partnership interests in 
Pinecrest Hospital. Jones agreed to the proposal. Subsequently, Runft directed Jones to send him a 
check for the loan and stated that Runft would place "all" documents in trust with the escrow company 
pending closing of the deal. Runft was present at the closing and the escrow company disbursed the 
funds despite the fact that the partnership interests in the hospital had never been assigned as security. 
The venture eventually defaulted on the loan, Sigismonti and Kundrat declared bankruptcy, and Jones 
brought suit against the escrow company. During discovery, Jones learned that the escrow company 
disbursed the funds at the direction of Runft. He and his law firm were then joined as defendants, plaintiff 
alleging that "Runft breached an assumed duty to act in Jones's best interests by modifying portions of 
the escrow instructions to allow release of the loan proceeds without the Pinecrest assignment." The trial 
court granted defendants summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. 
 
The Idaho Supreme Court began by noting that plaintiff’s complaint refers to a breach of 
an "assumed duty or contract." A claim for breach of an assumed duty is a negligence action 
where the duty of care arises from a voluntary undertaking. Bowling v. Jack B. Parsons 
Companies, 117 Idaho 1030, 793 P.2d 703 (1990). A voluntary duty is distinct from any other 
duty the party may have as a result of another undertaking or relationship. 
 
The law firm argues that there are no facts to support a determination that the law firm 
assumed any duty towards Jones. In support of this assertion, the law firm submitted evidence 
that Jones [was] aware that Runft was acting as NIJC's attorney and that [he] knew Runft as not 
acting as [his] attorney. Runft's status as NIJC's attorney, however, does not entitle the law firm to 
summary judgment on a claim for breach of an assumed duty, if there is a genuine issue of fact 
whether Runft undertook a separate duty on the behalf of Jones. We conclude that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning this claim. 
 
  Jones argues that Runft assumed a duty to act on behalf of Jones "contractually or 
otherwise." The August 5 letter [which instructed Runft to handle the transaction in Jones's best 
interests] and Runft's failure to repudiate the direction in this letter for Runft to act in Jones's best 
interest create a genuine issue of material fact whether Runft contractually assumed a duty. The 
statement in the August 5 letter can be viewed as an offer for Runft to enter a unilateral contract. 
Although the breach of an assumed duty claim sounds in tort, evidence to support the existence 
of an assumed duty can be contractual in nature. 
 
A contract may ... create a state of things which furnishes the occasion for a tort. If the 
relation of the plaintiff and the defendants is such that a duty to take due care arises therefrom 
irrespective of contract and the defendant is negligent, then the action is one of tort. Taylor v. 
Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138483 P.2d 664,669 (1971). 
 
The law firm argues that the August 5 letter cannot be used as evidence of an 
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assumed duty because the letter was written by Addison and the request in the letter that Runft 
handle the transaction in the best interests of Jones was never communicated to Jones. It is not 
required, however, that Jones personally knew of Addison's direction to Runft. Runft does not 
dispute that Addison was Jones's employee and agent or that Addison had Jones's authority to 
act on behalf of Jones in the loan transaction. Unless Addison's actions exceeded the scope of 
his authority, Addison's actions are sufficient to bind Runft to fulfill any duty toward Jones that 
Runft had assumed. Liberally construing the facts in favor of Jones and making all reasonable 
inferences in his favor, we conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Runft 
undertook a voluntary duty to act in Jones's best interests in handling the transaction. Runft's 
failure to repudiate the unilateral offer contained in the August 5 letter, and his subsequent 
endorsement and transfer of the $320,000 check to the escrow company creates a genuine issue 
of material fact concerning his acceptance of this offer. 
Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin, & Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 873 P.2d 861 (1994). 
 
(7)  Boots ex rei. Boots v. Winters: A renter owned two dogs, a white one and a brown one. As the 
juvenile plaintiff and his brother were walking to school, they noticed that the white dog was in the alley. 
When they returned the dog to the backyard, plaintiff was attacked by the brown dog. The brother ran to 
get the mother who was then attacked by the brown dog. They sued the renter and his landlord, arguing 
in part that the landlord had assumed a duty to protect third parties by regulating the type or size of the 
dogs that they permitted on their rentals. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the 
landlord: 
 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that it is possible to create a duty where one 
previously did not exist. If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do 
so, the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner. Udy v. Custer County, []; 
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 400, 987 P.2d 300, 312 (1999). See also 
Sharp, [] Liability for an assumed duty, however, can only come into being to the extent that there 
is in fact an undertaking. Udy, []. See also Bowling v. Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 
793 P.2d 703, 705 (1990). 
 
Although a person can assume a duty to act on a particular occasion, the duty is limited 
to the discrete episode in which the aid is rendered. Udy, []. 
 
In the present case, there is no evidence that the Winterses volunteered to help third 
parties, such as the Bootses, by regulating the type or size of dog that Martinez could keep on the 
rented property. Jack Winters averred in an affidavit that Martinez paid a deposit of $100 to keep 
one large dog on the premises, and a copy of the rental agreement confirms s that Martine paid a 
$100 pet deposit. Martinez testified during his deposition that he Informed the Winterses that he 
had two medium-sized dogs which he Intended to keep on the premises and, when Jack Winters 
asked him what type of dogs he had, Martinez informed him the dogs were "mutts." There is no 
evidence, however, that the Winterses restricted the type or size of the dogs Martinez could keep 
on the premises. Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that the Winterses secured the 
pet deposit with the intent to protect third parties from Martinez's dogs. The Bootses' reliance on 
Sharp is therefore misplaced. In that case, a landlord provided a security service for his tenant's 
business, and an employee of the business was assaulted and raped by an intruder who 
apparently gained access to the building through an unlocked door. The Supreme Court held that 
once the landlord and property manager had initiated a locked door policy and had employed a 
security service with the intent of keeping the doors locked, they undertook a duty to keep doors 
locked. Sharp, [J. In contrast, there is no evidence that the Winterses took any actions with the 
intent of protecting third parties from Martinez's brown dog, and the Winterses therefore assumed 
no duty to provide such protection for the Bootses. 
Boots ex ref. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 
(8)  Good Samaritan statutes: Idaho has adopted three statutes providing immunity for "good 
Samaritans." For example, 
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I.C. § 5-330 Immunity of persons giving first aid from damage claim. That no action shall lie or be 
maintained for civil damages in any court of this state against any person or persons, or group of 
persons, who in good faith, being at, or stopping at the scene of an accident, offers and 
administers first aid or medical attention to any person or persons injured in such accident unless 
it can be shown that the person or persons offering or administering first aid, is guilty of gross 
negligence in the care or treatment of said injured person or persons or has treated them in a 
grossly negligent manner. The immunity described herein shall cease upon delivery of the injured 
person to either a generally recognized hospital for treatment of ill or injured persons, or upon 
assumption of treatment in the office or facility of any person undertaking to treat said injured 
person or persons, or upon delivery of said injured person or persons into custody of an 
ambulance attendant. 
 
       Similar provisions have been adopted immunizing the conduct of volunteer ambulance attendants 
(I.C. § 5-331) and underground mine rescue participants (I.C. § 5-333). What policy justification exists for 
such statutes? 
 
(9)  §39 Duty Based in Prior Conduct Creating a Risk of Physical Harm 
 
  When an actor's prior conduct, even though not tortious, creates a continuing risk of harm of a 





c. Risk of a type characteristic of conduct. The duty imposed by this Section is 
conditioned on the creation of a continuing risk characteristic of the actor's conduct. To create 
such a risk of harm, the actor's conduct necessarily must be a cause, at the time of the conduct, 
of a risk of subsequent physical harm. But merely being a cause of a continuing risk is not 
sufficient for a duty under the Section. The conduct must also be sufficiently connected with the 
potential for later harm that imposing a duty to prevent or mitigate the harm is appropriate. The 
duty imposed by this Section is justified by the actor's creating a risk (even if nontortiously) and 
the absence of the pragmatic and autonomy reasons for the no-duty rule in § 37. Nevertheless, it 
is unfair to impose this duty when the actor's conduct has not generally increased the risk of harm 
...or is quite removed from the risks that pose harm to the other .... 
RESTATEMENT {THIRD)OF TORTS § 39 (Proposed Final Draft No.1, Apr.6,2005). 
 
(10)  §42 Duty Based in Undertaking 
 
An actor who undertakes to render services to another that the actor knows or should know 
reduce the risk of physical harm to the other has a duty of reasonable care to the other in the undertaking 
if: 
(a)  the failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm beyond that which existed 
without the undertaking, or 
 
(b) the person to whom the services are rendered, or another relies on the actor's exercising 




  c.Ordinary duty of reasonable care and affirmative duty based on undertaking. An actor 
who engages in an undertaking is subject to the ordinary duty of reasonable care provided in § 7 
for risks created by the undertaking. In that case, no inquiry into affirmative duties is necessary. 
This Section, by contrast, addresses an actor's liability for harm arising from other risks when the 
actor undertakes to ameliorate or eliminate those risks.... 
 
The duty provided in this Section is one of reasonable care. It may be breached 
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either by acts of commission (misfeasance) or by acts of omission (nonfeasance). [] 
Courts sometimes imply that, if an undertaking duty exists, the defendant is liable for the 
harm. This improperly conflates the questions of duty and breach. Even where a duty 
exists under this Section, an actor is subject to liability only for a duty to exercises reasonable 
care. 
d. Threshold for an undertaking. An undertaking entails an actor voluntarily rendering 
services, gratuitously or pursuant to contract, on behalf of another. The undertaking may be on 
behalf of a specified individual or a class of persons. The actor's knowledge that the undertaking 
serves to reduce the risk of harm to another or circumstances that would lead a reasonable 
person to the same conclusion is a prerequisite for an undertaking under this Section. The actor 
need not act for the purpose of protecting the other; this Section is equally applicable to those 
who act altruistically and those who act nonaltruistically, as is often the case when an undertaking 
is a result of a contractual arrangement. While knowledge that the undertaking will reduce the risk 
of harm to another is necessary for the existence of an undertaking, knowledge that the other will 
rely in the undertaking is not. 
 
When the underlying facts are in dispute, the question of whether a duty exists must be 
submitted to the factfinder with appropriate alternative instructions.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 42 (Proposed Final Draft No.1, Apr. 6, 2005). 
 
(11)  § 44 Duty to Another Based on Taking Charge of the Other 
 
(a) An actor who, despite no duty to do so, takes charge of another who reasonably 
appears to be (1) imperiled and (2) helpless or unable to protect himself or herself has a 
duty to exercise reasonable care while the other is within the actor's charge. 
 
(b) An actor who discontinues aid or protection is subject to a duty of reasonable care to 
refrain from putting the other in a worse position that existed before the actor took charge 
of the other and, if the other reasonably appears to be in imminent peril or serious bodily 
harm at the time of the termination, to exercise reasonable care with regard to the peril 




d. Rationale.  The rationale for the duty in this Section is primarily the absence of reasons 
that justify the no-duty-to-rescue rule. Since the actor has voluntarily chosen to engage in a 
rescue, imposing a duty of reasonable care does little harm to the freedom and autonomy of the 
rescuer. The actor has singled himself or herself out thereby obviating concerns about a duty to 
rescue when there are many persons who might perform the rescue equally well. The "taking 
charge" requirement eliminates much of the difficult line-drawing that might well be required to 
determine whether preliminary steps by an actor amount to a "rescue" that imposes the duty 
provided in this Section. It also eliminates any need to distinguish between "easy'' rescues and 
those that impose substantial burdens because the actor, by engaging in the rescue, has already 
made the choice to engage in a rescue and proceeded significantly in pursuing it. By taking 
charge of the other, the rescuer may have prevented others from rescuing, but neither reliance 
nor increased risk need be proved for this Section to be applicable. Finally, the duty imposed by 
this Section is confined in time and scope by the specific peril to which the other is exposed and 
therefore does not create a protracted and burdensome obligation. 
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BEERS V. CORP. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS  
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
155 Idaho 680, (2013) 
 
HORTON, J., - Heidi Beers, a minor, was injured after jumping from a bridge into the Payette River. Heidi 
had been attending a campout organized by ward members of her church. Her parents, Gregory and 
Caralee Beers, brought suit individually and on behalf of their daughter against the Corporation of the 
President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the COP) and fourteen individual 
defendants. The Beerses' complaint advanced claims of negligence against all defendants and a claim 
based upon I.C. § 6-1701 (tort actions in child abuse cases) against the individual defendants. The district 
court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment in part, dismissing all negligence claims 
except for those brought against two individual defendants, Richard and Kathy Kartchner, who have not 
participated in this appeal. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment as to the statutory 
claim against five individual defendants, including Richard Kartchner. The Beerses timely appealed and 
the four individual defendants have cross-appealed from the district court's order denying their motion for 
summary judgment as to the statutory claim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Heidi Beers was thirteen years old when she was injured. She belonged to the Autumn Faire 
Ward (the Ward) of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Church) in Meridian, Idaho. The 
Ward organized a campout to take place in Smiths Ferry, Idaho, during the summer of 2007. Ward 
members were invited to a campout to be held August 17-18, 2007, at a cabin owned by Frank and Gloria 
Skinner. A similar campout had been held in 2005 and 2006. In 2007, the campout was planned by Lisa 
Panek, chair of the Ward Activities Committee. Ward members were notified of the upcoming event 
through flyers and a sign-up sheet for a Dutch oven dinner. The only formal activities planned for the 
campout were the Dutch oven dinner, an evening devotional, and a breakfast. There was no RSVP 
required and no list of attendance taken. 
 
Heidi wanted to attend, however her parents were not interested in going. Heidi originally planned 
to attend with a friend's family, but they could not go. Heidi then contacted another friend and asked if she 
could "get a ride" to the campout. This friend spoke to her mother, Kathy Kartchner, and asked if they 
could give Heidi a ride to the campout. Ms. Kartchner agreed and testified that it was her understanding 
that she was only providing a ride to Heidi, as Heidi's grandfather would also be attending the campout. 
Heidi's parents did not speak with any Ward member regarding Heidi's attendance. The record is silent as 
to whether Heidi's grandfather agreed to look out for her during the campout. 
 
Heidi rode up with the Kartchners on the evening of Friday, August 17. After her arrival, she rode 
from the Skinners' cabin to the Smiths Ferry Bridge with around twenty other youths in Bradley Day's 
pickup. Mr. Day told the youths that he would take them to the bridge if they obtained their parents' 
permission. After confirming that they had received permission, Mr. Day took them down to the bridge. 
Heidi had not sought or obtained permission from anyone to attend. Upon arriving at the bridge, some of 
the youths checked under the bridge for rocks or other obstructions. Many then proceeded to jump from 
the bridge into the river. Heidi did not jump. There were no injuries that evening, and the youths then 
returned to the campsite. 
 
Heidi spent the evening with her friends, and they stayed up late talking. Rather than sleeping in 
a tent provided by the Kartchners, Heidi and her friends slept in the Skinners' cabin. The next morning, 
following breakfast, members of the Ward began to separate. Some returned home, others went hiking or 
fishing, and some returned to the bridge to play in the water and jump into the river. Heidi went to the 
bridge. Before anyone jumped from the bridge, there was another inspection for rocks or other 
obstructions. Garrett Haueter, an adult present at the bridge, told everyone to jump in the location that 




Many of those present then began to jump from the bridge into the river. Heidi spoke briefly to 
Sharolyn Ririe, another adult present at the bridge. Heidi told her that she was scared to jump. Ms. Ririe 
said that she would also be afraid to jump, as she had a fear of heights. Eventually, Heidi summoned the 
courage to jump. She climbed over the railing but was outside the area that had been inspected. Heidi hit 
the water and felt instant pain and numbness. She does not believe that she hit anything on the way 
down or that she hit the river bottom. Thus, it appears that she jumped directly over one of the bridge 
support columns. Regardless of the mechanism of injury, Heidi suffered a compound fracture of her 
ankle. Several of those present helped Heidi to shore where she was attended to by several Ward 
members. 
Defendant Mark Kropf, a physician and Ward member, was summoned. He arrived and attended 
to Heidi with the help of paramedics from Cascade, as well as an emergency room team from St. 
Alphonsus that happened to be floating the river. One of the emergency room team members, Dr. Ho, 
was a physician with expertise in dealing with trauma. Dr. Ho reduced the fracture and brought the bone 
back within the skin. Heidi was then transported by Life Flight to the hospital. 
 
Heidi's parents then brought this action, individually and on Heidi's behalf, against the Church and 
fourteen Ward members, asserting claims of negligence and civil child abuse under I.C. § 6-17012 
against the individual defendants and claiming negligence on the part of the COP. The COP and the 
Ward members moved for summary judgment. The Beerses did not oppose the request for summary 
judgment dismissing their claims against three defendants, Merlinda Haueter, Kirt Nielsen and Katie 
Nielsen. The district court granted the motions as to the Beerses' negligence claims against all other 
defendants except Richard and Kathy Kartchner, holding that neither the COP nor the Ward members 
owed Heidi a duty of care. The Beerses appeal, arguing that both the COP and the Ward members owed 
Heidi a duty of care arising out of a special relationship and the undertaking of a duty to supervise her. 
 
The district court denied the motions for summary judgment as to the child abuse claim against 
four Ward members (Sharolyn Ririe, Garrett Haueter, Brenda Kropf and Brent Rasmussen) who were 
present when Heidi was injured. The district court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether they should have known that Heidi was likely to be injured. These four Ward members cross-
appeal, arguing that the district court erred by finding that an affirmative duty to act exists in the absence 
of a special relationship to the child. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); G & M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 
514, 516-17, 808 P.2d 851, 853-54 (1991). Furthermore, "[a]ll doubts are to be resolved against the 
moving party, and the motion must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be 
drawn therefrom, and if reasonable people might reach different conclusions." Id. 
 
Generally, to state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish four elements:  
 
"(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct;  
 
(2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and 
thenresulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage." 
Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 691, 302 P.3d 26, 31 (2013) (quoting Fragnella v. Petrovich, 
153 Idaho 266, 272, 281 P.3d 103, 109 (2012)). "Whether a duty exists is a question of law, 'over which 
this Court exercises free review.'" Gagnon v. W. Bldg. Maint., Inc., 155 Idaho 112, 306 P.3d 197, 200 










A. The district court properly granted summary judgment as to the Beerses' negligence claims. 
 
The Beerses argue that the district court erred in finding that the COP and the Ward members 
owed no duty to Heidi. As previously noted, a cause of action for negligence must establish: "(1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of 
duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual 
loss or damage." Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). 
 
The critical inquiry in this appeal, as it relates to the negligence claim, is whether the COP or the 
Ward members owed a duty to Heidi. The Beerses rely upon our statement that "one owes a duty to 
every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in 
which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such 
injury." Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 581, 961 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1998). However, contrary to the 
Beerses' contention, this statement extracted from Garcia does not impose an affirmative duty on 
everyone to prevent foreseeable injury to everyone else. Rather, the broad statement in Garcia must be 
viewed in the context of that case. 
 
Garcia was hired by St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center as a respiratory therapist. Id. at 579, 
961 P.2d at 1182. Shortly after being hired, he sought the services of the Employee Assistance Program, 
staffed by employees of the defendant hospital, for his preoccupation with sex. Id. During a counseling 
session, he told his counselor that he had been terminated from another hospital for "molesting a patient." 
Id. His previous employer had a policy that it would release former employees' personnel files upon 
written request, but St. Alphonsus made no such request. Id. at 580, 961 P.2d at 1183. Doe was a minor 
who was hospitalized at St. Alphonsus for six weeks approximately a year after Garcia was hired. Id. at 
579, 961 P.2d at 1182. Following his discharge from the hospital, Garcia began to sexually molest Doe. 
Id. 
 
This Court evaluated whether the hospital owed a duty to Doe, employing the "balancing of the 
harm" analysis. Id. at 581, 961 P.2d at 1184. This is an analysis that this Court employs "in those rare 
situations when we are called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed, or when a 
duty has not previously been recognized." Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (1996). In 
Rife, we explained the analysis as follows: 
 
Determining whether a duty will arise in a particular instance involves a consideration of 
policy and the weighing of several factors which include: 
 
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury 
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future 
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing 
a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence 
of insurance for the risk involved (citations omitted). 
Id. (quoting Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653, 658 
(Cal. 1985)). After reviewing these criteria, this Court determined that the hospital owed a duty to Doe. 
Garcia, 131 Idaho at 581, 961 P.2d at 1184. 
 
The broad statement the Beerses rely upon is not generally applicable to the world at large. 
Indeed, we abrogated the holding of Garcia in Hunter v. State, Dep't of Corr., Div. of Prob. & Parole, 138 
Idaho 44, 50, 57 P.3d 755, 761 (2002), holding that Garcia "extend[ed] the duty of an employer too far." 
Otherwise, the general rule that "[t]here is ordinarily no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect another 
absent unusual circumstances, which justify imposing such an affirmative responsibility" would be devoid 
of meaning. Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 399, 987 P.2d at 311. Absent unusual circumstances, a person has no 
duty to prevent harm to another, regardless of foreseeability. Thus, in order to establish that any of the 
parties had a duty toward Heidi, the Beerses must establish one of the "unusual circumstances" 
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described in Coghlan. Idaho law recognizes two circumstances in which a person has an affirmative duty 
of care to another: a special relationship or an assumed duty based on an undertaking. Recognizing the 
general rule, the Beerses argue that the COP and the Ward members owed a duty to Heidi under both of 
these theories. We discuss them in turn. 
 
 
A. The district court did not err in determining that there was no special relationship between the 
COP and Heidi. 
 
The Beerses first argue that the COP owed a duty to Heidi based on a special relationship that 
existed between the Ward and Heidi. "An affirmative duty to aid or protect arises only when a special 
relationship exists between the parties." Rees v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 15, 137 
P.3d 397, 402 (2006) (quoting Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 399, 987 P.2d at 311). A special relationship can 
have two separate but related aspects. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "(a) a special 
relation exists between the actor and a third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the 
third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the 
other a right to protection." Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669, 673 (1999) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 315 (1966)). Thus, having control over someone or a duty to 
protect that person is indicative of a special relationship. 
 
This Court has listed examples of individuals having a duty to control another as "a parent's duty 
to control his child, an employer's duty to control an employee while at work, or a law enforcement 
officer's duty to control a dangerous prisoner." Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673. "The common 
element in each of these is knowledge of an unreasonable risk of harm and the right and ability to control 
the third party's conduct." Id. Thus, a special relationship imposing a duty to control another's conduct 
requires a foreseeable risk and the right and ability to control that person's conduct. Determining whether 
a special relationship exists that gives a person the right to protection "requires an evaluation of 'the sum 
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection.'" Rees, 143 Idaho at 15, 137 P.3d at 402 (quoting Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 399, 987 P.2d at 
311). 
 
In Coghlan, this Court held that a university did not have "the kind of special relationship creating 
a duty to aid or protect adult students from the risks associated with the students' own voluntary 
intoxication." 133 Idaho at 400, 987 P.2d at 312. In that case, a sorority student was injured after falling 
out of a window following a night of excessive drinking. The Court noted the "adult status of modern 
college students and the diminished custodial role of modern universities" in determining that the 
university had no duty to protect the student from the risk of drinking alcohol. Id. The concept of custody 
was also discussed in Rife. There, the question was whether a school had a duty to ensure that a student 
travelled home safely at the end of the school day. This Court explained that although it had "recognized 
a common law duty to protect against the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to a student while in the 
District's custody, we have not previously extended that duty once the student is no longer in a 
relationship of control or supervision by the District." 127 Idaho at 846, 908 P.2d at 148. Thus, a special 
relationship requires some level of custody, which Rife equated with control or supervision. 
 
In Rife, because the student was no longer in the custody of the school, the traditional duty 
derived from the school's custody of the child did not apply. The Court then applied the balancing of harm 
analysis and declined to extend the duty to situations after the student is released from the school 
district's custody, finding the burden would be too large to impose a duty on schools to ensure that the 
students travelled to and from school safely. 127 Idaho at 847, 908 P.2d at 149. Further, this Court noted 
that schools are merely releasing the children back into their parents' custody at the end of the school 
day. Thus, the duty was on the parents to ensure the children's safety. Id. 
 
In this case, the district court found that there was no special relationship between the Ward and 
Heidi. It found that the Ward did not exercise sufficient control over Heidi to rise to the level of custody. It 
further found that even if a special relationship did exist, it ended along with the campout after breakfast 
on Saturday morning. The Beerses argue that the district court erred in these findings because the Ward 
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did exercise control over Heidi and the determination that the Ward campout had concluded was an 
impermissible finding of fact that should be determined by a jury. We do not reach the second finding, 
because we conclude that the district court properly concluded that the Ward did not have a special 
relationship with Heidi that would impose upon it a legal duty to prevent her injury on the bridge. 
 
First, Heidi's participation in the loosely-organized campout is a completely different situation than 
that of a child's attendance at school. School attendance is legally mandated. During the school day, 
parents have no ability to supervise or protect their children. That was not the case at the Ward campout. 
Thus, the custody-derived duty acknowledged in Rife between a school and its students during the school 
day does not apply here. The COP argues that the situation is more akin to the adult student and the 
university situation presented in Coghlan. The district court in this case noted that "[p]roviding food, 
shelter, and enforcing minor rules is precisely the level of care and control that a sorority exercises over 
its members." As was the case with the sorority in Coghlan, there is no evidence that the Ward had any 
right or ability to control Heidi's actions. The Ward did not have the ability to compel Heidi's attendance at 
the campout or the Ward-planned activities of dinner, a devotional, and breakfast. 
 
The Beerses suggest that this Court ought to extend or recognize a new duty by weighing the 
various factors outlined in Rife. The district court in this case analyzed the Rife factors and determined 
that extending a duty owed by the Ward members was not appropriate. The district court found that the 
first two factors were undisputed: injury from bridge jumping is foreseeable, and Heidi was in fact injured. 
However, the court also found that none of the Ward members had undertaken supervision of the bridge-
jumping activity. Thus, it found that the connection between the defendants' conduct and Heidi's injury 
was too attenuated to impose a new duty. That connection is even more attenuated when the defendant 
is the COP rather than the individual Ward members. By all accounts, the bridge jumping was not an 
official Ward activity, it occurred a mile away from the location of the campout, and it took place after the 
conclusion of the last Ward-planned activity. We are unable to ascribe moral blame to the COP for this 
incident. We can, however, ascertain negative consequences to the community that would result from 
imposing a duty and resulting liability upon religious organizations to members of their faith. The result 
would be a powerful disincentive to organized fellowship activities. Thus, we decline to extend or create a 
new duty on the part of the COP toward Heidi. 
 
B. The district court did not err in finding that the COP did not assume a duty to Heidi. 
 
"Even when an affirmative duty generally is not present, a legal duty may arise if one voluntarily 
undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so." Baccus v. Ameripride Servs., Inc., 145 Idaho 
346, 350, 179 P.3d 309, 313 (2008) (internal quotation omitted). In such a case, the acting party has a 
duty to perform that act in a non-negligent manner. Udy v. Custer Cnty., 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 
1069, 1072 (2001). "When a party assumes a duty by voluntarily performing an act that the party had no 
duty to perform, the duty that arises is limited to the duty actually assumed." Martin v. Twin Falls School 
Dist. No. 411, 138 Idaho 146, 150, 59 P.3d 317, 321 (2002). Thus, merely because a party acts once 
does not mean that party is forever duty-bound to act in a similar fashion. A beach-goer may assume a 
duty to rescue a drowning swimmer in a non-negligent manner by undertaking to do so, but that same 
beach-goer has no obligation to rescue anyone else. In Martin, the school district was not required to post 
crossing guards at every school crossing even though it had provided crossing guards at certain 
crossings. Thus, although a party may assume a duty by undertaking to act, that duty is limited to the 
scope of the undertaking. 
 
Liability for an assumed duty, however, can only come into being to the extent that there is in fact 
an undertaking." Udy, 136 Idaho at 389, 34 P.3d at 1072. "A duty arises in the negligence context when 
one previously has undertaken to perform a primarily safety-related service; others are relying on the 
continued performance of the service; and it is reasonably foreseeable that legally-recognized harm could 
result from failure to perform the undertaking." Baccus, 145 Idaho at 351, 179 P.3d at 314. In Baccus, the 
defendant had contracted to place non-slip safety mats at the entrance of a building. The defendant failed 
to place the safety mats on one occasion and Baccus slipped, fell and was injured. This Court found that 
by undertaking to place the safety mats which induced reliance by those in the building where the 
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accident occurred, the defendant had assumed a duty by undertaking to perform an action. Id. at 352, 
179 P.2d at 315. 
 
The district court in this case found that the Ward had not undertaken supervision of Heidi. It 
stated that the Ward's knowledge that some minors may attend the campout unsupervised did not 
constitute an undertaking to supervise Heidi. The Beerses argue that the COP assumed a duty to Heidi 
because the Church Handbook requires supervision of youth participating in ward activities and there was 
"Ward Leadership" at the bridge. However, these facts do not rise to the level of an undertaking that 
creates a duty of care. In Baccus there was a failure to perform a safety-related function that the 
defendant had previously performed. In Martin, there was no duty to monitor a school crossing even 
though other crossings were monitored. "The underlying policy here arises from a person voluntarily 
assuming a position, and by filling that position another can reasonably rely on that person to act with 
reasonable care and provide protection from unreasonable risks of harm." Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 
P.2d at 673. Here, the COP's only affirmative actions were extending an open invitation to all Ward 
members to attend a campout and planning two meals and a devotional. These actions do not reflect the 
assumption of a duty by the Ward to supervise Heidi jumping from a bridge a mile away from the location 
of the Ward campout upon which she could reasonably rely. For this reason, we affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to the COP. 
 
 
C. The district court did not err in finding that the Ward members did not have a special 
relationship with Heidi. 
 
The law regarding duty as between Heidi and the Ward members is the same as explained 
above. Thus, the only consideration is whether there are facts relating to the individual Ward members 
sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a duty by them, whether founded upon a special relationship or 
the assumption of a duty. The district court found that none of the Ward members had a special 
relationship with Heidi. The Beerses devote a substantial portion of their brief to advance their argument 
that the Ward members owed a duty to Heidi because the risk of harm was foreseeable. The district court 
found that the risk of harm was foreseeable. It declined to extend a new duty in this situation because it 
found the connection between the Ward members' actions and Heidi's injury was not sufficiently close, 
not because of a lack of foreseeability. 
 
As explained above, a special relationship requires a right and an ability to control the conduct of 
the third party. There is no evidence that the Ward members had such a relationship with Heidi. None of 
the nine individual Respondents can be said to have had custody of Heidi at any time during the campout, 
let alone at the time of her injury. Heidi's parents did not speak to anyone regarding her attendance at the 
Ward campout. When Heidi decided to go down to the bridge, she did so without seeking or obtaining 
permission from any of the individual Ward members. The facts do not demonstrate that any of the Ward 
members exercised the level of control over Heidi that would justify imposing a duty based on a special 
relationship. Thus, the district court properly determined that the Ward members did not owe Heidi a duty 
because there was no special relationship. 
 
The other basis for finding the existence of a duty is that one or more of the Ward members 
undertook a duty of supervision toward Heidi. The Beerses argue that eight of the Ward members 
(Warren Ririe, Sharolyn Ririe, Phil Haueter, Beth Rasmussen, Mark Kropf, Bradley Day, Garrett Haueter 
and Brent Rasmussen) assumed a duty to Heidi. The district court found that none of the Ward members 
had undertaken any action to supervise Heidi or the bridge-jumping activity. Each of the individual 
defendant Ward members will be discussed below, considering any of their actions that may have given 




Warren Ririe's only connection to Heidi is by virtue of his calling as the High Priests group leader. When 
no member of the Bishopric was at the campout, leadership responsibilities would have fallen to him. 
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However, as the Ward, and thereby the COP, owed no duty to Heidi at the bridge, Warren Ririe did not 




Sharolyn Ririe was present at the bridge when Heidi was injured. She was there to watch her children, 
who were also at the bridge. While she was there she asked some of the youths on two separate 
occasions if they had checked the water for rocks or other hazards. She also had the conversation with 
Heidi in which Heidi indicated that she was fearful, and Sharolyn Ririe said that she would be fearful as 
well. These facts do not give rise to a reasonable inference that Sharolyn Ririe was supervising the bridge 
jumping in general, or Heidi in particular, much less that Heidi could reasonably rely upon her supervision. 




Phil Haueter's children told him they would be down by the river. He went looking for them on Saturday 
morning. He walked downstream, never found them, and returned to the cabin. He received word that 
Heidi was injured and stayed at the cabin, packing up his things. He was never at the bridge on the day 




Beth Rasmussen was not present at the bridge at any time prior to Heidi's accident. There is no indication 
that Beth Rasmussen had anything to do with the bridge jumping other than knowing that several 






Mark Kropf was not at the bridge when Heidi was injured. He had been there briefly prior to the accident 
to check on his wife and children. He then returned to the cabin to find one of his daughters who was not 
at the bridge. After finding her at the cabin, he was walking back to the bridge when he was notified that 
Heidi had been injured. As there is no evidence that he was involved in any way with the bridge jumping, 




Bradley Day was not present at the bridge when Heidi was injured. His involvement with bridge jumping 
occurred the evening before, when he transported a number of children to the bridge to jump. The 
Beerses argue that his actions the evening before obligated him to supervise the bridge jumping the 
following day. However, as we held in Udy v. Custer Cnty., 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 
(2001), the duty to act is limited to the discrete episode in which the aid is rendered. The district court 
correctly determined that, assuming he had undertaken a duty to supervise bridge jumping on Friday 




Garrett Haueter was present at the bridge when Heidi was injured. He testified that he witnessed some of 
the youths check the water for hazards as well as for depth. He also warned the jumpers that only a 
specific area under the bridge had been inspected. Of all the defendants, Garrett Haueter had the most 
active role on the bridge when Heidi was injured. However, the district court found that his actions did not 
rise to the level of undertaking supervision. The district court stated that "Garrett relayed information 
about where the river had been inspected. He never personally inspected the area, nor did he direct the 
inspection of the area. Furthermore, there is no indication that he exercised control over where the 
jumpers actually jumped." Indicating where the bridge and river had been inspected did not constitute 
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assumption of the duty to direct, control, supervise or prevent any person from jumping from the bridge. 




Brent Rasmussen was not present on the bridge when Heidi was injured. However, he was back and 
forth between his car and the bridge when the jumping occurred on Saturday. The district court noted that 
the Beerses relied on the testimony of Sharolyn Ririe and Brenda Kropf that they gave the children 
permission to jump "because they believed [Brent Rasmussen] was supervising the bridge jumping 
activity." The district court noted that the record did not support the Beerses' assertion, as it merely 
demonstrated that "Brother Rasmussen" was present at the bridge and Ms. Kropf believed that "her 
children should be supervised while at the bridge." These witnesses' subjective expectations, 
unsupported by any objective evidence that Brent Rasmussen did or said anything to suggest that he was 
supervising the bridge jumping, is insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether he assumed a duty to Heidi. 
 
For these reasons, we find that the district court correctly granted summary judgment as to the 
Beerses' claims of negligence. 
 
 
D. The district court erred by denying the Ward members' motion for summary judgment as to the 
Beerses' claim based upon the tort of child abuse. 
 
The Beerses also brought claims against the individual Ward members for the tort of child abuse based 
upon I.C. § 6-1701. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of those Ward members who 
were not present at the time of Heidi's injury as to this claim. The Beerses do not appeal this 
determination. However, the district court denied the motion as to Sharolyn Ririe, Garrett Haueter, Mark 
Kropf and Brent Rasmussen. These four Ward members cross-appeal the district court's order denying 
their motion for summary judgment. We address the preliminary question whether the cross-appeal is 
properly before this Court before turning to the merits of the cross-appeal. 
 
 
1. This Court may properly address the merits of the cross-appeal. 
 
The Beerses object to this Court's consideration of the cross-appeal, noting the general rule that 
"an order denying a motion for summary judgment is neither a final order that can be directly appealed 
nor is it an order that can be reviewed on an appeal from a final judgment in the action." Wesco Autobody 
Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 890-91, 243 P.3d 1069, 1078-79 (2010). This statement is true for 
direct appeals. However, a different rule applies when the denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
presented by way of cross-appeal. Idaho Appellate Rule 15 provides: 
 
Right to cross-appeal. After an appeal has been filed, a timely cross-appeal may be filed 
from any interlocutory or final judgment or order. 
 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11(g) likewise provides the right to cross-appeal "any interlocutory or final judgment 
[,] order or decree." An order denying a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order. Garcia v. 
Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 541, 164 P.3d 819, 821 (2007). Thus, this Court has previously addressed the 
cross-appeal of an order denying a defendant's motion for summary judgment. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 
Idaho 249, 253, 678 P.2d 41, 45 (1984). The cross-appeal is properly before this Court. 
 
2. The district court erred by denying the Ward members' motion for summary judgment. 
 
Idaho Code section 6-1701(1)(d) provides that an action may be brought on behalf of any child against 
anyone who has "[i]njured a child as defined in section 18-1501, Idaho Code." Idaho Code section 18-
1501(2) provides: 
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Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great 
bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical 
pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person 
or health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation 
that its person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
 
Idaho Code section 18-1501(5) defines "willfully" as "acting or failing to act where a reasonable 
person would know the act or failure to act is likely to result in injury or harm or is likely to endanger the 
person, health, safety or well-being of the child." 
 
This Court addressed this broad definition of willfully in Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the Boy 
Scouts of Am., Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007), stating: 
 
In 2005, the legislature amended Idaho Code § 18-1501 to create a negligence standard of care 
for the conduct in that statute that must be done "willfully." It defined "willfully" in the statute to 
mean "acting or failing to act where a reasonable person would know the act or failure to act is 
likely to result in injury or harm or is likely to endanger the person, health, safety or well-being of 
the child." Ch. 151, § 1, 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 467. Defining "willfully" to mean what "a 
reasonable person would know" is a negligence standard of care. Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 
34 P.3d 1076 (2001) (a reasonable person standard encompasses the concept of ordinary 
negligence); Nelson v. Northern Leasing Co., 104 Idaho 185, 657 P.2d 482 (1983) (finding of 
negligence upheld based upon the risk to a child that a reasonable person would have foreseen); 
57A Am.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 133 (2004) ("The phrasing of the standard of care in negligence 
cases in terms of the 'reasonable person' is firmly implanted in the American law of negligence"). 
Id. at 854, 172 P.3d at 1129 n.3. Focusing on this statement in Steed, the district court concluded that 
"Sections 6-1701 and 18-1501 create a duty to affirmatively act to protect children where a reasonable 
person would know the child is likely to be harmed." The district court further concluded that "whether the 
bridge jumping was a circumstance where a reasonable person should have known it was likely to result 
in injury" was a question of fact for the jury. Thus, it denied summary judgment as to the four Ward 
members who were present at the time of Heidi's injury. 
 
The Beerses do not suggest that the Ward members willfully caused or permitted Heidi to suffer 
or that they inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on her. Rather, relying on the broad 
definition of "willfully," their theory is that the Ward members willfully caused or permitted Heidi to be 
injured or to be placed in such situation that her person or health was endangered. The difficulty for the 
Beerses is that the statute does not impose a duty upon the general public to act in such a way as to 
protect children from injury or exposure to dangerous conditions. Under the plain text of the statute, this 
duty only extends to those "having the care or custody of [the] child." As previously discussed, none of the 
Ward members had "the care or custody of" Heidi. Therefore, I.C. § 18-1501(2) imposed no duties and 
the district court erred by denying their motion for summary judgment. For that reason, we reverse the 





We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the Beerses' negligence claims against the 
COP and the Ward members. We reverse the district court's order denying the four Ward members' 
motion for summary judgment as to the child abuse claim and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. Costs to Respondents. 
 




(1) Is Beers a misfeasance case or a nonfeasance case?  Of the theories attempted in the case, what 




b. Duties Arising from Defendant's Relationship to Plaintiff 
 
 
COGHLAN v. BETA THETA PI FRATERNITY 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
133 Idaho 388, (1999) 
 
[The facts are set out in the preceding section of the materials.] 
 
B.  The Trial Court Erred In Dismissing Coghlan's Claim Against The University Defendants. 
 
       The appellants appeal from the district court's order granting the University defendants' motion to 
dismiss .... The district court ... held that no special relationship exists between the University and its 
students to give rise to an affirmative duty on the part of the University.... 
 
 
2.        Duty of care 
 
The district court granted the motion to dismiss based on its ruling that the University did not owe 
a duty to Coghlan who became intoxicated by consuming alcoholic beverages provided by third parties. 
This Court follows the rule that "'one owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care 
to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen 
that a failure to use such care might result in such injury."' Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho578, 581,961 P.2d 
1181, 1184 (1998) (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137(1980)) (emphasis 
in original). Further, there is a "general rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, 
foreseeable risks of harm to others." Id. (quoting Sharp v. WH. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 
506,509 (1990)). This Court has previously identified several factors to consider in determining whether a 
duty arises in a particular situation: 
 
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, 
the closeness of the connection between the defendants conduct and the 
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing 
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (1995) (quoting Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l 
Hasp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 211 Cai.Rptr. 356,695 P.2d653,658 (1985)). See also Turpen v. Pecha, 
133 Idaho 244, 985 P.2d 669 (1999). 
 
There is ordinarily no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect another absent unusual 
circumstances, which justify imposing such an affirmative responsibility. An affirmative duty to aid 
or protect arises only when a special relationship exists between the parties. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 314A (1965). The college-student relationship is not listed in Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 314A as one of the special relations giving rise to a duty to aid or protect, 
although the relations listed are not intended to be exclusive. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§314A cmt. b (1965). Determining whether a special relationship existed between the University 
and Coghlan sufficient to impose a duty requires an evaluation of "the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection." 
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 333 (3d ed.1964) (quoted in Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138 
(3d Cir. 1979)). 
 




1979) and Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), in holding that no special relationship 
existed between the University and Coghlan in this case. In Bradshaw, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that there existed no special relationship between the college and a student imposing upon the 
college either a duty to control the conduct of the student operating a motor vehicle off campus or a duty 
to protect a student in traveling to and from a class picnic. The court declined to recognize a duty based 
on the observation that "[c]ollege students today are no longer minors; they are now regarded as adults in 
almost every phase of community life." Id. at 139.This, combined with the recognition of the demise of the 
in loco parentis authoritarian role of modem college administrations, led the Third Circuit to conclude that 
the relationship between a college and its students is not sufficient to create a special relationship on 
which to predicate liability. 
 
Beach involved an underage intoxicated university student who was injured when she fell off a 
cliff after wandering away from camp during a university-sponsored activity. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Beach cited to Bradshaw in finding that no special relationship existed between the university and its 
students in light of the adult status of modem college students and the diminished custodial role of 
modem universities. See Beach, 726 P.2d at 418-19. We agree that "the modem American college is not 
an insurer of the safety of its students." Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138.Accordingly, we decline to hold that 
Idaho universities have the kind of special relationship creating a duty to aid or protect adult students from 
the risks associated with the students' own voluntary intoxication. 
 
C. The Trial Court Erred In Holding That Alpha Phi Sorority Owed No Duty To Coghlan 
 
Appellants challenge the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of Alpha Phi 
Sorority asserting that the district court erred in finding that Alpha Phi did not owe Coghlan any duty of 
care, that no special relationship existed between Alpha Phi and Coghlan, and that Alpha Phi did not 
assume a duty of care through its actions. 
 
 
2. Duty of care 
 
While appellants properly point out that "[e]very person has the general duty to use due or 
ordinary care not to injure others, to avoid injury to others ... and to do his work, render services or use 
his property as to avoid such injury," Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 935, 523 P.2d 536, 538 (1974), 
this case does not involve an allegation that Alpha Phi Sorority members affirmatively injured Coghlan. In 
order to find the existence of a duty of care, the appellants must show that Coghlan had a special 
relationship with Alpha Phi which obligated the sorority to protect her as an underage student from 
injuries resulting from her voluntary intoxication.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(A) 
(1964) (stating that an affirmative duty to act may arise only when a special relationship exists between 
the parties). These relationships generally arise only when one assumes responsibility for another's 
safety or deprives another of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection. See id. at § 314(A)(4). 
 
Examples of the types of "special relationships" ... which give rise to a duty to aid or protect 
include duties owed by: 1) a common carrier to its passengers; 2) an innkeeper to his guests; 3) a 
possessor of land who holds his land open to members of the public who enter upon the land in response 
to his invitation; and 4) one who takes custody of another. Id. [] Appellants argue that the relationship 
between Alpha Phi Sorority and Coghlan is the type of relationship which gives rise to a duty to aid or 
protect. It is true that Alpha Phi had a level of control over the behavior of Coghlan similar to the 
University. Like the University, Alpha Phi had a policy against underage drinking and exercised some 
influence over the behavior of sorority residents. However, as discussed above, society no longer expects 
universities to monitor the drinking activities of eighteen-year-old college students. [] Therefore, the 
district court correctly concluded that Alpha Phi's limited influence over Coghlan did not constitute a 
special relationship sufficient to create an affirmative duty for Alpha Phi to aid or protect Coghlan from 
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(1)  Why is there no "special" relationship between a sorority and a pledge? What is required for a 
relationship to be "special"? What factors are shared by the various relationships that the court lists? 
Recall that the court found that the sorority assumed a duty to Coghlan. 
 
(2)  "Special relationships," redux: The Idaho courts have also employed "special relationships" as a 
source of duty or, to say the same thing from the opposite side, a limit on liability, in cases involving pure 
economic loss. What factors led the courts in these pervious cases to find that the relationship was 
sufficiently "special" to justified imposing a duty? Are the same concerns present in assumption of duty as 
in pure economic loss? Recall that one concern in the economic loss cases was the difficulty in 
establishing a workable, nonarbitrary limit to liability. 
 
(2) §40 Duty Based on Special Relationship with Another 
 
(a) An Actor in a special relationship with another owes the others duty of reasonable 
care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship. 
 
(b) Special relationships giving rise to the duty provided in Subsection (a) include: 
 
(1) a common carrier with passengers, 
(2) an innkeeper with its guests, 
(3) A business or other possessor of land that holds its premises open to the 
public with those who are lawfully on the premises, 
(4) an employer with its employees who are: 
(a) in imminent danger; or 
(b) injured and thereby helpless, 
(5) a school with its students, 
(6) a landlord with its tenants, and 
(7) a custodian with those in its custody if: 
 
(a) the custodian is required by law to take custody or voluntarily takes 
custody of the other; and 
 




  f.  Scope of duty. The duty imposed by this Section applies to dangers that arise 
within the confines of the relationship and does not extend to other risks. Generally, the 
relationships in this Section are bounded by geography and time. Thus, this Section imposes no 
affirmative duty on a common carrier to a person who left the vehicle and is no longer a 
passenger. Similarly, an innkeeper is ordinarily under no duty to a guest who is injured or 
endangered while off the premises. Of course, if the relationship is extended -such as a cruise 
ship conducting an onshore tour- an affirmative duty pursuant to this section might be 
appropriate. 
 
  g.  Risks within the scope of the duty of care. The duty described in this Section 
applies regardless of the source of the risk. Thus, it applies to risks created by the individual at 
risk as well as those created by a third party's conduct, whether innocent, negligent, or 
intentional. If the actor's conduct plays a role in creating the risk, § 7[Duty] is also a source of 
duty. 




i. Public Callings 
 
 
CLARK v. TARR 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954) 
 
GIVENS, J.: A general demurrer to appellant's second amended complaint was sustained and 
consequent judgment of dismissal entered, on the theory the complaint did not state a cause of action .... 
 
  [Fanny Clark was a paying passenger on one of the buses operated by J.E. Tarr, Jr., going from 
her home in the residential area to the business district of Idaho Falls. Shortly after boarding the bus, the 
driver, Robert Remoir, stopped it on account of a flat tire. Several school children who were passengers 
in the bus got out, leaving only plaintiff and Albert Kelly as passengers. The bus driver stated he would 
have to telephone the garage and get another bus. Ms. Clark asked him if the bus would get to town by 
four o’clock because she had an appointment; the driver stated it would not. Mr. Kelly also stated he had 
a four o'clock appointment. They then talked about finding a telephone, so the driver could call for another 
bus. 
 
[While the driver and passengers were sitting in the bus looking about for a house with telephone 
wires running to it, defendant Herbert Fell, approached and the driver stuck his hand out of the bus 
window and stopped Mr. Fell. The bus driver told him he was "broke down" and asked him if he would 
take the two passengers to town. There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Ms. Clark asked the 
driver to do this, but upon Fell agreeing to do so, Ms. Clark and Mr. Kelly got out of the bus and into the 
Fell car and proceeded toward the business district of Idaho Falls. Both stated they were glad to get a 
ride as each had an appointment. They had traveled approximately a mile when there was a collision at 
the intersection of Ash Street and North Water Avenue with a car driven by Donald Mecham.] 
 
Under the allegations of the complaint, respondent Tarr, Jr., d/b/a Idaho Falls Transit Company, 
operating a general bus business in Idaho Falls, was a common carrier, [], and as such required to 
exercise the highest degree of care, skill and diligence in receiving appellant and conveying her to her 
destination and setting her down as safely as the means of conveyance and circumstances permit. [] 
 
Respondent Company, be accepting and receiving appellant as a paying passenger, undertook to 
transport her under the above standard of care to her destination. [] 
 
The allegation in the complaint that the Transit Company's driver, in securing the services of Fell 
and transferring appellant, was acting within the apparent scope of his employment was sufficient to 
charge the Company with responsibility therefor. [] 
 
The demurrer thus admits respondent's agent, acting within the apparent scope of his 
employment, secured a substitute conveyance to fulfill respondent Company's obligation to appellant as a 
paying passenger to convey her to her destination, and against her will and without her consent placed 
appellant in this substitute conveyance and because of this transfer and the negligence of the driver of 
this substitute conveyance and the negligence of the driver of another automobile, she was injured. 
 
The basis of respondent Transit Company's obligation and liability stems from the contract of 
transportation which arose when it accepted appellant as a pay passenger and which was to transport her 
carefully, with appropriate caution and circumspection and without negligence, to her downtown 
destination. 
 
This obligation was continued when respondent Company's employee allegedly acting within the 
scope of his employment, because of the flat tire and consequent interruption of the immediate 
continuance of appellant’s trip in respondent Company's conveyance and hence delay, secured a 
substitute conveyance, and not only tendered appellant this substitute conveyance as a means secured 
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by respondent Company through its agent for the completion of her journey and fulfillment of respondent 
Company's obligation, but against appellant's will and without her consent, the respondent Company, 
through its agent, ejected her from respondent's bus, itself initial negligence, wrongful ejection from a 
common carrier being actionable, Lindsay  v. Oregon Short Une Ry., 13 Idaho 477, 90 P. 984 (1907), in 
the alleged ensuing chain of events culminating in the accident and appellant's injury; and also against 
her will and without her consent, put her on the substituted conveyance. 
 
Respondent's obligation to exercise the high degree of care required and liability for negligence 
continued because by the automobile driven by Fell, respondent Company was carrying out its contract of 
transportation, though by a conveyance not owned or operated by it, but for its purpose in completing and 
executing its contract. Thus, the automobile was vicariously employed by it and, for the alleged negligent 
operation thereof, was as liable as for its own conveyance. [] 
 
 





(1)  What is the source of the duty owed to plaintiff? Was plaintiff suing for breach of contract? If not, 
was the contract relevant to the duty issue? What was the nature of the relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant? 
 
  What is the scope of the duty owed to plaintiff? Does the defendant owe plaintiff more than 
"reasonable care under the circumstances"? Why? 
 
  Recall that the court also created an exception for public callings in the pure economic loss 
cases. See Strong v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 18 Idaho 38, 109 P. 910 (1910). 
 
(2)  Straley v. ldaho Nuclear Corp.: Idaho Nuclear operated a bus line under contract with the United 
States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), to transport "authorized personnel" to and from the National 
Reactor Testing Station (now Idaho National Energy Laboratory, INEL) and various locations in the Idaho 
Falls-Pocatello area. Idaho Nuclear operated some 85 buses owned by the federal government along 
fixed routes. According to defendant, only employees of the federal government, AEC contractors and 
subcontractor employees, Navy personnel, and occasional business invitees are authorized to utilize the 
bus services. Plaintiff, however, states in his affidavits that he has seen persons not employed at the site 
ride on buses. 
 
Plaintiff boarded a bus on his way to work one morning. During the trip, he claims the bus hit 
"something" and he "sailed off his seat and hit the ceiling" of the bus, resulting in serious back, neck and 
arm injuries. The trial court granted defendants motion for summary judgment on the ground that 
defendant was a contract carrier rather than a common carrier. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed: 
 
[F]rom undisputed facts in the record we conclude that respondent, while it may not be 
classifiable as a common carrier under public utility law, nonetheless maintains enough of the 
characteristics normally found in a common carrier to be held to the higher standard of care 
ascribed to such a carrier.... 
 
As mentioned above, respondent does not fit within the traditional definition of "common 
carrier." Generally defined, a "common carrier'' is one ''who, by virtue of his calling and as a 
regular business, undertakes to transport persons or commodities from place to place, offering 
his services to such as may choose to employ him and pay his charges." [] 
 
A "private carrier," on the other hand, is "one who, without making it a vocation, or holding himself 
out to the public as ready to act for all who desire his services, undertakes, by special agreement m a 




for hire." The court noted that "[a]vailability to the public without discrimination appear to be the main 
feature distinguishing a private and common carrier." Nonetheless, "[t]he distinction between a private 
and contract carrier appears to be primarily a distinction drawn for purposes of regulation and licensing by 
public utility authorities and is not a distinction resulting from differing standards of care to be exercised 
toward the passengers or cargo carried." Here, defendant does not squarely fall within the general 
definition of "common carrier'' because only "authorized personnel"- i.e., certain employees of the federal 
government, employees of government contractors, and government guests and invitees are generally 
permitted to use the buses to travel to the site. However, [defendants] relationship to each of its individual 
passengers such as [plaintiff] does retain enough of the characteristics of a common carrier to raise an 
issue concerning whether or not [defendant] should be held to the higher standard of care generally 
ascribed to common carriers. [Defendant] held itself out generally to all members of the public who were 
travelling to the AEC site as a carrier of persons to and from that site for hire. While the scope of those 
persons eligible to travel to the AEC site is more restricted than the public in general to whom a common 
carrier must ordinarily provide service, the scope of persons served by [defendant] is much broader than 
the usual case of private carriage. Operationally [defendant] is much like any municipal bus line and it 
resembles a municipal bus line in its relationship to its passengers, specifically in the case of [plaintiff]. 
 
.... Considering all of these facts, we think that the relationship between [plaintiff] and [defendant] 
was more akin to common carriage than private carriage and thus the higher standard of care required of 
a common carrier should be applied to the relationship. 
 
Although there is authority for the proposition that a claim based on the negligence of a carrier 
can be founded in either contract or tort, [], the Idaho rule appears to be that such claims against carriers 
are better grounded in tort. Ness v. West Coast Airlines, Inc., 90 Idaho 111, 410 P.2d 965 (1965). The 
Ness case involved a claim against the defendant airlines for negligently injuring the plaintiff passenger. 
In bringing his action, the passenger sought recovery on both contract and tort causes of action. The 
district court struck the contract action from the pleadings prior to trial. In the course of its opinion on 
appeal, this court affirmed the district court's striking of the contract action, stating: "The defendant was 
not an insurer of the safety of its passengers. Its liability must be based on negligence." In other words, 
the court implied that the gravamen of the personal injury action against the carrier sounded intort rather 
than in contract. [Straley v. ldaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917,500 P.2d 218 (1972). 
 
What is the scope of the duty owed by a common carrier to its passengers? Is this a higher 
standard of care than would be the case if the action sounded in contract? That is, does the tort duty 
serve to protect the carrier- by making it less likely to be held liable for injuries it causes - or the 
passenger? 
 
(3)  Common carriers: Plaintiff shipped eight carloads of sheep with defendant. Because of a strike 
by defendant’s employees, the sheep remained in a stockyard in transit for a week during which time a 
large number died. The defendant challenged a jury instruction that the strike was not an excuse if the 
delay was unreasonable. The Idaho Supreme Court began by noting that a carrier is an insurer of the 
ultimate delivery of freight consigned to it. In the absence of a special contract, however, it is only 
required to deliver the property within a reasonable time. What is reasonable depends upon the 
circumstances. The court concluded that the strike was one of the "circumstances" and the question, 
therefore, was whether the defendant had acted reasonably: "defendant was liable if there was a strike, 
and due diligence had not been exercised by the carrier to overcome the strike; but if it had exercised 
such due diligence the delay would not have been unreasonable." Since the trial court instructed the jury 
that the strike was no defense, the court reversed. Richie v. Oregon Short Une R.R.,42 Idaho 193,244 
P.580 (1926). Who benefits from the scope of duty imposed upon common carriers? 
 
See also Wood Livestock Co. v. Oregon Short Une R.R., 50 Idaho 524, 298 P.2d 371 (1931); 
Cooper v. Oregon Short Une R.R., 45 Idaho 313,262 P. 873 (1927); Crabill v. Oregon Short Une R.R., 34 
Idaho 251,200 P. 121 (1921); Smith v. Hines, 33 Idaho 582, 196 P. 1032 (1921); Mcintosh v. Oregon 




(4)  McGill v. Frasure: Plaintiff, Kerin McGill, was attending "Ladies Night" at Garfield's Bar when she 
was assaulted by another customer, Connie Frasure. McGill brought suit against the owners of Garfields, 
alleging that they had been negligent in failing to protect her. Plaintiff appealed a directed verdict for the 
owners of the tavern. The court of appeals reversed, noting that "while not an insurer of safety of his 
patrons, the tavernkeeper owes them a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them from reasonably 
foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons." McGill v. Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 601, 790 P.2d 379, 
382 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 
(5)  Bailments: A general category of relationships in which courts have imposed a tort duty on a 
contract in with the bailor/bailee relationship: 
(a)  warehouses: After a fire of undetermined origin destroyed defendant's warehouse, 
plaintiff sought the return of goods that he had stored in the warehouse. The court noted that, to make a 
prima facie case, the bailor must establish a bailment contract, delivery of the goods, payment of storage 
charges, demand for return, and the defendant's failure to return the goods. The burden then shifts to 
bailee to establish an excuse for its failure such as "that he exercised due care, and the bailed goods 
were not destroyed because of his negligence." Merely establishing that the fire was of unknown origin is 
insufficient to satisfy this burden. Shockley v. Tennyson Transfer& Storage, Inc., 76 Idaho 131,278 P.2d 
795 (1955). 
 
(b)  banks: Plaintiff stored bonds in a safe deposit box in defendant's vault. The bank was 
robbed, and plaintiff's bonds were stolen. The court offered the following statement on the standard to 
which the bank was to be held: 
 
Being a bailment for hire, the degree of care which respondent bank was required to 
exercise over the property entrusted to it by appellant was that which an ordinarily prudent person 
would take of his own property of like description, and the bank could not be said to be an insurer 
of such property against theft, if it exercised such care. [] 
 
After appellant had proved the bailment and respondent bank had shown the cause of its 
inability to return the property to be on account of its loss by theft, the burden was upon appellant 
to show that the bank had not exercised the degree of care required of it, [], but the record 
discloses an utter lack of affirmative proof. 
Rosendahl v. Lemhi Valley Bank, 43 Idaho 273, 251 P. 293 (1926). The bailment thus imposes a tort 
duty- or, the contract contains a "reasonableness" limitation in place of the traditional strict liability 
standard that is applied in contracts. See also Riggs v. Bank of Camas Prairie, 34 Idaho 176, 200 P. 118 
(1921); Bates v. Capital State Bank, 18 Idaho 429, 110 P. 277 (1910). 
 
(c)  miscellaneous bailments: Plaintiff leased a barge and piledriver to defendant. 
The equipment was destroyed by fire and plaintiff brought an action for its value. After concluding that the 
bailment had been established, the court noted: 
 
The question of negligence presents more difficulty. Ordinarily, where property is injured, lost or 
destroyed while in possession of a bailee, a presumption of negligence arises, making a prima 
facia case and casting upon the bailee the burden of showing that the loss was due to other 
causes consistent with due care on his part. [} But, when it appears that the loss or injury was 
caused by fire or other extraordinary intervention, the burden is upon the bailor to prove a lack of 
ordinary care or violation of some specific 
duty by the bailee resulting in the proximate cause of damage. 
Carscallen v. Lakeside Highway District, 44 Idaho 724, 260 P. 162 (1927). See also Ford v. Transport 
Holding Corp., 96 Idaho 388, 529 P.2d 784 (1974)(engine of truck left with defendant froze for lack of 
antifreeze); Low v. Park Price Co., 95 Idaho 91, 503 P.2d 291 (1972) (car in custody of mechanic); Burt v. 
Blackfoot Motor Supply Co., 67 Idaho 548, 186 P.2d 498 (1947) (plaintiff satisfies prima facie case when 
bailed property not returned on demand); Bryant v. Clearwater Timber Co., 53 Idaho 413, 24 P.2d46 
(1933) (unless defendant explicitly agreed "to redeliver the truck ... in as perfect condition as when taken, 




Idaho 16, 292 P. 613 (1930) (cattle bailed with lessee of farm); Cliner v. Leahy, 44 Idaho 320, 256 P. 760 
(1927) (plaintiff bailed 120 sheep with defendant for pasturing; only 61 sheep were returned). 
 
 
ii. Custodial Relationships 
 
 
RIFE v. LONG 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
127 Idaho 841,908 P.2d 143 (1995) 
 
TROUT, J.: In 1988, Jacob Rife (Jacob), a fifth grader at American Falls Middle School, was walking 
home from school with his friend, Nick Wilkinson (Nick). The boys crossed the soccer field to the 
southwest of the school, crossed Bannock Avenue, and approached the intersection of Bannock Avenue 
and Harrison Street. Nick stopped at the curb, while Jacob continued on, stepped off the curb and walked 
into the rear wheels of a tractor-trailer driven by Glen Long (Long), resulting in serious injury to Jacob. 
 
Highway 39, or Pocatello Avenue as it is also called, enters the east end of American Falls in a 
southwesterly direction. It then veers approximately thirty or forty degrees and heads towards the center 
of town in a northwesterly direction. At this curve where it intersects with Bannock Avenue, Highway 39 
becomes Harrison Street as it continues west. The accident occurred at this intersection. 
 
At the time of the accident Long was driving a tractor-trailer unit owned by W.O.M. Inc. prior to 
entering the curve at Harrison and Bannock, Long observed several students walking toward the 
intersection. He testified he had driven this route many times and understood this was where many 
children crossed the road. He also stated the curve was tight, and he had to "ride" the center line in order 
for his trailer to clear the curb. Jacob's friend Nick testified Jacob was walking in "a daze" and he walked 
off the curb rather than stopping to check for traffic. Long was already past the point where Jacob entered 
the street having already made the tum with the truck, but not the trailer. When Jacob stepped off the 
curb, he was run over by the rear tires of the trailer which "off-track"; that is, they do not follow directly 
behind and in the path of the tractor's tires when turning. 
 
Jacob's parents (the Rifes), in their individual capacity and as guardians of Jacob, brought a 
negligence action against Long, his employer, the American Falls School District (the District), the City of 
American Falls, and the State of Idaho. 
 
The district court granted summary judgment to the District, finding it had no authority over the 




Ill. WHETHER SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED TO THE DISTRICT 
 
 
B. The District Does Not Have a Common Law Duty Under these Circumstances 
 
Next, the Rifes argue that this Court should recognize a common law duty requiring a school 
district to see that its students travel to and from school safely. They urge us to extend the duty of care 
we articulated in Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989). In 
Bauer, the injured student was on the school grounds prior to the beginning of the school day and the 
school authorities had knowledge the students used the grounds at that time. This Court quoted from 
Albers v. Independent School District No. 302, 94 Idaho 342,487 P.2d 936 (1971), that: "Generally, 
schools owe a duty to supervise the activities of their students whether they be engaged in curricular 
activities or non-required but school sponsored extra-curricular activities." Id. at 590, 778 P.2d at 340. The 
Court then cited with approval two Washington cases which held that the duty a school district owes to its 
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pupils is "[to] anticipate reasonably foreseeable dangers and to take precautions protecting the children in 
its custody from such dangers. The child may sue the school district for injuries resulting from its failure to 
protect the child." Id. The Rifes argue that this Court recognized a special relationship between student 
and school district in Bauer, and we should extend that duty to negligence occurring off the school 
grounds based upon Sharp v. WH. Moore, 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990). The Rifes claim the risk 
of harm was foreseeable to the District, and therefore, under Sharp, the District owed a duty to see that 
Jacob reached home safely. While we have recognized a common law duty to protect against the 
reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to a student while in the District's custody, we have not previously 
extended that duty once the student is no longer in a relationship of control or supervision by the District. 
 
We only engage in a balancing of the harm in those rare situations when we are called 
upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed, or when a duty has not previously 
been recognized. In the present case the Rifes are requesting that we extend the District's duty of care. 
Determining whether a duty will arise in a particular instance involves a consideration of policy and the 
weighing of several factors which include: 
 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, 
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the 
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent 
of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to 
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved (citations omitted). 
Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal.3d 112,211 Cal. Rptr.356,361,695 P.2d 653,658 (1985).  
 
With respect to the foreseeability of the harm, this Court has stated: 
 
[F]oreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the circumstances of each case. Where the 
degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of 
foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the burden of 
preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required. 
Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300-01, 796 P.2d at 509-10 (citing, inter alia, Isaacs, supra). 
 
We find, in weighing these basic policy considerations, the burden on our school districts would 
be enormous. If we were to impose a duty on each school district to protect its students outside of school 
and school hours, they would incur substantial financial and additional manpower burdens. Conversely, 
the harm to the students is relatively small given that the school district releases the students back to the 
care of their parents at the end of the school day. We believe the common law duty arose because the 
parents are not in a position to protect their children while they are attending school. Thus, the school 
district bears that burden while the children are in its custody. However, after school has adjourned for the 
day, and the students have been released, the parents are free to resume control over the child's well-
being. Accordingly, we decline to extend a common law duty under the circumstances of this case. 
 





(1)  Why was there no duty? What is required for "custody"? Presumably actual physical custody will 
create a duty to the person who is in custody - but will less that actual physical custody suffice? When is a 
relationship sufficiently custodial -sufficiently analogous to actual physical custody- to impose duty a duty 
on the custodian? Was the passenger in Clark v. Tan in the custody of the bus driver? Consider the 
following notes. 
 
If the source of the duty is the custodial nature of the relationship, what is the scope of 





(2)  Merritt v. State: Plaintiff ran away from home repeatedly and was placed in foster care. When 
she ran away again, she was detained in the Bonner County jail pending a court hearing. While in the jail, 
she was assaulted by a fellow inmate. Plaintiff brought an action against the state and Bonner County. 
The court concluded - through obliquely -- that the state was not liable because it did not have custody, 
i.e., control, over the plaintiff. Bonner County, however, had legal control and thus had a duty: 
 
One who is required by law to assume the custody of another so as to deprive him [sic] of his [sic] 
normal power of self-protection or to subject him [sic] to association with persons likely to harm 
him [sic], has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect him [sic] from harm. 
Merritt v. State, 108 Idaho 20, 696 P.2d 871 (1985). 
 
(3)  Lundgren v. City of McCall: Plaintiff was watching a Fourth-of-July firework display when he 
was injured by the explosion of an illegal firework. He sued the city, contending that its police department 
stood by while others attending the event were illegally drinking and setting off fireworks. The Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld summary judgment for the city. Noting that, as a general rule, "[m]unicipalities are 
not liable for the failure to provide police protection in the absence of a special relationship or duty to 
particular individuals," the court held that this not such a case: 
 
The respondent's police officers did not have an absolute, all embracing duty to protect the 
appellant from all types of foreseeable harm. Police officers cannot guarantee the public 
protection from every potential tortfeasor or criminal. The case law cited by Lundgren does not 
support his contention that the city owed him a duty of care. This is not a case of negligent 
entrustment, like Ransom v. Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d70(1987), where the police 
entrusted the keys of a vehicle to an intoxicated person to drive. It is not a case of negligent 
inspection, like Rawson v. United Steelworkers of America, 111 Idaho 630, 726 P.2d 742, where 
the mine workers' union had a duty to exercise due care in inspecting the mine. Nor is it a case of 
negligent supervision, as in Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), where the 
plaintiff was hit by a drunk motorist who was on probation for driving under the influence. It is a 
claim of negligent police protection, for which there is no available authority to support a valid 
cause of action. 
Lundgren v. City of McCall, 120 Idaho 556, 817 P.2d 1080 (1991). How does Lundgren differ from McGill, 
Merritt, or Bauer? 
 
(4)  School Districts and students: Rife is an example of by far the most common custodial 
relationship, that between students and local school districts. 
 
(a)  Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 331: Plaintiff tripped over sprinkler pipes and 
broke his leg while playing in an informal football game before the school day started at junior high 
school. Noting the "special relationship that a student has to a school district," the court reversed a 
summary judgment for the school district:  
 
In Albers v. Independent School Dist. No. 302, 94 Idaho 342, 487 P.2d 936 (1971) this Court 
noted:  
 
"Generally, schools owe a duty to supervise the activities of their students whether they 
be engaged in curricular activities or non-required but school sponsored extra-curricular 
activities." There, the Court offered no opinion whether schools must provide supervision where 
students participate in an informal basketball game in the school gymnasium during the 
Christmas vacation. However, the Court did cite favorably [a Washington decision] pointing out 
that the duty a school district owes to its pupils is "[to] anticipate reasonably foreseeable dangers 
and to take precautions protecting the children in its custody from such dangers. The child may 
sue the school district for injuries resulting from its failure to protect the child." 
 
If the district had a duty to supervise the students involved in the football game, and if the 
district should reasonably have foreseen the dangers that existed when Tregg and his classmates 
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played football on the field where the sprinkler pipes were stored, but failed to take precautions to 
protect him, the district breached its duty to supervise the students there. 
 
Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989). What is the source of the 
duty? Why does the court impose a duty to take affirmative steps to protect the plaintiff? Is Rife simply an 
extension of Bauer? 
 
(b)  Sherer v. Pocatello School District # 25:  Alameda Junior High School sponsored a 
carnival to celebrate the last day of the school year and hired Cliffhanger Recreation, a local business, to 
provide activities for the students. One of the activities was a "bungee run," in which participants donned 
a harness tethered to a fixed object by a bungee cord. Participants ran on an inflated rubberized surface 
to see who could reach the farthest point before being snapped back by the bungee cord. Alyssa Sherer, 
a student at the school, was injured while participating in the bungee run. The court reversed the 
summary judgment for the school district. 
 
  The school district bears "a common law duty to protect against the reasonably 
foreseeable risk of harm to a student while in the [d]istrict's custody." Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 
841,846, 908 P.2d 143, 148(1995) (emphasis omitted). This duty is not restricted to activities in 
the classroom: "Generally, schools owe a duty to supervise the activities of their students whether 
they be engaged in curricular activities or non-required but school sponsored extra-curricular 
activities." Bauer v. Minidoka School Dist. No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 590, 778 P.2d 336, 340 
(1989) (quoting Albers v. Independent School Dist. No. 302, 94 Idaho 342, 344,487 P.2d 936, 
938 (1971)). 
 
The duty is not an absolute mandate to prevent all harm; rather, schools are obligated to 
exercise due care and take reasonable precautions to protect their students. See Doe v. Durtschi, 
110 Idaho at 472, 716 P.2d at 1244 ("[T]he school district had a statutory duty to make 
reasonable efforts to protect its students from ...danger. A breach of that duty constitutes 
negligence."). The school's duty includes "anticipat[ing] reasonably foreseeable dangers and 
[taking] precautions protecting the child in its custody from such dangers." Bauer, 116 Idaho at 
590, 778 P.2d at 340 (quoting []). For that reason, "the fact that [a plaintiff’s] injuries were caused 
by a third party does not absolve [a] school district from liability for its negligence" if the third 
party's actions were the foreseeable result of the school's negligence. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 
at 472-73, 716 P.2d at 1244-45. 
 
The negligence claim relies upon a number of acts and omissions attributable to the 
school which, if proved, would constitute a breach of duty sufficient to allow a recovery for 
Alyssa's injuries. Alyssa was a student in the custody of the school and was injured while 
participating in a school-sponsored activity. The Appellants allege that the school was negligent in 
choosing to conduct an unreasonably hazardous activity, in failing to supervise Alyssa during her 
participation in that activity, and in failing to supervise Cliffhanger to ensure that they provided 
adequate instruction and supervision. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim under 
Idaho law and for which they would be entitled to money damages against a private individual if 
established. 
Sherer v. Pocatello School District # 25, 143 Idaho 486, 148 P.3d 1232 (2006). 
 
(c)  Summers v. Cambridge Joint School District No. 432: A student and his older brother 
were dropped off by defendant's school bus. The children crossed highway 95 and walked some distance 
up their family's driveway when the wind blew the brother's papers back onto the highway. When the bus 
driver saw the older brother about to enter the highway, he stopped and extended the stop arm. The 
brother waved the driver on and, after the bus and its trailing cars had passed, gathered up his papers. At 
this point, the wind blew plastic grass from an Easter basket that the younger brother was carrying into 
the highway. He ran to get it and was struck by a pickup truck. 
 
This court has recognized that "... a school district has a duty ... to act affirmatively to 




v. Long, []. That duty does not extend beyond the time the child is in the school district's control or 
custody. Rife, []. Typically, the school district's control or custody ends after school has adjourned 
for the day, students have been released from class, and they leave the school grounds. ld. At 
this time, parents are free to resume control over the child's well-being. Id. 
 
A school district has a duty to provide transportation services to its students so that, as 
far as practicable, no student has to walk more than 1 1/2 miles to school or the nearest school 
bus stop. See I.C. § 33-1501.Forthosechildren riding the school bus, the school district's control 
or custody over them continues until the school bus driver deposits them in a safe place. See 
Chatterton v. Pocatello Post, 70 Idaho 480,223 P.2d 389(1950); Crane v. Banner, 93 Idaho 69, 
75,455 P.2d 313, 319 (1969); Rife, 127 Idaho at 849,908 P.2d at 151. 
[Cambridge School District did not have a duty to protect Ryan Summers at the time of 
the accident.] Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we conclude the school 
bus driver deposited Ryan Summers in a safe place. Ryan exited and crossed in front of the 
school bus, reached his driveway on the opposite side of the highway, and walked approximately 
twenty feet up his driveway toward his home. The school bus driver noticed Ryan and Matthew 
Summers stop their progression toward their home and become preoccupied with papers blowing 
in the highway. The school bus driver re-extended the stop arm and beckoned the Summers' 
boys to come back into the highway. The boys refused, and Matthew waved the school bus driver 
on. When the school bus driver drove away, Ryan had not left the area of safety, twenty feet 
away from the highway, and was still in his own driveway. Ryan had been deposited into an area 
of safety. At that point, the school bus driver and the school district no longer had Ryan under 
their control or custody. Neither the school district nor the school bus driver owed any further duty 
to Ryan Summers. 
Summers v. Cambridge Joint School District No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 88 P.3d 772 (2004) 
 
(5) Employment as a custodial relationship: Junior staff members of a Boy Scouts camp operated 
by Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts of America alleged that they had been sexually abused by 
another employee. On appeal, the supreme court held that "[a]n employee is not, by virtue of that 
relationship alone, in the care or custody of his or her employer. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81,73 P.3d94 
(2003). However, there is no basis for holding that a minor can never be in the care or custody of his or 
her employer. There is nothing in ...the ordinary meaning of 'care or custody' that would preclude finding 
that the Steeds were in the care or custody of Grand Teton Council simply because they received some 
compensation for their services." Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 144 Idaho 
848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007). 
 
iii. Other "Special" Relationships 
 
A. Non-Professional Relationships 
 
 
S.H. KRESS & CO. v. GODMAN 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973) 
 
 
McFADDEN, J.: This appeal arises out of an action instituted by S.H. Kress & Company, plaintiff-
appellant. In its complaint appellant alleged the negligent repair of a boiler by Gate City Plumbing and 
Heating, respondent, and that as a consequence of the alleged negligent repair the boiler exploded 
causing extensive property and inventory damage to the appellant. On Saturday, April29, 1967, Robert 
Noll, appellant's store manager in Pocatello, Idaho, found the store cold and discovered the boiler's fire 
was out. He attempted to start the fire but failed. Then he called respondents, explained the problem to 
William C. Godman, owner of Gate City Plumbing and Heating, and requested a repairman. Godman 




On Monday, May 1, 1967, Cleo Smith, respondents' repairman, arrived, having been instructed 
by Godman to start the boiler fire. Noll explained to Smith that the boiler was not firing and that he did not 
know the nature of the problem. Noll then showed Smith the location of the "main water'' valve and the 
boiler room. While examining the boiler, Smith checked the water level and found it "just right." Then he 
discovered the water feeder, which supplied the water to the oiler, was leaking inside and outside the 
boiler. He repaired the leak by installing a new gasket m the water feeder. Next, Smith found the electrical 
switch controlling the gas flow into the boiler turned off. After he turned it on, the boiler fire started. After 
watching the boiler go through its heating cycle for approximately thirty minutes, Smith went upstairs and 
replaced a radiator vent. He returned to the boiler room for his tools and checked the boiler again. During 
this period of time the boiler operated without any difficulty. Before leaving appellant's store Smith advised 
Noll to watch the water and pressure gauges on the boiler. Smith left around 9:30 a.m. 
 
Around 11:00 a.m., on the same morning, appellant's manager, Noll, went down to the boiler 
room and found the boiler's water and pressure normal. He returned upstairs and went to his balcony 
office. Shortly afterward, around 11:30 a.m. the boiler exploded causing extensive damage to appellants 
store and inventory; fortunately, employees and customers escaped injury. 
 
As a result of the damage the appellant brought an action against Gate City Plumbing alleging 
negligent repair of the boiler as the cause of the explosion. The appellants sought $67,553.93 for the 
damage to the building, for the loss of inventory, and for other claims arising out of the explosion. After a 
jury was empaneled and the appellant presented all its evidence concerning negligence on the part of the 
respondents, respondents moved for an involuntary dismissal of the action stating that the appellant had 
failed to establish a prima facie case showing that the cause of the explosion was in any way attributable 
to a breach of duty by the respondents. In granting the motion for involuntary dismissal the trial court 
stated that there was no evidence of respondents' duty to discover or to repair the particular piece of 
equipment which malfunctioned. The trial court on May 21, 1971, entered a judgment of non-suit 
dismissing the appellants action with prejudice. The appellant appealed from this judgment of non-suit. 
In challenging the trial court's dismissal of its complaint, the appellant has raised two issues: one 
concerning the scope of respondents' duty in repairing the boiler .... 
 
In considering ...the scope of respondents' duty in repairing the boiler, it is necessary to consider, 
on the basis of the record, what each party expected to be done as the result of respondents' service call. 
Appellants store manager, Mr. Noll, testified that on Saturday morning he spoke to Mr. Godman by 
telephone, and stated, "I told him that we didn't have any heat in the building and didn't know what was 
wrong with the furnace, could somebody please come and see what was wrong. 
 
Following this call the next Monday morning, Mr. Godman instructed a repairman to go to 
appellant's place and that the boiler's fire had gone out and that he was to get it going. This the repairman 
did as previously discussed. It is the respondents' position that starting the boiler's fire was the extent of 
their obligation to appellant. Appellant, however, contends that the duty owed to it is more extensive, and 
that the respondents should have inspected the boiler's external safety devices. 
 
Testimony of appellants expert witness, Mr. Sudweeks, a graduate mechanical engineer, 
testified that the gas firing valve in the boiler's interior regulates the gas flow and that this valve cannot be 
inspected without disassembling the boiler. According to Sudweeks the gas firing valve malfunctioned 
causing gas to flow unchecked into the firing chamber. As the gas continued to flow freely, the 
temperature of the boiler increased raising the steam pressure to excessive limits. He explained the 
relationship between this gas firing valve and an external pressure switch. When the furnace is cool, and 
the pressure is low, the electric pressure switch opens the gas firing valve causing gas to enter and bum 
in the furnace, thus raising the temperature and increasing the steam pressure. When the steam reaches 
the predetermined pressure seton the pressure switch, the switch electrically closes the gas firing valve. 
He testified that if the gas firing valve were stuck in an open position, the electric pressure switch would 
have no effect on the operation of the boiler. 
 




valve to release excess pressure generated by the boiler. It was also his opinion that the pressure relief 
valve did not operate as designed since it was corroded. Sudweeks failed to explain, however, whether 
this corrosion would be detectable by a visual or manual inspection of the steam pressure relief valve. 
Appellant argues that it was entitled to assume the boiler would be free from immediate danger of 
malfunctioning parts proximately situated in the repairman's work area which he should have inspected. 
Appellant states that the standard of respondent's duty is found in Restatement (Second) Torts §§ 323, 
395, and404 (1965), which require repairmen to be aware of the reliance an owner could reasonably 
expect from the repair of a chattel possessing an unreasonable risk of potential physical harm. 
Respondents in response argue that the cause of the explosion, i.e., the malfunctioning of the gas firing 
valve, was not something which they were under a duty to inspect. However, appellant contends that 
even though the gas firing valve malfunctioned, the steam pressure relief valve was a back-up safety 
device which could have prevented the explosion had it been functioning properly. Appellant insists that 
respondents' repairman should have discovered the defective steam pressure relief valve which could 
have averted the explosion. 
 
The proper functioning of the steam pressure relief valve was critical to the safe operation of the 
appellant's boiler. While it is true that the gas firing valve initially malfunctioned raising the steam pressure 
above the danger level, the purpose of the steam pressure relief valve was to release steam in such an 
event and prevent an explosion like the one in this case. The steam pressure relief valve was an external 
back-up safety device which could be effortlessly inspected and checked. Respondents' repairman knew 
and understood this valve's function, purpose, and location. Yet, at trial he admitted failing to inspect or 
check it. 
 
The modem view ... is that an independent contractor who repairs a machine or other product has 
the same liability as a manufacturer. [] Restatement (Second) Torts § 395 states: 
 
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel which, 
unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical 
harm to those who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer should expect it to be used 
and to those whom he should expect to been dangered by its probable use, is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which it is 
supplied. 
Restatement (Second) Torts § 404 applies to repairmen the same duty imposed on manufacturers. We 
adopt the standard that one who as an independent contractor negligently makes, rebuilds, or repairs a 
chattel for another is subject to the same liability as that imposed upon negligent manufacturers of 
chattels. 
 
It is our conclusion that the jury should have been given the opportunity to resolve whether there 
was a duty to inspect certain safety devices on the boiler, whether the respondents breached that duty, 
and whether such a breach of duty if so found was the proximate cause of the boiler's explosion. When 
not functioning properly, a steam boiler is a hazardous instrumentality possessing a great potential for 
harm. Although respondents' repairman was qualified to work on steam boilers, he failed to inspect the 
steam pressure relief valve which could have possibly averted the extensive damage to appellant's store 
and inventory. The relative ease of checking the steam pressure relief valve's effectiveness an 
performance, its accessible location and its nearness to the working area in conjunction with its 
importance as a safety device in this case, when balanced with the boiler's potential for harm, are factors 
which must be considered in the appellant's favor in reversing the involuntary dismissal. 
 
We express no opinion whether or not an inspection of the steam pressure relief valve 
would have or could have revealed its defective condition or whether the steam pressure relief 
valve would have averted this danger even if it had been operable. These are matters properly 
for the parties to adduce evidence and persuade the trier of facts. On the basis of the record 
before the court we hold that reasonable men could have differed over the existence of a duty and breach 
of that duty on the part of respondents' repairman in failing to inspect the steam relief valve, and that the 




The judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
 





(1)  What is the source of the defendant's potential duty to the plaintiff? Did the defendant contract 
with the plaintiff to check the steam pressure relief valve? If the duty is not based upon contract, what is 
its source? What is the scope of the defendant's duty? What interest is protected by the duty. 
 
(2) Did the duty arise out of the contract between the parties? If so, how can defendant be held 
responsible for something it did not contract to provide? If not, what was the source of the duty? 
 
(3)  Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc.: Plaintiff crashed his vintage airplane while attempting to land. 
He arranged to have defendant repair the plane. Defendant sent two repairers to the crash; they repaired 
the craft and left plaintiff a note that it could be flown to defendant's shop for additional work. After 
verifying that the airplane could be flown, plaintiff took off. Shortly before landing, a bolt that attached the 
wing strut to the aircraft fuselage failed and broke, causing the left wing to rip off. These events occurred 
while Hoffman was between 900 and 1,000 feet. The aircraft went into a spin and crashed just short of 
the airport. Fortunately, plaintiff walked away from the crash. 
 
Plaintiff sued, alleging liability on four theories, including negligence, breach of warranty, and 
strict liability in tort. Defendant appealed a verdict for plaintiff on breach of implied warranty. The court 
noted that "none of the materials or services of the defendants in the actual repair of the aircraft caused 
the accident." Thus, liability "must be based on defendants' inspection of the aircraft following the repairs 
and their failure during that inspection to discover the defect in the clevis bolt." 
 
The jury found defendant liable for breach of an implied warranty. Defendant challenged the jury 
instructions on the warranty theory. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed that the instruction was error 
because "it permitted the jury to find liability absent any proof of fault or negligence by the defendants." 
 
It is clear that in a sales transaction an implied warranty may be imposed upon the seller to the 
effect that the goods are merchantable or are fit for the particular purpose for which purchased. 
I.C. §§ 28-2-314, 315.in circumstances involving personal services, however, the warranty is 
implied that the services will be performed in a workmanlike manner. The standard imposed may 
vary depending upon the expertise of the actor, either possessed or represented to be 
possessed, the nature of the services and the known resultant danger to others from the actor's 
negligence or failure to perform. 
 
However, as stated in the landmark case of Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal.2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 
(1954): 
The services of experts are sought because of their special skill. They have a duty to exercise the 
ordinary skill and competence of members of their profession, and a failure to discharge that duty 
will subject them to liability for negligence. Those who hire such persons are not justified in 
expecting infallibility but can expect only reasonable care and competence. They purchase 
service, not insurance. [] 
 
The more vexing problem of theory is the distinction, if any between the doctrines of 
implied warranty and negligence in circumstances involving the rendering of personal services. 
Although such causes of action are generally though to be independent of each other, in the 
instant circumstances they merge into one cause of action. A fundamental component in a 
negligence action is the existence of a duty (most often to refrain) toward another and a breach 
thereof. In circumstances involving the rendition of personal services the duty upon the actor is to 





We hold that under the circumstances of the case at bar the implied warranty theory of 
plaintiffs should have been submitted to the jury with proper instructions. [] The jury should have 
been instructed that plaintiffs were entitled to have defendants' services rendered in a workman-
like manner. The standard of care so imposed on the defendants should be determined in light of 
relevant factors such as: The inherent danger posed by an aircraft; the expertise possessed, or 
represented as possessed, by the defendants;  the knowledge of the defendants' intended use of 
the aircraft, and the contributory negligence of or assumption of the risk by the plaintiffs, if any, 
inconsideration of factors such as the age of the aircraft, its previous status and record of repair 
and maintenance and the previous accident. 
 
Plaintiffs-respondents argue that the recent case of S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 
Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973), militates against our result here. We do not agree. In Kress 
personal services were involved and there as here defendants were called to make repairs and it 
was alleged that such were made negligently. There also, it was argued that following the repairs 
an inspection in the immediate repair area would have revealed defects in parts which later 
caused an accident. Kress was reversed on the sole basis that the existence of a duty on the 
repairman and a breach thereof were questions which should have been submitted to the jury. 
There it is implicit that the cause of action was brought in negligence and that the contributory 
negligence of the owner was a defense. So, in the case at bar we hold that contributory 
negligence or assumption of the risk are defenses to plaintiffs' theory of implied warranty. 
Hoffman v. Simplof Aviation, Inc.,97 Idaho 32,539 P.2d584 (1975). See also Mica Mobile Sales 
& Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 546 P.2d 54 {1975). 
 
(4)  Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc.: Galbraith's house was destroyed in the explosion of her propane water 
heater. When the water heater had been installed, the Vangas employee making the installation realized 
that a pressure release valve was missing from the unit. He so informed Galbraith and told her he would 
return and install the missing valve. He never did not do so. Galbraith sued Vangas contending that the 
explosion was due to excessive pressure, which would have been prevented if the pressure relief valve 
had been installed. She further contended that it was the negligent omission of the employee that caused 
her losses. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment for Vangas, concluding: 
 
The existence of a contract does not necessarily mean that a cause of action is entirely 
contractual. In Idaho a plaintiff may bring an action for tortious negligence arising from a 
contractual relationship. E.g., Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Company, Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 
583 P.2d 997 (1978); McAlvain v. General Insurance Co., 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955(1976); 
Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133,483 P.2d 664 {1971); Wallace v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 31 
Idaho 481, 174 P. 1009 (1918). 
 
Negligence in the sense of nonperformance of a contract will not sustain an action 
sounding in tort, in the absence of a liability imposed by law independent of that arising out of the 
contract itself; rather, active negligence or misfeasance is necessary to support an action in tort 
based upon a breach of contract. [] Here Galbraith's claim does not assert nonperformance by 
Vangas of a contract to install a water heater. The water heater was, in fact, installed. Rather, the 
complaint, in substance, alleges misfeasance by Vangas in installing a water heater which lacked 
a pressure relief valve. 
 
Moreover, upon the pleadings, this case appears to be one in which there may be liability 
independent of that arising from the contract itself. The contract for sale and installation of a water 
heater (complete with a pressure relief device) established the relationship, and certain 
obligations, between the parties. But each of them also brought into this relationship a more 
general duty. This is the duty that "one owes ... to every person in our society to use reasonable 
care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated 
or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury." 




(5)  Master/servant: Prior to the adoption of workers compensation laws, the employer/employee 
relationship provided the best example of a duty arising from a relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant. For example, in Ramon v. lnterstate Utilities Co., 31 Idaho 117, 170 P. 88 (1917), plaintiff was 
employed as a lineman by defendant. He was injured when a telephone pole he was climbing collapsed 
because it had rotted through eight to ten inches below the ground. The court offered the following 
statement on the employer's duty: 
 
The company, in the absence of a contract of employment with respondent whereby the duty to 
inspect the telephone pole for hidden defects before climbing it devolved upon him, assumed the 
duty of using due care to the end that the pole upon which respondent was directed to work be 
reasonably sound and safe. The plaintiff company neglected its duty in this respect and provided 
a pole that beneath the surface of the ground was old and rotten, which condition was unknown 
to respondent. Under the great weight of authority, it was clearly the primary duty of the company 
to use due care to furnish the respondent with a reasonably safe place to work, -- a pole that is 
allowed to become rotten beneath the ground is not a reasonably safe pole upon which to work. It 
was not only the duty of the company to use such care to furnish a reasonably safe place but to 
inspect its pole line as often as necessary, and by reasonable inspection and care to maintain the 
poles in a reasonably safe condition. 
Ramon v. Interstate Utilities Co., 31 Idaho 117, P. 88 (1917). 
 
 




(1)  Trimming v. Howard: Plaintiff was treated by defendant for spinal meningitis. During the 
treatment, a hypodermic needle broke off in plaintiffs back. Because of conflicting statute of limitations, 
the central issue was whether the action sounded in tort or contract: 
 
This case is presented to the court upon two theories, [plaintiff] contending that it is one 
on contract ... and [defendant] as insistently contending that it is a case of malpractice, sounding 
in tort and therefore barred by [the statute of limitations]. The complaint primarily alleges that a 
contract for treatment was entered into between the parties. So far so good. But, in the 
performance of that contract, [defendant] impliedly contracted that he would exercise ordinary 
and reasonable care, [] which is another way of saying that such duty is imposed by law.... 
 
We do not have to deal here with a contract whereby the surgeon expressly undertook to 
use extraordinary skill and care. That being out of the way, the charging parts of the complaint will 
determine whether or not the gravamen of this action consists of a breach of the contract, itself, 
or the duty imposed by law in relation to the manner of its performance. [] Aside from the 
aggregation of fraud and concealment, the basic allegations of the complaint are directed solely 
to carelessness, negligence and misconduct as the proximate cause of the injury claimed to have 
been suffered. [Defendant] is not arraigned for breach of contract but for delinquencies incidental 
to its performance. As alleged, these are the very foundation of the action, and if true, constituted 
nothing but malpractice. The gist of a malpractice action is negligence, not a breach of the 
contract of employment. 
Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932). 
 
(2)  Flowerdew v. Warner: Plaintiff fell, injuring his back. Defendant was the treating physician. 
Plaintiff contended that defendant had contracted to cure him. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the 
trial court that the evidence failed to sustain this contention. It concluded, "Moreover, in the absence of a 
specific agreement, an agreement of a practitioner with his patient is one for services and treatment, not 
for a particular result." Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164, 409 P.2d 110 (1965). Since the relationship 
between the doctor and the patient is contractual, why is there a presumption that the claim is not in 
contract? See also Ogle v. De Sano, 107 Idaho 872, 693 P.2d 1074 (Ct. App. 1984).




(3)  Scope of the duty owed by a professional: What is the scope of the duty owed by a professional? 
Is it reasonable care under the circumstances? The scope of duty owed by a professional to a 
client/patient is examined in the chapter on breach. 
 
 
c. Duties Arising from Defendant's Relationship to a Third Party 
 
 
FULLER v. STUDER 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
122 Idaho 251, 833 P.2d 109 (1992) 
 
McDEVITT, J.: This case arises out of a snowmobile accident. Plaintiff Nina Fuller was injured by a 
snowmobile operated by the defendants' three-year-old daughter. The plaintiffs brought suit alleging that 
the defendants were negligent in leaving unattended a snowmobile with the engine running near their 
three-year-old daughter. While unattended, the three-year-old daughter climbed upon the snowmobile, 
pressed the throttle, and ran over the plaintiff Nina Fuller, causing severe injuries. Plaintiffs base their 
claim on the theories of negligent supervision and negligent entrustment. The district court granted 




The parties do not dispute the facts. On February 20, 1988, the defendant, Andy Studer, and his 
father-in-law, Charles Seager, took Studer's three-year-old daughter, Barbara, and three other children 
snowmobiling at Pomerene Ski Area. The snowmobiles involved were a Polaris owned by Mr. Studer and 
a John Deere owned by Mr. Seager. After giving the children rides on the snowmobiles, Studer and 
Seager returned to the pickup truck to load the snowmobiles onto the trailer. 
 
When Seager returned to the pickup, he got inside the pickup to rest. Studer returned and took 
Seager's John Deere for a short ride. After Studer returned from riding the John Deere, he tried to load 
the Polaris by himself, but a ski got entangled with a cable attached to the trailer, so Seager tried to assist 
Studer in loading the Polaris. As Studer was driving the Polaris onto the trailer, it threw mud and snow on 
the John Deere. Seager brushed the snow and mud off the John Deere and then drove the John Deere 
ahead of the trailer, where he left it with the motor running. Studer's three-year-old daughter Barbara then 
climbed upon the John Deere and pressed the throttle. The snowmobile took off and eventually went over 
an embankment and ran over seven-year-old Nina Fuller. Nina received severe and permanent injuries 
as a result of the accident. Barbara was not injured. 
 
The Seagers were dismissed by stipulation. The Studer's motion for summary judgment was 
granted by the district court. The district court ruled that the facts lacked any indication that Studer 
"entrusted" Barbara with the snowmobile and that there was no evidence indicating Barbara's propensity 
or proclivity for climbing on a snowmobile. Hence, there were insufficient facts to support either theory of 
negligent entrustment or negligent supervision.] 
 
The elements of an action based upon negligence are: "(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring a 
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the defendants conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage." Alegria v. 
Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619,619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980); Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation Dist., 97 
Idaho 580, 583, 548 P.2d 80, 83 (1976) .... 
 
II. NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT 
 
The plaintiffs urge that Studer negligently entrusted the snowmobile to Barbara. To support their 
theory of entrustment, the plaintiffs rely upon the fact that Barbara was allowed to remain in close 
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proximity to the idling snowmobile and that a three-year-old would have a natural proclivity to climb upon 
and play with a snowmobile. 
 
One of the first cases in Idaho to discuss the tort of negligent entrustment is Kinney v. Smith, 95 
Idaho 328, 508 P.2d 1234 (1973). Kinney does not provide us with much detail as to the specific 
elements of the tort. Recently, we stated that negligent entrustment is a particularized application of the 
general principles of negligence law. Olguin v. City of Burley, 119 Idaho 721, 810 P.2d 255 (1991). 
Essentially, the term "entrustment" characterizes the duty of care to be applied in evaluating an alleged 
tort-feasor's conduct. 
 
The crucial element of this tort is "the legal right to 'control' the thing entrusted which gives rise to 
the duty in negligent entrustment" and that in exercising control over the thing entrusted a plaintiff need 
not show that the defendant placed the instrument in "the hands of a child," but that the defendant acted 
"in a manner that it became likely a child would come into possession of it and use it in such a manner as 
to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others." Ransom v. City of Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 207, 
743 P.2d70, 75 (1987). While "control" usually means legal ownership, the paramount requirement is a 
person's right to control, even if the person is not the legal owner. Lopez v. Langer, 114 Idaho 873, 761 
P.2d 1225 (1988). 
 
In this case, the John Deere snowmobile was legally owned by Mr. Seager, who had been driving 
for most of that day. While Mr. Studer had also driven the John Deere the day of the accident, the 
affidavits indicate that it was Mr. Seager who had left the snowmobile with the motor running in close 
proximity to Barbara. It appears that it was Mr. Seager who "controlled" the John Deere snowmobile, Mr. 
Studer did not have the necessary right to control the snowmobile to impose liability for negligent 
entrustment. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this issue. 
 
Ill. NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION 
 
In addition to their claim of negligent entrustment, the plaintiffs further contend that Studer was 
negligent in the supervision of his daughter Barbara. Plaintiffs argue that this breach of the duty to 
supervise is a proximate cause of Nina's injuries. 
 
In order to address the issue of negligent supervision, first we recognize the common law 
rule that parents are not responsible for the torts of their children. Gorden v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502, 33 P.2d 
351 (1934); In Gorden, this Court rejected an argument that would have imposed liability upon parents for 
a child's negligence based upon the theory of the "family purpose doctrine." We recognized in Gorden 
that imposing liability in this area would be best handled by the legislature and not by the courts. Gorden, 
54 Idaho at 512-13,33 P.2d at 355. 
 
Subsequent to the Gorden decision, the Idaho Legislature recognized that it is contrary to public 
policy to hold parents vicariously liable for the torts of their children by enacting I.C. § 6-210. This section 
holds parents liable for economic losses "willfully caused" by a minor child still living with the parents, but 
only up to a maximum of $2,500. Subsection (2) of the statute disallows recovery for "less tangible 
damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death, or emotional distress." The effect of this statute is to 
prohibit imposing vicarious liability upon the parents for a child's negligent conduct. 
 
While it could be argued that the doctrine of negligent supervision is just an abrogation of I.C. § 6-
210, this is not the case. Negligent supervision is an action based upon the independent act of negligence 
on the part of a parent in failing to exercise the proper control of a minor child. Like the related tort of 
negligent entrustment, the term "supervision" characterizes the duty of care imposed upon a person, such 
as in the parent-child context. 
 
This Court has never dealt directly with the issue of liability to a third party based upon 
a parent's negligent supervision of a child. This Court has held that parent-child immunity prevents a child 
from suing his parents for negligent supervision, Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560 (1980), 
and that parents may not personally profit from the negligent supervision of their children. Jacobsen v. 
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Schroder, 117 Idaho 442, 788 P.2d 843 (1990). (If parents bring action in their own name for damages 
arising from injuries to a child, parents award can be reduced by the percentage of their negligence in 
supervising the injured child.). 
 
In other contexts, this Court has recognized this tort. In Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 
331, 116 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d336 (1989), this Court held that material issues of fact existed 
precluding summary judgment, therefore remanding a case based on the negligent supervision of a 
student by the school district. In Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 739 P.2d 290 (1987), this 
Court remanded a case based upon the negligent supervision of a 17-year-old prisoner by the county 
officers in charge of the county jail. 
 
The most informative case in Idaho concerning negligent supervision is Sterling v. Bloom, 111 
Idaho 211,723 P.2d 755 (1986), where this Court held that the State can be held liable for parole officer's 
negligent supervision of a parolee. In Sterling we stated that "one who takes charge of a third person 
whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty 
to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm." Sterling, 
111 Idaho at 225, 723 P.2d at 769. 
 
  Expanding the Sterling rationale to the parent-child context, a parent who has knowledge of a 
minor child's propensity for a particular type of harmful conduct is under an affirmative duty to guard 
against the foreseeable consequences of that specific propensity. Thus, this duty requires a two-step 
analysis. First, the court must look to see whether a parent has knowledge of a minor child's propensity or 
proclivity for a specific harmful conduct. If the first step is answered affirmatively, then it must be 
determined whether the parent took reasonable steps to guard against the foreseeable consequences of 
the minor child's propensity for the specific harmful conduct. 
 
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants filed the affidavit of Mr. Studer 
and Mr. Seager. Both affiants stated that they were unaware of any propensity of Barbara to climb upon 
and play on a snowmobile. The plaintiffs did not dispute these affidavits. Therefore, there was no genuine 
issue of material fact to show that Mr. Studer knew of Barbara's propensity to climb upon and play on a 





We hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the issue of negligent 
entrustment or negligent supervision. The trial court’s decision is affirmed. 
 
BAKES, C.J., JOHNSON, J., AND REINHARDT, J. PROTEM., CONCUR. 
 
BISTLINE, J., DISSENTING: The district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants. 
There is most definitely an issue of material fact that should have been entrusted to a jury to decide. The 
issue of fact is whether the Studers' three-year-old daughter, Barbara, had any tendencies or proclivities 
that would cause her father to be aware of where she was and what she was doing while in the proximity 
of an idling snowmobile. This issue is crucial to both the negligent entrustment and negligent supervision 
theories of recovery advanced by plaintiffs, though it is more crucial to the latter. It is clear that the 
negligent entrustment theory might have been readily sustained if the Seagers had not been dismissed 
from the action. In addition to the majority's failure to recognize the existence of a triable issue of material 
fact, they erroneously rely on I.C. § 6-210 to construct an argument against the viability of plaintiffs' 





The negligent entrustment theory would have been viable if the original named defendants, Mr. & 
Mrs. Seager, had not been dismissed from the action. As the majority opinion correctly states in part II of 
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their opinion, Mr. Seager is the party who owned the snowmobile and left it running in close proximity to 
the child, Barbara Studer. As an owner of that snowmobile, he would be responsible for any injury done to 
an innocent party by reason of his negligence in allowing an operable snowmobile, with its engine 
running, to come into the control of some interloping person, be that person intoxicated, Ransom v. 
Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70 (1987), or any person by reason of age not entitled to be in 
control and/or operation of a vehicle. The record is unclear as to how the plaintiffs came to stipulate that 
the Seagers be dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit. Had they been retained as parties in the action, 




In part Ill of their opinion, the majority relies on I.C. § 6-210 to conclude that "[t]he effect of this 
statute is to prohibit imposing vicarious liability upon the parents for a child's negligent conduct." This is 
an incorrect interpretation of the statute and by so indulging, the majority has misguided itself. The intent 
of the statute is not to preclude vicarious liability, but rather to limit recovery to $2500 against the parents 
for willful acts of the child. Furthermore, it is inapplicable to this case. Idaho Code § 6-210 clearly applies 
only to situations where a parent is liable for economic loss willfully caused by a minor. No facts whatever 
have been presented which suggest, indicate, or intimate that three-year-old Barbara willfully injured the 
Fuller child, or, that she had any such intent, or that she even knew the child. Further, the issue in the 
case at bar is not the child's negligence, but rather the father's negligence. The policy implemented in I.C. 
§  6-210, that of restricting parental responsibility for willful acts by a minor child, cannot be superimposed 
upon the present situation, where the plaintiffs have asserted an independent basis for finding that the 




Moreover, it is abundantly clear that the snowmobiling experience was a family affair, and hence 
a joint venture excursion headed by the adult father and the adult grandfather. A jury should properly hear 
all of the facts from the available witnesses and make a determination as to culpability. Neither the father 
or the grandfather can so easily be exculpated from all responsibility; it was they who possessed 
snowmobiles and arranged the outing. That the grandfather has been dismissed from the action is not a 
bar to his name being placed on a special verdict instruction which inquires as to percentage of fault. [] 
Clearly there is a triable issue of fact, and for that reason and in the interests of justice, the judgment of 




(1)  Why did the majority conclude that there as no duty? What must the defendant have the right to 
control for there to be a duty to control? 
 
(2)  Nature of the "special relationship": What types of relationship are sufficiently "special" to create a 
duty? In Fuller, the court identified two different types of situations in which a duty might be found, 
labeling them "negligent entrustment" and "negligent supervision." Consider this division as applied to the 
following cases. 
 
(a) Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc.: The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the 
issue in a legal malpractice action brought by Lee and Dale Podolan. The Podolans had employed 
Michael Donnelly when he worked in a private firm. Following a period of suspension for unethical 
conduct caused by his severe psychological problems, Donnelly was briefly employed by Legal Aid. 
During this period the Podolans contacted him and he agreed to represent them in two different matters. 
Donnelly failed to represent the Podolans but, as the court noted, "his misrepresentations to the Podolans 
were very numerous, convincingly performed, and dreadful in their falsity." The Podolans discovered the 
deception after Donnelly had been fired by Legal Aid. Although they had not been Legal Aid clients, the 
Podolans nonetheless brought a malpractice action against Legal Aid arguing in part that the agency had 
negligently supervised Donnelly and thus was liable for their losses. 
The court began by noting that negligence requires a duty: 




A duty may arise several ways. In the context of negligent supervision, duty is the product 
of the supervisor's "special relationship" with the supervised individual, not with the injured 
person. Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211,723 P.2d 755 (1986); Utchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 
416, 835 P.2d651 (Ct. App. 1992). The duty requires the supervisor who knows the supervisee's 
dangerous propensities to control the supervisee so he will not injure third parties. Id. Our 
Supreme Court has held that the duty described in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS 
§319 applies to questions of negligent supervision in Idaho. Sterling, 111 Idaho at 125, 723 P.2d 
at 770. That section states one who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should 
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965). Here, there was no bodily harm as 
contemplated by the Restatement and Sterling. But see Oppenheimer Industries, Inc. v. Johnson 
Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423, 431, 732 P.2d 661, 669 (1968) (negligence of brand inspector could 
be imputed to State Brand Board for property loss in allowing sale of stolen cattle). 
 
The court concluded that Donnelly's conduct at Legal Aid gave the agency no notice that he was 
"engaged in a fantasy pursuit." Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 854 P.2d 280 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
 
What is required to "take charge of a third person"? Recall that one situation in which a person 
may have a duty to protect another person is when the first person takes custody of the second. Does 
"take charge" give rise to a custodial relationship? Will less than physical custody suffice? When is a 
relationship sufficiently custodial- sufficiently analogous to actual physical custody- to impose duty a duty 
on the custodian? Did the doctor in Davis take charge of the nurse? Did the bartender in Alegria take 
charge of the drinker? Did the bartender take charge of the dangerous instrumentality? Is this the 
distinction between negligent entrustment and negligent supervision? 
 
If taking charge is at the core of the source of the duty in such cases, what is the scope of the 
duty? That is, what must the person who takes charge do to avoid liability? 
 
(b) Stanberry v. Gem County: Plaintiff struck a horse that had wandered onto the highway beside 
the county fairgrounds. The horse had been loaned by one of the defendants to the other. The trial court 
granted a summary judgment for the horse's owner and plaintiff appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed, noting that generally a bailor is not liable for the negligent use of the bailed property by the 
bailee. Stanberry v. Gem County, 90 Idaho 222, 409 P.2d 430 (1965). 
 
What are the differences in the relationship between defendant and the third party that justify the 
different results in Stanberry and Alegria? Is the difference the degree of the degree of control that the 
owner can exercise? The moral culpability of loaning a horse vs. selling alcohol? The differing of harm? 
 
(c) Ryley v. Lafferty: Plaintiff brought an action for injuries to her son who was beaten by 
defendant's son. She alleged that defendant's son, "Elmer Lafferty had a vicious and malignant 
disposition and the habit of persuading and inveigling smaller boys into secluded places and away from 
older and adult people and of beating, bruising, maiming, and punishing such smaller boys, and that the 
defendants ...well knew of such habit and ... notwithstanding such knowledge and information, they 
allowed him to go alone among smaller boys and to continue ... to beat, bruise, and maim them." The trial 
court overruled defendants' demurrer to the complaint: 
 
While it is true that parents are not liable for torts committed by their minor children 
without their consent and knowledge, yet the principle applicable to the facts alleged in this case 
is that the parents are liable if it appears that they knew that their child was guilty of committing 
the particular kind of tort habitually and encouraged the child, as alleged, and made no effort to 
correct or restrain him. Under such circumstances as alleged the child's tort was committed with 
the parents' knowledge and implied acquiescence, and such consent may be expressed or 
implied, rendering the parents liable without proof of their actual knowledge of the tort sued upon. 
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Having full knowledge of their child's habits, traits, and vicious disposition, and encouraging him 
in the manner charged to continue such acts, would constitute assent and participation on the 
part of the parents in the tort alleged, and, if so, it would be regarded as negligence upon the 
parents' part. It may be a question of fact as to whether the child knew of his parents [p]resenting 
any resistance or admonition made by other adult persons whose children were also beaten and 
maimed, for to encourage the child the parents must signify their consent to a continuation of their 
child's conduct, or direct or ratify the act, or that the child was at the time acting as their agent or 
servant in their interests or for their benefit. 
Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (N.D. Idaho 1930). What is the source of the duty? Did the parents 
take charge of their delinquent child? 
 
       (d) Bell v. Joint School District No. 241: Plaintiff was a passenger in a pickup that was struck by a 
school bus. The bus was passing the pickup when the pickup turned left. Plaintiff appealed a jury verdict, 
contending that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury that the negligence, if any, of the [pickup] 
driver Kenneth Schwartz, would become a factor in the instant case if you determine that [plaintiff] Roy D. 
Bell had supervisory authority over Kenneth Schwartz and the he failed properly to supervise or direct 
Kenneth Schwartz after he has a reasonable opportunity to see or know that the driver was operating the 
pickup without due regard for the safety of others and that plaintiff was negligent in failing to exercise his 
authority or acquiesced or cooperated in the act complained of. 
 
Plaintiff argued that his "supervisory power was not such as to require him to act affirmatively to 
control the driving of the vehicle." After noting that plaintiff knew where the driver was planning 
to tum and that the driver was not signaling, the court concluded: 
 
In any event, the record clearly shows that Bell was Schwartz's immediate supervisor, and Bell's 
failure to exercise his right of control over Schwartz may have constituted independent 
negligence on Bell's part which contributed to the injuries he sustained in the accident. The 
challenged jury instruction was, therefore, a proper statement of the applicable law. Bell v. Joint 
School District No. 241, 94 Idaho 837,499 P.2d 323 (1972). 
 
What are the differences in the relationship between defendant and the third party that justify the 
different results? Is the difference the degree of foreseeability? The degree of control that the supervisor 
can exercise? 
 
(e) Doe v. Durtschi: Durtschi was a fourth-grade teacher who sexually molested the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
allege that school district knew or should have known that Durtschi had committed similar acts in his 
previous assignment within the district. The court held that the mere fact that the injuries were caused by 
a third party does not absolve defendant where the conduct causing the injuries was the risk that made 
defendant's actions a breach of duty: "The very risk which constituted the district's negligence was the 
probability that such actions might occur....The fact that the foreseeable danger was from intentional or 
criminal misconduct is irrelevant; the school district had a statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to 
protect its students from such a danger. A breach of that duty constitutes negligence." Doe v. Durtschi, 
110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). How did the school board take charge of the teacher? 
 
(f) Sterling v. Bloom: Another case involving a disastrous mixture of alcohol and motor vehicles. Plaintiff’s 
vehicle was struck, and she was severely injured by Bloom who was legally intoxicated at the time. 
Defendant was on probation from a conviction for felony DUI-his third DUI conviction. ln addition to 
Bloom, Sterling sued the state, arguing that the Probation and Parole Board had acted negligently in 
supervising Bloom's probation in allowing him to drive a motor vehicle for nonemployment purposes, 
allowing him to reside in the same building which housed the Seven Mile Lounge, and to work there as a 
bartender. The court began by noting that "the Board has a statutory duty to supervise probationers and, 
where appropriate, to investigate and report violations of probation conditions for the purpose of revoking 
probation." Since the relationship established by the statute was "custodial in nature," defendant was 
required "to control his charge and to guard other persons against his dangerous propensities." The court 
concluded: 
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the key to this duty is not the supervising individual's direct relationship with the 
endangered person or persons, but rather is the relationship to the supervised individual. 
The duty extends to the protection and safety of "others" foreseeably endangered. Where the   
duty is borne by governmental officials, it is a duty more specific than one to the 
general public; instead, it is a duty to those foreseeably endangered. [] 
 
Clearly a duty can be owed to more than single individuals known to the tort-feasor. In a 
case like the instant one, the duty is owed to a class rather than a single individual. With a drunk 
driver on the highways, it is strictly a matter of chance who may become his victim. For certain, 
however, potential victims include those persons in the class of motorists on the same highway. 
The negligent conduct here involved and alleged obviously endangered more than the single 
victim, Maude Sterling. As Dean Prosser noted, "liability in tort is based upon the relations of 
persons with others; and those relations may arise generally, with large groups or classes of 
persons, or singly, with an individual."[] Here, the admitted negligent supervision of Bloom by the 
probation officer foreseeably created a potential for harm to those motorists whom Bloom would 
encounter on the state's highways. The probation officer owed those motorists a duty. 
Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986). 
 
       (g) Ransom v. Garden City: Plaintiffs were injured when their vehicle was struck by another vehicle 
that was being drive the wrong way down a one-way street. The driver of the vehicle had been the 
passenger in the vehicle when it had previously been stopped by a police officer. The officer concluded 
that both the driver and the passenger of the vehicle were intoxicated. After arresting the driver, the 
officer gave the keys to the passenger. The accident occurred shortly thereafter. Plaintiffs's claim against 
Garden City was predicate upon negligent entrustment. After examining several cases applying the 
negligent entrustment theory, the Court concluded: 
The cases illustrate that the negligent entrustment rule is nothing more than a particularized 
application of general tort principles.... 
Where a person has a right to control a vehicle, he must exercise ordinary care and not 
permit another to use it in circumstances where he knows or should foreseeably know that such 
use may create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. [) Defendant's argument that the tort 
requires ownership of the vehicle was rejected because the officer had legal control over the 
vehicle and "[i]t is the right to 'control' the thing entrusted that gives rise to the duty in negligent 
entrustment cases, [], and this require to 'control' is not limited to those who hold absolute title." 
Ransom v. Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70 1987). 
 
       (h) Lopez v. Langer: The right-to-control issue was central to Lopez Plaintiff alleged that the father of 
the driver was independently liable because he was the owner of the vehicle and had been negligent in 
entrusting the vehicle to his son given the son's driving record. The court stated: 
An owner or other person in control of a vehicle and responsible for its use may be held liable for 
damages resulting from use of the vehicle by another under the theory of negligent entrustment, 
where such person knew or should have known that such use may create an unreasonable risk of 
harm to others. Kinney v. Smith, [] 
Lopez v. Langer, 114 Idaho 873, 761 P.2d 1225 (1988). The court held, however, that the father 
did not have actual control since he had transferred that to the child's mother from whom he was 
divorced; the mother had failed to re-register the vehicle. Note also that the court's statement suggests 
that the source of the duty in Kinney was the general, action-involving-foreseeable-risk- the same 
predicate relied upon by the majority in Alegria. Is harm less foreseeable in one rather than the other 
situation? 
 
(i)       Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co.: Plaintiff worked as an independent contractor, installing carpet for 
defendant. One of defendant's employees pulled a chair from beneath plaintiff as he was sitting down 
causing serious injuries to plaintiff. Plaintiff sued defendant on a negligent supervision theory, alleging 
that defendant had a duty to know of an employee's dangerous propensities and to take care to control 
the employee so that he will not cause injuries to third parties. Relying upon Podolan, the court reversed 
a summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff was entitled to a jury determination of whether the 
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employer was aware of its employee's "propensity to engage in rough and dangerous horseplay." Rausch 
v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 80, 14 P.3d 1074 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 
(3) §41 Duty to a Third Person Based in Special Relationship with Person Posing Risks 
 
(a) An actor in a special relationship with another owes a duty of reasonable care to third persons with 
regard to risks posed by the other that arise within the scope of the relationship. 
 
(b) Special relationships giving rise to the duty provided in Subsection (a) include: 
 
(1) a parent with dependent children, 
(2) a custodian with those in its custody, 
(3) an employer with employees when the employment facilitates the employees causing harm to 
third parties, and 
(4) a mental health professional with patients. 
 
RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS § 41 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Apr. 6, 2005). 
 
 
d. Statutes as Sources of Duty 
 
 
WHEELER v. OREGON R.R. & NAVIGATION CO. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
16 Idaho 375, 102 P. 347 (1909) 
 
STEWART, J. [Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action for the death of his three-year-old daughter who 
was struck by defendant's railroad train. The accident occurred at a grade crossing used by the general 
public in passing from the train depot to a boat landing where passengers take passage upon boats 
plying upon Lake Coeur d'Alene. The crossing is used by 500 to 1,000 people daily. There were no gates 
or and lookout at the crossing to warn of approaching trains or to signal trains of any danger at the 
crossing.] The whistle was not blown, nor the bell rung or any indication given from the train of its 
approach to the crossing.... 
 
Counsel for respondent [plaintiff] argue that the facts thus disclosed by the evidence ... constitute 
negligence ... upon the part of the railroad company in operating such train; while counsel for appellant 
[defendant] argues that the railroad company was not guilty of negligence and exercised due care as 
required of an ordinary person under the circumstances. 
 
It is generally conceded, by the authorities, that the question of negligence may be one of law or 
law and fact. If from the evidence different minds of prudent and reasonable men might come to different 
conclusions, as to whether there was negligence, then the question is one of fact to be submitted to the 
jury under proper instructions; but if only one conclusion is deducible from the facts, then the question 
becomes purely a question of law. [] If, then, from the facts detailed by the evidence in this case 
reasonable and prudent men might disagree as to whether the company was negligent, then the question 
of negligence becomes one of fact, and under proper instructions should be submitted to the jury. [] 
 
This question, however, is not open to controversy in this case, for section 2821 of the Rev. 
Codes of this state makes a railroad company liable for all damages sustained by any person and caused 
by its locomotive, trains or cars when the provisions of the section are not complied with. Rev. Codes, 
section 2821: 
 
A bell of at least twenty pounds weight must be placed on each locomotive engine, and be rung 
at a distance of at least eighty rods from the place where the railroad crosses any street, road or 
highway, and be kept ringing until it has crossed such street, road, or highway; or a steam whistle 
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must be attached, and be sounded, except in cities, at the like distance, and be kept sounding at 
intervals until it has crossed the same, under a penalty of one hundred dollars for every neglect, 
to be paid by the corporation operating the railroad, which may be recovered in an action 
prosecuted by the prosecuting attorney of the proper county, for the use of the state. The 
corporation is also liable for all damages sustained by any person, and caused by its locomotives, 
trains, or cars, when the provisions of this section are not complied with. 
 
It will be seen from this section that the failure to ring a bell or blow a whistle, when 
approaching a street crossing or roadway, makes the company liable for damages sustained by 
any person and caused by a locomotive, train or cars. This statute does not rest the liability for damages 
upon the contingency that the injury sustained was the result of the failure to ring the bell or blow the 
whistle but declares absolutely that where the bellis not rung or the whistle blown and damages are 
sustained, the company is liable. This section, no doubt, was enacted for the purpose of requiring a 
railroad company operating a train over a track, crossing a street or public highway, to give a signal of 
warning of the approach of such train, and to thereby notify persons attempting to pass over the same of 
the approach of such train. lt prescribes a penalty for a failure to comply with its provisions and makes the 
company liable for all damages sustained.... [T]his section provides that a railway is liable for all damages 
sustained by any person caused by a locomotive, train or cars, when a bell is not sounded, or a whistle 
blown.... 
 
It is true ... that the authorities on this question are not uniform, but we believe that the better 
reason is with the proposition that the failure of the railroad company to comply with the statute is 
negligence per se, negligence in law. Under this statute the plaintiff makes his case by showing the 
negligence or noncompliance with the law, and the injury; ... 
 
It then must be conceded in this case that the defendant was guilty of negligence by failing to 
comply with the law of this state in ringing a bell or blowing a whistle at the time of approaching the 
crossing where the accident occurred and is liable in this case for the injury.... 
 
We find no error in this record and the judgment is affirmed. 
 




ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
 
AILSHIE, J. - A petition for rehearing has been filed in this case, and we are asked to again consider the 
provisions of § 2821 of the Revised Codes. It is contended by the petitioner that the construction we have 
placed on the provisions of that section is too harsh and not warranted by the language of the statute 
itself, and that it is also contrary to the decision of the courts construing similar statutes. We have held, 
and are of that opinion still, that a failure to ring a bell or blow a whistle at a crossing as required by the 
statute is in itself negligence. This fact alone would not entitle a plaintiff to recover, unless he can also 
show that the injury was inflicted by the defendant’s locomotive or train of cars. The fact that a bell was 
not rung, or a whistle blown would not make the company liable for an injury that it did not inflict. When, 
however, it is shown that the injury was inflicted by the defendant's locomotive or train of cars at a place 
where it is required to blow its whistle or ring its bell, and it is shown that the company failed and 
neglected to comply with the law in this regard, the plaintiff has made a prima facie case that he is entitled 
to have submitted to the jury. If, on the other hand, the injured party has been guilty of contributory 
negligence, either in failing to look and listen or in recklessly and carelessly subjecting himself to the 
danger from which he received his injuries, that is a proper matter of defense, and the burden of proof 




We see no reason for granting a rehearing in this case. The petition is denied. 
 





(1)  What is the source of the duty? What is the scope of the duty? What interest is protected by the 
duty? 
 
(2)  What role did the statute play in this case? Was plaintiff required to prove that defendant failed to 
act reasonably or only that defendant failed to comply with the statute? 
 
(3)  Does the statute impose strict liability on the railroad? Could the railroad have acted with "due 
care under the circumstances" and avoided liability despite not ringing bell? 
 
(4)  Wrongful death actions are the most common statutory duty in negligence law. I.C. § 5-311 
provides in part: "When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his or 
her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the 
person causing the death." Like Wheeler- and unlike most statutes that are construed to create a duty- 
the wrongful death statute explicitly creates a cause of action. 
 
(5)  § 38 Affirmative Duty Based on Statutory Provision Imposing Obligations to Protect Another 
       When a statute requires an actor to act for the protection of another, the court may rely on the statute 




c.  Express and implied statutory causes of action. Some statutes that impose an 
obligation to protect others expressly provide for a private cause of action. Even without such a 
provision, courts may find that a private cause of action is implied. On the other hand, sometimes 
statutes expressly or implicitly bar a private cause of action. This Section addresses the 
interstices left when statutes neither provide for nor negate private rights of action. When the 
legislature has not provided a remedy, but the interest protected is physical harm, courts may 
consider the legislative purpose and the values reflected in the statute to decide that the purpose 
and values justify adopting a duty that the common had not previously recognized. 
 
Whether an implied statutory claim or, on the other hand, a judicially recognized tort claim 
exists may affect several aspects of the claim, including the available remedies and the 
availability of affirmative defenses and excuses recognized by the negligence per se doctrine. 
 
d.  Relationship with negligence per se. Whether a statute provides an affirmative 
duty in tort is different from negligence per se for statutory violations. Negligence per se relies on 
a specific statutory standard to pretermit reference to the more general reasonable-care standard 
for adjudicating the question of breach of duty. But even without the statute, the actor is subject to 
a duty of reasonable care and potential tort liability. Employing a statute to provide a tort duty 
where none previously existed creates a new basis for liability not previously recognized by tort 
law. This is a more significant role for a statute to play in a tort case that the negligence per se 
role of providing a specific standard of care to displace the more general reasonable-care 
requirement. This Section is limited to statutes that impose obligations to act for the safety of 
others where tort law otherwise would not have so provided under the rule in § 37. 
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CARSON v. CITY OF GENESEE 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
9 Idaho 244, 74 P. 862 (1903) 
 
AILSHIE, J. - [This action was commenced to recover damages for personal injuries received while 
traveling over a defective sidewalk within the corporate limits of the city of Genesee. Plaintiff had been 
visiting a sick neighbor and was detained until after dark. On her homeward trip, she stepped into a hole 
broken in the board sidewalk at the intersection of the walk along Spruce street with the walk on Walnut 
street, fell, and was injured. She says she was walking along "just the same as anyone would walk up the 
street," and that she did not know that the holes were there or that the walk was out of repair. She had 
used another route to go to the neighbor's house that afternoon. The city appealed a judgment for 
plaintiff.]. 
 
The ... most serious point urged by appellant is: That "in Idaho, municipal corporations are not 
liable in damages to the individual for injuries sustained by reason of defective streets or sidewalks." [] 
 
Davis v. Ada County, [5 Idaho 126,47P.93 (1896)], is urged by appellant as an authority from this 
court sustaining the position of the city. In that case the sole question involved was the liability of a county 
of this state for damages caused on account of a defective and negligently constructed bridge. The 
conclusion reached in that case is plainly stated in the syllabus as follows: "A county is not liable for 
damages sustained by reason of negligence in construction and maintenance of bridges unless made so 
by statute." 
 
It can only be said that that case decides any question involved in this case under consideration, 
upon the assumption that the same principle applicable to counties of this state applies equally to the 
cities and villages organized under the general laws of the state. We therefore approach this subject as 
an open question in this jurisdiction. 
 
Appellant insists that cities organized under the general laws "are not distinguishable in principle 
from counties created by law." Upon this point we will first examine the legislation of the state relative to 
their respective powers and duties.... 
 
Section 81 of the act of 1899 providing for the government of cities and villages, [], is in part as 
follows: "The city council, or board of trustees, shall have the care, supervision and control of all public 
highways, bridges, streets, alleys, public squares and commons within the city or village, and shall cause 
the same to be kept open and in repair and free from nuisance." 
 
It will be seen from the foregoing that the power of cities and villages in this state over the streets 
is exclusive and unlimited, and the question therefore arises: Are their express or implied duties to the 
public and the individual commensurate with the powers granted them? It is conceded that there is no 
express statute in this state making municipal corporations liable in damages for negligence. The only 
remaining question is: Can such liability be said to be implied? 
 
Beach on Public Corporations ...says: "The general rule is that under the powers usually 
conferred upon municipal corporations in respect to streets within their limits, it is their duty to keep them 
in a reasonably safe condition for use by travelers in the usual modes, and that they are liable in 
damages for injuries resulting from neglect of such duty; and this rule extends not only to the roadbed but 
also to the structures over it." 
 
... It must be conceded that the American authorities are at variance on this question, but we think 
a great weight of authority from both text-writers and adjudicated cases sustains the liability of such 
municipal corporations. Much of this diversity of precedent appears to be due to the legislation of the 




It seems to us that incorporated cities and villages act not only in a legislative and governmental 
capacity, but also in a private or business capacity, and that the care and repair of streets and sidewalks 
... is ... a ministerial or business duty it owes to the individuals it impliedly invites to travel over its 
thoroughfares. [] 
 
Cities and villages become incorporated because of the fact that a large number of people 
have gathered together in the same community and deem it to their best interest, both 
governmental and business, to assume corporate existence. In such communities travel both by 
day and night is so much greater in comparison with the travel over the country at large that the 
maintenance of good and safe thoroughfares for the protection of life and property becomes an 
urgent necessity, and such corporations should be held liable for a negligent discharge of that 
duty. The application of this principle should prove a spur to the officials of such corporations to 
keep the streets and sidewalks in a safe condition for the uses to which they are dedicated. Its 
denial would be to defeat the plainest justice in many instances. 
 
 





(1)   What is the source of the duty? What is its scope? What interest is protected by the duty? 
 
(2)  What role did the statute play in this case? Was plaintiff required to prove that defendant failed to 
act reasonably or only that defendant failed to comply with the statute? 
 
(3)  Does the statute impose strict liability on the municipality? In Miller v. Village of Mullan, plaintiff 
fell and broke her leg when a board in the sidewalk broke as she stepped on it. The court held the village 
could not be liable in the absence of notice: 
 
If this court should hold that the municipalities of this state are chargeable with notice of the time 
when and conditions under which a wooden sidewalk or cross-walk ceases to be safe for 
pedestrians on account of age and use where no patent or obvious defect is apparent, it would 
subject them to a hazard, care and expense that but few of them could afford. [] If, on the 
contrary, a walk has been used for so long that it is in a general state and condition of decay and 
disrepair, and is allowed to remain in such condition, notice of such condition will be imputed to 
the municipality, and if so bad as to be dangerous, such failure to repair or improve it will become 
negligence. In order to impose liability in such case as this, the condition of the walk must be 
such that danger may reasonably be apprehended at anytime, and therefore reasonable diligence 
and prudence would require that it be guarded against. 
Miller v. Village of Mullan, 17 Idaho 28, 104 P. 660 (1909). 
 
(4)  What is the rationale for basing a duty on the statute in this case? Is the statute like the statute 
present in Wheeler? To the extent that they differ, what is the relevance of the differences? Since the 
statute does not impose liability, why does the court use the statute to support its determination that the 
city has a duty to plaintiff? 
 
(5)  Mahaffey v. Carlson: Plaintiff constructed a ditch to carry water from the Lemhi River to his land. 
Defendants subsequently constructed a ditch to irrigate their lands. At the point where the two ditches 
intersected, defendants replaced plaintiff's ditch with a flume. Plaintiff accepted the change. Nothing was 
said about the burden to maintain the flume. The flume was subsequently washed out. Defendants 
refused to repair it. The court noted that 
 
[Defendants] take the position that there is not testimony in the record that supports or even tends 
to support the theory that [defendants] were under obligation or owed a duty to [plaintiff] to keep 
the flume in proper repair. C.S. § 5653, provides as follows: 




"Any person, company or corporation, owners of any ditch, flume or other conduit, cannot 
lawfully deny to any other person, company or corporation the right to cross their right of 
way with another ditch, flume or conduit either upon a higher or lower level, where the 
same can be done in a convenient and safe manner; provided, that such second person, 
company or corporation shall be liable for all damages that may accrue from the 
construction of such ditch, flume or other conduit across the conduit of another." 
  C.S., § 5657, provides that: 
 
''The owners or constructors of ditches, canals, works or other aqueducts, and their 
successors in interest, using and employing the same to convey the waters of any stream 
or spring, whether the said ditches, canals, works or aqueducts be upon the lands owned 
or claimed by them, or upon other lands, must carefully keep and maintain the same, and 
the embankments, flumes or other conduits, by which such waters are or may be 
conducted, in good repair and condition, so as not to damage or in any way injure the 
property or premises of others." 
 
Under the provisions of the statute ... the duty of defendants, after receiving permission to 
construct a flume across their ditch in lieu of the ditch that was theretofore constructed, was to 
carefully keep and maintain the flume in good repair and condition so as not to damage or in any 
way injure plaintiff's property, otherwise they became liable, by virtue of the provisions of the 
statute last quoted, for all damages that might accrue by their failure so to do.... 
Mahaffey v. Carlson,39 Idaho 162,228 P.793 (1924). What is the relationship between the duty 
and breach elements of the prima facie case? Which does the statute provide? 
 
 
OPPENHEIMER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. JOHNSON CATTLE CO. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1986) 
 
HUNTLEY, J.-This appeal arises out of a grant of summary judgment for the State Brand Board on the 
ground that the complaint by Oppenheimer Industries was barred by provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act. 
In 1981, Oppenheimer contracted with Bolen Cattle Co.to care for several head of cattle owned 
by Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer alleges Bolen re-branded the cattle and sold them without 
Oppenheimer's permission. Oppenheimer sued Bolen and several of the purchasers of the Oppenheimer 
cattle for conversion in February 1983and brought action against the State Brand Board on the theory 
that the Board's failure to require proof of ownership of the cattle despite presence of "fresh" brands on 
the cattle violated the non-discretionary directives of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA) 
11.02. and constituted actionable negligence, as such failure resulted in the conversion of Oppenheimer's 
cattle. 
 
A state deputy brand inspector inspected the converted cattle prior to the sale and noticed two 
brands on the cattle, one of which was "fresh," (i.e., had not yet scabbed over or healed). Such ''fresh" 
brands were, at the most, two weeks old and could have been as new as one day old. The inspector 
testified that he knew he had the right to require proof of ownership of such cattle before they were sold, 
but that it was general practice to merely rely on the reputation of the seller (here, Bolen). The inspector 
had heard nothing detrimental concerning Bolen's reputation. The inspector also stated that he simply 
could not conceive of a "scam" of such magnitude, involving so many cattle (1,681 head). As a result, the 
inspector neither requested proof of ownership or a bill of sale from Bolen, nor did he advise 
Oppenheimer that cattle bearing its brand were being sold by Bolen, which fact the inspector knew prior 




In the instant case, IDAPA 11.02.312 sets forth the standard of conduct required of a state brand 
inspector in two distinct contexts: When confronted with a "fresh" brand, and when confronted with two or 
more brands. The regulation clearly states that, "fresh brands ...shall not be accepted as proof of 
ownership unless accompanied by a brand inspection certificate or a bill of sale covering older brands." 
That regulation further provides: "(a) The state brand inspector may inquire into the ownership of all 
livestock bearing two or more brands." 
 
The language of the regulation speaks for itself. While a state brand inspector may 
exercise discretion in deciding whether to inquire into the ownership of livestock bearing two or more 
brands, the appearance of a "fresh" brand mandates that the same inspector shall not 
accept such a brand as proof of ownership absent a certificate or bill of sale covering older brands. There 
is no room for discretion in implementing this policy directive. Accordingly, since the deputy brand board 
inspector in the instant case testified that the brands he encountered were ''fresh," but he nevertheless 
did not require further proof of ownership of the cattle, the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing 
the complaint .... 
 
 
DONALDSON, C.J., AND BISTLINE, J., concur. 
 
BAKES, J., dissenting- .... I fail to find within the facts of this case anything which would support a finding, 
as a matter of law, that an action in negligence lies in favor of Oppenheimer, a third party to the brand 
inspection, against the State Brand Board. I know of no law in this state which would establish such a 
cause of action. The State Brand Board owes no duty to protect Oppenheimer against loss, damage or 
theft of its cattle by third parties. The mere fact that the brand regulations in question result in an indirect 
benefit to all members of the public dealing with the cattle or livestock trade does not in and of itself 
create a cause of action in Oppenheimer for any alleged failure to protect him against loss or theft of his 
cattle. In Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), this Court held that an action would lie 
intort in favor of a third party (Sterling) who was injured as a result of the negligent conduct of the state 
with regard to an individual entrusted to the state's charge. In Sterling, the Court based the existence of a 
cause of action upon the Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 315, 319. However, in the present case, it is 
clear that Restatement (Second), Torts, §§ 319, does not apply. Neither statute nor regulation imposes 
upon the State Brand Board or the brand inspector any responsibility or duty to supervise feedlot 
operations such as the one involved in the present case. In short, I fail to see any basis in the law or facts 
of this case for asserting that the state was under a duty to protect Oppenheimer against the loss or theft 
of its cattle. 
 
SHEPARD, J., concurs. 
 
ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
 
HUNTLEY, J.-The petition for rehearing by the board asserts one issue we wish to address, that being 
that "there was no relationship between Oppenheimer, Bolen Cattle Co., and the brand board giving rise 
to any duty on the part of the brand inspector toward Oppenheimer." This assertion ignores the basis 
upon which liability exists in this case, namely IDAPA 11.02.3, which reads: 
 
IDAPA 11.02.3. Fresh brands on cattle, horses, mules and asses bearing older brands shall not 
be accepted as proof of ownership unless accompanied by a brand inspection certificate or bill of 
sale covering older brands. (a) The state brand inspector may inquire into the ownership of all 
livestock bearing two or more brands. 
 
                                                     
12        IDAPA 11.02.3 provides: "Fresh brands on cattle, horses, mules and asses bearing older brands shall not be accepted as 
proof of ownership unless accompanied by a brand inspection certificate or a bill of sale covering older brands. 
(a) The State Brand Inspector may inquire into the ownership of all livestock bearing two 
or more brands." 
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We take this opportunity to clarify that liability in this case is solely premised upon IDAPA 11.02.3. Our 
opinion states that "[w]hile a state brand inspector may exercise discretion in deciding whether to inquire 
into the ownership of livestock bearing two or more brands, the appearance of a ''fresh" brand mandates 
that the same inspector shall not accept such a brand as proof of ownership. ***" [].... 
 
The further argument, that IDAPA 11.02.3 fails to define those to whom the brand inspector's duty 
is owed is addressed in Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d755 (1986). While the statute does not 
purport to identify by name or class those to whom that assigned duty is owed, in the instant 
circumstances, obvious to the utmost, the motorists foreseeably endangered by the negligent supervision 
of Bloom are within the class protected. [] Here, cattle ranchers, like Oppenheimer, who rely on the brand 
inspectors to do their jobs, are within the class protected. 
 
Obviously, the brand inspector did not supervise Bolen in the same fashion that the state 
supervised Durtschi and Bloom. However, at the time of inspection, the brand inspector had the 
authority and duty to ensure that Bolen had not fraudulently rebranded someone else's cattle. This 
he allegedly failed to do, despite the regulatory directive that such brands "shall not be accepted 
as proof of ownership unless accompanied by a brand inspection certificate or a bill of sale covering older 
brands." The reasoning of Durtschi applies here. One whose negligence brings about harm at the hands 
of a third party is liable for that harm. 
 
DONALDSON AND BISTLINE, JJ., concur. 
 
SHEPARD, C.J., & BAKES, J., dissenting .... The opinion on rehearing, without citing any authority for the 
proposition, now holds that the "brand inspector had the ... duty to insure that Bolen had not fraudulently 
rebranded someone else's cattle." While it is a proper role of government to protect its citizens from 
unlawful conduct of individual members of society via the law enforcement and police powers of the state, 
government does not have a "duty to insure" against damage caused by the unlawful conduct of third 
parties. Government was never intended to be an "insurer" or guarantor of the safety of the person or 





(1)  What is the source of duty? What is the scope of the duty? What interest is protected by the duty. 
Is the dissent correct that the interest holders must be identified in the statute? Were the interest holders 
more specifically identified in the statute involved in Carson? 
 
(2)  What role did the statute play in this case? Was plaintiff required to prove that defendant failed to 
act reasonably or only that defendant failed to comply with the statute? 
 
(3)  Doe v. Durtschi involved a negligence action against a local school which had employed a 
teacher who had sexually molested several of his fourth-grade students. The court held, inter alia, that the 
exemption in Idaho Torts Claims Act for intentional conduct was inapplicable to the school district since 
that was the source of the risk that made the defendants conduct negligent towards the students: 
 
The fact that the foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrelevant; the 
school district had a statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to protect its students from such a 
danger. A breach of that duty constitutes negligence. Under the allegations of the present case, 
Durtschi's actions would not constitute a supervening cause, and the school districts tortious 
conduct would not arise out of assault and battery. 
Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). 
 
(4)  Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation District: Plaintiff sought damages for flooding caused by 
a break in defendant's canal. At issue was the role of a statute which provided that an irrigation district 
"must carefully keep and maintain ... its canals] in good repair and condition, so as not to damage or in 
any way injure the property or premises of another." The defendant appealed a verdict for plaintiff 
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contending that the trial court had improperly relied upon a statute to determine the applicable standards 
of care. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the statute did not establish a standard of care: 
"[the statute] defines a duty owed by an irrigation district, nor [sic]the standard of care by which the trier of 
fact determines whether the defendant has breached his duty.... [The statute] imposes a duty to 'carefully 
keep and maintain [canal banks] in good repair and condition'; the statute does not define whether a 
defendant has failed to 'carefully keep and repair' its canal banks." Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian 




BROOKS v. LOGAN 
 
Idaho Supreme Court 
127 Idaho 484,903 P.2d 73 (1995) 
 
TROUT, J.- This is a wrongful death action and an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
arising from the suicide of fourteen-year-old Jeffrey Brooks. 
 
I 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
 
In this case, Jeffrey Brooks (Jeff), who was a student at Meridian High School, was asked by his 
English teacher, respondent Laura Logan (Logan), to make entries into a daily journal as part of an 
English composition assignment. He did this beginning in September of 1990 and continued on to the end 
of December 1990.The following January he committed suicide at his home. 
 
After Jeff’s suicide, Logan read through his entries in the journal and then turned it over to a 
counselor who subsequently delivered it to Jeff’s parents, James and Diane Brooks (the Brooks). The 
Brooks then called Logan, and according to them she indicated that she had "re-read" the journal 
provisions and decided that the Brooks should have it. When the composition project began, Logan 
advised the students that she would be reading their journals; however, after a few months Jeff 
expressed concerns that he could not fully express himself knowing that Logan would read his entries. 
Thereafter Jeff’s journal contains a passage written by Logan in which she indicated that she would not 
read the journal for content but would instead check the entries for dates and length. In her affidavit, 
Logan claims she never read Jeff's journal after advising him that she would not. She, therefore, disputes 
the Brooks' assertion that she "re-read" Jeff’s journal after his death. To the contrary, she maintains that 
she read the journal entries for the first time only after Jeff’s death. Jeff’s journal contains some passages 
in which he alludes to death or depression, but there is no definite statement that he was contemplating 
suicide. 
 
The Brooks brought suit against Logan and the Meridian School District (the District) and have 
alleged that the District has a duty regarding the investigation and training of qualified teachers, and a 
duty [to establish a suicide-prevention program]. 
 
Logan and the District filed a motion for summary judgment .... The trial court granted Logan and 
the District's motion, finding that they did not owe a duty of care to Jeff .... Because there was at least a 
factual question about whether Logan had indeed read the entire journal, the judge concluded that for the 
purposes of the summary judgment motion he would deem that she had read the journal. In spite of that, 
the court still concluded that Logan had no responsibility to take action. The case is now before us on 
appeal from the grant of summary judgment. 
 
 
III. EXISTENCE OF A DUTY 
 
The elements of common law negligence include (1)a duty, recognized bylaw, requiring the 
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of duty; (3) a causal connection 
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between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage. Alegria v. 
Payonk, 101 ldaho 617, 619,619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980) (citing Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation 
District, 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80 (1976)). Thus, an analysis of the propriety of a summary judgement 
for a negligence cause of action must necessarily begin with an evaluation of duty. 
 
C. Statutory Duty 
 
Next, the Brooks contend that the Idaho Code creates a duty to protect the health and morals of 
students, and further that this duty extends to the prevention of suicide by a student at his home. The 
Brooks first argue that I.C. §33-202, which requires children between the ages of seven and sixteen to be 
instructed in subjects commonly and usually taught in public schools in Idaho, gives rise to a "special 
relationship." They argue that this statute creates a special duty, and that parents can bring a private 
cause of action based on this statute. The Brooks also cite I.C. § 33-512(4), which provides that the 
school district board of trustees have a duty "[t]o protect the morals and health of the pupils." They argue 
this is a codification of the special relationship between schools and students and thus establishes the 
duty owed by school officials. 
 
The district court found that the statutory duty codified in I.C. § 33-512(4) did not extend to the 
circumstances of this case. We disagree. Previously, we have ruled that when the legislature enacted I.C. 
§ 33-512(4), it created a statutory duty which requires a school district to act reasonably in the face of 
foreseeable risks of harm. Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint School District, 116 Idaho 326,331, 775 P.2d640, 
645 (1989); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986). We again discussed this statutory duty 
in Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989). In that opinion we 
noted that this statutory duty exemplifies the role of the state to the children in school, which is a role 
described as one in loco parentis. Id. at 588, n8 P.2d at 338. We quoted favorably from a Washington 
opinion which pointed out that "the duty a school district owes to its pupils is '[t]o anticipate reasonably 
foreseeable dangers and to take precautions protecting the children in its custody from such dangers."' Id. 
at 590, 778 P.2d at 340 (quoting Carabba v. Anacortes School District No. 103, 72 Wash.2d 939,435 
P.2d 936, 946 (1967)). 
 
Thus, under our previous case law we have determined that a school district has a duty, 
exemplified in I.C. § 33-512(4), to act affirmatively to prevent foreseeable harm to its students. The 
District made several arguments on appeal, one of which urges the Court to find that no duty 
arises in this case because the injury occurred off the school grounds. We do not find this argument 
persuasive. Under the District's rationale, Logan would have a duty to prevent Jeff's suicide if it occurred 
on the school grounds. Conversely, if he had stepped one foot off the school grounds and committed 
suicide, no duty would arise. We do not believe this arbitrary line can be drawn. For the purposes of this 
motion we must assume that the negligence occurred, if at all, while Jeff was attending school and Logan 
failed to seek help. The result of the alleged negligence is the only element that did not take place on the 
school grounds. Therefore, we find that the question of whether Logan had a duty to seek help for Jeff is 
essentially a question that has already been addressed by this Court. 
 
Accordingly, we find that there is a duty which arises between a teacher or school district and a 
student. This duty has previously been recognized by this Court as simply a duty to exercise reasonable 
care in supervising students while they are attending school. 
 
IV 
OTHER ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE 
 
A.       Breach and Causation 
 
The second element of a negligence cause of action, that of breach of duty by the allegedly 
negligent party, requires measuring the party's conduct against that of an ordinarily prudent person acting 
under all the circumstances and conditions then existing. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619,619 P.2d 
135, 137(1980) (citing Nagel v. Hammond, 90 ldaho 96, 408 P.2d 468 (1965)). What circumstances and 
conditions existed is a factual question to be determined by the trier of fact. Toner v. Lederfe Laboratory, 
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112 Idaho 328, 348, 732 P.2d 297, 317(1987) (Bakes, J. concurring specially) (citing O'Connor v. Meyer, 
66 Idaho 15,154P.2d 174 (1944)). Thus, the trier of fact will determine what circumstances and conditions 
existed in Logan's classroom at the time of the suicide, and will compare her actions, or lack of action, to 
those of an ordinarily prudent teacher acting under such conditions. 
 
The third element, causation, requires the trier of fact to determine whether Logan and the District 
could reasonably have foreseen or anticipated that the failure to refer the student for help might result in 
injury to that student. See Alegria, 101 Idaho at 619, 619 P.2dat 137. Factual issues of proximate cause 
are again for the jury to resolve, and not the court. McKinley v. Fanning, 100 Idaho 189, 190, 595 P.2d 
1084, 1085 (1979). 
Faced with the conflicting factual question of whether Logan read the journal or whether 
she could have detected his suicidal thoughts if she had read the journal, for the purposes of this 
motion this factual dispute must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Doe v. 
Durtschi, 110 ldaho 466, 470,716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986) (quoting Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 593 
P.2d402 (1979)). The Brooks have submitted an affidavit from Mr. Brooks in which he claims Logan had 
read the journal prior to Jeff's death. Additionally, the Brooks submitted the affidavit of Dr. Hamilton, which 
states that based upon his reading of the journal, and clinical interviews with the family, it was apparent 
that Jeff was suffering from adolescent turmoil and had he been referred for help, his suicide may have 
been prevented. 
 
By submitting these affidavits, the Brooks have raised the question of whether Logan had 
knowledge of Jeff's suicidal thoughts and whether her actions, or inactivity, resulted in Jeff's suicide. A 
motion for summary judgment must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be 
drawn therefrom, and if reasonable people might reach different conclusions. [] We therefore leave for the 
trier of fact the determination of whether the duty has been breached and whether that breach was the 






Based upon the factual dispute arising from the affidavits in the record, and the potential breach 
of a legal duty owed to Jeff, we find that the motion for summary judgment was improperly granted. 
 
JOHNSON AND SILAK, JJ., CONCUR; McDEVITT, C.J., CONCURS IN RESULT. YOUNG, JUSTICE 






(1)  What is the source of duty? What was the scope of the duty? What interest is protected by the 
duty. 
 
(2)  Brooks II: Following remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the school district, 
concluding that the district was immune under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The supreme court affirmed. 
 
(3)  What role did the statute play in this case? Was plaintiff required to prove that defendant failed to 
act reasonably or only that defendant failed to comply with the statute? How does the use of the statute in 
this case differ from a negligence per se situation? Is there a difference? What is the relationship between 
duty and breach of duty? 
 
(4)  Did the statute impose strict liability on the school board? I.C. § 33-512 provides in part: The 
board of trustees of each school district shall have the following powers and duties: 
(1) To determine the length of school terms which in no case shall be less than nine (9) months; 
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(4) To protect the morals and health of the pupils; 
(5) To exclude from school, children not of school age; 
 
(7) To exclude from school, pupils with contagious or infectious diseases who are diagnosed or 
suspected as having a contagious or infectious disease ...; 
 
(11)   To prohibit entrance to each schoolhouse or school grounds, to prohibit loitering in 
schoolhouses or on school grounds and to provide for the removal from each schoolhouse or 
school grounds of any individual or individuals who disrupt the educational processes or whose 
presence is detrimental to the morals, safety, academic learning or discipline of the pupils. A 
person who disrupts the educational process or whose presence if detrimental to the morals, 
health, safety, academic learning or discipline of the pupils or who loiters in schoolhouse or on 
school grounds, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
 
(5)       Following the decision in Brooks, the legislature enacted I.C. § 33-5128: 
 
Suicidal tendencies- Duty to warn. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 33-512(4), Idaho Code, 
neither a teacher nor a school district shall have a duty to warn of the suicidal tendencies of a student 
absent the teacher's knowledge of direct evidence of such suicidal tendencies. 
 
(2) "Direct evidence" means evidence which directly proves a fact without 
inference and which in itself, if true, conclusively establishes that fact. Direct evidence would 
include unequivocal and unambiguous oral or written statements by a student which would not 
cause a reasonable teacher to speculate regarding the existence of the fact in question; it would 
not include equivocal or ambiguous oral or written statements by a student which would cause a 
reasonable teacher to speculate regarding the existence of the fact in question. 
(3)    The existence of the teacher's knowledge of the direct evidence referred to in subsections 
(1) and (2) of this section shall be determined by the court as a matter of law. 
       
The supreme court applied the statute in Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School District# 84, 142 
Idaho 804, 134 P.3d 655 (2006). Carrier was an action brought by the parents of a student who 
committed suicide. The court held that the legislature had reduced the scope of the duty owed by school 
districts to warn of potential suicides: ''The Legislature was well aware of the damages caused by suicides 
and the risks suicide presents to students and their families and friends. However, it still chose to balance 
these risks against the liability under the Brooks I decision by adopting a statute with the express purpose 
of narrowing the duty to warn announced by this Court in Brooks I." The legislature had the power to do 
so and the court upheld the "narrow definition of 'suicidal tendencies"' in the new statute. 
 
(6)  Statutes, ordinances, regulations, and other enforceable norms: A duty may be predicated on a 
number of statute-like norms: 
 
(a) Anderson v. Blackfoot Livestock Commission Co.: Plaintiff purchased a number of hogs from 
defendant. He added them to his herd. When hogs began to die, he contacted a veterinarian who 
determined that the animals were dying from hog cholera. At trial, plaintiff argued that defendant had 
breached a duty owed to him under regulations promulgated by Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry. 
These regulations required all sales yards to inoculate hogs against hog cholera. The court noted: 
 
That the regulations imposed a duty on the part of the defendant Commission Co. to vaccinate or 
inoculate hogs incompliance therewith, cannot be questioned. The fact that this defendant did not 
itself commit the acts or omissions with which we are here concerned does not relieve it from 
responsibility imposed by the regulations. 
Anderson v. Blackfoot Livestock Commission Co., 85 Idaho 64, 375 P.2d 64 (1962) 
 
(b) Johnson v. Jones was a legal malpractice action that arose out of the purchase by the 
Johnsons of a mobile home sales business. The earnest money agreement provided that the "buyer and 
seller [are] to share equally in attorney's fees." Defendant Nagel, an attorney, prepared the sale contract. 
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Nagel reviewed the earnest money agreement prior to drawing up the sales contract; the Johnsons paid 
one-half of Nagel's $250 fee. Nagel never spoke with the Johnsons or affirmatively stated that he would 
represent them. The Johnsons' complaint alleged that Nagel breached his duty to them by failing to 
disclose his possible conflict of interests and by failing to advise them both of the need to inventory the 
business and of their right to receive certain assets. The trial court granted Nagel a summary judgment; 
the Johnsons appealed, alleging that "compensable damages arose out of the failure of the attorney to 
fulfill fiduciary responsibilities imposed by the Code of Professional Conduct." The Idaho Supreme Court 
held that the Code of Professional Conduct could be the source of a tort duty: "If, as the uncontroverted 
facts show, Nagel was aware or should have been aware that both the buyer and seller were paying his 
fee, he would be under a duty to disclose to both parties the possible conflict of interest and obtain the 
consent of both parties before proceeding with the contract." The court relied upon a formal opinion from 
the Idaho State Bar Committee on Professional Ethics in support of its conclusion that the attorney had a 
duty to disclose. The court did not, however, offer any discussion of why the Code of Professional 
Conduct created a tort duty to the attorney's clients. Johnson v. Jones, 103 ldaho 702, 652 P.2d 640 
(1982). 
 
(7)  Is it possible to generalize a list of factors that a court ought to rely upon in deciding that it will rely 
upon a statute to create a duty? Remember that a "duty" specifies a relationship of obligation between 
one group and another: one group is under a duty to refrain from invading the protected interests of 
another group or is under a duty to act to protect the interests of the other group. Must the statute 
denominate a protected class of individuals? Must this class be less than "the general public"? Must the 
statute denominate the obligated class? Must the statute denominate a prohibited or required type of 
conduct? What else ought the statute to specify? How, again, does this differ from negligence per se? 
See generally Caroline Forell, The Interrelationship of Statutes and Tort Actions, 66 OREGON LAW 
REVIEW 219 (1987). 
 
(8)  The Carson, Miller, Durtschi, Oppenheimer, and Brooks cases involved governmental entities that 
arguably would have been immune from suit in the absence of the statute. Thus, the statutes can be 
viewed as waivers of sovereign immunity. 
 
(9)  The cases involve statutes that create duties where none had previously existed. Statutes may 
also operate as a liability limiting mechanism. For example, the common law rules potentially applicable to 
ski operators - since they are land occupiers and the skiers are invitees - have been substantially reduced 
by statute. Another example is the state's cattle industry which is able to avoid the costs both of fencing 
and tort liability for damage done by wandering cattle. Such statutory immunities are examined below in 
the chapter on defenses. 
 
(10)  Statutes and negligence law: Statutes can playa number of roles in a negligence case, 
including: 
 
(a) statutes as a source of duty: When should a court treat a statute as creating a duty? Recall 
that "duty" has been defined as "a requirement that one conduct himself in a particular manner with 
respect to a risk of harm." Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 671 P. 2d 1112 (1983). "Duty" thus 
is the legal shorthand for the conclusion that one person is obligated to act with some degree of care to 
avoid risking an invasion of another person's interest. We have also repeatedly analyzed duty in terms of 
source, scope, and protected interest(s). 
 
This suggests that the relevant concerns that a court should consider are: 
 
(i) Does the statute specify an obligated class of interests? 
(ii) Does the statute impose an obligation? 
(iii) Does the statute specify a protected class of interests? 
 
That is, the statute must specify that some group is obligated to protect some class of interests. 
The statute may do so either explicitly or implicitly. 
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Note the statute in Carson v. City of Genesee: ''The city council, or board of trustees, shall have 
the care, supervision and control of all public highways, bridges, streets, alleys, public squares and 
commons within the city or village, and shall cause the same to be kept open and in repair and free from 
nuisance." The court read this statute as stating: (i)the city council (ii)shall (iii) protect the interests of 
users of the public highways, bridges, streets, alleys, public squares and commons. 
 
Similarly, note the language of the regulation at issue in Oppenheimer: 
 
Fresh brands on cattle, horses, mules and asses bearing older brands shall not 
Be accepted as proof of ownership unless accompanied by a brand inspection certificate 
or a bill of sale covering older brands. 
 
(a) The State Brand Inspector may inquire into the ownership of all livestock 
bearing two or more brands. 
The court read the statute as stating: (i) the State Brand Inspector (ii) shall not accept 
fresh brands as proof of ownership (iii) to protect the owner of the older brand. 
 
(b) statutes as sources of scope of duty/standard of care: Statutes can also specify the 
scope of duty or standard of care, i.e., be the basis for a jury instruction on negligence 
per se. In Oppenheimer, for example, the regulation states that the brand inspector shall 
not accept a fresh brand. In Carson, on the other hand, the statue does not specify a 
standard of care, simply stating that the roads and sidewalks "be kept open and in repair 
and free from nuisance." The court read the general standard of care, i.e., due care 
under the circumstances, into the statute. 
 
(c) sometimes a source of duty, sometimes a standard of care, and sometimes both: 
 
 
(i) A statute like that in Carson is only a source of duty; it does not trigger 
negligence per se because it specifies only the result- that the roads and 
sidewalks are to be kept open and in repair - rather than how the city is to act. 
Unless the statute specifies actions, e.g., stop at stop signs, then it is no more 
specific that the general standard of care (due care) and cannot substitute for it. 
For example, in Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation District, 97 Idaho 580, 
548 P.2d 80 (1976), plaintiff sought damages for flooding caused by a break in 
defendant’s canal. At issue was the role of a statute which provided that an 
irrigation district "must carefully keep and maintain ...pts canals] in good repair 
and condition, so as not to damage or in any way injure the property or premises 
of another." The court held that the statute did not establish a standard of care: 
"[the statute] defines a duty owed by an irrigation district, nor [sic] the standard of 
care by which the trier of fact determines whether the defendant has breached 
his duty." That is, the statute imposes a duty to "carefully keep and maintain 
[canal banks] in good repair and condition," but it does not define what actions 
the defendant is required to undertake to meet this standard. 
 
(ii) When there is an existing duty - more frequently the general rule that acts that 
create risks obligate the actor to act with due care- a statute may substitute for 
the general standard of care by providing a more specific standard. For example, 
a landowner has a duty to trespassers "to refrain from willful and wanton acts that 
might cause injury." Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 612 P.2d 142 
(1980).in O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005), two 
children trespassed on defendant's landfill. The court held that the county's 
failure to place fences around the landfill in violation of state and federal 





(iii) statutes as both source of duty and scope of duty/standard of care: 
 
When the statute is like those in Oppenheimer or Blackfoot Livestock Commission, it 
forms the basis for the application of negligence per se- it imposes a specific standard of care 
("shall not accept afresh brand") that replaces the general standard of care ("due care under the 
circumstances"). 
 
The Idaho courts have not always carefully distinguished among these categories: 
 
The effect of establishing negligence per se through violation of a statute is to 
conclusively prove the first two elements of a cause of action in negligence. Slade v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 119 Idaho 482, 489, 808 P.2d 401, 408 (1991). Negligence per se lessens 
the plaintiffs burden only on the issue of the "actor's departure from the standard of conduct 
required of a reasonable man." [] Thus, the elements of duty and breach are "taken away from 
the jury." [] Once proved, however, negligence per se does not differ in its legal consequences 
from ordinary negligence. 






























[A] THE GENERAL STANDARD OF CARE 
 
1. RISK/UTILITY ANALYSIS 
 
 
LeDEAU v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RY. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
19 Idaho 711, 115 P. 502 (1911) 
 
AILSHIE, PRESIDING J. - Respondent obtained a judgment against defendant for $1,287.75, damages 
alleged to have been sustained by reason of personal injuries received by respondent while riding on 
appellant's railway train. The respondent took passage on appellant's train at Houston Station, Montana, 
for a trip to Coeur d'Alene City, and while traveling between Taft and St. Regis stations, a rock or boulder 
rolled down the mountain-side, passed through the car window, and struck respondent on the shoulder, 
inflicting a serious blow. 
 
It appears that the railroad track runs around a precipitous rocky mountain-side, and that at the 
place where the accident occurred the track passes through a cut in the point of a spur of the mountain, 
and that this cut is about twenty feet deep. From the top of the open cut the mountain slopes back and is 
rather rugged and precipitous and is covered with loose rock and boulders. No one saw the rock start, 
and no one pretends to testify as to the cause which started it, or the place from which it fell. The 
respondent testifies that when he first saw it, it was in the air, some ten or twenty feet from him, and 
apparently had come from high up on the mountain; that it was coming with great force. Another witness, 
who at the time sat on the seat beside respondent, saw the rock at about the same time, when it was in 
the air falling toward respondent. It broke through the top of the car window and struck respondent on the 
shoulder and rolled off onto the floor. The evidence varies as to the size of the stone, but it was 
somewhere from three to twenty pounds in weight. 
 
Some evidence was introduced to show that the company had noticed that rocks frequently rolled 
down this mountain-side and lodged on the track, and that it had been necessary at times to stop the train 
and have them rolled off before passing. This is the substance of all the evidence given in the case. 
The appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to charge the railroad company with 
negligence, and it is therefore not sufficient to support the verdict and judgment. The only question for 
consideration is that of negligence. It is clear from this evidence that the rock did not fall from the side of 
the cut. It was evidently not an overhanging or loose rock left on the face of the cut through which the 
track was laid. The respondent seems to think that the rock came from high up on the mountain-side, and 
that theory is borne out by the testimony of the other witnesses, as well as by the surrounding 
circumstances, and the actual falling of the stone and its striking the car at the height and place where it 
did strike. It must have come from a considerable distance in order to have gained a sufficient momentum 
to drive it from the place where it last struck the ground above the face of the cut and carry it through the 
car window in the direction in which it was passing when it struck respondent. 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the accident did not occur by reason of anything which the appellant or 
its agents or employees did, nor did it occur through any defect in the appliances which appellant was 
using, or the instrumentalities it was employing as a common carrier. The only theory on which appellant 
could be held for the results of this accident would be that it owed to respondent, and to all of its 
passengers, an active duty to employ such means as were necessary and sufficient to either clear the 
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mountain-side of loose and overhanging rock and stone, or else to construct along its right of way such 
retaining walls or barriers as would be likely to prevent rock and stone from rolling down the mountain-
side onto its track. To require such an active duty on the part of a railroad company operating in this 
mountain region, where roads are necessarily built through canyons and around mountain-sides, where 
the bluffs and hills rise precipitously for hundreds and sometimes thousands of feet above, would be 
imposing upon the company a duty that would be burdensome and might sometimes prove prohibitive to 
transportation companies. The mere suggestion of building retaining walls along railroad rights of way 
through some of the canyons and ravines in this mountainous country demonstrates its futility. No 
company could support such an expense. 
 
On the other hand, we have no doubt but that the railroad company is under an active duty and 
obligation to its passengers to take such reasonable precaution as is necessary to remove or prevent 
obvious dangers, whether they be on its right of way or beyond its right of way. [] But what might be 
termed an apparent and obvious danger along a railroad track in some sections of the United States, 
especially in less mountainous and rugged sections, would clearly not be considered an obvious danger 
along a line of road through the mountains, canyons and gorges of this country, and particularly in 
northern Idaho. 
 
It should be remembered that in this case the respondent did not attempt to prove that the 
appellant's right of way, or the mountain-side at the particular place where this accident occurred, was 
unusually dangerous, or presented obvious and patent dangers to the traveling public, against which the 
appellant ought to have taken special precaution or have made specific effort to remove. 
 





(1)  What standard did the court employ in determining whether defendant had breached its duty to 
plaintiff? 
 
(2)  Risk: What factors are relevant to a determination that defendant breached her duty? The 
concept of "risk" is helpful: risk is a probability that some untoward event will occur. It thus has two 
components: (1) some probability- foreseeability? -that (2) a harm will occur. This is a range of 
possibilities. Events can be risky along two different axes: a small probability of a major catastrophe or a 
large probability of a minor harm. 
 
(3)  Foreseeability: Why did the court in LeDeau conclude that the defendant had not breached its 
duty to plaintiff? Was the event unforeseeable? What evidence did plaintiff introduce to prove that the 
events was foreseeable? Did the plaintiff simply fail to establish that the event was more likely to occur at 
this point rather than at any point along the right of way? Why would this be relevant? Would plaintiff have 
prevailed if he had been able to establish that rocks had been found in the past on the tracks at the 
location when he was injured? If he had been able to establish that rocks were often found at the 
location? How probable must the event be? Must the risk be "apparent and obvious"? 
 
More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated the general standard to be: 
 
In general, it is held that "one owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care 
to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or 
foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury." ... [T]his Court [has] stated: 
 
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others, to avoid 
injury to others by any agency set in operation by him, and to do his work, render his 
services or use his property as to avoid such injury. In determining whether such duty has 




an ordinarily prudent person acting under all the circumstances and conditions then 
existing. 
Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). 
 
 
STEVENS v. FLEMING 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
116 Idaho 523, 777 P.2d 1196 (1989) 





(1)  How did the court evaluate the breach issue? In paragraph, the court offers three perspectives on 
breach: the reasonable person standard, risk-benefit balancing, and a policy rationale. We will take up the 
reasonable person in the next section. Here our focus is on the risk-benefit balancing. 
 
(2)  The court writes, "The burden [to act with reasonable care] is lodged squarely on the individual 
defendant to weigh the burdens associated with undertaking a particular caution against the probability of 
loss occasioned by a dangerous condition multiplied by the gravity of that loss. United States v. Carroll 
Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).it is the responsibility of the jury to evaluate the defendant's 
resolution of this equation in order to determine the presence or absence of negligence." 
 
Did the court offer any guidance on applying the Hand Formula to the facts? What are the 
"burdens associated with undertaking a particular caution" in this case? What is "[the] dangerous 
condition?" What is the "probability of loss occasioned by [that] dangerous condition?" What is "the gravity 
of that loss?" 
 
Are these questions to be answered before the fact of the accident? After the fact? Is the jury 
likely to be able to avoid the hard fact that the plaintiffs' father was killed in the fire? 
 
(3)  "the gravity of that loss," i.e., the gravity of harm: What magnitude of harm is required for 
conduct to be a breach of duty? In an early case, the court noted: 
 
The expression "ordinary care" is a relative term rather than a fixed and unvarying one. 
What would be "ordinary care" under one state of facts would be gross negligence under other 
conditions; and so what would amount to the "highest and utmost care" in one situation would be 
only "ordinary care" in another, and therefore when the term "ordinary care" is used we mean 
such care as is proportionate to the danger to be avoided or risk to be incurred, judging by the 
standard of common prudence and the surrounding facts and circumstances. 
Denbeigh v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co., 23 Idaho 663, 132 P. 112 (1913), quoting 
Anderson v. Great Northern R.R., 15 Idaho 513, 99 P. 91 (1908). In another contemporaneous case, the 
court wrote: 
 
Where the danger is exceedingly small and trivial, it may not be negligent at all to 
disregard it Where it is exceedingly great and obvious, it would be negligence per se n 
itself]to incur the hazard .... In other cases it would be open to question whether incurring the 
hazard would be consistent with ordinary care, and incases of this kind the question of ... 
negligence is one for the determination of the jury. 
Carson v. City of Genesee, 9 Idaho 244,250, 74 P. 862, 863 (1903) (quoting Samples v. City of Atlanta, 
95 Ga. 110, 22S.E. 135, 136 (1894)).is this consistent with the decision in LeDeau? In Stevens? 
 
(4)       "the burdens associated with undertaking a particular caution," i.e., the utility of the 
conduct: The cases also recognize that the utility of defendant's conduct is a factor in determining 
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breach. Why would the utility of defendant's conduct be relevant to the question of breach? Is it the utility 
of the conduct to defendant? Is it the utility of the conduct to society? What is "the conduct"? 
 
Did the decision in LeDeau on the cost of preventing the occurrence of a foreseeable event? Did 
the court, in other words, decide that the utility of railroads was sufficiently great that the company ought 
not to be driven from business? Was the cost prohibitive? Would defendant have been required to 
construct rock barriers along its entire line? In Stevens, should the defendants be found to have breached 
their duty to the decedent if the cost of installing safety devices was low? Was low in relationship to the 
value of a human life? 
 
In Idaho Northern R.R. v. Post Falls Lumber Co., defendant was driving logs down a stream to its 
sawmill when they jammed, flooding plaintiff’s property. The court began by noting 
that "[i]t is the policy of this state to encourage the employment of the watercourses for any useful 
and beneficial purpose, and to that end the power of eminent domain has been granted by the 
state for the purposes of improving streams, so that the people interested in the country through which 
they flow may utilize them for beneficial purposes." The court was quick to point out, however, that this 
public policy did not resolve the issue: 
 
The person who undertakes to float logs and lumber down a stream must exercise 
reasonable care in order to avoid injury to the property of others. The fact that a stream is 
navigable does not give anyone a right to dump logs and timber into the stream and allow the 
same to go unattended and without being cared for, and as a consequence to form dams and 
divert the current of water to the injury and damage of others. No doubt the damages which a 
riparian proprietor may sustain as a natural and unavoidable consequence of the navigation of a 
stream either with boats and other craft or rafts and logs, where the same is conducted with due 
care and in a reasonably prudent manner, must be borne by such riparian proprietor as a natural 
and consequent injury under the rule of damnum absque injuria. Mashburn v. St. Joe 
Improvement Co., 19 Idaho 30, 113 Pac. 92 (1910). On the other hand, the party who is 
attempting to navigate such a stream must exercise care proportionate to the dangers and 
difficulties of the undertaking and the liability of inflicting injury upon others. If the exercise of such 
care will entail such an expense as to make the enterprise unprofitable, the result will necessarily 
be that he will not navigate the stream. This, however, is a problem with which he is confronted 
and which he must solve at this own risk and responsibility. 
 
The appellant when it placed its logs in Eagle Creek did so with notice of the conditions of 
the stream and the situation of respondent's railroad grade and track. Appellant owed respondent 
the duty of exercising reasonable care and diligence in looking after its logs and keeping them 
moving and preventing them piling up and jamming so as to inflict unnecessary damages on 
respondent. 
Idaho Northern R.R. v. Post Falls Lumber Co., 20 Idaho 695, 119 P. 1098 (1911). 
 
(5) Unnecessary risks: Does the fact that a risk is unnecessary affect the breach issue? In an early 
case involving a railroad turntable, the court offered the following rationale for holding the railroad liable: 
 
The turntable in question was a dangerous instrument, insecurely fastened, in its very nature 
attractive to children, was located in a public place, and the agents and employees of the 
defendant corporation knew its dangerous character and knew that it was frequented by people in 
the vicinity and used by them for amusement. The construction of the machine was such that the 
distance between it and the frame in which it revolved was greater on one side than on the other, 
so much so that the limb of a person, and the body of the deceased, could be caught between the 
table and the frame around it. This fact, and the fact that children could revolve it, made it so 
dangerous that it became the duty of the defendant to keep it so secured that it would be safe. It 
would be no more difficult or inconvenient to keep this turntable locked than it is to keep a switch 
which is in constant use locked. It is usual, if not universal, for railroad companies to keep 
switches which are in constant use locked. The use of a lock upon this turntable would have 




York v. Pacific & Northern Ry., 8 Idaho 574,69 P. 1042 (1902) (Quarles, J., concurring). Does this 
analysis tum on the minimal burden imposed on defendant? Is the case distinguishable from LeDeau? 
From Stevens? 
 
(6)  Least-cost avoider: In York, Justice Quarles noted that it ''would be no more difficult or 
inconvenient to keep this turntable locked than it is to keep a switch which is in constant use locked." 
What should the rule be when it is plaintiff who can most cheaply avoid the loss. Should plaintiff be 
required to invest to protect herself if this will be less costly? 
 
Defendants canal crossed plaintiffs land. The canal leaked, and plaintiffs land had been damaged 
by the seepage. On appeal from a jury verdict for plaintiff, defendant argued that, "at a small expense on 
the part of the plaintiff, any surplus water that may have come from defendant's ditch could have been 
conducted off the land of the plaintiff, so that the same would do her no harm." The court rejected this 
argument, noting that defendant "cannot avoid his responsibility by showing that the one injured might 
have avoided the damage by a slight expense." McCarty v. Boise City Canal Co., 2 Idaho 245, 10P.623 




2.       THE REASONABLE PERSON 
 
 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary care in 
the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a reasonably 
careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. Negligence may 
thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of 
something a reasonably careful person would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the 
evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would act under those circumstances. 
That is for you to decide. 
-IDJ12.20 
 
As William Burroughs, in an interview with Paul Krassner on the possibility of communicating with dead 





(1)  Is IDJI2.20 consistent with LeDeau? with the Hand formula? Does the reasonable person engage 
in a cost-benefit calculation? 
 
(2)       Objective or subjective? Is the general standard objective or subjective? That is, does it make 
any difference what the individual defendant knew or didn't know? In a case involving an explosion at an 
oil well, one defendant contended that she was unaware of the risk involved in a defective "gas trap." The 
court rejected this argument: 
 
Among those acquainted with oil and gas operations, it is a matter of general knowledge that gas-
traps as originally constructed are dangerous. The trap at the well had lost the upper barrel with 
the small gas jet, leaving only the lower barrel with an opening in the pipe much larger, a 
condition of increased hazard. Manipulating such a dangerous instrumentality, both defendant[s] 
were under obligation to reasonably inform themselves of its peril to others: that they did not 
anticipate resultant injury is no excuse.... Injury having resulted from their negligence ... they were 
...liable for the damage. 
Hartman v. Gas Dome Oil Co., 50 Idaho 288,295 P. 998 (1931). 
 




possession of methamphetamine it was required to find that ''the Defendant knew or should have known 
that the substance possessed was a controlled substance." On appeal, the supreme court reversed 
defendant's conviction: 
 
The instructions as given allowed the jury to convict Blake on each count upon a finding 
that he was actually in possession of the methamphetamine and cocaine and that he "should 
have known that the substance[s] possessed were ... controlled substance[s]." Blake contends, 
and we agree, that this language improperly allowed the jury to convict him using a negligence 
standard. That is, even if Blake did not actually know methamphetamine was under the seat or 
cocaine was in the wallet, he should have known and is equally culpable as if he did know. 
       ...[The state's] arguments ignore this Court's holding in Fox ... that "knowledge that one is in 
possession of the substance" is an essential element of the offense. 
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 985 P.2d 117(1999). The difference between "knew'' and "should have 
known" is one measure of the difference between a subjective and an objective evaluative standard. 
 
(3)  Rumpel v. Oregon Short Line Ry.: If the "reasonable person" embodies the community's 
perception of what types of conduct are unreasonably risky, how closely tied to any particular community 
is the standard? 
 
Plaintiff was a laborer employed at a feed and livery stable in Nampa. ln the course of his 
employment he was required to cross F Street repeatedly. The defendant had blockaded the street with 
its freight cars. To avoid a lengthy detour around the train each time he crossed the street, plaintiff 
crawled under the boxcars. When plaintiff attempted to pass under the train for the sixth time, the train 
started up unexpectedly and injured plaintiff. The trial court allowed plaintiff to introduce evidence of the 
fact that it was common practice for people in Nampa to crawl beneath the defendant's boxcars because 
they so commonly blockaded F Street. On appeal by defendant, the court concluded: 
 
The fact that it was attempted to be proven, over the repeated objections of defendant, that it was 
the custom of the people of the town of Nampa to crawl under the cars when they blockaded the 
streets, if fully proven, could not have the slightest effect upon the plaintiffs right to recover, as a 
custom of the people in putting themselves daily in imminent danger of their lives in passing 
under cars blockading the streets ... could not excuse the plaintiff in his indulgence in conduct so 
reckless and so wanting in ordinary prudence and care. While it is improper and unlawful for a 
railroad company to unnecessarily blockade a street of a town or city with its cars, yet every man 
is bound at his peril to use ordinary care to preserve his own life and limbs ...; Therefore, all 
evidence of the custom of the people in passing under the cars so blockading the streets was 
irrelevant and incompetent and should have been excluded. 
Rumpel v. Oregon Short Line Ry., 24 Idaho 13, 35 P. 700 (1894). 
 
(4)  Learners and children: How should the law treat those who are less skilled? 
(a) Learners: A student pilot with 29.4 hours of flying time rented an airplane from 
the plaintiff for her first solo cross-country flight. As she attempted to land the plane, it crashed. 
On appeal, plaintiff raised several objections to the verdict for defendant. One of these was a 
challenge to 
 
the standard of care applied by the trial court. She contends that the court used the 
standard of an experienced pilot exercising ordinary care, rather than the standard of a student 
pilot exercising ordinary care. The argument suggests that there are separate 
standards for experienced pilots and student pilots. This premise is incorrect. There is only one 
standard- ordinary care. The degree of experience is a factor to be considered, along with other 
circumstances, in applying the standard. However, itis not a conceptual element of the standard 
itself.... 
The question, then, is whether the trial court, in its determination of negligence, gave due 
consideration to Blough's relative lack of experience. In his memorandum decision, the trial judge 
described Blough's prior training and experience. The court examined the specific tasks involved 
THE REASONABLE PERSON 
257 
 
in landing the airplane under the existing circumstances. His finding of negligence was couched 
in terms of Blough's particular training and experience. We conclude that the trial court properly 
applied the negligence standard to this case. 
T-Craft Aero Club, Inc. v. Blough, 102 Idaho 833, 642 P.2d 70 (Ct. App. 1982). 
 
(b)  Children: The Idaho courts apply a somewhat similar standard to judge the 
reasonableness of a child's conduct: 
A child is held to that standard of care which would be expected from an ordinary child of the 
same age, experience, knowledge, and discretion.... Because these factors vary so greatly 
among children and because children are naturally unpredictable and impulsive, it is especially 
difficult to judge their conduct as a matter of law. Instead, it is preferable to submit the issue of 
their conduct to a jury. 
Davis v. Bushnell, 93 Idaho 528, 564 P.2d 652 (1970). 
 
In Goodfellow v. Coggbum, 98 Idaho 202, 560 P.2d 873, (1977), the Idaho Supreme Court 
adopted the rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court: 
 
As a general rule, a child is held to [the Davis] standard .... There is a well-recognized exception, 
however, when a child is operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway. ln 
such instances, the child is held to an adult standard of care.... 
 
Although the jurisdictions are split on whether to recognize this exception, ...we believe 
that it represents the better rule. The rationale supporting it was best stated in Dellwo v. Pearson. 
See also Robinson v. Westover, 101 Idaho 766,620 P.2d 1096(1980); Kelly v. Bruch, 91 Idaho 50, 415 
P.2d 693 (1966); Mundy v. Johnson, 84 Idaho 438, 373 P.2d 755 (1962); Laidlaw v. Barker, 78 Idaho 67, 
297 P.2d 287 (1956). 
 
(c)  IDJI 2.02 -Duty of care- minor child 
 
A minor child has a duty to exercise the degree of care which would reasonably 
be expected of an ordinary child of the same age, maturity, experience and knowledge 
when acting under similar circumstances. 
 
An Ethical Aside 
 
(1)  Personal responsibility: What is the basis for imposing liability for less than reasonably careful 
conduct? Reconsider the statement from Stevens v. Fleming. The court in Stevens argued that it was 
based upon personal responsibility. 
 
The prevalent view in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was succinctly captured by 
Professor Ames: "The early law asked simply, 'Did the defendant do the physical act which damaged the 
plaintiff? The law of today ... asks the further question, 'Was the act blameworthy? The ethical standard of 
reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral standard of acting at one's peril." James Barr Ames, Law 
and Morals, 22 HARV. L.,. REV. 97 (1908). Why is "the early law" "unmoral"? Why isn't it moral to 
conclude that - as between two innocent individuals - the one whose conduct was the cause of the injury 
ought to pay for the loss? 
 
Holmes expands on this perspective in The Common Law. At one point He argues that "[t}he 
requirement of an act is the requirement that the defendant should have made a choice. But the only 
possible purpose of introducing this moral element is to make the power of avoiding the evil complained 
of a condition of liability." Thus, it is the moral blameworthiness of the individual's choice that is the 
predicate of liability. Subsequently, however, he writes that "(t]he law considers ...what would be 
blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability 
by that." What is the basis for liability in negligence? Are the two excerpts consistent? How can Holmes' 




Is "objective morality" an oxymoron? Consider: is a person of less than average intelligence who 
does not recognize a risk morally culpable? Is such a person legally responsible for his negligent 
conduct? Is a person who is insane morally culpable? Is such a person legally responsible for her 
negligent conduct? Is "reasonableness" truly a moral standard? 
 
The underlying moral position of liability predicated upon fault is most apparent in a situation 
where the individuals were strangers prior to the accident: the moral position of negligence law is that 
defendant's benefits from his own conduct are a valid excuse for not paying plaintiff for the harm that such 
conduct causes. That is: if the defendant's benefit "outweighs" in some sense plaintiff's loss, defendant is 
not required to compensate plaintiff for the loss. 
 
Strict liability challenges this fundamental point: as between an innocent plaintiff and an actor who 
has caused injury, the actor ought to bear the entire cost of the action particularly if the gains to be 
derived from that action are as great as defendant contends, i.e., strict liability embodies a cost-
internalization rationale: force the actor to internalize all the costs of his conduct where the defendant 
alone reaps the benefits. 
Which position is ethically preferable? What assumptions and goals are needed to answer this 
question? Again: why isn't it moral to conclude that- as between two innocent individuals, the one whose 
conduct was the cause of the injury ought to pay for the loss? That is: why is it moral that innocent non-
actor ought to bear the loss caused by the actor's conduct? 
 
(2)  Men, women, and "reasonableness": Can a woman be a "reasonable man"? Can a woman be 
a "reasonable person"? Can a woman be "reasonable"? Is "reasonable" inherently sexist? 
 
In her now-classic study of the psychological development of girls and boys, Carol Gilligan 
discussed a traditional test for moral development, "Heinz's dilemma." The dilemma involves Heinz, a 
man who is faced with a decision whether to steal a drug that he cannot afford in order to save his wife's 
life. The dilemma was one of a series designed to measure moral development in adolescence. The 
reasons for and against stealing are explored through a series of questions "that vary and extend the 
parameters of the dilemma in a way designed to reveal the underlying structure of moral thought." 
 
Gilligan discusses two children's responses to the dilemma. The children, Amy and Jake, 
were "bright and articulate and ... resisted easy categories of sex-role stereotyping, since Amy 
aspired to become a scientist while Jake preferred English to math." Nonetheless, their moral 
judgments seem initially to confirm familiar notions about differences between the sexes, 
suggesting that the edge girls have on moral development during the early school years gives 
way at puberty with the ascendance of formal logical thought in boys. 
 
Jake, at eleven, is clear from the outset that Heinz should steal the drug. Constructing the 
dilemma ... as a conflict between the values of property and life, he discerns the logical priority of 
life and uses that logic to justify his choice: 
 
For one thing, a human life is worth more than money, and if the druggist only makes 
$1,000, he is still going to live, but if Heinz doesn't steal the drug, his wife is going to die. (Why is 
life worth more than property?) Because the druggist can get a thousand dollars later from rich 
people with cancer, but Heinz can't get his wife again. (Why not?) Because people are all 
different .... 
 
Jake also considers the legal implications of his choice, arguing that, if Heinz is caught, 
"the judge would probably think it was the right thing to do." When it was pointed out that, in 
stealing the drug, Heinz would break the Jaw, Jake replied that "the laws have mistakes, and you 
can't go writing up a Jaw for everything that you can imagine." 
 
Thus, while taking the Jaw into account and recognizing its function in maintaining social 
order (the judge, Jake says, "Should give Heinz the lightest possible sentence"), he also sees the 
law as man-made and therefore subject to error and change. Yet his judgment that Heinz should 
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steal the drug, like his view of the Jaw as having mistakes, rests on the assumption of agreement, 
a societal consensus around moral values that allows one to know and expect others to 
recognize what is "the right thing to do." 
 
  In contrast, Amy's responses convey "an image of development stunted by a 
failure of logic." When asked if Heinz should steal the drug, she replies in a way that seems 
evasive and unsure: 
Well, I don't think so. I think there might be other ways besides stealing it, like if he could 
borrow the money or make a loan or something, but he really shouldn't steal the drug - but his 
wife shouldn't die either. 
 
When asked why Heinz should not steal the drug, Amy does not consider either property 
or law but rather "the effect that theft could have on the relationship between Heinz and his wife: 
If he stole the drug, he might save his wife then, but if he did he might go to jail, and then his wife 
might get sicker again, and he couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not be good. So, they 
should really just talk it out and find some other way to make the money. Seeing in the dilemma 
not a math problem with humans but a narrative of relationships that extends over time, Amy 
envisions the wife's continuing need for her husband and the husband's continuing concern for 
his wife and seeks to respond to the druggist's need in a way that would sustain rather than sever 
the connection. Just as she ties the wife's survival to the preservation of relationships, so she 
considers the value of the wife's life in a context of relationships, saying that it would be wrong for 
her to die because, "if she died, it hurts a lot of people and it hurts her." Since Amy's moral 
judgment is grounded in a belief that, "if somebody has something that would keep somebody 
alive, then it's not right not to give it to them," she considers the problem in the dilemma to arise 
not from the druggist's assertion of rights but from his failure of response. 
 
[S]eeing a world comprised of relationships rather than of people standing alone, a world 
that coheres through human connection rather than through systems of rules, she finds the 
puzzle in the dilemma to lie in the failure of the druggist to respond to the wife. Saying that "it is 
no right for someone to die when their life could be saved," she assumes that if the druggist were 
to see the consequences of his refusal to lower his price, he would realize that "he should just 
give it to the wife and then have the husband pay back the money later." Thus, she considers the 
solution to the dilemma to lie in 'Taking the wife's condition more salient to the druggist or, that 
failing, in appealing to others who are in a position to help. 
 
Just as Jake is confident that the judge would agree that stealing is the right thing to for 
Heinz to do, so Amy is confident that, "if Heinz and the druggist had talked it out long enough, 
they could reach something besides stealing." As he considers the law to "have mistakes," so she 
sees this drama as a mistake, believing that "the world should just share things more and then 
people wouldn't have to steal." Both children thus recognize the need for agreement but see it as 
mediated in different ways – he impersonally through systems of logic and law, she personally 
through communication in relationship. 
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 25-29 (1982). See also Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on 
Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 3 (1988). 
 
Does converting "reasonable man "to "reasonable person" eradicate the term's sexism? Or 
merely obscure - and thus embed - it? Does Gilligan's discussion cast light on the "reasonable person" 
standard? What would a reasonable person do in Heinz' position? What did learned Hand conclude? 
 
Should the negligence-determining standard be changed? Would "good neighbor" be preferable? 
Would an instruction embodying a "concerned person" standard be an improvement? Would these verbal 
formulations change the results in actual cases? 
 
(3) Italians and "reasonableness": Can an Italian be "a reasonable person"? Guido Calabresi, 
previously dean of Yale law School and a federal court of appeals judge, has written on the question of 
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"reasonableness." He noted that the standard descriptions provided for the "reasonable person" were all 
"unmistakably male": 
 
The reasonably prudent man was invariably described rather vaguely, but always 
in male terms. In England, he was defined as the man on the Clapham Omnibus - a definition 
which has always left me utterly cold since I have never met the Clapham Omnibus or any man 
on it, and have no idea why reasonableness should attach especially, to those males who ride 
that line. In Roman law (and, by derivation, in most civil law countries) the analogous figure was 
"the good father of the family." I have met many good fathers of families in my time, and I 
suppose some of them even reasonable. In America the definition - perhaps the most startling of 
all -was given by courts and commentators as ''the man who takes the magazines at home and in 
the evening pushes the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves." I must say I have never understood 
what this (like riding the Clapham Omnibus) has to do with reasonableness of behavior- 
stereotypical masculinity perhaps, but reasonableness? One has to wonder at the glory of the 
law! In any event, all these people whose attributes seem, in Europe and America, to define 
reasonableness are unmistakably male. It would not be surprising, then, if "reasonable man," at 
law, meant reasonable male and not reasonable person. 
 
  Furthermore, he argues, since reasonableness is a question of attitudes, the "key question is 
whose attitudes are reasonable." A question to which the law gives at best an uncertain answer: 
 
Is reasonableness defined by the attitudes and points of view of the dominant ethnic, 
racial, or sexual groups in the society, or are those who do not share these views to be tested by 
their own standards? Different still, are the standards, though unitary and applied to all, a mixture 
of those of all groups- of all reasonable persons and not merely of white reasonable fathers riding 
Clapham Omnibuses while mowing their lawns in their shirt sleeves? And if the attitudinal 
differences are so great that such a mixture is impossible (as it would be, physically, between the 
blind the seeing), which attitudes should be considered reasonable, and for whom? 
 
  Let us assume that for cultural reasons women drive differently than men. It is not 
impossible- though I doubt it. My wife drives far better than I do, but she drives well in a 
somewhat different way I drive. I do not believe that either her greater skill or her different style 
are because she is a woman and I am a man. It seems more likely to me that it is due to those 
who taught me, not to mention our personality difference. Still, if it were the case that women qua 
women drove differently than men, it would not be all that surprising. If a society is sexist- and 
ours surely is- it would not be odd that people within that society who were characterized as 
different and treated differently would react to different treatment by behaving differently in a wide 
variety of everyday contexts. Driving is such a context, so it should not be outside the range of 
possibility that in our sexist society women as a group would drive differently than men as a 
group. If this were so, would it be appropriate to consider how reasonable women drive in 
deciding whether a woman had behaved reasonably when her driving led her to be a victim in an 
accident? Or should the test instead be that of driving behavior of a combination of the two? 
The same line of reasoning can be applied to Italians. Since behavior is also a product of cultural 
differences, is the "stereotype that Italians drive fast, and squiggle between cars, and act as 
though they perennially involved in a sporting event ... such a cultural attribute"? Is such driving 
reasonable, or is the standard to be imposed that of another culture whose values stereotypically 
give rise to "stodgy, plodding driving?" This problem is even more significant and dramatic today 
because it is fundamental to the issue of women's liberation. It is the question of whether equality 
is being achieved at an appropriate price when one moves form the "reasonable prudent man," to 
the "reasonable prudent person." If all that has happened is a verbal change and women are now 
expected to act as reasonable men did before (in order to qualify as reasonable persons), rather 
than men being expected to act, at least in part, as reasonable women did, then equality may be 
there - but at the cost of cultural subjugation! 
 
I do not think I am exaggerating this tendency of the previously dominant group to offer 
equality, but only when the group seeking it accepts the culture of the group granting it. Ask 
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yourselves, for example, why, when an objection is made to the designation of toilets as "Men's 
Room" and "Ladies' Room," the difference is usually corrected by a change to "Men's Room" and 
'Women's Room" rather than to "Gentlemen's Room" and "Ladies Room." It may be, of course, 
that the reason for this is that we don't like gentility in toilets, and that both the terms "ladies" and 
"gentlemen" connote something to which we object. That would be fine. But it may also be that 
equality will be granted only if we are willing to conform to the male stereotype and therefore the 
female stereotype of gentility becomes unacceptable, even if itis the better ideal to which both 
men and women ought to aspire. 
 
GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEAS, BELIEF, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 22-23, 27-29 (1985). 
 
(4)  One possible approach to answering such questions is to consider how "reasonableness" 
functions as a standard. Is "reasonableness" a formal, i.e., "empty" term? Remember the critique that the 
term is actually sexist because women are not "reasonable." If "reasonableness" is a formal, i.e., "empty," 
concept, how can it be predicated upon a moral position? Is it precisely because it is a formal concept 
that it embodies a moral perspective? What is the source of the moral content of the term? See Steve 




[8] PARTICULARIZING THE STANDARD OF CARE 
 
1.       JUDGE AND JURY 
 
 
McPHETERS v. PETERSON 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
108 Idaho 107, 697 P.2d 447 (1985) 
 
DONALDSON, C.J. -- On March 5, 1982, five-year-old Aaron McPheters was injured in an automobile 
accident in a residential Boise neighborhood. As he entered the intersection of Latah and Kootenai 
streets, Aaron was struck by an automobile driven by respondent, Gene Peterson. Wallace and Debra 
McPheters initiated this action seeking damages on their own behalf and as the parents and guardians of 
Aaron McPheters. They allege that the accident resulted from the negligence of Gene Peterson .... 
 
The case was tried to a jury. The jury returned a special verdict finding that there was no 
negligence on the part of Gene Peterson or the Ada County Highway District which was the proximate 
cause of the accident. The McPheters have appealed citing as error the trial court's refusal to give 
Instructions 20 through 25 of their proposed jury instructions. The appeal against the Highway District 
was dismissed by stipulation of the parties. 
 
The sole issue on this appeal is whether the failure to give plaintiffs' requested instructions 20 
through 25 constitutes reversible error. The record reflects that at the close of the evidence at trial, the 
district judge met with counsel outside the presence of the jury to discuss the proposed jury instructions. 
At that time, the McPheters' attorney objected to the court's refusal to give plaintiffs' instructions 20 
through 27. Those instructions spoke to the standard of care required of the operator of an automobile; in 
particular, the standard of care required when a child is present. 
 
In declining to give the instructions, the trial judge stated that he was electing to rely on 
the approach set forth in the Idaho Jury Instructions (IDJI). He noted that IDJI222 recommends 
that no instruction on the care required for the safety of a child be given. He further stated that, although 
he recognized some of the proposed instructions were taken from previous Idaho Supreme Court 
opinions, he believed under the circumstances of the present case they were argumentative and 
unnecessary, as the approved instructions adequately set forth the standard of care. 5 I.R.C.P. 51(a)(2) 
recommends that a trial judge use the IDJI whenever it contains an applicable instruction, unless the 
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judge finds that a different instruction would more adequately, accurately, or clearly state the law. I.R.C.P. 
51(a)(2) (1980). Pursuant to this recommendation, the trial judge defined "negligence" for the jury 
according to the general definition contained in IDJI 210 [now 2.20]. He also instructed the jury as to the 
standard of care required of a minor. IDJI 201? We believe that these instructions adequately set forth the 
standard of care required of respondent in this case. Appellants contend that the instructions did not 
adequately delineate the standard of care required of an adult in relation to a child, or of an operator of a 
motor vehicle in relation to a pedestrian. We disagree. As we have previously stated "Pin all but the most 
intricate negligence cases, the general definition of negligence sufficiently outlines the required 
standard of care." 
 
The jury was instructed that ordinary care means "the care a reasonably careful person would 
use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence." Appellant has chosen not to provide us 
with a complete trial transcript, and, thus, we are unable to assess the evidence presented at trial. 
However, viewing the evidence most favorably to respondent as we are required to do on appeal. The 
record actually before us does not demonstrate that this case was so intricate as to require additional 
instructions amplifying on this general standard of care. We hold that the trial court's instructions 
adequately stated the standard of care required of respondent in the present case. 
 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed. 
 
BAKES, J., AND McFADDEN AND WALTERS, JJ. PROTEM, concur. 
 
BISTLINE, J., dissenting -I dissent from the majority's conclusion that the district court did not err in 
refusing to instruct the jury concerning the standard of care an automobile operator owes to a pedestrian 
and an adult owes to a child. Those instructions were vital in properly informing the jury of the requisite 
standard of care Mr. Peterson owed Aaron McPheters. 
 
The instruction the district court used to instruct the jury with respect to the "standard of care" due 
in this case reads as follows: "The words 'ordinary care' mean the care a reasonably careful person would 
use under the circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence." Such a definition is too general to 
have any chance of being properly applied to the facts of a case such as this one. The Restatement of 
Torts (Second) §285, comment d, states this point succinctly: 
 
If the standard of conduct is not fixed by reference to a legislative enactment, it is that of 
a reasonable man under the circumstances which, at the time of his action, the actor knows or 
has reason to know. This standard is, without more, incapable of application of the facts of a 
particular case. It requires further definition, so as to express the opinion of society as to what 
should be done or left undone by a reasonable man under the circumstances of the particular 
case. 
 
The three requested instructions adequately delineated the standard of care of a reasonable person 
under the circumstances of this case. They read as follows: 
 
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No.23: While it is the duty of both the driver of 
a motor vehicle and a pedestrian, using a public roadway, to exercise ordinary care, that duty 
does not require necessarily the same amount of caution from each. The driver of a motor 
vehicle, when ordinarily careful, will be alertly conscious of the fact that he is in charge of a 
machine capable of projecting into serious consequences any negligence of his own. Thus, his 
caution must be adequate to that responsibility as related to all the surrounding circumstances. A 
pedestrian, on the other hand, has only his own physical body to manage and with which to set in 
motion a cause of injury. While usually that fact limits his capacity to cause injury, as compared 
with a vehicle driver, still, in exercising ordinary care, he, too, will be alertly conscious of the 
mechanical power acting on the public roadway, and of the possible serious consequences from 
any conflict between himself and such forces. And the caution required of him is measured by the 
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danger of safety apparent to him in the conditions at hand, or that would be apparent to a person 
of ordinary prudence in the same position.13 
 
       Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 24: You are instructed that it is ordinarily necessary to exercise 
greater care for the protection and safety of young children than for adult persons possessing normal and 
mature faculties. Their conduct is unpredictable, and a person operating an automobile should anticipate 
their thoughtlessness and impulsiveness. You are further instructed that it is a matter of common 
knowledge that children may at unexpected moments run upon or across the part of highways used for 
vehicles and where !he driver of a motor vehicle knows of the presence of a child or children in,  or 
adjacent to the street or highway upon which he is traveling, or should know that children may reasonably 
be expected to be in such vicinity, such driver is under a duty to exercise  care commensurate with the 
emergencies presented. One driving an automobile must not assume that children of immature years will 
exercise the care of their protection and must not assume that such children will not expose themselves 
to danger. 
 
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 25: Ordinarily it is necessary to exercise greater 
caution for the protection and safety of a young child than for an adult person who possesses 
normal physical and mental faculties. One dealing with children must anticipate the ordinary 
behavior of children. The fact that they usually do not exercise the same degree of prudence for 
their own safety as adults, that they often are thoughtless and impulsive, imposes a duty to 
exercise a proportional vigilance and caution on those dealing with children, and from whose 
conduct injury to a child might result. 
 
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No.23was taken directly from the California Pattern Jury 
Instructions, BAJI 5.51.... 
 
[ln] Jones v. Mikesh, 60 ldaho 680,686, 95 P.2d575,578(1939), ...this Court approved the 
following instruction: 
 
The court instructs the jury that neither a pedestrian nor an automobile has a superior right to any 
part of a public highway in the State of Idaho. Each with respect to the other in the use of the 
highway is entitled to equality of right, the duties of both are reciprocal; however, while the duty of 
exercising reasonable care for their own safety and the safety of others is imposed alike on both 
the pedestrian and the driver, the automobile being a dangerous instrumentality capable of 
inflicting fatal injuries, the comparative safety of its driver in case of a collision with a pedestrian is 
to be taken into consideration in measuring the duty of a driver. 
 
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No.24 has also been approved by this Court.  
  
[] In Davis v. Bushnell, 93 Idaho 528, 531, 465 P.2d 652, 655 (1970), this Court approved a 
similar instruction and noted the appropriateness of such instructions by stating, "ordinary and due care 
may mean different conduct under different circumstances." 
 
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No.25 is based upon the California Pattern Instructions, BAJI 
3.38.... Other states approve of similar instructions and the statement of law contained therein. [] The 
reasons for giving Requested Instruction Nos.24 and 25 are self-evident; they are contained in the 
instructions themselves. They are particularly relevant and should have been used in this case in light of 
the fact that the accident occurred in the area of Monroe Elementary School where Aaron was returning 
home from kindergarten. 
 
The above three requested instructions are correct statements of the law. Each has persuasive 
reason for its being used in this case and should have been allowed in order that the jury understand 
                                                     
13 "A minor has the duty to exercise the degree of care which would be expected from an ordinary child of the same age, 
experience, knowledge and discretion, under similar circumstances. 
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clearly what the reasonable person would have done under the circumstances of this case. Refusing to 





(1)  What are the views of the majority and dissent on the respective roles of judge and jury? Which is 
consistent with Holmes' position in Goodman? With Cardozo's position in Pokora? 
 
(2)  Particularizing the standard of care: Bistline quotes the Restatement for the proposition that "[t]his 
[reasonable person] standard is, without more, incapable of application of the facts of a particular case. It 
requires further definition, so as to express the opinion of society as to what should be done or left 
undone by a reasonable man under the circumstances of the particular case." Note that the quo e is 
absolute: the general standard always requires "more" to apply it to any particular case. Which 
component of the trial tribunal, the judge or jury, generally provides the "more" and thus particularizes the 
standard? Is there something about the facts of this particular case that makes it appropriate to instruct 
the jury with a more specific standard of care? 
 
(3)  Functions of the judge and jury in negligence cases: Fleming James has examined the roles of 
the judge and jury in a negligence case: 
 
The jury system plays an important part in the administration of accident law. This means that 
procedural rules and devices which allocate power between court and jury may have great 
bearing on the way accident law actually works. And it also means that the practical implications 
of many a rule of substantive law can scarcely be appreciated without an understanding of just 
how the rule affects that allocation of power...[T]here is a good deal of reason to believe that 
much of accident law is now in a period of transition from older notions based on individual blame 
or fault towards some form of social insurance roughly comparable to workmen's compensation. 
And it is in such a time of flux, when legal theory is apt to be laggard, that the jury is likely to play 
a particularly significant role - one which calls for frequent reexamination and re-appraisal.... 
 
THEORETICAL DIVISION OF FUNCTION 
 
It is a commonplace today that questions of law are for the court and questions of fact for the jury, 
whatever the historical vicissitudes of this notion may have been. It is just as commonplace, at least in the 
profession, that this statement has never been fully true in either of its branches, and tells us little or 
nothing that is helpful... [l]t will be more helpful for our purpose to disregard the statement and see what 
jobs the tribunal as a whole has to perform intort cases, then examine the roles which have been 
assigned by precedent to judge and jury respectively, in connection with performing that job. This will 
reveal the points at which theory is elastic, and most subject to change. 
 
Determination of Facts 
 
The tribunal's first job is to determine what the parties did and what the circumstances 
surrounding their conduct were. This we denote as the facts of the specific case, as distinguished from an 
evaluation or interpretation of those facts in terms of their legal consequences. To be sure, any such 
distinction (here as elsewhere in the law), is somewhat theoretical and by no means clear-cut; but if we 
keep its limitations in mind and remember its rough character, the distinction will be useful enough for 
present purposes. The questions whether a pedestrian looked for traffic before stepping off the curb, 
whether at this time defendant's automobile was 50 feet or 200 feet away, whether the traffic signal was 
red or green, the speed of the car, the distance in which it could be stopped at that speed, whether the 
driver saw the pedestrian, whether he sounded a horn, and so on, may conveniently be distinguished 
from such questions as whether the pedestrian should have looked or should have seen the car, whether 
he should have proceeded with the traffic light as it was, the reasonableness of the car's speed, the 
adequacy of brakes which could perform as these could, whether the driver should as a reasonable man 
have foreseen that the pedestrian would continue into danger, and should have blown his horn. 




Now the determination of what the facts of a specific case were, in the sense referred to above, 
may be called the determination of the very prototype of questions of fact which are to be determined by 
the jury; and so it is, to the extent that any question is. Yet it is at once apparent that in connection with 
this very process the court has important roles to play, and opportunity to exercise very real control over 
the jury. All this stems from the basic notion, now universally accepted, that the jury is limited, in making 
these determinations, to the evidence produced in court and to matters so commonly known and s 
beyond dispute, that the principle of judicial notice is applied to them. The notion has this consequence 
because it is the court that determines what evidence may be received, what the proper limits of judicial 
notice are, and whether sufficient evidence has been produced to warrant the finding of any given fact. 
 
The court limits what the jury may consider. The court decides questions of the admission of 
evidence. There are of two kinds: those involving notions of relevancy, and those involving the 
exclusionary rules. Now the concept of relevancy itself is not a legal one, but one involving principles of 
logic of general application. That is to say, the question whether a given piece of evidence is relevant in 
the attempt to prove a proposition and the question of the extent of its probative value, are both referable 
to general principles of logical reasoning and not to any rules of law. Nevertheless, the decision of 
questions of relevancy invokes the function of the court in the following ways: 
 
(1) The court determines what the propositions are which need to be proved or which may be 
proved. Thus, the court limits and selects the evidence which will come before the jury for 
consideration. If, for example, the court rules that the novice and the experienced driver are both 
held to the same standard of conduct, it will exclude testimony that the defendant was just 
learning to drive if that evidence is offered as tending to excuse him from taking a given 
precaution, and if a timely and proper objection is made.... 
 
(2) The court determines what degree of relevance or probative value will satisfy the 
requirements of the law. General reasoning may reveal whether offered evidence has any 
relevancy or probative value and if so how much. But there are infinite degrees of relevancy, and 
itis the court which determines what degree is requisite for admissibility and whether offered 
evidence will be so confusing or prejudicial that its probative value is outweighed. Thus, the court 
decides whether a restaurateur may show that his beans were eaten by many patrons without ill 
effects for the purpose of proving that they were not the cause in fact of plaintiff’s sickness. 
 
The limits imposed by the concept of relevancy are not the only ones. Anglo-American law has 
developed the great exclusionary rules of evidence and these of course are administered by the court. 
Thus, the court determines whether evidence of a conversation is offered for a hearsay purpose and if so 
whether it comes within any exception to the hearsay rule. Moreover, it is often necessary for the court to 
make a finding, on conflicting evidence, as to whether a fact exists as a preliminary step in ruling on this 
kind of question of admissibility. 
 
The court determines the sufficiency of the evidence to show-the existence of a fact. When there 
is direct evidence of the existence of a fact in issue, a jury will in most cases be authorized to find the 
existence of that fact. Thus, if plaintiff says he looked before he stepped off the curb, or the defendants 
engineer says he blew his whistle for the crossing, or a tenant testifies that he requested the landlord to 
make certain repairs in the premises six weeks before the accident, it is the jury's province to decide 
whether to believe the witness. But even here the court has retained some control. In all cases it may find 
a direct testimonial assertion of a fact insufficient evidence of that fact's existence where under all the 
circumstances the testimony is not reasonably credible. A witness's story may be so inherently fantastic 
as to be incredible. Or it may fly in the face of incontrovertible physical facts. Perhaps the commonest 
instance of this is the case where a motorist says he looked carefully down the track just before crossing 
it and saw no train, but was struck at the crossing by a train which was in clear view for half a mile... 
 
Where the question is one of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove a fact in issue, 
the courts have exercised far more control although its extent is partly concealed and not, perhaps, often 
fully realized. This is true because the test for determining whether an inference (from circumstantial 
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evidence) is a rational one is stated in terms of mathematical precision but is one which allows the very 
greatest latitude in actual application ... [A]s it is sometimes put, where from the facts most favorable to 
plaintiff the nonexistence of the fact to be inferred is just as probable as its existence, the conclusion that 
it exists is a matter of speculation, sun rise, and conjecture, and a Jury will not be permitted to draw it. 
Thus, the test purports to invoke only the processes of logical reasoning and the mathematics of 
probability. "Difficulty comes from the fact that anything even remotely adumbrating accurate statistical 
knowledge about the relative probabilities in even the most commonly recurring situations is completely 
lacking... 
The court creates presumptions and allocates the burden of proof. We have seen how the court 
determines whether from facts in evidence a rational inference may be drawn of a fact to be proved, and 
how very much room for discretion in this process lurks behind the false precision of a phrase. But even if 
such a "purely logical" inference may not be drawn, the court may create a rebuttable presumption on the 
basis of certain facts that a fact to be proved existed. This may either permit or require a decision that the 
presumed fact existed, depending on the effect at the that the court determined the presumption to have, 
and, on what, if any, evidence has been introduced which tends to show the nonexistence of the 
presumed fact. 
 
Moreover, in all cases the court determines who has the burden of producing evidence in the first 
place, and at various stages in the trial such as upon the closing of his case by either party. And it is the 
court which allocates the risk of non-persuasion of the jury. 
 
Determination of Legal Consequences 
 
The other main job confronting the tribunal as a whole in accident cases is to evaluate 
the conduct of the parties, in the light of the circumstances, in terms of its legal consequences. At 
one end of this function the exclusive role of the court is clear. It alone determines what the broad 
rules of substantive law are, and which ones may be applicable to the case at hand. Thus, the 
court decides whether the case is one where liability is absolute or whether it depends on 
negligence; what, if any, effect contributory negligence will have; how liability will be affected if 
injury is produced through the intervention of some unforeseeable factor; that negligence consists 
in conduct involving an unreasonable risk of harm, and the like. But each case also involves a 
more specific evaluation of the conduct in the concrete situation with which it deals; a 
determination of specific standards of conduct for the parties under the circumstances of the 
actual case. It must be decided, for instance, whether this driver should have been proceeding 
more slowly at this intersection, whether he should have blown his horn, whether he should have 
anticipated that a pedestrian on the sidewalk would continue on to the crosswalk. Now it is 
perfectly clear that rules of law could be so formulated and so administered as to exclude the jury 
from making these evaluations. A court could decide, for instance, that under a given set of 
circumstances a motorist must blow his horn; that under a different set of circumstances he need 
not do so. Under such a pair of rules, the theoretical function of the jury would be only to decide 
which set of circumstances existed in the case before them, and whether the horn was blown; the 
question whether it should have been blown being decided by the court. On the other hand, it 
would be perfectly possible so to formulate the rule that the jury is to decide not only what the 
circumstances and the conduct were but also whether the horn should have been blown. 
 
On the whole the rules of accident law are so formulated as to give the jury considerable 
scope in deciding what the parties should have done, in each specific case, as well as what they 
did do. The cardinal concept is that of the reasonably prudent man under the circumstances: what 
he would have observed; what dangers he would have perceived; what he would have done, and 
the like. And as a rule, the jury is called upon to determine such questions under broad directions 
as to what evidence and what kinds of factors they ought to consider in making such decisions. 
Here again, however (as in the case of what testimonial evidence a jury may believe), the courts 
set outer limits. A jury will not be permitted to require a party to take a precaution which is clearly 
unreasonable. Nor may it excuse a party from taking a precaution which all reasonable men 
would clearly take under the circumstances. Thus, for example, the jury may not require a train to 
stop before passing over each grade crossing in the country. On the other hand, a pedestrian 
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may not be excused from looking at some point when he is about to cross a busy thoroughfare. 
Since it is the courts which determine what is clearly or undoubtedly reasonable under this rule of 
limitation, they could so administer it as to leave little or nothing for the jury to decide in this 
sphere. But here again (also as in the case of what testimonial evidence a jury may believe), the 
courts have exercised restraint in invoking this limitation, and the trend is probably on the whole 
towards even greater liberality. 
 
Within these limitations (of what reasonable men could find to be reasonable conduct or 
its opposite), courts sometimes go further in setting specific standards for the parties in a given 
case. Where they do, they may derive the standard from any one or more of a number of sources 
such as from their own notions of what is proper and reasonable; from a prescription of the 
legislature; from what is customary in a trade, business or profession; from the opinion of experts, 
and the like. Thus, a court may decide that when coal is piled by an open coal hole in a sidewalk 
in Boston, no further warning of the situation need begiven. It may hold that the jury is not free to 
exonerate the failure to take a precaution required by statute. It may refuse to let a jury hold a 
manufacturer or a railroad to the taking of precautions not generally adopted by the industry. It 
may rule that a case of malpractice may not be maintained against a doctor unless there is expert 
medical testimony as to what doctors should do under the circumstances of the case. The 
adoption of any such rule enlarges the function of the court and narrows that of the jury. Here 
again the tendency has been away from fixed standards and towards enlarging the sphere of the 
jury. 
 
It should be noted here that matters of presumption and burden of proof may affect the 
evaluation of conduct as well as the ascertainment of what conduct was. Thus, a presumption 
that there was negligence in the setting of a fire by a locomotive spark covers an assumption of 
some (here unspecified) standard of care in equipment and operation of the train as well as an 
assumption of substandard conduct in this case. And in evaluating known conduct as reasonable 
or the opposite, a jury should find against the party having the risk of non-persuasion if their 
minds are in equipoise as to whether that conduct is reasonable. 
Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 667-79 
(1949). 
 
James extended discussion of the respective roles of judge and jury- the "trial tribunal" in a 
negligence case divides the necessary functions into two categories, determination of facts and 
determination of legal consequences. And he also divides the second function - determination of legal 
consequences - into two components: 
 
(a) one that "clearly" belongs to the judge: determining which "broad rules of 
substantive law ... may be applicable to the case at hand"; and 
(b) one that he does not explicitly assign to either judge or jury: "a determination of specific 
standards of conduct for the parties under the circumstances of the actual case." The 
determination that this driver was less that reasonably careful under these circumstances. 
 
Both the general and the specific are determination of legal consequences. Both - as James 
notes - could have been assigned to the judge. The system, however, gives the jury "a considerable 
scope in deciding what the parties should have done." 
 
It is useful to give titles to each of the trial tribunal's three decisions: 
 
1. factfinding, i.e., a determination of what occurred outside the courtroom that gave rise to the 
dispute. This is James' first category, "determination of facts." 
2. law declaring, i.e., the statement of the law that is applicable to the out-of-court dispute. The 
judicial component of James' second category, "determination of legal 
consequences." 




        
Consider how the roles of the judge and jury vary in Goodman, Pokora, and McPheters. How 
were the three decisions distributed among the trial tribunal's constituent parts in Goodman? Does it differ 
in Pokora? That is, does the degree of specificity with which the standard of conduct has been defined 
affect the allocation of responsibilities within the tribunal? If the applicable standard of conduct has been 
narrowly defined, do the law declaring and law applying functions tend to merge? Which component of 
the tribunal was responsible for the law-declaring function in Goodman? The law-applying function? 
Which component was responsible for each in Pokora? 
 
(4)  Rules vs. standards (pt 1): While the Goodman and Pokora cases might suggest that there is a 
sharp distinction between rules and standards, McPheters suggests that they are in fact (end) points on a 
continuum rather than binary opposites. A specific standard (such as those advocated by Justice Bistline) 
accords the jury less discretion than a more general standard (such as IDJI 2.20). See also Zolber v. 
Winters, 109 Idaho 824, 712 P.2d 525 (1985); Coughran v. Hickox, 82 Idaho 18, 348 P.2d 724 (1960). 
 
(5) Rules vs. standards (pt.2): In Testo v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co., 34 Idaho 765, 
203 P. 1065 (1921), the court stated that it was plaintiffs duty to make a reasonable use of his senses in 
order to determine whether a train was approaching before going upon the tracks or, as generally 
expressed, it was his duty to look and listen.... 
 
Is the court correct that the two statements are the same? Is a rule-"look and listen"- the same as 
a standard -"make reasonable use of his senses"? Is the jury's role the same under the two statements? 
 
(6)  Metz v. Haskell: Plaintiff was employed by a company that sold and repaired radios and 
televisions. While plaintiff was delivering two television stands to defendant's motel, he noticed that the 
wire from the antenna had come loose. Defendant offered plaintiff a ladder; the ladder broke as plaintiff 
was climbing it to reach the loose wire. Defendant argued- and the trial court decided - that summary 
judgment was appropriate since, 'as a matter of law ... the ladder involved in this case was a "simple tool, 
that the "simple tool doctrine" applies, that the defendant owed no duty to inspect, warn or protect and 
that there was, therefore, no negligence on the part of defendant.'" On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
adopted a more general approach: 
 
As a general rule, it may be stated that when one undertakes to furnish another with a tool or 
instrument for the latter's use, the supplier is under a duty to supply a proper and safe implement 
and not to be negligent in furnishing one that is defective. 
 
The court rejected defendant's argument "that he was relieved of any obligation to provide a safe 
ladder by reason of the 'simple tool doctrine'": 
 
The so-called 'simple tool' rule is based on the ideas that ordinarily the employee has better 
opportunity than the employer to observe defects and guard himself against them, and that the 
employer should not be charged with the duty to care for the safety of an employee with respect 
to a matter in which the employee is in the better position to care for himself ... [where] the defect 
is one so apparent that the employee is guilty of negligence in using the tool, or where he knew of 
its condition or had equal opportunity with the employer for knowing it. 
 
The court concludes that the doctrine is not applicable since 
 
the mere simplicity of the tool does not relieve the supplier of all duty to reasonably inspect the 
instrument in every situation but depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The facts 
indicate that Metz was not in a superior position than Haskell to discover the defect, which 
contradicts the underlying basis of the rule. 
Metz v. Haskell, 91 Idaho 160,417 P.2d 898 (1966) 
 
(7) Rules vs. standards (pt. 3): the problem of costs: What are the administrative costs of the 
alternative judge and jury roles? Under Goodman, is a summary judgment more likely than under 
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Pokora? Won't Pokora generally require a jury trial? What does this suggest about the relative values of 
rules (Goodman) versus standards (Pokora)? The quest for perfect decision making comes at a price 
since many of the costs of a trial are borne by society -for example, Judges are paid, and courthouses are 
constructed and maintained with public funds. 
 
(8)  Juries as communitarian lawmakers: Consider again Holmes' argument in The Common Law. 
He argues that- in part at least because of the variability of individual juries- an experienced trial judge is 
more likely to know the community's sense of what is reasonable and thus be able to formulate that sense 
as a rule. Consider the argument to the contrary by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
 
One reason for the rule that the existence of negligence ...is not generally a question for the judge 
is that a jury is composed of members of various ages, occupations and experiences, and is in 
better position to determine what a reasonably prudent person would do, under stated 
circumstances, than is a trial judge or an appellate court. It is well known that some people react 
more quickly, and more intelligently, to impending danger than do others; that old people are apt 
to be more cautious than are young people, and that human judgments are as diversified as are 
human beings. Therefore, the best way to get a just determination, as to whether a man or 
woman acted "as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under like circumstances," is to 
submit the question to a jury, and get the benefit of the combined opinions of twelve persons on 
it. It is only when there can be but one possible answer, reasonably made, to that question that a 
trial judge, or an appellate court, should assume to decide it. 
Adams v. Zalasky, 59 Idaho 292, 81 P.2d 1090 (1938). See also Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727P.2d 
1187(1986); Stowers v. Union Pacific R.R., 72 Idaho 87,237 P.2d 1041(1951); Hobbs v. Union Pacific 
R.R., 62 Idaho 58, 108 P.2d841 (1941); Curtis v. Ficken, 52 Idaho 426, 16 P.2d 977 (1932); Pilmer v. 
Boise Traction Co., 14 Idaho 327, 94 P.432(1908). Cf. Ryals v. Broadbent Development Co., 98 Idaho 
392, 565 P.2d 982 (1977); Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 (1978). 
 
(9)  A bit of history: The rules vs. standards distinction also has a historical component. Arguably 
one result of the legal realists- a group that included Cardozo- was to undermine the assumption that 
rules are determinate and thus produce certainty in the law. In federal constitutional law, the rule-based 
perspective was associated with the era of substantive due process during which the United States 
Supreme Court attempted to construct bright lines between activities such as mining and agriculture -
which preceded "commerce" - and those economic activities that were in interstate commerce and thus 
subject to regulation by Congress under the Commerce Clause. The collapse of the rigid and increasingly 
artificial rules and their replacement with balancing tests are mirrored in the divide between Goodman 
and Pokora. While the law has generally moved away from rule-based and standard-based decision 
making, McPheters and Metz demonstrate that the issue has continuing vitality. Consider, for example, a 
discussion of the historical context in a decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals: 
 
The appellants next contend that instruction number 23 was prejudicial and erroneous. The 
instruction given to the jury reads as follows: 
 
The court instructs the jury that neither a pedestrian nor an automobile has a superior 
right to any part of the public roadway. Each with respect to the other in the use of the roadway is 
entitled to equality of right, the duties of each a reciprocal; however, while the duty of exercising 
reasonable care for their own safety and the safety of others is imposed alike on both the 
pedestrian and the driver, the automobile being a dangerous instrumentality, capable of inflicting 
fatal injuries, the comparative safety of its driver in case of collision with a pedestrian is to be 
taken into consideration in measuring the duty of a driver. Therefore, while the rights of a 
pedestrian and driver of an automobile to use a roadway are equal, and their duties to each other 
are reciprocal, the one having the greater power to do injury owes to the other a comparatively 
greater duty to exercise care in the use of that power. The instruction is taken directly from Jones 
v. Mikesh, 60 Idaho 680, at 686, 95 P.2d 575, at 578 (1939). However, the Mikesh case was 
decided at a time when the defense of contributory negligence was a complete bar to a plaintiff's 
recovery. The concept of comparative negligence came much later. Further, when Mikesh was 
written, instructions containing fine distinctions on the law were accepted practice. Modern 
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thought considers these fine-line distinctions to be unnecessary. The Supreme Court has 
commented several times in recent years that "in all but the most intricate negligence cases, the 
general definition of negligence sufficiently outlines the required standard of care." McPheters v. 
Peterson, 108 Idaho 107, 697 P.2d 447 (1985); [] So here. The general definition of negligence, 
coupled with the specific statutory duties applicable to the case, should be sufficient. To go 
further may be inappropriate, but not necessarily error.... 
WarTen v. Furniss, 124 Idaho 544, 861 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 
(10) Appellate courts and negligence: What is the role of an appellate judge in a negligence case? 
 
In administering the law of negligence, we use the "reasonable and prudent man" 
standard to guide the trial court in its determinations of whether or not to submit certain cases to 
the jury. Such cases as are submitted to the jury are accompanied by charges exhorting the 
jurors to consider the evidence concerning the negligence issue on the basis of the same 
standard. Indeed, when the only issue before an appellate court is whether or not the trial court 
was right in submitting the case to the jury at all on the basis of the evidence of negligence 
adduced, the appellate court must also seek recourse to this standard. In each instance a 
process of evaluating human conduct occurs. That evaluation is conducted on the basis of 
familiarity with more or less normal human experience. The trial judge refuses to let the case go 
to the jury at all if, in his opinion, twelve laymen could not reasonably disagree among themselves 
that the defendant's conduct was not negligent. When the plaintiff assigns as error on appeal the 
trial court's direction of a verdict for the defendant on this ground, the appellate court has to go 
through the same process of evaluating human conduct on the basis of their notions (quite often 
vicarious) of human experience. If they allow the appeal, it is because they disagree with the trial 
court's evaluating process. And the same phenomenon is involved if the trial court does let the 
case go to the jury and the defendant appeals from judgment entered on the verdict for the 
plaintiff on the ground that it was error to submit the question of negligence to the jury in the first 
place. Here, often enough, the appellate court may agree with the defendant that no jury of 
laymen could reasonably infer that the conduct in issue was negligence; and if it does so, it 
reverses the trial court with an order to direct a verdict for the defendant. 
 
Some very amusing cases have arisen in this connection, one of the most striking of 
which is Bennett v. Illinois P. & L. Corp. [355 Ill. 564, 189 N.E. 899 (1934)]. There a power 
company had been stretching wire along a road and had left a huge wire spool standing 
alongside the roadway, just off the line of travel. Plaintiff's horse was frightened by the spool and 
ran away, the plaintiff sustaining damage as a consequence. The only issue involved was 
whether or not the defendant had been negligent in leaving the spool where it was. The trial court 
apparently thought a jury of laymen might reasonably so conclude and let the case go to the jury, 
which brought in a verdict for the plaintiff, judgment being entered thereon. At any rate, the case 
was finally disposed of by the Supreme Court of Illinois, its4-3 decision holding that the case was 
improperly submitted to the jury. Of course, this seems ridiculous at first blush, for if three out of 
seven state supreme court judges are of the belief that a jury of laymen might reasonably draw 
the inference that the defendant had been negligent, then one would suppose off hand that the 
matter was properly left to the jury in the first place. 
 
But that is not true at all. Paradoxical as this decision may seem, it is absolutely 
defensible. The state supreme court is not acting as a jury of laymen. t is, rather, making the last 
guess on whether or not the evidence of alleged negligence would justify the inference by a group 
of laymen that the defendant's conduct actually had amounted to negligence or, put another way, 
of whether or not a group of laymen could reasonably differ among themselves over this matter. 
This guess is a terribly important judicial function- of the very essence of the administration of the 
law of negligence. Indeed, the determination of this issue at the judicial stage is usually called an 
"issue of law," although a little clear thinking will reveal that it is simply an evaluation process no 
different from that which the jury indulges in when it is permitted to do so. What really 
distinguishes the judicial function in dealing with the simple negligence issue is the realization that 
it is not safe to let all simple negligence cases go to the jury because of the realization that jurors' 
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collective reactions are apt to be based on such psychological factors as sympathy, the color of 
the female plaintiff’s hair, the fact that the defendant is a "big corporation," and the like. Only 
when the "professionals" involved believe that the evidence adduced could reasonably support 
the inference of negligence (regardless of what ultimate inference these "professionals" 
themselves might draw, were they sitting on the case without a jury) should they let the case be 
finally disposed of by the "tyros." Then whatever the jury does -and for whatever reasons- the 
judges can salve their consciences with the knowledge that the evidence could reasonably be 
interpreted to support the inference of either negligence or no negligence. 
 
In the Bennett case the four judges constituting the majority of the Illinois Supreme Court 
apparently were convinced that a miscarriage of justice would occur if a jury were permitted to 
conclude that the defendant's conduct in that case was actionable negligence. Another way of 
saying this is that they were convinced, as professionals and experienced jurists, that the 
defendant's conduct was not sub-standard conduct and that no group of laymen in the jury-box 
should be permitted to conclude otherwise. The three dissenting judges differed from them in only 
this respect - that, on the basis of their professional experience and observations, this conclusion 
was not so obvious. Their dissent did not necessarily mean that if they had been in the jury-box, 
or if they were acting as judges without a jury, they would have drawn the inference that the 
defendant was negligent. Far from it. All they meant was that they, as professional jurists, could 
not be sure that the inference of negligence would be unreasonable. Here was an honest 
difference of opinion among the professionals of last resort, distinguishable from the 5-4 decision 
of the United States Supreme Court only by the fact that this evaluation process occurred at a 
relatively uncomplicated and lowly level -one not charged with grave social and political 
considerations. 
Charles 0. Gregory, Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 CORNELL LAW 
QUARTERLY 622, 623-25 (1951). See also LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 350-417 (1930); Leon 
Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 30 
(1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS§§ 3288, 328C. 
 





(1)  Statutes and negligence: A statute may be relevant to the decision in a common law tort action 
for negligence in a variety of ways. For example, a statute might create a cause of action by imposing a 
duty on a class of people to behave in a certain way toward another class of people, it might preclude 
certain types of recovery, or it might limit damages. Sometimes the role of a statute is less clear cut. 
Recall Stevens v. Fleming, the statute in the first chapter of these materials that introduced negligence. 
One issue in that case was what role the Uniform Fire Code should play in the case since it was not 
applicable to the building involved. Did its formal inapplicability make the statute irrelevant to the case? 
Was it evidence of what a reasonable person might have done when they remodeled the structure? Of 
the type of changes that might have been made that would have made the structure safer? Of the "the 
burdens associated with undertaking a particular caution," as the court phrased one side of the balancing 
test? 
 
This section is concerned with the use of statutes to particularize the standard of care that is, to 
specify what a reasonable person would do in a particular situation. There are two situations in which 
statutes are relevant to determining the standard of care. 
 
(2)  Statutes explicitly creating a cause of action: The legislature may explicitly provide for civil liability 
for the violation of a statutory standard. For example, an early Idaho statute provided: 
 
A bell of at least twenty pounds weight must be placed on each locomotive engine, and be rung 
at a distance of at least eighty rods from the place where the railroad crosses any street, road or 
highway, and be kept ringing until it has crossed such street, road or highway ... under penalty of 
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one hundred dollars for every neglect, to be paid by the corporation operating the railroad ....The 
railroad is also liable for all damages sustained by any person, and caused by its locomotives, 
trains, or cars, when the provisions of this section are not complied with. 
(emphasis added). 
In Wheeler v. Oregon Railroad & Navigation Co., 16 Idaho 375, 102 P.347 (1909), the court held 
that this statute "does not rest the liability for damages on the contingency that the 
injury sustained was the result of the failure to ring the bell ...but declares absolutely that where 
the bell is not rung ...and damages are sustained, the company is liable." Does this mean that the railroad 
is strictly liable? 
 
The court continued its analysis of the statute by noting that it "must be conceded in this case that 
the defendant was guilty of negligence by failing to comply with the law of this state in ringing a bell ...at 
the time of approaching the crossing where the accident occurred, and is liable in this case for the injury, 
unless it appears that the injury received by the plaintiffs child was the result of contributory negligence." 
See also Wallace v. Oregon Short Une R.R., 16 Idaho 103, 100 P. 904 (1909) (statute providing that the 
killing or maiming of any domestic livestock by a railroad is prima facie evidence of negligence). 
 
The court has recently described such statutes: 
 
We have held that a statute that recognizes the right to recover damages for negligence 
cannot be the basis of a negligence per se claim. In Stott ex rei. Dougall v. Finney, 130 Idaho 
894,896,950 P.2d 709,711 (1997), the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for injury to 
her real property allegedly caused by the failure of an earthen dam constructed by the defendants 
on their property. On an appeal from a jury verdict on behalf of the defendants, the plaintiff 
contended that the trial court erred by failing to give a negligence per se instruction based upon 
Idaho Code § 42-1204. That statute provides that the "owners or constructors of ditches, canals, 
works or other aqueducts ...must carefully keep and maintain the same ...in good repair and 
condition, so as not to damage or in any way injure the property or premises of others." In 
upholding the district court, we held, "I.C. § 42-1204 does not create a negligence per se action, 
but only codifies that ditch owners and constructors can be held liable for damages occurring to 
others as a result of negligence." 130 Idaho at 896, 950 P.2d at 711. Similarly, a statute that 
creates a civil cause of action cannot be the basis of a negligence per se claim. The statute 
creating the cause of action defines the conduct constituting the tort and the applicable standard 
of care. 
Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 144 Idaho 1123, 172 P.3d 1123 
(2007). 
 
(3)  Statutes that particularize the standard of care: the doctrine of negligence per se: The term 
"negligence per se" has come to mean the use of a statute to particularize the standard of care. Before it 
became a term of art, however, it simply referred to negligence that was obvious: 
 
Where the danger is exceedingly small and trivial, it may not be negligent at all to 
disregard it. Where it is exceedingly great and obvious, it would be negligence per se to incur the 
hazard .... In other cases, it would be open to question whether incurring the hazard would be 
consistent with ordinary care, and in cases of this kind the question of ... negligence is one for the 
determination of the jury. 
Carson v. City of Genesee, 9 Idaho 244, 250, 74 P. 862, 863 (1903) (quoting Samples v. City of Atlanta, 
95 Ga. 110,22 S.E. 135, 136 (1894)). 
 
(4)  Administrative regulations and municipal ordinances: In addition to statutes that have been 
enacted by the legislature, the negligence per se doctrine is applicable to "[r]egulations and orders 
enacted by administrative authorities pursuant to statutory authority having the force and effect of law." 
Anderson v. Blackfoot Livestock Commission Co.,85 Idaho 64, 375 P.2d704 (1962) (state agency's 
regulation). See also Walton v. Potlatch Corp., 116 Idaho 892, 781 P.2d 229 (1989); Arrington v. 
Arrington Brothers Construction, Inc., 116 Idaho 887, 781 P.2d 224 (1989); Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 




county ordinances. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984) (building code enacted as 
city ordinance). 
 
(5)  Statutes that are the basis of negligence per se-the statutory purpose doctrine: Generally, the 
legislature will enact a penal statute and say nothing about its effect on civil liability. Should the fact that 
one party to a tort action has violated such a statute (and therefore is subject to potential penal sanctions) 
have any bearing on the tort suit? 
 
Penal statutes are a determination by the highest lawmaking body that certain conduct is so 
socially unacceptable that it should be illegal. In some situations, this legislative conclusion seems 
relevant to the determination that must be made in assessing civil liability for allegedly negligent conduct. 
For example, driving a vehicle after dark without lights violates a statute and is subject to penalties; it also 
seems relevant to the question of what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances, other 
penal statutes seem inapplicable. The violation of a statute prohibiting driving on Sundays, for example, 
does not seem relevant to the question of what a reasonable person would do because the no driving-on-
Sunday statute was intended to accomplish goals other than making roads safe. 
 
To assist in making decisions on which statutes should be used in negligence actions in a 
principled manner, the courts have developed an analytical schema known as the statutory purpose 
doctrine. In Idaho, the doctrine requires: 
 
Several criteria [to] be met before negligence as a matter of law will be found [in the violation of a 
statute or regulation]. First, the statute or regulation must clearly define the required standard of 
conduct, Brizendine v. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 831 (1976); 
second, the statute or regulation must have been intended to prevent the type of harm 
defendant's act or omission caused, Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 
(1984);third, the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute or regulation was 
designed to protect, Stephens; and fourth, the violation must have been a proximate cause of the 
injury, Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 ldaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983). 
Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609,733 P.2d 1234 (1987). See also Kinney v. Smith, 95 Idaho 328, 508 
P.2d 1234 (1973). 
 
(a)  The elements of the statutory purpose doctrine- the type of statute: There is a threshold 
consideration that the court did not note -perhaps because it was too obvious: since torts are focused on 
safety, a statute that is not concerned with health or safety is not relevant to a determination that a 
defendant breached her duty by failing to act as a reasonable person would have acted. This is the no-
driving-on-Sunday statute. 
 
Although the Idaho's traditional statement of the elements of the doctrine does not include 
consideration of the type of statute, the court has recognized that the statute must be a health or 
safety statute. In Griffith v. Schmidt, the court noted in passing that "the maximum speed contained in I.C. 
§ 49-681 which states, '[N]o person shall drive a vehicle at a speed in excess of such maximum limits:*** 
(b) Fifty-five (55) miles per hour in other locations [outside urban districts],' is a safety statute and the 
violation of this positive inhibition is negligence per se." Griffith v. Schmidt, 110 Idaho 235, 715 P.2d 905 
(1986). 
(b)  The elements of the statutory purpose doctrine- conduct as conduct: The role second 
element- the requirement that the statute "clearly define the required standard of conduct"- is to ensure 
that the statute is more specific than the general standard of care. If the statute says only that the actor 
must be reasonably careful, it adds nothing to the jury's evaluation of the breach element. This issue has 
been examined in several cases. 
 
(i) Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation District: landowners brought a negligence 
action for damages resulting from flooding caused by a break in the defendant's canal. On 
appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred by imposing negligence per se for 
violating a statute which provided that an irrigation district "must carefully keep and maintain ... its 
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canals] in good repair and condition, so as not to injure the property or premises of others." The 
court agreed: 
 
A standard of conduct may be defined by legislation or administrative regulation.... Proof 
of a violation of a statute which defines a standard of conduct may establish negligence 
per se. That is, proof of an unexcused violation of a statute, if the statute is designed to 
protect the plaintiffs class against the harm incurred, is conclusive on the issue of 
negligence.... However, I.C. § 42-1204 defines the duty owed by an irrigation district, 
no[t]the standard of care by which the trier of fact determines whether the defendant has 
breached his duty.... I.C. § 42-1204 imposes a duty to "carefully keep and maintain [canal 
banks] in good repair and condition"; the statute does not define a standard of care by 
which the trier of fact may determine whether a defendant has failed to "carefully keep 
and repair" its canal banks. 
Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation District, 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d80 (1976). What might the statute 
have included if it were to have been the source of a particular standard of care? 
 
(ii)  Johnson v. Emerson: For a case that fails to recognize this principle, see 
Johnson v. Emerson, 103 Idaho 350,647 P.2d 806 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the 
state's "general rule" statute -"No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing" - would serve as the basis of a negligence per se 
instruction). 
 
(iii) Ambiguous statutes: lf the statute does not specify the conduct that is required, then it 
does not assist in particularizing the general, due-care-under-the circumstances 
standard. As the court noted in Easterbrook, "to constitute negligence as a matter of law, 
a statute or regulation must clearly define the required standard of conduct." For 
example, in Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 396, 34 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2001), the statute 
did not provide a clear standard of because the statutory distinction between "roadway" 
and "highway'' "cannot be easily ascertained, contributing to the vagueness of the 
standard of conduct expressed therein." 
 
(c)  The elements of the statutory purpose doctrine- type of risk: An example of the third 
element- the requirement that the statute be intended to prevent the type of risk that defendant's conduct 
entailed- is found in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984). Plaintiff was injured when 
she fell on a stairway in her apartment. The stairway lacked a handrail as required by the Uniform 
Building Code, which had been adopted by a Boise ordinance. The code requirement for handrails was 
intended to reduce the risk of falls. 
 
In contrast, a statute that makes it a misdemeanor to tamper with an electric meter should not 
have been used as the basis for e negligence per se instruction since it was intended to prevent the theft 
of electric service rather than injury resulting from electrocution. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 134 Idaho 
598,7 P.3d 207 (2000). 
 
Similarly, in Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 245 P.3d 1009 (2011), the court held that a city 
ordinance requiring abutting landowners to "keep the sidewalk ...free and clear from snow, wood, leaves, 
weeds, litter, debris, or other obstructions or impediments of whatsoever kind" did not apply to groups of 
people who were fighting outside a bar. 
 
(d)  The elements of the statutory purpose doctrine - class of interests: 
 
Statutes are generally given a broad construction in determining whether the plaintiff fall within 
the class of interests that the statute seeks to protect. For example, in Arrington v. Arrington Brothers 
Construction, Inc., 116 Idaho 887, 781 P.2d 224(1989), the court held that, "[s]ince the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act is remedial legislation, and preventative in nature, the Act must be construed 





Similarly, in Stephens v. Stearns, plaintiff was injured when she fell on a stairway that lacked a 
handrail as required by the applicable building code. In upholding a negligence per se instruction, the 
court noted that "the ordinance in question was designed to protect users of stairways." Stephens v. 
Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984). 
 
In O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005), the court held that a state 
regulation requiring municipal solid waste facilities to prevent access to the facilities by unauthorized 
persons was applicable in a case arising from the death of two trespassing children. 
 
(6)  "Causation" and "clarity": The court's enumeration of the elements of negligence per se in 
Sanchez v. Galey concludes with the requirement that "the violation [of the statute] must have been a 
proximate cause of the injury." The statement is superfluous if the court means that the defendant's 
breach must be the "proximate" cause of the injury before a defendant can be held liable because the 
statement simply restates the third (cause in fact) and fourth (scope of liability) elements of the prima 
facie case for negligence. In other cases, the court has focused on whether the statute "clearly define[s] 
the required standard of conduct" when it does not mean that the statute cannot be ambiguous as 
discussed in note (5)(b)(iii) above. For example, the court in Stem v. Prouty blended both phrases, noting 
that Prouty argued that "because site engineering is not clearly defined as required in the state, Stem 
cannot show that failure to obtain a building permit was the proximate cause of the accident." The facts of 
these cases, however, suggests that rather than causation or clarity the court's concern is the non-
mandatory nature of the statute. 
 
Stem worked for a company (Custom Rock Tops) that rented part of a commercial building from 
Prouty. When Prouty had purchased the building, he added a third overhead door to improve forklift 
access to the rented premises. Stem was helping to load a forklift when its driver back it over a water 
meter cover broke under the weight of the forklift. The forklift tipped over, pinning Stem to the ground and 
resulting in the amputation of his right leg. Stem sued Prouty alleging that the premises was unsafe 
because the cover was not designed to be used the type of area in which the accident occurred. He 
argued inter alia that Prouty had been negligent per se: he had failed to obtain a building permit when he 
added the third overhead door and, had he done so, "site engineering would have occurred, which would 
have revealed the inadequacy of the water meter covers on the Premises, and Prouty would have been 
require to replace the meter covers before his application could be approved by Garden City, thereby 
preventing Stem's accident." The court rejected Stem's argument because "site engineering is a 
discretionary matter. The applicable building codes requiring a building permit do not mandate site 
engineering .... This Court finds that Stem cannot prove the elements of negligence per se because the 
site engineering is not a clearly defined requirement of the building codes." Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 
590, 272 P.3d 562 (2012). See also Easterbrook v. State, 863 P.2d 349, 124 Idaho 680 (1993) (a non-
mandatory statute cannot be the basis for negligence per se); Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 
886 P.2d330 (1994) (same). But see Munns v. Swift Transportation Co., 138 Idaho 108, 111, 58 P.3d 92, 
95 (2002). 
 
(7)  Excuses for noncompliance: Are there situations when the violation of a relevant statute may be 
excused? 
 
(a)  Bale v. Penyman: The Idaho Supreme Court offered a list of justifications for not 
complying with a statute 
 
It is generally held that in civil actions for damages, where injury occurs as a 
proximate result of a violation of a statute enacted for the protection of motorists, such violation 
constitutes negligence per se. []It must be recognized that certain circumstances furnish an 
excuse or justification for the negligence presumed to arise on proof of violation of a statute or 
ordinance .Such circumstances may generally be classified in four categories: (1) Anything that 
would make compliance with the statute impossible; (2)Anything over which the driver has no 
control which places  his car in a position violative of the statute; (3) An emergency not of the 
BREACH 
276 
driver's own making by reason of which he fails to obey the statute; (4) An excuse specifically 
provided by statute. [) 
Bale v. Perryman, 85 Idaho 435, 380 P.2d 501 (1963). See also Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho 
Equipment Co., 137 Idaho 578, 51 P.3d 392 (2002) (statute provided an exception for a vehicle "disabled 
in such a manner and to an extent that itis impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving the 
vehicle"); Chard v. Bowen, 91 Idaho 521, 427 P.2d 568 (1967) (statutory violation excused where it 
resulted from "exigencies of traffic beyond the control of the driver''); Hamilton v. Carpenter, 49 Idaho 629, 
290 P. 724 (1930) (a "reasonable attempt" to avoid a collision with an oncoming vehicle justified crossing 
the center line).                        
                 
How would Tedla be decided in Idaho? Does it fit within any of the exceptions specified by the 
Court? See Hooker v. Schuler, 45 Idaho 83, 260 P. 1027 (1927) (essentially the same facts as Tedla). 
 
(b) Nettleton v. Thompson: An invitee brought a negligence action against homeowners for 
damages allegedly resulting from a fall on an unsafe stairway. The invitee claimed that the homeowners' 
failure to comply with the Uniform Building Code (USC) was negligence per se. The district court had held 
the failure excused by the homeowner’s ignorance of the code requirements. The court of appeals began 
its analysis by noting that,  
 
[b]ecause of the potentially harsh results which may flow from application of this doctrine, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that an excused violation of a law does not constitute 
negligence per se. See State ex rei. McKinney v. Richardson, 76 Idaho 9,277 P.2d 272 (1954); []. 
The Court's recognition of this principle thus creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence per 
se for violation of a law in the absence of excuse or justification. [) The burden of proving excuse 
of a violation rests with the violator .... cf. Bale v. Perryman, 85 Idaho 435, 380 P.2d 501 (1963) 
(violation may be explained by defendant showing conduct was excusable). 
 
The defendants argued that their ignorance of UBC requirements constituted an excuse. The 
court disagreed: 
 
Generally, a defendant may establish excuse or justification for violation of a statute or ordinance 
if the defendant's conduct could nevertheless be said to fall within the standard of reasonable 
care under the circumstances. See ...Nichols v. Sonneman, 91 ldaho 199, 418 P.2d 562 (1966); 
Bale v. Perryman, 85 Idaho 435, 380 P.2d 501 (1963). 
 
Furthermore, whether a defendant's per se negligence is excused is a question for the 
jury to decide. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984). We agree with these 
standards. However, the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court indicate that, in order to warrant 
an excuse instruction, the defendant must establish that his or her conduct was objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances. For instance, in Bale v. Perryman, the plaintiff brought an 
action to recover damages incurred in a motor vehicle accident in which he attempted to pass a 
truck driven by the defendant. In determining that the plaintiff was negligent per se, the Court 
found that the only evidence presented by the plaintiff to show that his negligent driving should be 
excused was his subjective belief that the other driver would not tum into his line of travel. [] 
 
       Implicit in all these decisions is the notion that proof of excuse must be established by more 
than the violator's ignorance of the law or the violator's subjective belief that his or her conduct 
was in accord with a reasonable standard of behavior. Rather, these decisions indicate that 
excuse can only be established by evidence that the individual had an objectively reasonable 
explanation for violating the law. This reasoning is persuasive; it would be incongruous to permit 
an alleged tortfeasor to subjectively define the scope or extent of the duty owed under the law. 
Judge Burnett specially concurred: 
 
I write separately to emphasize that negligence per se is not a doctrine of absolute 
liability. It differs from common law negligence only insofar as it replaces a general duty of 




lead opinion, negligence per se is subject to exceptions where performance is impossible, or 
nonperformance is otherwise justified. Thus, an exception might exist where a defendant has no 
actual or imputed knowledge of the facts invoking application of a legislative standard. In this 
case, however, the Thompsons had actual or imputed knowledge of the variations in stair width 
and the lack of a stair handrail in their home. These facts were discernible, and they invoked 
application of the Uniform Building Code, as adopted by the municipal ordinance. 
Nettleton v. Thompson, 117 Idaho 308, 787 P.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 
(c) Teply v. Lincoln: Plaintiffs were injured when defendant’s vehicle slid across the 
centerline of the highway and struck their automobile. Defendant testified that the pickup's rear end had 
begun to slide on the slick road without warning and that he had not been able to stay on his side of the 
highway. Over plaintiff’s objections, the trial court had instructed the jury that 
 
A violation of a statute is negligence unless compliance with the statute was impossible or 
something over which the party had no control placed him in a position of violation of a statute or 
an emergency not of the party's own making caused him to fail to obey the statute. 
 
Noting that the only evidence offered to explain defendant's violation of the statute requiring approaching 
drivers to pass one another on the right was the icy conditions of the road, the court of appeals reversed 
a jury verdict for defendant: "we hold that the evidence of icy roads in this case was insufficient, as a 
matter of law, to excuse [defendant's] statutory violations." Teply v. Uncoln, 125 Idaho 773, 874 P.2d 584 
(Ct. App. 1994). See also Haakonstad v. Hoff, 94 Idaho 300,486 P.2d 1013 (1971). 
 
(8)  IDJI 2.22 -Violation of statute or ordinance - negligence per se 
 
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
 
[quote or paraphrase the applicable statute.] 
A violation of the statute is negligence, [unless (compliance with the statute was 
impossible) (or) (something over which the party had no control placed the individual in a position 
of violation of the statute) (or) (an emergency, not of the party's own making, caused the 
individual to fail to obey the statute) (or) (an excuse specifically provided for within the statute 
existed)]. 
 
Comment: Change the term "statute" to "ordinance" as required. See Sanchez v. Galey, 112 
Idaho 609 (1987), on issue whether violation of administrative regulation may constitute 
negligence per se. 
 
(9)  Effect of satisfying the statutory purpose doctrine --judge and jury functions: What is the role of 
the judge and jury when there is a violation of a relevant statute? Is the jury still required to determine the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct? 
 
In Walton v. Potlatch Corporation, the Idaho Supreme Court held that OSHA regulations could 
provide the basis for a negligence per se instruction to the jury. Justice Bakes dissented: 
 
Furthermore, the effect of a negligence per se instruction is to deprive a litigant of his right to a 
jury trial on the question of the reasonableness of his conduct which is the subject of the 
negligence per se instruction. Thus, two essential elements of a prima facie negligence case - 
duty and breach - are "taken away from the jury." [] By such a negligence per se instruction the 
jury, in effect, is directed not to consider the reasonableness of the person's acts, the court 
having concluded that by violating a "positive statutory prohibition" the person's conduct is 
unreasonable, and therefore negligent, as a matter of law. Given the strong public policy in favor 
of jury trials, as rooted in Art. 1, § 7, of the Idaho Constitution, negligence per se instructions 
should only be approved where a party has clearly violated a positive statutory prohibition....[B]y 
an over-expansive application of the doctrine of negligence per se ...Potlatch's right to trial by jury 
BREACH 
278 
on the reasonableness of its conduct has been denied, I believe in violation of Art. 1, § 7, of the 
Idaho Constitution. Steed v. Young, 115 Idaho 247,766 P.2d 717 (1988). 
Walton v. Potlatch Corp., 116 Idaho 892, 781 P.2d 229 (1989) (Bakes, J., dissenting). 
Article I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions, three-fourths of the jury may 
render a verdict, and the legislature may provide that in all cases of misdemeanors five-sixths of 
the jury may render a verdict. A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases not amounting to 
felony, by the consent of both parties, expressed in open court, and in civil actions by the consent 
of the parties, signified in such manner as may be prescribed by law. In civil actions the jury may 
consist of twelve or any number less than twelve upon which the parties may agree in open court. 
Provided, that in cases of misdemeanor and in civil actions within the jurisdiction of any court 
inferior to the district court or in district court, the jury shall consist of not more than six. 
 
There are two very different problems with Justice Bakes' argument. First, does his argument 
claim too much? That is, is a negligence per se instruction ever permissible if one accepts Bakes' 
argument? Second, and alternatively, is he simply incorrect? That is, does the Idaho Constitution 
guarantee a party a jury determination of all elements of a prima facie case? 
 
Is it sufficient that the jury is required to determine whether the defendant violated the statute, or 
must the jury also determine that the statutory violation was unreasonable? 
 
(10)  Effect of not satisfying the statutory purpose doctrine: A statute that does not satisfy the elements 
of the statutory purpose doctrine is not negligence per se. It may, nonetheless, still be relevant to the 
question of the appropriate standard of care in other ways. For example, an ordinance that did not apply 
to a particular class of persons might still be useful in determining what is reasonable. Thus, although city 
ordinances generally do not apply to the state, a city building code might be useful in demonstrating what 
a reasonable builder would have done. See Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 610 P.2d 517 (1980) 
(Bistline, J., dissenting). Similarly, the fact that state transportation department regulations were not 
mandatory means that the regulations will not serve as the basis for a negligence per se instruction but 
does not prohibit their introduction on the general question of the reasonableness defendant's conduct. 
Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394,901 P.2d 501 (1995). What role might the Uniform Fire Code 
play in the Steven v. Fleming [chapter 1]? Did its formal inapplicability make the code irrelevant to the 
case? Was it evidence of what a reasonable person might have done when they remodeled the 
structure? Of the type of changes that might have been made that would have made the structure safer? 
 
(11)  Legislative preclusion of the use of a statutory standard -Griffith v. Schmidt: Just as a legislature 
may specifically provide that a statute creates liability in a common-law tort action, so it may preclude the 
use of a statute in a tort suit. Sometimes the legislature's actions are ambiguous. In 1977, the legislature 
re-codified the motor vehicle statutes. The recodification included I.C. § 49-686(2) which provides that 
violation of maximum speed limitations "shall not be construed to relieve the plaintiff in any civil action 
from the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as the proximate cause of an 
accident." Prior to 1977, former I.C. § 49-701 contained maximum speed limits and specifically set out 
that the violation of the maximum speed limit was prima facie evidence that the speed was not 
reasonable or prudent. The court had repeatedly interpreted this provision to create a rebuttable 
presumption of negligence. Did the change in statutory language that accompanied the recodification 
change the effect of the statute? 
 
In Griffith v. Schmidt, while there was a dispute on the plaintiff’s speed, the evidence was 
uncontroverted that she was exceeding the posted speed limit of 55 m.p.h. at the time of the collision. 
She argued that the change in the statute's language was intended to abrogate the common law that 
violation of the maximum speed limit is negligence per se. This argument was accepted by the trial court 
when refusing to instruct the jury that plaintiffs excessive speed constituted negligence. The Idaho 





We are persuaded that the maximum speed contained in I.C. § 49-681 which states, "[N]o person 
shall drive a vehicle at a speed in excess of such maximum limits: * * * (b) Fifty- five (55) miles 
per hour in other locations [outside urban districts]," is a safety statute and the violation of this 
positive inhibition is negligence per se. []We [also hold]that a plaintiff in a civil action is not 
relieved from proving proximate cause even though the negligence found is a result of the 
violation of the maximum speed limits set out in I.C. §  49-681. In the present case the evidence 
was uncontroverted that plaintiff was exceeding the maximum speed limit of 55 m.p.h. Therefore, 
the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that plaintiffs speed constituted negligence as a 
matter of law. Only the issue of whether such negligence proximately caused the accident should 
have been submitted to the jury. 
Griffith v. Schmidt, 110 Idaho 235, 715 P.2d 905 (1986). 
 
(12)  Compliance with statutory requirements: Thus far the materials have focused on noncompliance 
with a statute. Should compliance with a statute be relevant? 
 
(a)  Farris v. Union Pacific Railroad: A mother and her three children were killed when their 
automobile was struck by defendant’s train. Decedent's heirs brought a wrongful death action, contending 
in part that defendant had failed to install warning devices at the crossing beyond those required by 
statute or other regulations. The railroad was granted summary judgment on its claim that it had complied 
with all relevant statutory and regulatory standards and that compliance with these standards precluded 
the imposition of common law liability. Noting that the United States Supreme Court had held in CSX 
Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), that the federal regulatory standards did not 
preempt state tort law, the Idaho Court of Appeals turned to the state statute, which provided that 
 
Nothing in this subsection [mandating the erection of stop signs at grade crossings] shall be 
construed as granting immunity to any railroad company as to liability, if any, for an accident 
which might occur at a crossing where stop signs are erected and in place, but liability shall be 
determined as provided by law. 
 
Relying upon this explicit statement, the court held that traditional negligence principles governed the 
railroad's potential liability. Farris v. Union Pacific R.R., 124 Idaho 932, 866 P.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 
(b)  Probart v. Idaho Power Co.: At the time he died, Gerald Probart, a crane operator, and a 
third employee were moving a35foot long steel beam from one side of a building onto Balsam Street, 
underneath a transmission line, and onto Pole Line Road. Probart was steadying one end of the beam 
when the boom came into contact with the high voltage transmission line; he was electrocuted. Plaintiff 
alleged that the power company was negligent in failing to have its lines a sufficient distance above the 
roadway and in failing to insulate the transmission lines. Alternatively, plaintiff alleged that the conditions 
at the site of the accident had changed thus rendering the lines unsafe. The area where the accident 
occurred had been developed as an industrial and urban residential district the appellants uninsulated 
high voltage transmission line carried 12,500 volts; the line was at least 21 feet, 9 inches above the 
ground at the site of the accident. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $50,200. Defendant 
appealed, contending that it had complied with a detailed safety code established by the United States 
Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards. The code had been adopted by the Idaho 
Public Utilities Commission. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
 
Where a safety code is adopted by the state and constitutes a guide for electric 
companies, the construction and maintenance of a line in accordance with such code, constitutes 
prima facie evidence of the absence of negligence. [] 
 
.... In order for the [plaintiffs] to prevail, they must go farther and prove some actionable 
negligence on the part of the company. In this respect the only further evidence submitted related 
to the building activity generally throughout Pocatello and vicinity; that in recent years many 
building contractors had resorted to the use of cranes and derricks of various sizes and heights 
and that such machinery had been operated over and along the streets and highways and used 
in the construction of various buildings. Such contractors in the movement of their machines over 
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and along the streets and highways always lowered the boom except when such machinery was 
used to move material and that when so used, with two exceptions, no contact with the wires of 
the company was had; on the two occasions contact was made no injury or damage resulted and 
no report was ever made to the company and it did not otherwise have knowledge of such 
instance; this is the only additional evidence in the record which it is asserted constitutes active 
negligence on the part of the company because it failed to anticipate and meet the particular 
hazard even though it had met the minimum standards of due care with reference to the 
construction and maintenance of such lines by compliance with the requirements of the order of 
the Public Utilities Commission in every respect. 
 
The burden was on respondents to show the negligent character of the failure to either 
insulate the wires or to place them at a greater height; neither the failure to insulate nor to place 
such wires at a height in excess of 20 feet warrants a presumption or an inference of negligence; 
unless there is a showing of negligence in some other respect, no issue of negligence is raised 
.... 
Probart v. Idaho Power Co., 74 Idaho 119, 258 P.2d 351 (1953). Should compliance with a statute 
constitute non-negligence per se? Should compliance be relevant? What effect should compliance with a 
statute have? 
 
Is there a difference between a statute that requires specified conduct and one that merely allows 
that conduct? Ought the two statutes to be treated differently? See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 
282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978). 
 
(c) Fleenor v. Oregon Short Line R.R.: Plaintiff sought to recover for the death of her 
husband who was struck by defendant's train as he crossed the tracks in Nampa. On appeal from a jury 
verdict for plaintiff, the defendant 
 
complains of the action of the court in allowing evidence to be introduced showing that the 
railroad company did not provide a flagman or any gates for the F street crossing.... No ordinance 
of the city of Nampa was shown requiring any such thing, but the fact that the city had no 
ordinance requiring the railroad company to maintain gates or station a flagman at this crossing 
would not relieve the company from the charge of negligence in failing to do so, if, in fact, the 
relative situations of the track and crossing and the extent of its use were such as reasonable 
care and diligence on the part of a reasonably prudent person would demand such precaution for 
the protection of the traveling public. [] 
 
The question as to whether the railroad company was guilty of negligence in not 
maintaining gates at this crossing or keeping a flagman there was properly a question of fact to 
go to the jury, under all the circumstances of the case and the necessity and requirements of the 
peculiar use of this crossing and the extent of that use by the public. Such a duty rests upon a 
different principle from that of ringing a bell or blowing a whistle. The latter is required by positive 
mandate of the statute, and a failure to do so is negligence per se. Wheeler v. Oregon Railroad & 
Navigation Co., 16 Idaho 375, 102 P. 347 (1909). While the duty to maintain gates and keep a 
flagman at a crossing is not enjoined by statute and under some, and perhaps ordinary, 
circumstances is not required as an act of due diligence and reasonable precaution, still under 
other facts and a different situation a failure to do so would constitute negligence at common law, 
irrespective of statutory requirement. [] 
Fleenor v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 16 Idaho 781,102 P.897 (1909). Why is compliance with the law 
generally not dispositive of the breach issue? Should defendant be allowed to prove that she was driving 
the speed limit and thus was not negligent as a matter of law despite the fact that the road was a sheet of 
ice? Cf. Chatterton v. Pocatello Post, 70 Idaho 480,223 P.2d 389 (1950) ("Negligence cannot be 








[C] PROOF PROBLEMS 
 
1.       GENERAL CONCERNS 
 
 
McDONALD v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
109 Idaho 305, 707 P.2d 416 (1985) 
 
HUNTLEY, J.- On April17, 1981, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Alta McDonald entered a Twin Falls 
Safeway Store to make a purchase. As she walked down the aisle, her foot went out from under her and 
she fell, landing on her right hip. 
 
Safeway had been conducting an ice cream demonstration since 10:00a.m. that day. The 
substance that Mrs. McDonald slipped on was cream colored and appeared to be melted ice cream. As a 
result of the fall, Mrs. McDonald suffered severe injuries, requiring the replacement of a total hip 
transplant which she had received shortly before the fall. Thereafter, Alta McDonald brought the action for 
damages for injuries she had sustained, her husband joining with a claim for loss of consortium, services, 
care, comfort and companionship. A jury trial resulted in a special verdict finding Safeway's negligence at 
100% and awarding Alta McDonald damages of $196,000 and Donald McDonald damages of $35,000. 
 
Safeway first assigns error to the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment, asserting 
that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of whether the actions of the Safeway employees 
were reasonable under the circumstances. For reasons which follow we conclude that the trial court 
properly denied the motion. 
 
The complaint alleged, in part: 
 
That on or about Friday, April17, 1981, at some time prior to plaintiff Alta McDonald's 
arrival at said store defendant negligently caused and/or permitted a slippery substance 
consisting of melted ice cream to be deposited and to remain on the floor of said store in 
a place allowed for the passage of plaintiff and other customers and shoppers. 
*** 
That defendant knew or reasonably should have known that slippery substances, including ice 
cream, would foreseeably be dropped by passing shoppers and would accumulate on the floor 
and would endanger the safety of persons walking on the floor. The melted ice cream had been 
dispensed negligently by the defendant and had been negligently allowed to remain on the floor 
for such a period of time immediately preceding the accident that persons of ordinary prudence in 
the position of defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the same, and in the exercise 
of ordinary care would have remedied the same, prior to the happening of the accident herein 
alleged. In spite of defendant's notice of the presence of the melted ice cream on the floor, 
defendant negligently failed and omitted to remove the slippery substance within a reasonable 
time and failed to take any precaution to prevent injury to plaintiff and other invitees that 
foreseeably would be injured. The accident and injury hereinafter alleged were proximately 
caused by the negligence of defendant in causing the ice cream to be dispensed in a manner in 
which it was foreseeable that it would cause injury to others, and in causing and permitting the 
melted ice cream to remain on said floor and in failing to take reasonable precautions to prevent 
injury to plaintiff or to warn of the dangerous, unfit or unsafe conditions. 
 
In its memorandum opinion denying Safeway's motion for summary judgment, the trial court stated:
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In most supermarket slip and fall cases the plaintiff merely slips on an item or slick spot, 
the presence of which cannot be explained by anyone. Normally, the hazard exists during the 
normal business operation of the supermarket. Naturally, in those cases, the focus of attention is 
on the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the market that the hazard involved was on the floor. 
Here we have a substantially different situation. Three separate [sic] demos were being 
conducted on the premises of Safeway where food and napkins were being handed out to 
customers, including infants. This, giving plaintiff the benefit of all inferences, could have created 
an unreasonable risk of harm to people, even if the store had very efficient clean-up procedures. 
The mode of operation of the ice cream demo on a very busy Good Friday, combined with the 
abnormally large crowds and other demos, in and of itself could constitute an act of negligence on 
the part of defendant. It is also possible that Safeway should have taken super extraordinary 
supervisory precautions considering the mixture of ice cream and infants. 
 
A jury question is presented regarding Safeway's negligence. 
 
Safeway argues that the McDonalds' claim of negligence was based on two distinct 
theories, the first being that the Safeway employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
dangerous condition and failed to remedy it and the second being that by permitting three separate 
demonstrations on a busy sales day and furnishing ice cream to infants, Safeway created a foreseeable 
risk of harm to its customers. Safeway contends that it was entitled to an order of summary judgment on 
the negligence claim regardless of the theory upon which the McDonalds relied. 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate only where the pleadings, depositions and affidavits show that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact. Further, all facts and inferences must be construed in favor of 
the party opposing the motion. [] Clearly, as to the first theory of negligence, the record before the trial 
court permitted the reasonable inference that Safeway knew or should have known of the dangerous 
condition, that it had sufficient time to remedy the situation and that in the exercise of reasonable care, its 
employees should have cleaned the spill. 
 
Safeway contends that Idaho law does not permit a plaintiff to recover under the second 
negligence theory, that is, negligent creation of a foreseeable risk of harm. That theory does not require 
that the owner or possessor of land have actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. 
Safeway insists that in dispensing with the knowledge requirement, the second theory is inconsistent with 
Idaho law regarding the liability of an owner or possessor of land for injuries to an invitee. In support of 
this proposition Safeway cites Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1980), 
wherein we stated: 
 
The law is well settled in this state that to hold an owner or possessor of land liable for injuries to 
an invitee caused by a dangerous condition existing on the land, it must be shown that the owner 
or occupier knew, or by the existence of reasonable care, should have known of the existence of 
the dangerous condition. 
 
In Tommerup, the plaintiff-appellant Mrs. Tommerup, had slipped and fallen on a cupcake wrapper which 
apparently had been discarded in the parking lot near the doorway of a grocery store. The record was 
devoid of evidence indicating that the condition which caused Mrs. Tommerup's injury was anything other 
than an isolated incident. In Tommerup, we distinguished the "isolated incident" situation from 
circumstances where an alleged tortfeasor is charged with having actively created a foreseeable risk of 
danger in its course of business, stating: 
 
Appellants cite Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co., [], in support of this argument. That case, 
however, is readily distinguished on its facts. In Jasko, the plaintiff was injured in the defendant’s 
store when she slipped on a slice of pizza which was on the terrazzo floor. An associate manager 
of the store testified that 500-1000 individuals per day purchased one or more slices of pizza at 
the pizza counter. There were no chairs or tables by the counter. Many customers stood in the 
aisle and ate the pizza from the wax paper sheets upon which they were served. When pizza was 
being consumed, porters "constantly'' swept up debris from the floor. 




In reversing an order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Colorado 
Supreme Court held defendant's method of selling pizza was one which led inescapably to such 
mishaps as that of the plaintiff, and in such a situation conventional notice requirement (i.e. actual 
or construction knowledge of the specific condition) need not be met. 
 
The court there stated: 
 
The practice of extensive selling of slices of pizza on wax paper to customers [to] consume it 
while standing creates the reasonable probability that food would drop to the floor. Food on a 
terrazzo floor will create a dangerous condition. In such a situation, notice to the proprietor of the 
specific item on the floor need not be shown.... 
 
The court further stated: 
 
The mere presence of a slick or slippery spot on a floor does not in and of itself establish 
negligence, for this condition may arise temporarily in any place of business. [Citation omitted.] 
Nor does proof of a slippery floor, without more, give rise to an inference that the proprietor had 
knowledge of the condition. [Citation omitted.] But we are not dealing with an isolated incident. [] 
 
The facts of the instant case more closely approximate those of Jasko, than those of Tommerup. 
Certainly, the trial court could not have concluded as a matter of law that the presence of the ice cream 









(1)  In McDonald, what was the basis upon which defendant was found to have breached its duty to 
plaintiff? Was plaintiff required to prove constructive or actual notice of the presence of the ice cream on 
the floor for an unreasonable length of time? What served as a substitute for such a requirement? 
Compare the approach of the McDonald court to that of the Brooks court. 
 
(2)  Professors Morris provide a handy list of what the plaintiff’s attorney must establish in order to get 
to the jury: 
 
(a) what defendant did or did not do, i.e., defendant's actual conduct; 
(b) how dangerous the conduct was; 
(c) defendant's opportunity to discover the danger; 
(d) the availability of safer alternatives; 
(e) defendant's opportunity to discover the safer alternatives; 
(f) that defendant's conduct fell short of the care required under the circumstances. CLARENCE 
MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 80 (2d ed. 1980). 
 
The Morrisses preface their list with the statement that "[t}he substantive law of negligence points 
to the goals of proof of negligence." What are the substantive points which underlie each of the six 
points? In considering the cases in this and subsequent sections, determine which of these elements the 
plaintiff is having difficulty proving. 
 
(3)  Miller v. Village of Mullan: Plaintiff fell and broke her leg when a board in the sidewalk broke as 




but no one claims that any holes or breaks were visible at the end or near where this board broke 
and Mrs. Miller received her injuries. After the accident it was discovered that the board was well 
rotted on the under side and that the sill or cross-piece on which the boards rested at this point 
was also rotten and had not been sufficient to support the board with the added weight of Mrs. 
Miller. No contention is made that there was any patent or visible defect in the crossing at the 
point where the injury occurred. The cause of action appears to have been prosecuted on the 
theory that the crossing contained a latent defect, namely, rotten and decayed boards and sills, 
which an ordinary pedestrian could not, and would not be expected to, discover, but which it was 
the duty of the village authorities to discover and repair. Itis not contended that the authorities had 
any actual notice of the defect at this place, but it is contended, and there is some evidence to 
support the contention, that this was an old crossing, and that it was somewhat decayed and out 
of repair toward the other end from where the accident occurred. Respondents insist that 
although this was a latent defect, the village authorities are chargeable with constructive notice of 
the same, and that their failure to have it repaired before this accident is negligence for which the 
municipality is liable. 
 
Without negligence there can be no recovery. Negligence may arise out of a failure to act 
on actual and positive knowledge of a defect or danger in a street or sidewalk, or it may equally 
arise out of constructive knowledge on the part of the proper village or city authorities that a 
defect or danger exists.  
 
Since it is not contended that the village had actual notice of the decayed and defective 
condition of the walk at the place where this injury was sustained, the recovery must be had, if at 
all, on the grounds of constructive notice. The walk was built prior to the incorporation of the 
village, but no contention is made that the walk was not properly constructed in the first place. ln 
order to hold the village liable, it should be shown that the defect was so obvious or had existed 
for such a length of time as to indicate that the authorities knew of the danger and had known it a 
sufficient length of time to have repaired it. [] It is common knowledge that the board sidewalks 
used in the villages and most of the cities of this state will rot and decay in course of time, but the 
length of time in which they will become dangerous and unsafe is so indefinite and uncertain and 
subject to so many influences, either advancing or retarding the process of decay, that no 
reasonable estimate can be made as to the specific time at and after which a walk will become 
unsafe. Climatic conditions vary greatly indifferent localities and walks are also constructed in 
different ways. [] One walk might be fairly good after ten years' use, while another might become 
wholly unsafe in less time. 
 
This kind of a case is clearly distinguishable from cases involving the duty to inspect and 
keep in safe condition coal-holes and trap-doors in sidewalks and bridges and culverts within the 
city limits. In these latter cases the nature of the place demands a higher degree of care and 
vigilance, and more frequent inspection than is required for the ordinary sidewalk or street 
crossing. 
 
In the case at bar, many witnesses testified to passing over this crossing daily and that 
they had never noticed any defect at or near the place of the accident. Some said the walk as a 
whole was in fairly good condition, while others said it had holes in it and was in a decayed 
condition on the side of Pine street next to the electric light plant, and the cause for this was given 
as being on account of wagons crossing, principally on that side. It seems that teams could not 
cross on the side next to the candy store. The street commissioner testified that he inspected this 
crossing about one month prior to the accident and that it was in "very fair condition," and that he 
discovered no danger or defects. 
 
If this court should hold that the municipalities of this state are chargeable with notice of 
the time when and conditions under which a wooden sidewalk or cross-walk ceases to be safe for 
pedestrians on account of age and use where no patent or obvious defect is apparent, it would 
subject them to a hazard, care and expense that but few of them could afford. [] If, on the 
contrary, a walk has been used for so long that it is in a general state and condition of decay and 
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disrepair, and is allowed to remain in such condition, notice of such condition will be imputed to 
the municipality, and if so bad as to be dangerous, such failure to repair or improve it will become 
negligence. In order to impose liability in such case as this, the condition of the walk must be 
such that danger may reasonably be apprehended at any time, and therefore reasonable 
diligence and prudence would require that it be guarded against. [] 
Miller v. Village of Mullan, 17 Idaho 28, 104 P. 660 (1909). What must be foreseeable? How specific must 
the foreseeability of the danger be? 
 
In LeDeau, the court states, "It is clear ... that the accident did not occur by reason of anything 
which the appellant or its agents or employees did." Might the same be said of the village in Miller? In 
both cases, defendant constructed something that plaintiff was using when injured. In neither case did 
plaintiff allege that the construction was itself faulty. Rather, plaintiff argued that defendant had a duty to 
act to protect plaintiff, whether as a result of the terrain in LeDeau or the passage of time in Miller. Should 
this affect the analysis of the breach issue? 
 
(4)  The ice cream that would not melt: The first trial in McDonald v. Safeway had resulted in a hung 
jury. At the end of the second trial, the attorney representing Mrs. McDonald began his closing argument 
to the jury by placing a small table in front of the jury box. On the table, he placed a clock and a 
thermometer. He put a paper plate on the table. He pulled out a sack, from which he removed a carton of 
the very brand of vanilla ice cream that had caused the injury to Mrs. McDonald. He opened the carton, 
removed a tablespoonful of ice cream and splattered it onto the paper plate. He then began his closing 
arguments. He never looked at the ice cream or the clock and never said anything about it. There was 
enough preservative in the ice cream that it had a consistency more like putty than ice cream. After more 
than an hour, the ice cream was still visibly solid on the plate. He finished and removed the table (still with 
the ice cream, clock and thermometer on it) and put it behind plaintiffs' counsel's table. The store's 
attorney argued for 30 or 45 minutes. When it was time for rebuttal, out came the table, with the ice 
cream still about as hard as it had been. 
 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the verdict for plaintiff but noted, "We strongly 
admonish counsel against such antics and would order a declaration of mistrial but for the fact that a 
complete review of the record reflects that the effect and purpose of the experiment was only to establish 
that even a small chunk of ice cream requires an hour or two to melt at room temperature." McDonald v. 
Safeway Stores lnc., 109 Idaho 305, 707 P.2d416(1985). Are there appropriate alternatives for presenting 
the evidence to the jury? 
 
 
BROOKS V. WAL-MART STORES, INC. 
2018 WL 1872059 
 
BEVAN, J.:  This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment dismissing an action originally brought 
by Diane Brooks (“Brooks”) against Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., (“Wal–Mart”) based on injuries Brooks 
received when she slipped and fell on a puddle of water near a Rug Doctor self-service kiosk (the “kiosk”) 
inside the Wal–Mart on Overland Road in Boise, Idaho. Brooks bases her claims on premises liability and 
negligent mode of operation, alleging Wal–Mart knew or should have known that water could spill or leak 
onto the floor near the kiosk. Wal–Mart moved for summary judgment, arguing that Brooks failed to 
establish Wal–Mart had actual or constructive notice of the condition that caused her injury. This is 
because there was no evidence showing where the liquid came from, how long it had been on the floor, 
or what it was. The district court agreed. Because we find material issues of fact exist, we reverse the 
district court. 
 
A. The rental process at Wal–Mart. 
 
In August 2011, Wal–Mart and Rug Doctor entered into a Vendor Agreement which 
allowed Rug Doctor to place its carpet cleaning machines into Wal–Mart stores and offer them for 
rent to Wal–Mart customers. Through the Vendor Agreement, Wal–Mart directs that the machines 
be offered to customers through an automated self-serve rental process which required no 
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involvement from Wal–Mart’s employees. Thus, the process was self-serve and unsupervised. No 
Wal–Mart employee had a responsibility to interact with either Rug Doctor’s account manager, 
Spencer Hinkle (“Hinkle”), or customers renting or returning Rug Doctor machines at the kiosk. 
  
The machines are serviced approximately every two weeks by Hinkle. Hinkle testified that 
he serviced sixty-eight total accounts in the Treasure Valley, nine of which were Wal–Mart stores. 
The self-service mode of operation was utilized only at Wal–Mart; in all other locations a store 
employee was involved in the rent-and-return process. 
  
Rug Doctor split the rental and cleaning product fees with Wal–Mart. In the typical 
arrangement with other stores, Hinkle would provide training to store employees who were 
involved in the rental and return process. Hinkle testified that he provided no training to the 
Overland Wal–Mart personnel, nor was he ever asked by anyone at that location to provide 
training. Thus, no employee was responsible to inspect the Rug Doctor machines to determine if 
they were clean or dirty upon return; no Wal–Mart employee was responsible to determine if a 
Rug Doctor machine still had liquid in it when rented or returned; and no Wal–Mart employee was 
responsible to inspect the Rug Doctor machines to determine if they leaked. 
 
B. Wal–Mart’s slip-and-fall policy 
 
Wal–Mart adopted a slip-and-fall policy, entitled “Slip, Trip and Fall Guidelines” which 
was in place at the time Brooks fell. This policy required employees to keep an eye out for safety-
type issues in areas they worked. Specifically, Wal–Mart’s maintenance associates were tasked 
with the specific responsibility of performing “safety sweeps” of high traffic areas and cleaning up 
spills throughout the day. All other Wal–Mart associates were tasked with performing visual 
“safety-sweeps” as they performed their regular job duties in the areas they were assigned. Thus, 
Wal–Mart operated on a clean-as-you-go method with employees directed to observe and 
remove spills or other safety issues. 
  
C. The accident 
 
On July 24, 2013, Brooks went to Wal–Mart on Overland Road in Boise, Idaho to buy 
bags of wood chips for her yard. Brooks entered the store through the main doors on the east end 
of the store and asked a cashier for assistance. A cashier directed Brooks to Customer Service. 
Brooks proceed down the action alley—a high traffic area/aisle which runs perpendicular to the 
cash registers and connects the store’s front two entrances—to Customer Service. A Wal–Mart 
employee then escorted Brooks back through the action aisle towards the garden center. While 
walking down the action alley, Brooks’ left foot started to slide, she slipped, and ultimately fell in 
the area of the self-serve Rug Doctor and Primo Water kiosks. As a result of her fall, Brooks 
suffered an injury to her left knee that required surgery. 
 
 Prior to her fall, Brooks did not see any liquid on the floor. After her fall, Brooks saw the 
liquid and was lying in it while Wal–Mart employees were assisting her. Neither Brooks nor Wal–
Mart employees could find the direct source of the liquid; however, in a subsequent investigation, 
Wal–Mart documented that Brooks slipped on a puddle of water that had apparently originated 
from the Rug Doctor kiosk. 
 
 Brooks’ fall was captured on video. The surveillance video shows that approximately 
seven minutes before Brooks’ fall, a Wal–Mart customer had rented a Rug Doctor machine and 
lifted it into a shopping cart. The video does not show liquid coming directly from the machine; 
however, that can be related to the quality of the video and glare on the flooring. The video does 
show the customer and another person tilting the machine back-and-forth while lifting it into a 
shopping cart. Brooks’ fall was in nearly the precise location where the customer was tilting and 
moving the machine into the shopping cart. 
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 The video also shows that a Wal–Mart employee and several customers travelled within 
the same area or path that Brooks travelled within the seven minutes after the Rug Doctor 
machine was rented before Brooks’ fall. During this interval no customers reported any spills and 
no employees noticed the hazard.  
 
D. Procedural Background 
 
Brooks filed a complaint on November 19, 2014 alleging claims of negligence against 
Wal–Mart for failure to maintain the premises and to adequately warn Brooks of the dangerous 
condition. In an amended complaint filed on July 7, 2015, Brooks included a claim of negligent 
mode of operation against Wal–Mart, Rug Doctor, Inc., and Rug Doctor, LLC. 
 
 On March 2, 2016, Wal–Mart filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of 
Brooks’ claims, arguing her allegations were based on speculation rather than objective evidence. 
Rug Doctor filed a similar motion on the same date. On April 11, 2016, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Wal–Mart but denied the same relief to Rug Doctor. The court 
determined that Rug Doctor machines could leak or spill liquid onto the floor of the Wal–Mart 
store which would create a potentially dangerous condition, finding issues of fact remained as to 
whether it was foreseeable that a Rug Doctor machine could cause an injury, and whether Rug 
Doctor exercised its duty to use reasonable care to avoid Brooks’ injury. The court also found that 
there were triable issues of fact as to whether it was reasonably foreseeable to Rug Doctor that 
the machine would or could leak or spill liquid during the self-serve rental process. The court, 
however, refused to apply these findings to Wal–Mart. 
 
 The court found Brooks failed to offer evidence that established Wal–Mart had actual or 
constructive notice of the dangerous condition and that the liquid on the floor near the kiosk was 
not a continuous or foreseeable condition. Brooks timely filed a motion for reconsideration on 
April 25, 2016, arguing that because the district court found reasonable minds could differ 
whether or not Rug Doctor’s self-serve rental process could create a hazardous condition in her 
claim against Rug Doctor, then Wal–Mart, too, should be held liable for choosing the operating 
method and introducing the potentially hazardous rental process into its store. In its order denying 
reconsideration, the district court determined (1) that Brooks failed to present evidence that Wal–
Mart was a direct and immediate cause of Brooks’ injury; (2) that Wal–Mart did not breach the 
general duty of care; and (3) that Wal–Mart’s decision to use the self-service model is not what 
caused the liquid to be on the floor. The district court dismissed Brooks’ claims against Wal–Mart 





A cause of action for common law negligence in Idaho has four elements: “(1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a 
breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting 
injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.” Griffith v. JumpTime Meridian, LLC, 161 Idaho 913, 915, 
393 P.3d 573, 575 (2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In general, “[e]very person 
has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others, to avoid injury to others by any 
agency set in operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his property as to 
avoid such injury.” Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 256, 678 P.2d 41, 48 (1984) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). Generally, “[w]hether a duty exists is a question of law.” Cumis 
Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. Massey, 155 Idaho 942, 948, 318 P.3d 932, 938 (2014). 
 
 When a negligence cause of action is based on premises liability, the element of duty 
depends on the status of the injured person in relation to the landowner, i.e., invitee, licensee 
(social guest), or trespasser. Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 528 (citing Peterson v. Romine, 
131 Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998)). An invitee is defined as one who enters the 
premises of another with the owner’s express or implied consent for the mutual benefit of the 
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entrant and the owner, or for a purpose connected with the business in which the owner is 
engaged. Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871 P.2d 814, 817 (1994). 
 
 Wal–Mart concedes that Brooks had the status of an invitee on the Wal–Mart premises. 
Landowners are charged with a superior knowledge of their premises and the possible dangers 
located there, as compared with their invitees. Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 
778, 251 P.3d 602, 606 (Ct. App. 2011). Traditionally, there are two kinds of duties a landowner 
owes to an invitee: “to keep the premises reasonably safe, and to warn of any concealed dangers 
which the landowner knows of or should have known of upon reasonable investigation. ...” Stem 
v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 590, 594, 272 P.3d 562, 566 (2012) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
Typically, a landowner’s duty to keep the premises reasonably safe and to warn of hazards arises 
only when the landowner or occupier “knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known, of the existence of the dangerous condition.” All v. Smith’s Management Corp., 109 Idaho 
479, 481, 708 P.2d 884, 886 (1985) (citing Tommerup v. Albertson’s, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 
1055 (1980)). 
  
B. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment where triable questions of fact existed. 
 
1. A genuine issue of material fact exists whether or not Wal–Mart should have known of 
the existence of a dangerous condition by choosing a self-service operating method which 
required no employee involvement by Wal–Mart. 
 
The trial court found, both at summary judgment and when denying Brooks’ motion for 
reconsideration, that Brooks had failed to establish that Wal–Mart should have known that the 
Rug Doctor kiosk created a dangerous condition. We disagree. 
 
 The trial court analyzed the issue much like the trial court in All v. Smith’s Management 
Corp., supra, where the court granted a directed verdict because the plaintiff failed to prove that 
the defendants “knew of the existence of the specific pothole into which she fell, or how long the 
pothole was in existence prior to the accident.” 109 Idaho at 480–81, 708 P.2d at 885–86. This 
Court reversed the trial court’s determination, holding that to establish a prima facie case against 
the owners and possessors of a parking lot, the plaintiff was only required to establish that the 
owners or possessors had actual or constructive notice of a foreseeable dangerous condition. 
  
Similarly, the trial court here held: 
 
[T]here is no evidence that there was frequently or commonly water or other liquids on 
the floor near the Rug Doctor kiosk. Therefore, the dangerous condition which allegedly caused 
Plaintiff’s injuries is an isolated incident. 
 
... Plaintiff argues that Wal–Mart failed to acquire any knowledge with regard to potential 
hazards the Rug Doctor machines could cause. The Court does not find that this failure, taking all 
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, creates constructive knowledge of this hazardous condition. 
Because the Court is addressing an isolated event, Wal–Mart’s constructive knowledge should 
match the event, not all possible events. Therefore, the fact that Wal–Mart did not make itself 
aware that Rug Doctor machines could leak does not impute to Wal–Mart the knowledge of the 
puddle in which plaintiff slipped. 
 
 By focusing on Wal–Mart’s lack of actual notice in this case, the court overlooked Wal–
Mart’s possible negligent conduct in purposefully failing to even inquire, in any way, regarding the 
Rug Doctor machines’ potential to leak or otherwise create an unreasonable risk of harm to Wal–
Mart’s customers. Whether Wal–Mart should have exercised due care to familiarize itself of these 
risks in its chosen, self-service operation is a triable question of fact that the jury must resolve. 
  
This Court previously made this point in Tommerup, wherein we stated: 
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“The owner is not an insurer of such (invitees) .... Nor is there any presumption of 
negligence on the part of an owner or occupier merely upon the showing that an injury has been 
sustained by one while rightfully upon the premises. The true ground of liability is the proprietor’s 
superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going 
upon the property. (Mautino v. Sutter Hospital Association, 211 Cal. 556, 296 P. 76 (1931)).” 
Martin v. Brown, 56 Idaho at 382, 54 P.2d at 1158. (emphasis ours) [.] 
 
Because the true ground of liability is the superior knowledge of the owner or possessor, 
we fail to see any justification for holding him liable for injury caused by defects about which he 
had no knowledge, when the lack of knowledge was not due to a failure by the owner or 
possessor to use ordinary care. 
101 Idaho at 3–4, 607 P.2d at 1057–58 (emphasis added). 
  
Thus, as a matter of law, Wal–Mart must possess “superior knowledge” of the operating 
methods utilized in its stores. As noted, the very purpose for the “true ground” of premises liability 
mandates that property owners not stick their heads in the sand and simply ignore potential risks 
to their customers. If that were the case, the superior knowledge which underpins premises law’s 
standards would be merely an illusion. We decline to hold that landowners can purposefully 
choose to remain ignorant of potential hazards on their property. 
 
 As we pointed out above, Wal–Mart and Rug Doctor created an agreement which 
allowed Wal–Mart to profit from the rental of Rug Doctor machines in its premises, while at the 
same time failing to gain any knowledge whatsoever about the potential for the Rug Doctor 
machines to pose a hazard, through leaking water or other substances, to Wal–Mart’s customers 
who traversed the busiest part of the store—the action alley. 
 
 On these facts the trial court denied summary judgment for Rug Doctor, finding that 
[w]hile there are many potential sources of the liquid on which Plaintiff slipped, the Court must 
take the inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. ... This confluence of location, timing and the admission of 
leaking machines create a circumstantial piece of evidence the Court simply can’t disregard or 
weigh as a scintilla or less. The jury could view the video, hear testimony of the kiosk manager, 
and consider evidence as to whether the Rug Doctor machine could have leaked at that location 
and conclude Rug Doctor LLC caused the puddle in which Plaintiff slipped. 
 
 Such facts apply similarly to Wal–Mart’s failure to educate itself as to foreseeable risks 
due to its own chosen operating method. “At this point ... what needs to be proved is [Wal–Mart’s] 
actual or constructive knowledge of its own operating methods relating to the ... foreseeable 
dangerous condition.” All, 109 Idaho at 481, 708 P.2d at 886 (emphasis added). Whether Wal–
Mart failed to exercise due care when it adopted an automated self-serve rental process for the 
Rug Doctor machines is a triable question of fact that precluded summary judgment in this case. 
As such, a jury may have properly considered the following evidence, which is, for our purposes, 
construed in Brooks’ favor: 
 
• Wal–Mart stores are the only locations where a self-service operating method is utilized 
in the Rug Doctor account manager’s territory. Fifty-nine other accounts utilize employees to 
check-in and check-out such machines; 
• The Rug Doctor machines can leak from their nozzles or from the bottom or if hoses 
break down from normal wear and tear; 
• The machines can be returned with water remaining in them, which can spill when 
machines are lifted, tilted and placed into a shopping cart; 
• The rental process for Rug Doctor machines at Wal–Mart is self-serve and 
unsupervised. Thus, no Wal–Mart employee inspects the machines upon return to determine if 
they are clean or dirty; 
• No Wal–Mart employee is responsible to determine if a Rug Doctor machine still had 
liquid in it when returned; 
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• The Rug Doctor account manager never provided any training to the Overland Wal–
Mart personnel, nor was he ever asked by anyone at that location to provide training; 
• Wal–Mart fails to document when or if floor sweeps occur. While employees are trained 
to be constantly on alert for spills or other hazards, Wal–Mart does not document when or where 
spills occur, or why. 
  
This case presents the unique circumstance where the landowner placed a product that 
could potentially leak fluid in the busiest part of its store, and then refused to request any help 
from the manufacturer regarding training or other information that would alert the landowner to 
potential safety hazards inherent in the machinery or the operating method that it implemented. 
Here, in making such a decision, Wal–Mart profited from their sharing arrangement with Rug 
Doctor. However, Wal–Mart ignored the fact that carpet cleaning machines are not like Red Box© 
DVD kiosks, which can be left alone and ignored. These machines can leak or spill or come back 
with water still in them. A jury could have considered whether such actions amounted to a breach 
of Wal–Mart’s standard of care, which required Wal–Mart to be aware of and manage foreseeable 
hazards, particularly where Wal–Mart sits in a position of superior knowledge vis-à -vis Ms. 
Brooks. Given these facts, a reasonable jury could have reached the conclusion that Wal–Mart 
should have known its operating method for managing Rug Doctor machines could have created 
a dangerous condition. 
 
 Wal–Mart argues, and the district court agreed, that this situation presented an isolated 
incident for which Wal–Mart had no actual or constructive notice as a matter of law. We will not 
go so far. Whether the incident was isolated or not, Brooks’ burden to establish constructive 
notice is mired in facts that preclude summary judgment against her. “[C]onstructive knowledge is 
that knowledge which reasonable diligence would have disclosed. ...” State v. Carlson, 50 Idaho 
634, 637, 298 P. 936, 937 (1931). Wal–Mart’s negligence need not be tied to whether the event in 
this case was isolated. Like the reference to all potholes in All, not just the one the plaintiff fell in, 
the particular spill at the Overland store is not the sole issue; rather, one question is whether 
Wal–Mart created a dangerous condition when it placed potentially leaky machines on its 
premises and then failed to act reasonably in managing those machines. A jury may find that 
Wal–Mart’s actions were not negligent, but it may find that they were. Therefore, the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed. 
  
2. Brooks is not relieved from establishing that Wal–Mart had constructive notice in this case. 
 
Brooks argues that she is relieved of having to establish that Wal–Mart had constructive 
notice of the dangers inherent in its operating method. The facts here do not support her 
argument. 
 
a. Idaho law is settled regarding an invitee’s burden in isolated cases. 
 
Brooks argues that the potential dangers from the Rug Doctor machines are so readily 
apparent as to be “continuous,” and/or “easily foreseeable.” As such, she opines she is relieved 
of the duty to prove that Wal–Mart had notice of the dangerous condition at all. We disagree. 
 
 This Court has recognized that when the operating methods of a proprietor are such that 
“dangerous conditions are continuous or easily foreseeable, the logical basis for the notice 
requirement dissolves” and “actual or constructive notice of the specific condition need not be 
proved.” All, 109 Idaho at 481, 708 P.2d at 886. Therefore, under Brooks’ theory, she is not 
required to prove actual or constructive notice of the specific condition. In All, we distinguished a 
plaintiff’s obligation to prove constructive notice from continuous or easily foreseeable dangerous 
conditions. We stated: 
 
In Tommerup, the dangerous condition was a cupcake wrapper which had been 
discarded near the parking lot. The record was devoid of evidence indicating the condition was 
anything but an isolated incident. In Tommerup, and most recently in McDonald, we distinguished 
GENERAL PROOF PROBLEMS 
291 
 
the nonrecurring or isolated incident situation—where actual or constructive notice of the specific 
condition must be shown—from circumstances where the plaintiff shows that the operating 
methods of the landowner or possessor are such that dangerous conditions are continuous or 
easily foreseeable. 
 
All, 109 Idaho at 481, 708 P.2d at 886 (internal citations omitted). See also Tommerup, 
101 Idaho at 4, 607 P.2d at 1058 (quoting Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 177 Colo. 418, 420, 494 
P.2d 839, 840 (1972)) (en banc) (“the Colorado Supreme Court held defendant’s method of 
selling pizza was one which led inescapably to such mishaps as that of the plaintiff.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 
 While the jury will consider on remand whether Wal–Mart failed to exercise due care in 
the way it adopted and managed its operating methods, the facts here do not lead “inescapably” 
to the conclusion that Brooks’ fall was due to continuous spills from the Rug Doctor machines, nor 
was her fall easily foreseeable as a matter of law. As noted above, the jury may find that Wal–
Mart’s failure to avail itself of training or other information about the machines is such that Wal–
Mart will be deemed to have constructive knowledge of the danger—but this is not the same as 
ruling as a matter of law that such self-service operations remove Brooks’ burden to show 
constructive notice in cases like this one. 
  
b. The record here is insufficient to establish that Brooks’ fall was more than an isolated 
occurrence. 
 
“‘The mere presence of a slick or slippery spot on a floor does not in and of itself 
establish negligence, for this condition may arise temporarily in any place of business. ... Nor 
does proof of a slippery floor, without more, give rise to an inference that the proprietor had 
knowledge of the condition.’” Tommerup, 101 Idaho at 4, 607 P.2d at 1058 (quoting Jasko, 177 
Colo. at 421, 494 P.2d at 840–41.). 
 The record in the instant case through circumstantial evidence may lead a jury to 
conclude that the liquid in which Brooks fell came from the Rug Doctor machine due to the rental 
of a machine by another customer about seven minutes before Brooks’ fall. Nevertheless, that 
alone is insufficient to establish that the condition which caused Brooks’ injury was anything other 
than an isolated incident. Therefore, it remains incumbent upon Brooks to carry her burden of 
proof as to Wal–Mart’s constructive notice. 
  
3. Issues of fact also preclude summary judgment based on Wal–Mart’s constructive notice of the 
hazardous condition in this case. 
 
Brooks also argues that material issues of fact exist to preclude summary judgment as to 
Wal–Mart’s constructive notice of the spill itself. We agree. 
 
 In addition to issues of fact regarding Wal–Mart’s imputed constructive notice due to its 
operating method, Brooks has established a genuine issue of material fact that Wal–Mart had 
constructive notice of the liquid in front of the Rug Doctor kiosk at the time Brooks fell. Brooks has 
shown that Wal–Mart associates could have seen the liquid based on their training and clean-as-
you-go maintenance policy. 
 
 First, video surveillance shows a Wal–Mart employee walking by the area approximately 
five and a half minutes before Brooks fell. Wal–Mart’s floor safety policy requires Wal–Mart 
associates to be constantly on alert, look for hazards, and correct any hazards quickly. Based on 
Wal–Mart policy, because an employee walked down the action alley opposite the Rug Doctor 
kiosk the employee should have discovered the liquid as part of a routine visual sweep of the 
area. Viewing this reasonable inference in a light most favorable to Brooks, a jury could find that 




 Second, the record reflects that the Wal–Mart associate escorting Brooks to the garden 
center failed to see the liquid and failed to warn her. Brooks testified as follows: 
 
Q. Did the Walmart [sic] associate that was walking with you ever make a comment 
about, “Be careful, there’s a puddle of water in front of you?” 
 
A. Not a word. 
  
Because Brooks testified she was looking up and around and not at the floor when she 
fell, Wal–Mart contends that Brooks should have been watching where she was walking to avoid 
injury. While this is certainly a good argument for the jury, such a claim carries little weight at the 
summary judgment stage. See Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681, 690, 39 P.3d 621, 630 
(2001) (generally, a plaintiff’s conduct affecting his comparative responsibility is a question for the 
jury). 
 For Wal–Mart to argue that Brooks should have seen the liquid is to disregard the 
statement of its own employee who was escorting Brooks. The associate, presumably trained to 
spot hazards, failed to notice the liquid on the floor despite the testimony of the store manager 
that every Wal–Mart employee is trained to watch for safety issues. The associate stated “I was 
walking with [Brooks] over to the garden center to help her with a purchase of bark, on our way to 
garden the customer fell down near the rug doctor. I saw water on the floor.” It follows that if 
Brooks should have seen the liquid, then the associate, who is not only more familiar with the 
store, but also has a higher duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition, should have seen 
the liquid prior to Brooks’ fall. The presence of two employees in the area creates a legitimate 
question of fact concerning Wal–Mart’s failing to notice the hazard. 
 
 Third, as noted above, Hinkle, Wal–Mart’s Rug Doctor account manager, stated that 
there are conditions under which the machines may leak. He testified, in his experience, “[water] 
could leak from the tank, [it] could leak from the bottom.” He also agreed that water could leak if 
“[the machine] is tilted on it’s [sic] side or upside down or [the] bottom tank [is] overfilled.” 
Additionally, he described that Rug Doctor machines could foreseeably leak water in the following 
ways: from a worn nozzle on the bottom of the machine; from the attachment for the upholstery 
tool; from a worn coupler; from hoses if not correctly attached; or from an incorrectly installed 
reservoir bucket. 
 
 In addition to evidence that suggests it is foreseeable Rug Doctor machines may leak, 
approximately seven minutes before the incident occurred Wal–Mart’s surveillance video shows a 
customer rented a Rug Doctor machine at or near the exact location where Brooks fell. In the 
process, the machine had to be tilted back-and-forth, so it would fit into a shopping cart. While 
there are many potential sources of the liquid on which Brooks slipped, we must take the 
inferences in Brooks’ favor and apply the lesser standard of proof required to survive a motion for 
summary judgment than is required at trial. Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co., 159 Idaho at 685, 365 
P.3d at 1040. 
 
 Under this standard, the location of the fall, the timing, and the evidence that Rug Doctor 
machines can leak creates a genuine issue of material fact that Wal–Mart had constructive notice 
of the spill in this case. 
 
4. Brooks failed to raise the adoption of foreign law before the district court; therefore, the Court will not 
consider the issue in this case. 
 
Brooks’ argument that this Court adopt Washington law and extend a mode of operation 
approach to premises liability is an argument raised for the first time on appeal. 
 
 Brooks argues that this Court should adopt Washington law to modify the traditional 
rules of premises liability by bringing them in line with the modern techniques of self-service 
merchandising. In doing so, Brooks maintains that the notice requirement should be eliminated “if 
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the particular self-service operation of the defendant is shown to be such that the existence of 
unsafe conditions is reasonably foreseeable.” Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wash.2d 39, 50, 666 
P.2d 888, 893 (1983). This argument is unavailing because Brooks did not ask the district court to 
adopt Washington’s exception to the requirement that she prove actual or constructive notice. 
“[A]ppellate courts will not consider new arguments raised for the first time on appeal.” English v. 
Taylor, 160 Idaho 737, 741, 378 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2016) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). Because Brooks did not ask the district court to adopt Washington law she is therefore 
precluded from asking this Court to do so. 
  
Alternatively, Brooks asks this Court to make new law, holding premises owners 
responsible for the risks associated with the self-serve operating methods they choose. Brooks 
asserts that retailers should not be allowed to plead conscious ignorance as a defense when their 
own operating method leads to an injury on their premises. Insofar as we have discussed Wal–
Mart’s general duty to exercise ordinary care in being aware of potential risks due to its operating 
methods, Brooks has prevailed on this point. To the degree that Brooks requests that we make 
new law and equate the term “easily foreseeable” as a matter of law to allegedly flawed operating 
methods, we decline to do so. These arguments were likewise not raised below; therefore, we will 




We vacate the district court’s order granting summary judgment and remand this case for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Costs on appeal are awarded to Appellant. 
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices HORTON and BRODY, concur. 
 
JONES, Justice, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of Wal–Mart. Specifically, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion 
that there was a material question of fact regarding whether Wal–Mart should have known of the 
existence of a dangerous condition by using an automated self-serve rental process for the Rug 
Doctor machines. The majority’s holding departs from existing premises liability laws and imposes 
a new standard for the duty of care owed by landowners that elect to offer self-service operations 
on their premises. I believe this holding ignores the reality that any item in a store can be 
construed as “self-service.” On a daily basis, stores are inundated with patrons who move items, 
drop things, spill liquids, or create any number of other hazards. Any of these actions can be 
done wholly independent of any store employee. Accordingly, I see no need to impose a new 
standard in instances involving a self-serve kiosk. 
 
 “Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others, to 
avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him, and to do his work, render services 
or use his property as to avoid such injury.” Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 256, 678 P.2d 
41, 48 (1984). The duty of care owed to a person depends on their status on the land. Holzheimer 
v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 399, 871 P.2d 814, 816 (1994). It is undisputed that Ms. Brooks 
was an invitee in this case. It is well established the standard of care owed to an invitee is “the 
duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed 
dangers.” Id. at 400, 871 P.2d at 817 (citing Bates v. Eastern Idaho Reg’l Med. Center, 114 Idaho 
252, 253, 755 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1988)). “To establish a prima facie negligence case, the invitee 
also must show that the landowner knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known, of the alleged dangerous condition.” Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 548, 328 P.3d 
520, 528 (2014). “For a nonrecurring or isolated incident, the invitee must show actual or 
constructive notice of the specific condition.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 
 The majority distinguishes the circumstances of this case from ordinary premises liability 
based on the fact that the landowner placed a product that could potentially leak fluid on its 
property, “and then refused to request any help from the manufacturer regarding training or other 
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information that would alert the landowner to potential safety hazards inherent in the machinery or 
the operating method that it implemented.” In doing so, the majority fails to consider that 
countless items in a store have the potential to leak fluid or create a hazardous condition in the 
immediate surrounding area. The fact that a self-service machine was allegedly involved in this 
case simply does not alter the duty of care that is owed by the owner of the premises. 
  
I would follow existing Idaho law and hold that the duty of care owed by Wal–Mart is “the 
duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed 
dangers.” Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. According to this standard, Ms. Brooks 
would have been required to establish that Wal–Mart “knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care 
should have known, of the alleged dangerous condition.” Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 
528; See also All v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 109 Idaho 479, 481, 708 P.2d 884, 886 (1985) (“to hold 
an owner or possessor of land liable for injuries to an invitee caused by a dangerous condition 
existing on the land, it must be shown that the owner or occupier knew, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care should have known, of the existence of the dangerous condition.”). 
 
 However, there was no evidence demonstrating that there were frequent spills from the 
Rug Doctor machine, or any reason to believe that a spill was imminent. In fact, this was the only 
spill alleged to have occurred from the Rug Doctor machine. Further, there was no evidence that 
anyone informed Wal–Mart of the spill, nor was there evidence that any Wal–Mart employee saw 
the spill and failed to clean it up. Instead, the evidence supports a finding that this was an isolated 
and unexpected incident. In sum, I see no reason to deviate from traditional premise liability laws 
merely because Ms. Brooks alleged that the water spilled from a “self-service” kiosk rather than a 
more traditional source. I believe the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
Wal–Mart, holding that Ms. Brooks failed to provide evidence that Wal–Mart knew or should have 




(1)  Slips and falls: The main cases involve comparatively simple factual situations. For a case that 
demonstrates some of the complexities that can be involved in a simple slip-and-fall case, see Herrick v. 
Breier, in which the case turned on consideration of the coefficient of friction between shoes and floor and 
whether the surface had been properly treated. Defendant argued that there was nothing unusual about 
the composition of the floor and that the it had no notice of any problems. Defendant buttressed these 
contentions introduced testimony of a person who sells and installs such floors and of a salesman who 
sells the cleaning compound. The court agreed that plaintiff had failed to prove that her fall was the result 
of any breach of duty by defendant: 
 
The mere assertion of a possibility of a faulty application will not support a verdict of 
negligence in the face of direct evidence that the material was properly applied, and that it had no 
material effect in making the surface of the floor slick or slippery. 
 
If the floor was unusually slick or slippery it thus was not because of any negligent act or 
omission on the [defendant] in caring for the building but because of the inherent nature of the 
material of which the floor was made. [Plaintiffs] have failed to show the presence of any foreign 
substance which could have caused the floor to be unsafe, the remaining question is whether or 
not the jury was justified in finding and concluding from the fact that Mrs. Herrick did fall while 
walking upon the floor that such floor was unsafe and that its maintenance in the manner here 
alleged was of itself negligence. 
The court reversed the jury verdict for plaintiff. Herrick v. Breier, 59 Idaho 171,82 P.2d90(1938). See also 
Antrim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 251 P.3d 602 (Ct App. 2011) (extended discussion of 
constructive notice). 
 
(2)  Statutes and notice: Plaintiff contended that defendant allowed his sheep- which were infected 
with scab, a highly infectious disease -to run free and mix with plaintiff’s sheep. This was in violation of a 
statute requiring anyone herding sheep to report the presence of scab within fifteen days to the deputy 
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sheep inspector. Defendant argued that he was unaware that his sheep were infected. The court rejected 
this argument: "The law presumes that every man knows the condition of his sheep and requires him to 
report the existence of scab within fifteen days after it makes its appearance." North & Douglas v. 
Woodland, 12 Idaho 50,85 P. 215 (1906). Does the presumption of knowledge transform the action into 
strict liability? 
 
ROBINSON v. WILLIAMSEN IDAHO EQUIPMENT CO. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
94 Idaho 819, 498 P.2d 1292 (1972) 
 
McQUADE, C.J.- [The Robinsons (appellants) purchased a truck for use in their roofing business. The 
truck was equipped with a Marion hydraulic scissors hoist to lift roofing materials on the truck bed to roof 
height. The hoist was purchased through Williamsen Idaho Equipment the local distributor of Marion 
products. 
 
[Three weeks after receipt of the truck, it tipped over while being used to lift a load of gravel. 
Respondent's employee thought that the tipping was caused by an unequal distribution of the load on the 
truck bed. The truck was repaired, and appellants were charged $1,000. Two weeks later the truck tipped 
over again as sacks of gravel were being unloaded onto a roof. Respondent again repaired the truck at a 
cost of $1,800. The next day the truck tipped a third time. 
 
[Appellants brought a negligence action against respondents. At trial, appellants introduced 
undisputed evidence from which it was possible to conclude that the cause of the accident was the lack of 
a flow control device to prevent one cylinder of the hydraulic hoist from losing fluid relative to the other 
cylinder.] Taken in its entirety, the substantiated testimony at trial established that the accidents resulted 
from the interplay of uneven loading and the loss of hydraulic fluid in one cylinder causing it to depress. 
 
The parties stipulated that there existed flow control devices for hydraulic hoists in 1965 and 
1966, but respondent's representative, whose exposure to Marion hoists dated to 1959, testified that he 
was unaware of them during those years. However, he also indicated at several points in his testimony 
that he knew the cylinders on the Marion hoist could extend at different rates, or that one could sink 
relative to the other. Stated simply, he revealed that he knew the effect if not the cause of the problem. 
He further testified that [he] was actually informed of the manner in which they intended to use the hoist. 
 
Appellants' expert concluded without contradiction that a Marion hoist of the type sold, would be 
unsafe to operate when used for the kind of work contemplated by appellants. He further stated without 
refutation that the design characteristic which rendered it unsafe would not be common knowledge, or 
even known by most owners of such equipment. On this point, respondent's representative conceded that 
to his knowledge appellants had received no special warnings, or even qualifying instructions, on use of 
the hoist at the time of purchase. 
 
The unsafe condition of the hoist when used for the intended purpose was, in tum, attributable to 
a design characteristic of which respondent's representative was aware but which he lacked requisite 
knowledge to alter. He was unaware of flow control devices at the time because none of the Marion hoists 
contained them. There is no evidence in the record to show that he was informed or was presented the 
reasonable opportunity in the conduct of the business to be informed, of the design of hoists marketed by 
other manufacturers, which contained such devices. This Court has held that the supplier of a tool or 
instrument for use by another is under a duty to exercise reasonable care, commensurate with the facts 
and circumstances, to see that the implement is proper and safe for the purpose. In this case, however, 
respondent was not capable of remedying the defect of which it was aware. We concur with the trial court 
that respondent breached no duty of care toward appellants by failing to perform an act not reasonably 






(1)  What is the holding? Which element or elements from the Morrisses list did plaintiffs' attorney fail 
to establish in Williamsen? How might the attorney have met plaintiffs proof obligations on this question? 
 
(2)  Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho Equipment Co., part 2: In a section of the decision not reproduced 
above, the court held that Williamsen had a duty to warn plaintiff of the risk: 
[If a seller] knows or has reason to know that the product is likely to be unsafe when used 
for the purpose for which it is supplied and has no reason to believe that the persons for whose 
use the product was supplied will realize its unsafe condition, then the supplier has a duty to 
exercise reasonable care adequately to warn them of the unsafe condition or of the facts which 
make the product likely to be dangerous. 
 
The duty, the court writes, applies to a seller "who knows or has reason to know'' that the product is 
unsafe for the purposes for which it is sold. Thus, a product- not defective in manufacture or design- may 
be defective for failure to warn of risks which arise from known or foreseeable uses. The reasonableness 
of a warning is measured by the risk. 
 
 
2.       RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
 
 
C.C. ANDERSON STORES CO. v. BOISE WATER CORP. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
84 Idaho 355, 372 P.2d 752 (1962) 
 
TAYLOR, J. -Approximately 1:30 a.m., June 12, 1959, a break occurred in defendant's ˙ [appellant's] ten-
inch water main on 9th street, between Idaho and Bannock streets, in Boise. Water from the ruptured 
main flowed down Idaho street, over the sidewalk, and into the store building owned and occupied by 
plaintiff [respondent], damaging merchandise and other property therein. 
 
The main had been laid in 1890, about four and one-half feet beneath the surface of the street. 
The pipe was purchased by defendant under the trade name of Kalomine, which was composed of 
wrought iron alloyed with a small amount of lead to inhibit corrosion and was coated on the outside with 
asphalt. Defendant maintained 223 miles of main, of which approximately 12 1/2 miles were of the 
Kalomine pipe. The trenches for the Kalomine pipe were dug in soil consisting of a mixture of gravel and 
silty-clay loam and backfilled with sand. 
 
The defendant's records indicate two prior "serious" breaks in its mains, one of which occurred in 
a wooden pipe and the other in a "relatively new steel pipe." The manufacturer of the Kalomine pipe 
guaranteed it to withstand hydrostatic pressure of five hundred pounds per square inch and represented 
that the pipe was still in service in places where it had been laid for over one hundred years. The break 
occurred on the underside of the pipe where it had been weakened by corrosion, and consisted of a split 
about eighteen inches long. Asked the cause of the corrosion, defendant's engineer testified: 
 
I know of no scientific way you could say what caused the failure in that particular pipe, 
it could be a mixture of possibly manufacturing impurities, electrolytic corrosion, rust on the 
outside of the pipe. 
 
Other portions of the pipe in the area of the break appeared to be in good condition. Four strips 
were cut from the pipe in the immediate area of the break; one from each of the bottom quarters and one 
each from the top quarters of the pipe. These strips were subjected to tests for tensile strength by the 
Gem State Testing Laboratory, from which it was determined that the portions from the upper quarters of 
the pipe had a tensile strength in excess of 37,000 pounds per square inch, and the pieces from the 
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bottom quarters in excess of 30,000 pounds per square inch. Based on the tests the defendant's engineer 
testified that the bottom portions of the pipe tested would withstand hydrostatic pressure of924 pounds 
per square inch, and the top sections 1100 pounds per square inch. 
 
The normal pressure maintained by defendant in its mains varied from seventy to eighty pounds 
per square inch and dropped below that pressure during hours of heavy withdrawal. The 
maximum pressure placed in the pipe immediately before the break, as recorded by an automatic 
pressure gauge maintained by defendant, was 78 pounds per square inch on June 2nd, 1959. The 
pressure was 76 pounds at the time of the break, and as a result of the break the pressure dropped to 55 
pounds per square inch. 
 
Through the telephone answering service, subscribed to by defendant, the city police notified 
defendant's designated employee of the break at 2:08a.m. At approximately 2:15a.m. such employee and 
another commenced closing off the flow of the broken section. This was done by means of seven valves 
in the downtown grid. At, or about, 2:45a.m. the pressure was restored, indicating the water had been cut 
off from the section in which the break occurred. 
 
The foregoing indicates that defendant was not negligent in applying excessive pressure to the 
pipe, nor in failure to act promptly and effectively after notice of the break. Plaintiff offered no 
contradictory evidence and does not seriously contend that defendant was negligent in that regard. 
 
This appeal is from a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff; from order denying 
defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and from order denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
 
Defendant contends the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable and that the trial court erred 
in submitting the doctrine to the jury and permitting the jury to apply it in this case. The essentials of the 
doctrine are: (1) that the agency or instrumentality causing the injury was under the control and 
management of the defendant, Splinter v. Nampa, 74 Idaho 1, 256 P.2d 215 (1953); (2) that the 
circumstances were such that common knowledge and experience would justify the inference that the 
accident would not have happened in the absence of negligence. Walker v. Distler, 78 Idaho 38, 296 P.2d 
452 (1956). 
 
In this case it is conceded that the pipe which ruptured, and the water therein was under the 
control and management of the defendant. In the application of the second required element of the 
doctrine, consideration must be given to other established fundamental principles. 
 
The defendant is not an insurer against injury to others arising out of the installation, maintenance 
or operation of its water system. Its liability for such injury depends upon negligence. Dunn v. Boise 
City,48 Idaho 550, 283 P.606 (1929); Yearsley v. City of Pocatello, 69 Idaho 500, 210 P.2d 795 (1949), 
71 Idaho 347,231 P.2d 743 (1951); [] The burden of establishing such negligence rests upon the plaintiff. 
[] The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. It 
merely shifts to the defendant the obligation to produce evidence to explain or rebut the inference of 
negligence raised by the application of the doctrine. [] 
 
In our opinion, res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of 
negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of 
negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not 
necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that they call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily 
that they require it; that they make a case to be decided by the jury, not that they forestall the 
verdict.... When all the evidence is in, the question for the jury is whether the preponderance is 
with the plaintiff. 
Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233. 
 
Plaintiff contends the defendant was bound to take notice that its mains would deteriorate from 
time and use and was required to take such measures as ordinary care would dictate, to guard against
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rupture therein, citing Dunn v. Boise City, 48 Idaho 550,283 P. 606 (1929). That case involved damage 
caused by the rupture of timbers used in the construction of a wooden flume. The court there said: 
 
The city was not an insurer of the condition of its drainage system but was bound to use ordinary 
care and skill in constructing and maintaining it. It was likewise bound to take notice of the liability 
of the timbers to decay from time or use, and to take such measures as ordinary care would 
dictate to guard against the breaking of the flume across the Boise Water Company's canal 
because of the decay of timbers used in its construction. 
 
The Dunn case was followed in Yearsley v. Pocatello, 69 Idaho 500, 210 P.2d 795 (1949), in 
which it was said that the city was bound to take notice that pipes in its water system were liable to 
deteriorate from time and use and must take such measures as ordinary care would dictate to guard 
against leakage resulting from such deterioration. However, it was, nevertheless, held in the Yearsley 
case: 
 
Third, that the city is not liable for damages occasioned by a latent defect in the absence of 
notice, express or implied, of such defective condition, i.e., the municipality must have 
had actual notice or the defect actually existed for such a length of time, or under such 
circumstances that it should have known thereof. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from defendant's evidence as to the cause of the rupture is at that 
there could have been a defect in the manufacture of the pipe, or some of the asphalt coating could have 
been rubbed, knocked off, or damaged in the shipping, handling, or installation of it, which reasonable 
inspection at the time of installation would have revealed; and that such defective condition permitted 
corrosion to weaken the pipe to the extent that it ruptured. The inference of negligence, which the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits to be drawn from the circumstances, is a reasonable one and is 
justified in this case. O'Connor v. Black, 80 Idaho 96, 326 P.2d 376 (1958); [] 
 
The only requirement as to notice is such as is compatible with the application of the doctrine, 
namely, defendant is bound to take notice that its mains will deteriorate from time and use. To the extent 








KRINITT V. IDAHO DEP’T OF FISH & GAME14 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
159 Idaho 125, (2015) 
 
 
EISMANN, J.- This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's action for wrongful death after 
the district court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Because there are genuine 
issues of material fact regarding the liability of the Defendants, we vacate the judgment and reverse the 





This lawsuit arose out of a fatal helicopter crash that occurred on August 31, 2010, in Kamiah, 
Idaho. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game (Department) had contracted with Leading Edge 
                                                     
14 This case was argued on appeal in the Courtroom at the University of Idaho College of Law (Moscow). 
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Aviation, LLC, to fly two Department employees from Clarkston, Washington, to the Selway River in Idaho 
in order to collect data on salmon spawning. The pilot of the helicopter was Perry J. Krinitt, Jr., the son of 
the Plaintiff. The two Department employees were Larry Barrett and Danielle Schiff. 
 
The helicopter had a "bubble canopy" with seating for three abreast and two bubble doors, one 
on each side. The bubble doors had windows that bulged outward so that passengers could look down. 
The bubble doors also increased the amount of room for the passengers. The pedestal with the flight 
instruments was located in front of the center seat. 
 
For the flight, the pilot was going to sit in the center seat, Mr. Barrett was going to sit in the left 
seat, and Ms. Schiff was going to sit in the right seat. During the survey of the river, Mr. Barrett would be 
looking for the salmon spawning beds and Ms. Schiff would be recording his observations with paper and 
pencil. She had a metal clipboard that was about nine inches by twelve inches by three-fourths of an inch 
thick. The top was hinged so that paper or other items could be stored in the clipboard. Prior to the flight, 
the pilot briefed Mr. Barrett and Ms. Schiff, and during the briefing he told them that they must at all times 
maintain control of any items they had with them in the helicopter and that Ms. Schiff was responsible for 
the clipboard. 
 
The pilot intended to fly to Selway Falls, Idaho, and refuel before flying along the Selway River. At 
about forty minutes into the flight, the pilot radioed that they were landing in Kamiah, Idaho, which was an 
unscheduled stop about 35 miles from Selway Falls. The pilot did not state why they were landing there. 
A man who was installing a sprinkler system at a retirement home in Kamiah looked up when he heard 
the helicopter and soon saw it appear over a ridge flying toward him. Its flight path was slightly to his left, 
so he could not see the right side of the helicopter. He noticed that as it came over the ridge, it began to 
descend like it was going to land. He watched for a while, and then resumed digging. 
 
Upon hearing a loud bang, he looked up at the helicopter and saw something coming off the tail 
rotor. The helicopter began rotating back and forth on its axis. It rotated counterclockwise far enough for 
him to see the right side, and he saw that the right door was open about as far as it would go with 
someone in the doorway holding it open. It appeared to him as if the person was contemplating jumping. 
The helicopter then rotated clockwise so that he could not see the right side, and when it rotated 
counterclockwise again the right door was closed. He estimated that the helicopter was 300 to 400 feet in 
the air when he heard the loud bang. It continued descending, while rotating back and forth, until it was 
about 150 to 200 feet in the air. At that point it fell straight down and crashed. The pilot and Ms. Schiff 
were killed in the crash, and Mr. Barrett died shortly after the crash from his injuries. An investigation 
revealed that Ms. Schiff's clipboard had struck the tail rotor, causing the tail rotor assembly to separate 
from the helicopter. 
 
The Plaintiff filed this wrongful death action contending that the accident was caused by the 
negligence of the Department or its employees. The Defendants moved for summary judgment, and, after 




Did the District Court Err in Granting Summary Judgment? 
 
A trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). In an 
appeal from a summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by 
the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 46-
47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1101-02 (2002). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the 
nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in 




In its decision granting summary judgment, the district court found that the Plaintiff's evidence 
was lacking because it did not show who had possession of the clipboard when it left the cabin. The court 
also stated that the evidence showed that the clipboard hitting the tail rotor was an unforeseeable 
accident. The court erred in these determinations. 
 
With respect to who had possession of the clipboard when it left the cabin, the court stated as 
follows: 
No one knows how or exactly when the clipboard left the helicopter and subsequently hit the tail 
rotor of the aircraft. There is no evidence indicating how or exactly when the clip board [sic] left 
the cockpit of the helicopter, or who had control over the clipboard just prior to the door being 
opened. 
 
The plaintiff has not offered any facts to show that Ms. Schiff or Mr. Barnett [sic] had exclusive 
control over the clipboard. 
 . . . . 
 
There is no evidence, only suspicion, that the clip board [sic] was in Ms. Schiff's possession when 
the door was opened. 
 
The undisputed facts are that Ms. Schiff had possession of the clipboard before the helicopter 
took off and that she was going to use it while writing down the observations of Mr. Barrett. Before she 
climbed into the helicopter, she set the clipboard on her seat. Prior to getting into the helicopter, the pilot 
instructed her to maintain control at all times of her items of property and that she was responsible for the 
clipboard. There is no evidence that anyone else was going to use the clipboard. As stated above, in 
ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the court was required to draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the Plaintiff. The most reasonable inference from the facts is that Ms. Schiff would have retained 
control of the clipboard during the flight. With respect to when the clipboard left the cabin, the witness on 
the ground saw the helicopter making a normal landing approach. He resumed his work, and then heard 
a loud bang. When he looked up again, he saw something coming off the tail rotor, and the helicopter 
began rotating back and forth on its axis. The wreckage documentation issued by the National 
Transportation Safety Board stated that the debris field was about 1,500 feet in length; that the two tail 
rotor blades were fractured about twelve inches from the tail rotor hub; that crush damage to one of the 
blades showed that the damage occurred before the blade fractured; and that the 18-inch-long sections of 
the tail rotor blades that broke off were some of the earliest components in the debris field. The main 
parts of the metal clipboard were recovered in a similar location in the debris field, and the three main 
parts of the clipboard exhibited creasing, tearing, and red paint transfer marks, all of which were 
consistent with the clipboard being struck by the tail rotor blades. The reasonable inference is that the 
clipboard left the helicopter just prior to it hitting the tail rotor blades, which caused the loud noise that the 
man on the ground heard. 
 
With respect to how the clipboard left the helicopter, it could only do so if the door was opened. 
During oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, the Defendants' counsel stated that it was 
undisputed that "the clipboard exited the helicopter on the right-hand side." Jim Pope, Jr., the owner of 
Leading Edge Aviation, stated that during June or July 2010, the right door of the helicopter had come 
open while he was flying it. He said that upon landing, he had his mechanic make adjustments to the 
door, that the helicopter was flown about 80 hours 5 afterwards, and that there were no further 
inadvertent door openings. During his deposition, Mr. Pope was asked how far the door would open when 
it opened inadvertently, and he answered, "Inch and a half to two inches." When asked about closing the 
door when it inadvertently opened, he responded, "It is as easy to close as a lid on a laptop." 
 
Mr. Pope also explained that with the door handle in the closed position, the shoulder of the 
person sitting next to the door would effectively block the handle from inadvertently moving forward and 
allowing the door to open. He was alone in the helicopter when the door had come open in June or July 
and was sitting in the left seat (there were apparently duplicate flight controls—tail rotor pedals, collective 
lever, and cyclic stick—for the left seat). One of the experts testified that "there appears to be no 
explanation for the door opening in flight other than by the action of the passenger sitting in the seat 
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closest to the door." Thus, there was evidence in the record that the clipboard could not have left the 
helicopter unless Ms. Schiff opened the door and failed to maintain control of the clipboard. 
 
The district court also stated that the clipboard hitting the tail rotor if it went out the door was not 
foreseeable. The court wrote: 
 
Mr. Pope, a helicopter pilot and owner of this helicopter, in his deposition, testified that 
having a clipboard fall out of this helicopter and engage with the rear rotor was not foreseeable. 
The court mischaracterized Mr. Pope's testimony. He did not testify that he did not foresee that a 
clipboard that went out the door could damage the helicopter. What he stated was that he did not 
fathom that someone would fail to keep control of a clipboard in the helicopter. 
 
Q. You testified you didn't realize a metal clipboard was a hazard until after the accident, but you 
also testified that you didn't want things going out of the aircraft. You never put two and two 
together before the accident? 
 
A. I did not recognize the clipboard as big of a hazard because the assumption of it being in direct 
operational control of one of the observers and crew members. I did not fathom that it would 
come away from the operational control of the operator. 
    . . . . 
 
A. But as a crew member I trust a person to—that's their whole job is to hang onto that, and I trust 
in their abilities to do that. 
 
The court later added: 
 
In addition, the cause of the accident was not foreseeable. It would be expected that any object 
dropped from a height would fall towards the ground. If an object was dropped from a helicopter 
preparing to land it would be expected that the object would be forced towards the ground at a 
rate greater than gravity due to the downward thrust of air from the rotors immediately above the 
cockpit. 
 
There is nothing in the record to support this statement. The court apparently was under 
the misconception that the helicopter was hovering about 300 to 400 feet in the air and slowly 
descending straight down when the clipboard left the cabin. Instead, as the eyewitnesses 
testified, the helicopter was apparently making a landing approach, descending with forward air 
speed, when the clipboard hit the tail rotor. Although the record does not indicate an estimate of 
its forward airspeed, it was clearly not hovering. 
 
Immediately following the above quote, the court stated, "How the clipboard got from the 
cockpit all the way back to the rear rotor is unknown." To the contrary, how it occurred is obvious 
and undisputed. As explained by one of the experts in his conclusion, the "[a]luminum clipboard 
was blown back along the right side of the aircraft and drawn into the tail rotor causing failure of 
the tail rotor blade, tail rotor gear box, and subsequent loss of control of the aircraft." During oral 
argument on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, their counsel stated that nobody 
disputed that "a metal clipboard struck one of the blades of the tail rotor disabling the tail rotor, 
which then led to a succession of events that caused the tail rotor disassembly to disengage from 
the tail boom and basically render the helicopter unflyable at that point in time." Thus, there is no 
basis for the court's conclusion that how the clipboard could have hit the tail rotor was unknown. 
 
Implicit in the district court's analysis is that the Plaintiff was required to prove his case with direct 
evidence. The court stated: "There is no evidence indicating how or exactly when the clip board left the 
cockpit of the helicopter, or who had control over the clipboard just prior to the door being opened." 
(Emphasis added.) What the district court failed to recognize however, is that "[c]ircumstantial evidence is 
competent to establish negligence and proximate cause." Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74 Idaho 1, 10, 256 
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Did the District Court Err in Holding that the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur Was Inapplicable? 
 
The Plaintiff argued the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in opposing the Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. The district court held that the doctrine was inapplicable, stating: 
 
The plaintiff has not offered any facts to show that Ms. Schiff or Mr. Barnett [sic] had exclusive 
control over the clipboard. The pilot was also in the cockpit and had access to the clipboard. 
Therefore, res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the undisputed facts of this case. 
 
In so holding, the district court erred. 
 
"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a means of establishing negligence through circumstantial 
evidence. . . . [Its function] is to replace direct evidence of negligence with a permissive inference of 
negligence." Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 934, 523 P.2d 536, 537 (1974) (footnotes omitted). For the 
doctrine to apply, two elements must exist: "the agency or instrumentality causing the injury must be 
under the exclusive control and management of the defendant and the circumstances must be such that 
common knowledge and experience would justify the inference that the accident would not have 
happened in the absence of negligence." Christensen v. Potratz, 100 Idaho 352, 355, 597 P.2d 595, 598 
(1979). 
In this case, the evidence was sufficient to show that the clipboard was under the exclusive 
control and management of the Defendants' employee. As discussed above, the evidence shows that it 
was Ms. Schiff's clipboard, that she was going to use it during the flight, and that the pilot told her prior to 
takeoff that she was responsible for the clipboard and was to maintain control of it at all times. If she had 
given the clipboard to anyone, it would most reasonably have been given to Mr. Barrett. However, 
because both the Plaintiff's and the Defendants' experts stated that the clipboard came out the right-side 
door of the helicopter, it is unlikely that Mr. Barrett would have had it immediately before it exited the door. 
He would have had to have thrown it out the door from the left side of the helicopter. 
 
The court's statement that "[t]he pilot was also in the cockpit and had access to the clipboard" is 
unavailing. When the clipboard came out of the helicopter, the pilot was making a landing approach. Most 
likely, he would have had his left hand on the collective lever and his right hand on the cyclic stick. There 
is absolutely no evidence or logical inference supporting a conclusion that he would have been holding 
the clipboard. 
 
For res ipsa loquitur to apply, it is not necessary to conclusively show that the pilot would not 
have had possession of the clipboard. As stated in 57B Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 1235 (2004): 
 
Evidence conclusively showing the control or management of the instrumentality causing the 
injury is not required. It may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence, and by 
such reasonable and logical inferences as may be drawn therefrom. The evidence must afford a 
rational basis for concluding that the cause of the accident was probably such that defendant 
would be responsible for any negligence connected with it. That does not mean that the 
possibility of other causes must be altogether eliminated, but only that their likelihood must be so 




With respect to the second element, common knowledge and experience would justify the 
inference that the clipboard would not have gone out of the helicopter but for the failure of Ms. Schiff, or 
Mr. Barrett in the unlikely event that he had the clipboard, to maintain control of the clipboard. Even if the 
door of the helicopter had accidentally come open, there is nothing to indicate that Ms. Schiff could not 
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have maintained control of the clipboard. A jury could conclude that the accident would not have 





We vacate the judgment and reverse the order granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 





{1)  Elements of the doctrine -"the agency or instrumentality causing the injury was under the control 
and management of the defendant": What is required to establish "control"? 
 
(a) Hansen v. City of Pocatello: Plaintiff was injured when she stepped on the lid of a water 
meter box embedded in the sidewalk. The lid flipped up and she fell into the hole. She filed suit claiming 
that the city was negligent, relying in part of res ipsa loquitur. The supreme court affirmed a verdict for the 
city: 
In her complaint, Hansen alleged the City was liable to her under a theory of res ipsa 
loquitur. She cited Le'Gall v. Lewis County, 129 Idaho 182, 923 P.2d 427 (1996), in support of 
this claim. Res ipsa loquitur applies when "the agency or instrumentality causing the injury is 
under the exclusive control and management of the defendant, and the circumstances of the case 
are such that common knowledge and experience would justify the inference that the accident 
would not have happened in the absence of negligence." Id. at 187,923 P.2d at433 (quoting 
Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615,618,717 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1986)). The 
burden shifts to the defendant in such instances to rebut an inference of negligence. 
 
The district court correctly declined to apply res ipsa loquitur. The water meter lid was not 
under the exclusive control of the City; it was located on a public sidewalk. Further, the evidence 
disclosed that water meter lids can be readily removed by passersby. Thus, res ipsa loquitur does 
not apply. 
Hansen v. City of Pocatello, 145 Idaho 700, 184 P.3d 206 (2008). Is it the access by others than the 
owner to the box that distinguishes Hansen from C.C. Anderson? 
 
(b)  Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow: Plaintiff, owner of one part of a building complex 
in Wendell, brought suit against the owner of another part of the complex, arguing that defendant was 
responsible for the fire that destroyed the complex. Plaintiff, Hamilton Drug, appealed a summary 
judgment: 
 
Hamilton Drug asserts that the court erred in ruling prior to trial that the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable and that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on that 
doctrine. We disagree and hold that the necessary conditions for application for the principle of 
res ipsa loquitur were not present in the instant case. 
 
  The cause of fire cannot be established by application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 
but if there is substantial evidence that an instrumentality in the exclusive control of the defendant 
did cause the fire the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is available to raise the presumption of 
negligence. [] Hamilton's premise was clearly that the fire was electrically caused and that it 
started in the department store. However, Fire Chief Hosack and defense witness Beland testified 
that the fire damage was so extensive that the point of origin could have been burned up and lost. 
Beland testified that he saw no evidence of a point of origin of the fire and that "obviously if you 
don't find the point of origin, how do you find the cause." Hence, we hold that the "instrumentality 
causing the injury'' was not established and in fact no instrumentality could be identified as having 




However, even assuming that the electrical system did cause the fire, exclusive control of 
that system was not established. A common wall existed between the department store and the 
doctors' offices, and the drug store and department store also shared a common wall. Electrical 
wiring ran above the common wall from the electrical meters outside the building complex. 
Hence, we hold that there is no justification for the conclusion that negligence is the most 
likely explanation for this fire because there was no showing of the instrumentality that caused the 
damage, much less any showing of exclusive control. Our common knowledge and experience, 
or that of a jury, would not justify the inference that the accident would not have happened in the 
absence of negligence in that there are many possible causes for a building fire in the absence of 
negligence. 
Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615,717 P.2d 1033 (1986). 
 
(c)  Splinter v. City of Nampa: Plaintiffs building was destroyed in an explosion that occurred 
as a deliverer was delivering a load of butane. Plaintiff sued the city in addition to the butane company, 
contending that the city had been negligent in requiring the placement of the butane delivery pipes 
adjacent to a coal chute. Plaintiff contended that this allowed any butane that leaked during delivery to 
flow into the basement. Plaintiff, however, was unable to pinpoint the cause of the explosion. Plaintiff 
appealed a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; the court affirmed, noting in passing: "It must be born in 
mind that this is not a case for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The city had no control 
over the maintenance or operation of either the tank, or any of the fittings or appliances in the building." 
Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74 Idaho 1,256 P.2d 215 (1953). See also Maloney v. Winston Bros., 18 Idaho 
740, 111 P. 1080 (1910). 
 
(2)  Elements of the doctrine - ''the circumstances were such that common knowledge and experience 
would justify the inference that the accident would not have happened in the absence of negligence": 
 
(a)  Western Stockgrowers Association v. Edwards: In August 1990, a grass fire started on 
Bureau of Land Management lands in southern Idaho. The fire burned several thousand acres and 
damaged fences owned by plaintiff. Defendant was driving through area on the day the fire began and 
admitted that his vehicle started the fire. Plaintiff did not, however, call Edwards as a witness, relying 
instead on witnesses who had seen Edward's vehicle near the point at which the fire started. Following 
plaintiffs case in chief, defendant moved for a directed verdict, asserting that plaintiff had failed to prove 
that he had breached any duty. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal, the court of appeals 
affirmed. The evidence, the court concluded, was insufficient to establish res ipsa loquitur. 
 
At trial, there was no evidence presented regarding the actual cause of the fire, whether 
related to some mechanical problem of the car or otherwise. Evidence was presented, however, 
that on the day of the fire, the weather was hot, dry and at least mildly windy. One witness 
testified that dry plants grew in the road on which Edwards had been driving. Because a variety of 
circumstances could start a fire in such a situation, many of which would not require negligence, 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable. We do not believe that common knowledge and 
experience justifies making such an inference of negligence, and we affirm the order of the district 
court in this regard. 
Western Stockgrowers Association v. Edwards, 126 Idaho 939, 894 P.2d 172 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 
(b) S.H. Kress & Co.v. Godman: Upon arriving at work, plaintiff employee found a cold store. 
When he investigated further, he discovered that the boiler was not lit and that he could not restart it. He 
called defendant and requested a repairer. Upon inspection of the boiler, defendant determined that the 
water line was leaking and that the electrical switch controlling the gas flow into the boiler was turned off. 
He replaced the water line, turned the electricity back on, and restarted the boiler. Two hours later the 
boiler exploded. At trial, plaintiff’s expert testified that the explosion was caused by a defective regulator 
valve located inside the boiler. The defect could not be discovered without disassembling the boiler. The 
expert also testified that an external pressure relief valve failed to operate because it was corroded. 
Plaintiff argued that the defendant had a duty to inspect the external safety features of the boiler. Plaintiff 
also sought to have the jury instructed on res ipsa. The supreme court agreed with the trial court's refusal 
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to charge the jury on the doctrine: "In this case there are other probable explanations of the cause of the 
boiler's explosion including [plaintiff's] negligence in the control of maintenance of the boiler. For this 
reason, the trial court correctly concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable to the facts 
of this case." S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973). See also Wing v. Clark's 
Air Service, Inc., 106 Idaho 806, 683 P.2d 842 (1984); Christensen v. Potratz, 100 Idaho 352, 597 P.2d 
595 (1979). 
 
(c)  Walker v. Distler: In C.C. Anderson, the court noted that res ipsa was based 
upon the fact "that the circumstances were such that common knowledge and experience would 
justify the inference that the accident would not have happened in the absence of negligence." Does this 
mean that the doctrine is never applicable to circumstances which are beyond the common range of 
experience? In a medical malpractice case, the Court noted that the doctrine was generally inapplicable 
in such cases "because the causative factors are not ordinarily within the knowledge or experience of the 
laymen composing the jury." Nevertheless, the doctrine can be applied 
in cases where common knowledge alone may not be sufficient to enable a layman to say the 
accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence. In such cases 
the evidence produced is considered and, if it furnishes a sufficient basis for information from 
which a lay jury can reasonably conclude that the accident is of a kind which normally does not 
occur unless someone is negligent, the doctrine is applied. 
Walker v. Distler, 78 Idaho 38, 296 P.2d 452 (1956). 
 
(d) A role for expert testimony? As society and technology become increasingly complex, 
more things are outside common experience. Is there a role for experts in bridging the gap? Generally, 
the answer is that "in cases 'where common knowledge alone may not be sufficient to enable a layman to 
say the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence,' expert 
testimony may be admissible" to "give a foundation for the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the 
accident would not have occurred in the absence of negligence." Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian lnigation 
District, 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d80 (1976) (quoting Walker v. Distler, 78 Idaho 38, 296 P.2d 452 (1956)). 
The case resulted from the District's canal breaking through its banks and flooding plaintiffs' property. The 
plaintiffs presented the testimony of three experts who testified on a number of potential causes within the 
District's control, e.g., inadequate design or construction, gopher holes, etc. 
 
In Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., plaintiff was shocked before he touched an aluminum irrigation 
pipe that he was preparing to move. His expert testified that the case was a "fascinating engineering 
problem" and that he had "spent very great attention" to trying to understand how plaintiff was shocked 
and ''finally arrive at the conclusion that the mechanism was a high impedance fault" which permitted 
electricity to jump to the pipe without actually having contact with the pipe. The court decided that the 
explanation was insufficient because it required the jurors to apply "specific technical information, which is 
outside of common knowledge and experience." Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 272 P.3d 
534 (2012). 
 
(3)  Effect of the doctrine: What is the effect of the doctrine in Idaho? That is, does it give rise to a 
presumption of negligence or a permissible inference of negligence? What is the difference between the 
two? 
(a)  Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow: 
 
Res ipsa loquitur, it applicable, creates an inference of the breach of an imposed 
duty and replaces direct evidence with a permissive inference of negligence. The 
principle only applies when the agency or instrumentality causing the injury is under the 
exclusive control and management of the defendant, and the circumstances of the case 
are such that common knowledge and experience would justify the inference that the 
accident would not have happened in the absence of negligence. [] 
Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615, 717 P.2d 1033 (1986). 
 




If the plaintiff proves that the instrumentality or mechanism which caused the injury or damage in 
this case was under the control or management of the defendant, and further proves that in the 
normal course of events the injury or damage would not have happened in the absence of 
negligence, then you may find from these facts that the defendant was negligent in causing the 
injury or damage in this case. 
 
(c)  Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls: The city in its role as owner of the local 
water system argued that the application of res ipsa effectively imposed strict liability. The court 
responded: 
 
We disagree. The City is not an insurer for injury to others arising out of the installation, 
maintenance or operation of its water system; its liability depends solely upon negligence. The 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not, theoretically or practically, transform 
liability for negligence into insurance or absolute liability. Its only function is to replace direct 
evidence of negligence with a permissive inference of negligence. It warrants, but does not 
compel, a finding of negligence. It furnishes circumstantial evidence of defendant's negligence 
where direct evidence may be lacking. The burdens of proof of the parties remain the same the 
plaintiff, with the aid of the inference, must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence; if 
the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to get to the jury, the defendant is obligated to produce 
evidence to explain or rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case. lf he fails to do so, he will in most 
instances suffer a verdict against him. In all cases, however, the preponderance of the plaintiff’s 
evidence is a question for the trier of facts. 
 
The City vigorously contends that the methods of preventing leaks caused by rusting, 
namely, soil testing and periodically digging down to inspect the pipes, are impractical due to the 
high cost and shortage of manpower. This ultimate issue is clearly for the jury to determine and is 
a question of fact, not of law. This court will not disturb the findings of the jury if there is 
substantial evidence to support such a verdict, even though the evidence is conflicting. 
 
Because the question of negligence is for the jury to determine, the City urges that this 
court modify the rule established in C.C. Anderson Stores Co. v. Boise Water Corporation, []; 
Yearsley v. City of Pocatello, []; and Dunn v. Boise City, [], that the operator of a water system is 
bound to take notice that water pipes will deteriorate with time and use. The City contends that 
this court has held it is negligence for the water supplier to fail to take such steps as will prevent 
damage from leakage resulting from such deterioration. The trier of facts, not this court, has 
determined that the City's actions, or lack of the same, constitute negligence. The City claims that 
"The in this case clearly shows there is no practical way for a water supplier to obtain knowledge 
of the extent of depreciation in certain parts of the water system." Again, however, the question of 
practicality has been decided adversely to the City by the jury. The City's own expert testified that 
rusting is a normal process and eventually occurs in all iron water pipe. This is sufficient to charge 
the jury that a water supplier is on notice that a pipeline is subject to deterioration. 
Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1,407 P.2d695 (1965). Why isn't res ipsa strict 
liability? How is it different than strict liability? Is the difference one of degree or kind? Does the court's 
response in Skaggs indicate another unspoken function of the jury? Leon Green has written that the 
greatest function (of the jury] in our government [is]that of an absorber of the discontent of citizens whose 
everyday affairs are subjected to the control of courts. In this it serves as prime political function in 
democratic [] government. What discontent, however inflamed, can be long sustained against a jury 















LOW v. PARK PRICE CO. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
95 Idaho 91, 503 P.2d 291 (1972) 
 
DONALDSON, J. -The defendant, Highway Motor Company, dba Park Price Motors, operates an 
automobile repair garage in Pocatello, Idaho. On December 2, 1969, Cal Dale Low, the son of plaintiff-
appellant Dale K. Low, brought the latter's car to the respondent's garage for repairs. In order to make 
these repairs, it was necessary to remove the engine from the appellant's car. Having removed the 
engine, the respondent stored the car in an unfenced area between the garage and an adjacent street. 
While the vehicle was stored in this location, its transmission disappeared. On or about December 18, the 
respondent told the appellant that the transmission had been stolen. Exactly when and by whom the 
transmission was removed are facts which remain unknown. 
 
The respondent disclaimed any obligation to compensate the appellant for the loss of his 
transmission. The appellant then commenced this action for conversion and, in the alternative, for 
negligence. The parties stipulated that the lost transmission had a reasonable market value of five 
hundred dollars.... After a nonjury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the respondent 
garage owner and denied the appellant car owner's motion for a new trial. This appeal followed. 
 
In its defense at trial, the respondent-bailee introduced testimony as to the currently prevailing 
custom and usage regularly observed by other service garages in the area. The appellant contends 
initially that the court erred in admitting such evidence because, he submits, the customary practices of 
the Pocatello garage owners constituted negligence as a matter of law and indicated a deliberate 
disregard of a known high risk of theft. In certain cases, where negligence or the absence of it appears as 
a matter of law, proof that the act or omission of the defendant did or did not conform to general usage or 
custom is immaterial. [] What everyone else does may be so clearly negligent in itself that it may be 
excluded from evidence. [] But these are the "extreme cases." [] As a general rule, the customs of the 
community, or of others under like circumstances, are factors to be taken into account in determining 
whether conduct is negligent. [] We do not think this is one of the extreme cases where it may be said that 
the defendant's practices, or those customarily adhered to by others similarly situated, are negligent as a 
matter of law. Therefore, the evidence of custom was properly admitted in this case. But the appellant 
further contends that the trial court erroneously reasoned that simply because the respondent had 
adhered to the customary practices among garage owners in the area, the respondent was, for that 
reason - and for that reason only - not negligent. "In determining whether conduct is negligent, the 
customs of the community, or of others under like circumstances, are factors to be taken into account, but 
are not controlling where a reasonable man would not follow them." [RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 295A {1965)] In other words, "custom or usage does not determine ordinary care, but the 
standard is what a reasonably prudent man under like circumstances would do."Albrethson v. Carey 
Valley Reservoir Co., 67 Idaho 529, 186P.2d 853 {1947). Or, as Justice Holmes succinctly stated the rule: 
'What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a 
standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not." Texas & Pacific Ry. v. 
Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 {1903); [] A good summary of the law is contained in comments band c to § 
295A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts {1965): 
 
b. Relevance of custom. Any such custom of the community in general, or of other 
persons under like circumstances, is always a factor to be taken into account in determining 
whether the actor has been negligent. Evidence of the custom is admissible, and is relevant, as 
indicating a composite judgment as to the risks of the situation and the precautions required to 
meet them, as well as the feasibility of such precautions, the difficulty of any change in accepted 
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methods, the actor's opportunity to learn what is called for, and the justifiable expectation of 
others that he will do what is usual, as well as the justifiable expectation of the actor that others 
will do the same. If the actor does what others do under like circumstances, there is at least a 
possible inference that he is conforming to the community standard of reasonable conduct; and if 
he does not do what others do, there is a possible inference that he is not so conforming. In 
particular instances, where there is nothing in the situation or in common experience to lead to 
the contrary conclusion, this inference may be so strong as to call for a directed verdict, one way 
or the other, on the issue of negligence. Thus, even in the absence of any applicable traffic 
statute, one who drives on the right side of a private way is under ordinary circumstances clearly 
not negligent in doing so, and one who drives on the left side is under ordinary circumstances 
clearly negligent. On the same basis, evidence of the past practices of the parties to the action in 
dealing with each other is admissible, and relevant, as indicating an understood standard of 
conduct, or the reasonable expectation of each party as to what the other will do. 
 
       c. When custom not controlling. Any such custom is, however, not necessarily 
conclusive as to whether the actor, by conforming to it, has exercised the care of a reasonable 
man under the circumstances, or by departing from it has failed to exercise such care. Customs 
which are entirely reasonable under the ordinary circumstances which give rise to them may 
become quite unreasonable in the light of a single fact in the particular case. It may be negligence 
to drive on the right side of the road, and it may not be negligence to drive on the left side when 
the right side is blocked by a dangerous ditch. Beyond this, customs and usages themselves are 
many and various. Some of them are the result of careful thought and decision, while others arise 
from the kind of inadvertence, neglect, or deliberate disregard of a known risk which is associated 
with negligence. No group of individuals and no industry or trade can be permitted, by adopting 
careless and slipshod methods to save time, effort, or money, to set its own uncontrolled 
standard at the expense of the rest of the community. If the only test is to be what has always 
been done, no one will ever have any great incentive to make any progress in the direction of 
safety. It follows, therefore, that whenever the particular circumstances, the risk, or other 
elements in the case are such that a reasonable man would not conform to the custom, the actor 
may be found negligent in conforming to it; and whenever a reasonable man would depart from 
the custom, the actor may be found not to be negligent in so departing." 
 
[] [As] Judge Learned Hand stated [in The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737,740 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 
Eastern Transportation Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932)]: 
 
Indeed, inmost cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its 
measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It 
never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what 




Turning to the case at bar, we note that since the respondent has shown that it has done what 
others do under like circumstances, there is at least an inference that it is conforming to the community's 
idea of reasonable behavior.[]Where there is nothing in the evidence or in common experience to lead to 
a contrary conclusion, the inference arising from conformity to custom may be so strong that the issue of 
negligence may be determined as a matter of law. [] We conclude that this is such a case. The appellant-
bailor failed to introduce any evidence to overcome the inference of reasonable care arising from the 
respondent-bailee's evidence; and there is nothing in common experience to lead to the conclusion that 
the respondent’s conduct was negligent. Therefore, even though the burden of persuasion is on the 
respondent-bailee, in this case the bailee proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, its freedom from 
negligence. 
 
The appellant's remaining assignment of error - to the effect that the court erred in refusing to 
allow the appellant to ask one of the garage-owner witnesses what his profits amounted to for the 




assertion that he could not afford to hire a night watchman. The district court correctly concluded that the 
information sought to be elicited was immaterial. Whether the garage owner could afford to hire a night 
watchman is immaterial to the question of whether ordinary care requires a night watchman. Of course, 
the cost of the suggested precaution would be relevant in determining whether the reasonable man would 
employ it. [] But in this case, the appellant did not seek to establish the cost of employing a night 
watchman; rather, the appellant sought to show that the witness's profits were such as to indicate that he 
could currently afford to take such a precaution against theft. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 





(1)  When is evidence of custom inadmissible? Why was the evidence admissible in this case? How 
might plaintiff’s attorney have rebutted the persuasiveness of the custom evidence? 
 
(2)  A definition: "Custom" has been defined as "a fairly well defined and regular usage or way of 
doing a specific thing, among a group of people such as a trade, calling or profession." Fleming James Jr. 
& David K. Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L.REV. 697, 
709-10 {1952). 
 
(3)  Effect of custom: Proving that a statute satisfies the statutory purpose doctrine means that 
plaintiff has proved that defendant is negligent as a matter of law if she violated the statute. Does proof of 
custom operate in the same manner? Is the violation of the custom negligence per se? 
 
(a)  Hansen v. Standard Oil Co.: In Hansen, defendant employed plaintiff to weld a crack in 
a gasoline storage tank that it had sold to a third party. Plaintiff was injured when gasoline vapors in the 
tank exploded. At trial, plaintiff had testified that "he understood it was the custom for oil companies ...to 
properly prepare a used tank and make it safe for welding." Relying upon his understanding of the 
customary practices, plaintiff had failed to prepare the tank. On appeal, defendant argued that plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent. The court rejected this argument, noting that "custom" was ''the ordinary 
manner in which certain work is done." It concluded: 
 
Considering the right to rely on a custom ...as a way of going things and as bearing on the 
question of contributory negligence, there are two stages, first, was there a custom or usage or 
general course of conduct ... and if there was, second, was it acting like a reasonably prudent 
man for [plaintiff] to rely on such custom. First as to the question of fact, plaintiff so testified 
without objection and was not contradicted, and second, whether reliance was justifiable or not 
was for the jury. []The custom or usage so relied on herein was not so dangerous as to be 
rejected as a matter of law, as in Rumpel v. Oregon Short Une Ry., 4 Idaho 13, 35 P. 700 (1894). 
Hansen v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Idaho 483,44 P.2d 709 (1935). 
 
(b)  Albrethson v. Carey Valley Reservoir Co.: Plaintiff alleged that defendant had allowed 
water to seep from its canal, rendering the land plaintiff farmed too wet for crops. On appeal, the Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument that the trial court had erred in refusing to give an 
instruction on custom; the court simply noted that "custom and usage does not determine ordinary care, 
but the standard is what a reasonably prudent man under like circumstances would do."Albrethson v. 
Carey Valley Reservoir Co., 67 Idaho 529, 186P.2d853 (1947). 
 
(c) Bicandi v. Boise Payette Lumber Co.: Parents of a child who drowned in the 
defendant's mill pond contended that the defendant was negligent in failing to fence the pond. The 
court rejected this argument: "Mill ponds are, and for many years have been, in common use in Idaho. 
Logs have been, and are kept and floated therein, as is alleged to have been done by [defendant], and it 
is not customary to enclose them. [Defendant's] failure to maintain a sufficient fence, to keep boys away 
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from the pond does not render it liable." Bicandi v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 55 Idaho 543, 44 P.2d 
1103 (1935). 
 
What weight does the court give to the custom? 
 
3.  PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE (CUSTOM, Part 2) 
 
a.  Medical Malpractice 
 
i. Prelitigation Screening Panels 
 
 
(1) The traditional standard of care: Prior to 1976, the Idaho courts employed the traditional "same-
or-similar locale" standard in medical malpractice cases. In Flowerdew v. Warner, for example, defendant 
treated plaintiff for an injury to his back that resulted from a fall. The court affirmed a directed verdict for 
the doctor, holding that "[t]here was no evidence that defendant's treatment was not incompliance ''with 
the standards of practice of an osteopathic physician in the community." Plaintiffs witnesses were all 
medical doctors who had no knowledge of osteopathic practice: 
 
The general rule is that a practitioner of one of the healing arts, while remaining within the scope 
of his field of practice, is entitled to have the standard of treatment he gave a patient tested by the 
rules and principles of the school of medicine to which he belongs, and not by those of some 
other school. 
Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164, 409 P.2d 110 (1965). 
 
(2)  The 1976 legislature adopted the following statutes applicable to medical malpractice actions. As 
with many statutes, the legislature introduced the substantive provisions of the statute with the following 
statement of the purposes of the legislation: 
 
It is the declaration of the legislature that appropriate measures are required in the public interest 
to assure that a liability insurance market be available to physicians and hospitals in this state 
and that the same be available at reasonable cost, thus assuring the availability of such health 
care providers for the provision of care to persons in this state. 
 
It is, therefore, further declared to be in the public interest to encourage nonlitigation 
resolution of claims against physicians and hospitals by providing for prelitigation screening of 
such claims by a hearing panel as provided in this act. 
 
§ 6-1001: Hearing panel for prelitigation consideration of medical malpractice claims -Procedure -
The Idaho state board of medicine, in alleged malpractice cases involving claims for damages 
against physicians and surgeons practicing in the state of Idaho or against licensed acute care 
general hospitals operating in the state of Idaho, is directed to cooperate in providing a hearing 
panel in the nature of a special civil grand jury and procedure for prelitigation consideration for 
personal injury and wrongful death claims for damages arising out of the provision of or alleged 
failure to provide hospital or medical care in the state of Idaho, which proceedings shall be 
informal and nonbinding, but nonetheless compulsory as a condition precedent to litigation. 
Proceedings conducted or maintained under the authority of this act shall at all times be subject 
to disclosure according to chapter 3, title 9, Idaho Code. Formal rules of evidence shall not apply, 
and all such proceedings shall be expeditious and informal. 
 
§ 6-1002: Appointment and composition of hearing panel- The board of medicine shall provide for 
and appoint an appropriate panel or panels to accept and hear complaints of such negligence 
and damages, made by or on behalf of any patient who is an alleged victim of such negligence. 
Said panels, shall include one (1) person who is licensed to practice medicine in the state of 




serving administrator of a licensed acute care general hospital in the state of Idaho. One (1) 
additional member from each such panel shall be appointed by the commissioners of the Idaho 
state bar, which person shall be a resident lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho 
and shall serve as chairman of the panel. The panelists so appointed shall select by unanimous 
decision a layman panelist who shall not be a lawyer, doctor or hospital employee but who shall 
be a responsible adult citizen of Idaho. All panelists shall serve under oath that they are without 
bias or conflict of interest as respects any matter under consideration. 
 
§ 6-1003: Informal proceedings -There shall be no record of such proceedings and all evidence, 
documents and exhibits shall, at the close thereof, be returned to the parties or witnesses from 
whom the same were secured. The hearing panel shall have the authority to issue subpoenas 
and to administer oaths; provided, the parties requesting the presentation of such proof shall 
provide the funds required to tender witness fees and mileage as provided in proceedings in 
district courts. Except upon special order of the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating 
extraordinary circumstances, there shall be no discovery or perpetuation of testimony in said 
proceedings. 
 
§ 6-1004: Advisory decisions of panel -At the close of proceedings the panel, by majority and 
minority reports or by unanimous report, as the case may be, shall provide the parties its 
comments and observations with respect to the dispute, indicating whether the matter appears to 
be frivolous, meritorious or of any other particular description. If the panel is unanimous with 
respect to an amount of money in damages that in its opinion should fairly be offered or accepted 
in settlement, it may so advise the parties and affected insurers or third-party payors having 
subrogation, indemnity or other interest in the matter. 
 
§ 6-1005: Tolling of limitation periods during pendency of proceedings --There shall be no judicial 
or other review or appeal of such matters. No party shall be obliged to comply with or otherwise 
[be] affected or prejudiced by the proposals, conclusions or suggestions of the panel or any 
member or segment thereof; however, in the interest of due consideration being given to such 
proceedings and in the interest of encouraging consideration of claims informally and without the 
necessity of litigation, the applicable statute of limitations shall be tolled and not be deemed to run 
during the time that such a claim is pending before such a panel and for thirty (30) days 
thereafter. 
 
§ 6-1006: Stay of other court proceedings in interest of hearing before panel - During said thirty 
(30) day period neither party shall commence or prosecute litigation involving the issues 
submitted to the panel and the district or other courts having jurisdiction of any pending such 
claims shall stay proceedings in the interest of the conduct of such proceedings before the panel. 
 
§ 6-1007: Service of claim on accused provider of health care - At the commencement of such 
proceedings and reasonably in advance of any hearing or testimony, the accused provider of 
health care in all cases shall be served a true copy of the claim to be processed which claim shall 
set forth in writing and in general terms, when, where and under what circumstances the health 
care in question allegedly was improperly provided or withheld and the general and special 
damages attributed thereto. 
 
§ 6-1008: Confidentiality of proceedings- Neither party shall be entitled, except upon special order 
of the panel, to attend and participate in the proceedings which shall be subject to disclosure 
according to chapter 3, title 9, Idaho Code and closed to public observation at all times, except 
during the giving of his or her own testimony or presentation of argument of his or her position, 
whether by counsel or personally; nor shall there be cross-examination, rebuttal or other 
customary formalities of civil trials and court proceedings. The panel itself may, however, initiate 
requests for special or supplemental participation in particular respects and of some or all parties; 
and communications between the panel and the parties, except only the parties' own testimony 




§ 6-1009: Representation of parties by counsel- Parties may be represented by counsel in 
proceedings before such panels, though it shall not be required. 
 
§ 6-1010: Fees for panel members˙˙The Idaho state board of medicine shall provide, by uniform 
policy of the board, for the payment of fees and expenses of members of panels, such payment 
to be made from the state board of medicine fund created in section 54-1809, Idaho Code. Panel 
members shall serve upon the sworn commitment that all related matters shall be subject to 
disclosure according to chapter 3, title 9, Idaho Code. 
 
§ 6-1011: Limit on duration of proceedings - Panel's jurisdiction -There shall be no repeat or 
reopening of panel proceedings. In no case shall a panel retain jurisdiction of any such claim in 
excess of ninety (90) days from date of commencement of proceedings. Ifat the end of such 
ninety (90) day period the panel is unable to decide the issue before it, it shall summarily 
conclude the proceedings and the members may informally, by written communication, express to 
the parties their joint and several impressions and conclusions, if any, albeit the same may be 
tentative or based upon admittedly incomplete consideration; provided, by written agreement of 
all parties the jurisdiction of the panel, if it concurs therein, may be extended and the proceeding 





(1)  What are the precise steps with which a plaintiff must comply? How does the plaintiff initiate the 
process? 
 
(2)  In 1990, the legislature amended the Idaho Public Records Act to provide a centralized listing of 
what public records were available to the public. In conjunction with this recodification, the prelitigation 
screening panel statute was amended by deleting the following confidentiality provision: "confidential, 
privileged and immune from civil process and evidence of them or results, findings or determinations 
thereof shall be inadmissible in any civil or other action or proceeding by, against or between the parties 
thereto or any witness therein." See Act of Apr. 15, 1990, ch. 213, 1990 Idaho Sess. Laws 480. The new 
provision references I.C. § 9-340, which provides in part: "The following records are exempt from 
disclosure: .... (32) The records, findings, determinations and decision of any prelitigation screening panel 
formed under chapter 10, title 6, Idaho Code." 
 
 
ii. Proving a Breach of the Standard of Care 
 
In addition to creating hearing panels, the 1976 legislature modified the proof requirements 
applicable to medical malpractice litigation: 
 
It is the declaration of the legislature that appropriate measures are required in the public interest 
to assure that a liability insurance market be available to physicians, hospitals and other health 
care providers in this state and that the same be available at reasonable cost, thus assuring the 
availability of such health care providers for the provision of care to persons in the state. It is, 
therefore, further declared to be in the public interest that the liability exposure of such health 
care providers be limited and made more definable by a requirement for direct proof of departure 
from a community standard of practice. 
 
§ 6-1012: Proof of community standard of health care practice in malpractice case 
- In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any person, brought against 
any physician and surgeon or other provider of health care, including, without limitation, any 
dentist, physicians' assistant, nurse practitioner, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse 
anesthetist, medical technologist, physical therapist, hospital or nursing home, or any person 




failure to provide health care or on account of any matter incidental or related thereto, such 
claimant or plaintiff must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by 
direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such 
defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care 
practice of the community in which such care allegedly was or should have been provided, as 
such standard existed at the time and place of the alleged negligence of such physician and 
surgeon, hospital or other such health care provider and as such standard then and there existed 
with respect to the class of health care provider that such defendant then and there belonged to 
and in which capacity, he, she or it was functioning. Such individual providers of health care shall 
be judged in such cases in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same 
class in the same community, taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields of 
medical specialization, if any. If there be no other like provider in the community and the standard 
of practice is therefore indeterminable, evidence of such standard in similar Idaho communities at 
said time may be considered. As used in this ad, the term "community" refers to that geographical 
area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such care was or 
allegedly should have been provided. 
 
§ 6-1013: Testimony of expert witness on community standard- The applicable standard of 
practice and such a defendant's failure to meet said standard must be established in such cases 
by such a plaintiff by testimony of one (1) or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses, 
and such expert testimony may only be admitted in evidence if the foundation therefor is first laid, 
establishing (a) that such an opinion is actually held by the expert witness, (b) that the said 
opinion can be testified to with reasonable medical certainty, and (c) that such expert witness 
possesses professional knowledge and expertise coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable 
said community standard to which his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed; provided, this 
section shall not be construed to prohibit or otherwise preclude a competent expert witness who 
resides elsewhere from adequately familiarizing himself with the standards and practices of (a 




(1)  See Monique C. Lillard, The Standard of Care for Medical Malpractice Claims in Idaho:  Time for 
Reassessment, The Advocate (Idaho) 51:5 (May 2008). 
 
(2) See Monique C. Lillard, The Standard of Care for Health Providers in Idaho, 44 Idaho Law 
Review, Symposium Edition, 295-359 (2008). 
 
(3) The legislative goal: The language of the Act's preamble- "It is ...declared to be in the public 
interest that the liability exposure of ...health care providers be limited"- suggests that the legislature 
intended to change the common law. Did the legislature succeed? For example, if a physician left a 
sponge in a patient following surgery, would the patient be able to rely upon res ipsa loquitur to establish 
the physician's negligence? See Kolin v. Saint Luke's Regional Medical Center, 130 Idaho 323, 334, 940 
P.2d 1142, 1153 (1997) (res ipsa may not be used in medical malpractice cases); see also Schmechel v. 
Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 219 P.3d 1192 (2009) (negligence per se may not be used in a medical malpractice 
action). 
 
Consider the following decision: 
 
 
MAXWELL v. THE WOMEN'S CLINIC, PA 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
102 Idaho 53, 625 P.2d 407 (1981) 
 
DONALDSON, J.: Plaintiffs-appellants Mr. and Mrs. Maxwell brought a medical malpractice suit against 
defendants-respondents the Women's Clinic, P.A., and Dr. Stromberg. The Maxwells alleged that the 
defendants improperly and negligently failed to advise Mrs. Maxwell of certain risks of a laparoscopic 
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tubal ligation surgical procedure and improperly and negligently performed that surgical procedure by 
burning a hole in Mrs. Maxwell's small intestine necessitating additional surgery. Besides the pain and 
loss of a portion of the small intestine to Mrs. Maxwell, they alleged that the additional surgery caused Mr. 
Maxwell to be deprived of his wife's services, comfort, society and companionship during her surgery and 
extended recovery. 
 
Mr. Maxwell's deposition describes as follows a conversation he had with Dr. Stromberg in which 
the appellants allege that Dr. Stromberg admitted negligence: 
 
"Q. And would you relay what you remember saying yourself, and what Dr. Stromberg said to 
you? 
 
A. Dr. Stromberg introduced himself to me and said that they would need to do additional 
surgery. And I remember saying something about it. And he said, the way I remember it, 
he said, I obviously messed up on the first one, and another surgery has to be done to 
repair the damage........ 
B.  
Q.  In testifying here today as to what Dr. Stromberg said to you, do you recall his 
exact words? 
 
A. No, not exactly. I do remember him saying, I obviously messed up. Other than that, I 
don't remember too much more about it." (emphasis added). Mr. Maxwell further stated that nobody else 
overheard the above statement. 
 
Additionally, Dr. Stromberg did not bill the Maxwells for his services in either the laparoscopic 
tubal ligation or for his assistance during in the exploratory laparotomy performed by Dr. Lung. He 
explained his non-billing by stating he did not wish to contribute to the Maxwells' financial hardship since 
he was concerned for their circumstances. 
 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that there were no issues of material 
fact and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In the defendants' memorandum supporting 
their motion for summary judgment, they argued that the consent form signed by Mrs. Maxwell indicates 
adequate notice, that a reasonable person in Mrs. Maxwell's position would have undergone the surgery 
notwithstanding the advice of possible complications and that plaintiffs have failed to provide expert 
testimony to refute defendants' experts that the operations were within required standards. The 
defendants also filed affidavits by Dr. Gerhard and Dr. Stromberg, physicians and surgeons practicing in 
the field of obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. Stromberg asserted in his affidavit that he performed the 
surgery in a manner consistent with the medical standards of care applicable in Boise, Idaho, at the time 
the operation was performed, and that the injury which Mrs. Maxwell suffered could have occurred in the 
absence of negligence on his part. Dr. Gerhard's affidavit stated that based on his review of the medical 
records that Dr. Stromberg did not deviate from the applicable medical standards and that this injury 
could have occurred without any negligence on the part of Dr. Stromberg. 
 
Plaintiffs resisted the motion by arguing, among other things, that whether Mrs. Maxwell's 
consent was informed was still at issue and that the statement attributed to Dr. Stromberg and his non-
billing were direct expert testimony. 
 
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs 
offered no medical or expert testimony that the defendants negligently failed to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community. Plaintiffs appeal arguing that Dr. 
Stromberg's statement and actions constitute an admission of medical malpractice and qualify 
as expert testimony. 
 
LePelley v. Grefenson, 101 Idaho 422, 614 P.2d 962 (1980),] held that plaintiffs in a medical 
malpractice action could not complain about the granting of summary judgment against them when no 




of I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013, which were passed by the Idaho legislature as part of retroactive and 
prospective medical malpractice emergency legislation. [The court then quoted the legislature's statement 
of purpose and language from §§ 6-1012 and 6- 1013.] 
Therefore, in order to preclude summary judgment in medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs must 
show that expert testimony has been offered by either the plaintiff or defendant which when viewed in a 
light most favorable to plaintiffs indicates that the defendant has negligently failed to meet the applicable 
standard of health care practice of the community. LePelley, []. In the case at bar, the alleged admission 
of the defendant doctor, equivocal at best, does not satisfy the standards set out in I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-
1013. Furthermore, both of the medical experts that submitted affidavits stated that injury to the bowel is 
an inherent and unavoidable risk in laparoscopic tubal ligation which can and does occur in the absence 
of negligence on the part of the physician performing the surgery. In fact, both experts indicated in 
affidavits submitted on behalf of the respondents that Dr. Stromberg had performed the operation within 
the standard of care of the community. Nothing is offered to refute this testimony other than Mr. Maxwell's 
testimony regarding Dr. Stromberg's alleged statement and Dr. Stromberg's admitted non-billing of the 
Maxwells. However, this evidence, even when construed in a light most favorable to the Maxwells, does 
not reasonably infer that Dr. Stromberg negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care 
practice of the community. Therefore, we affirm the district court's granting of summary judgment. 
 




(1)  What was the shortcoming in plaintiff’s proof? What must a plaintiff do to avoid summary 
judgment? 
 
(2)  Pearson v. Parsons: In Pearson v. Parsons, the court sought to clarify what was required from 
plaintiff: 
 
This Court has held that "in order to preclude summary judgment in medical malpractice 
cases, plaintiffs must show that expert testimony has been offered by either the plaintiff or 
defendant which when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs indicates that the defendant 
has negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice of the community." 
Maxwell v. Women's Clinic, P.A., []. 
 
When viewed in light of the standards set forth in Maxwell ..., the affidavit of Dr. Weeks 
[plaintiff's expert] was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact and to defeat the motion 
for summary judgment of Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson. A review reveals that when measured by 
these standards the affidavit fulfilled the requirements of I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 and should 
have been considered by the trial court, even though Dr. Weeks was not board-certified in either 
pediatrics or surgery. 
 
1. Dr. Weeks demonstrated that he was judging Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson "in comparison 
with similarly trained and qualified [physicians] in the same community, taking into account 
his or her training, experience, and fields of medical specialization." I.C. § 6-1012. ("Dr. 
Parsons and Dr. Thueson did not comply with the applicable standard of practice for 
physicians of their specialties in Blackfoot, Idaho." Weeks' affidavit, [].) 
 
2. He was a "knowledgeable, competent expert witness." I.C. § 6-1013. ("I am a practicing 
doctor of medicine." Weeks' affidavit, [].) 
 
3. He actually held an opinion about the "applicable standard of practice" and the failure of Dr. 
Parsons and Dr. Thueson to meet the standard. I.C. § 6-1013(a). 
 
("[l]t is the opinion of your Affiant ... that the recommendation that a child be back for re-
examination should significant improvement not occur in the child's condition and/or should the 
child become worse, is not the standard which is to be followed by a practicing physician and that 
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under the circumstances, a recommendation to bring the child back in twenty-four (24) hours was 
in error since the twenty-four (24) hour waiting period in an appendicitis case in a juvenile is an 
excessive amount of time ...that the child should have been brought back in the afternoon of the 
24th of December, 1984,for a re-examination and re-test of the blood count of the minor child ... 
[and] that Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson did not comply with the applicable standard[s] ... in the 
care and treatment they rendered to Emily Pearson on or about December 24, 1984."Weeks' 
affidavit, [].) 
 
4. His opinion was rendered ''with reasonable medical certainty." I.C. § 6-1013(b). ("[l]tis the 
opinion of your Affiant, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty...." 
Weeks' affidavit, [].) 
 
5. He possessed "professional knowledge and expertise coupled with actual knowledge of the 
applicable ...community standard to which his ...expert opinion testimony is addressed." I.C. §6-
1013(c). ("I am also familiar with the standards of the community regarding the diagnosis and 
treatment of suspected and actual appendicitis." Weeks' affidavit, [].) 
Pearson v. Parsons, 114 Idaho 334,757 P.2d 197 (1988). 
 
Again: what is plaintiff required to do to defeat defendants motion for summary judgment? What 
must plaintiffs? experts state in their depositions? 
 
(3) Grover v. Smith: Fourteen years later, the court noted that "the question of how to qualify an out-of-
area physician to render an opinion in a medical malpractice case 'has plagued the bench and trial bar 
since the enactment of Idaho's [medical malpractice statute's] requir[ement of] actual knowledge of the 
local standard of care.'" [quoting Keyser v. Gamer, 129 Idaho 112, 117, 922 P.2d409, 414 (Ct. App. 
1996)] The court reviewed several cases and concluded that they did not "provide a clear-cut set of 
rules." Nonetheless, the court was able to discern two points along a continuum: ''when the plaintiffs 
expert failed to contact any local physician" summary judgment is proper; but when "the plaintiffs expert 
did consult a local physician possessing expertise on the area at issue," summary judgment is not. The 
court then turned to the applicable statutes. I.C. § 6-1012 requires direct expert testimony to establish the 
community standard; I.C. §6-1013 requires expert testimony that the health care provider did not meet the 
applicable standard of care. Thus, 
 
[e]xperts testifying as to the standard of care in medical malpractice actions must show that they 
have familiarized themselves with the standard for a particular profession for the relevant 
community and time. See Kolln[ v. Saint Luke's Regional Medical Center,] 130 Idaho [323,] 331, 
940 P.2d[1142,] 1150[(1997)]. They must also state how they became familiar with the standard 
of care for the particular health care profession. ld. An out-of state expert can become familiar 
with the local standard of care by inquiring of a local specialist or by 'review of a deposition 
stating that the local standard does not vary from the national standard, coupled with the expert’s 
personal knowledge of the national standard.' Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 
134 Idaho 46, 51-52, 995 P.2d 816, 821-22 (2000). 
 
The court then examined the affidavit at issue in detail. The issue, the court stated, was whether taking a 
medical history from the patient was so fundamental that it was the applicable standard across the state. 
Plaintiffs expert testified that it was and defendant’s suggestion that, if local dentists so chose, community 
standards of care could fall below minimum statewide standards is not persuasive. At issue in this case is 
a minimum statewide standard of care, not a lack of advanced technology, conditions unique to the area, 
or particular specializations with which the expert is unfamiliar. While it may be understood that a small 
Idaho town may not have the technology used in a big city, thus necessitating a different local standard of 
care, choosing not to adhere to the basic dental standards established by the Idaho Board of Dentistry is 
not. Taking a patient's medical history is a minimum requirement that must be met to become a licensed 





[Defendant's] contention that professionals in a community could decide to adopt a local standard 
of care that is inferior to the bare minimum statewide standards is without merit. The court therefore 
reversed summary judgment for the dentist. Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105 (2002). 
 
Again: what is plaintiff required to do to defeat defendants motion for summary judgment? What 
must plaintiff’s experts state in their depositions? 
 
 
iii. Informed Consent 
 
In addition to the provisions governing the applicable standard of care, the 1976 legislature also 
adopted a statute specifying the requirements of "informed consent": 
 
§39-4301: Purpose -The primary purposes of this act are (1) to provide and codify Idaho law 
concerning consent for the furnishing of hospital, medical, dental or surgical care, treatment or 
procedures and concerning what constitutes an informed consent for such care, treatment or 
procedures and (2) to provide certainty and clarity in the law of medical consent in the furtherance 
of high standards of health care and its ready availability in proper cases. However, nothing in 
this act shall be deemed to amend or repeal the provisions of chapter 3, title 66, Idaho Code, as 
the same pertain to medical attendance upon or hospitalization of the mentally ill, nor the 
provisions of chapter 6, title 18, Idaho Code, pertaining to provision of examinations, 
prescriptions, devices and informational materials regarding prevention of pregnancy or 
pertaining to therapeutic abortions and consent to the performance thereof. Nothing in this act 
shall be construed to permit or require the provision of health care for a patient in contravention of 
his stated or implied objection thereto upon religious grounds nor shall anything in this act be 
construed to require the granting of permission for or on behalf of any patient not able to act for 
himself by his parent, spouse or guardian in violation of the religious beliefs of the patient and/or 
the parent or spouse. 
 
§39-4302: Persons who may consent to their own care - Any person of ordinary intelligence and 
awareness sufficient for him or her generally to comprehend the need for, the nature of and the 
significant risks ordinarily inherent in any contemplated hospital, medical, dental or surgical care, 
treatment or procedure is competent to consent thereto on his own behalf. Any physician, dentist, 
hospital or other duly authorized person may provide such health care and services in reliance 
upon such a consent if the consenting person appears to the physician or dentist securing the 
consent to possess such requisite intelligence and awareness at the time of giving it. 
 
§39-4303: Persons who may give consent to care for others – 
 
(a)  Parent, spouse or guardian. Consent for the furnishing of hospital, medical, dental or 
surgical care, treatment or procedures to any person who is not then capable of giving such 
consent as provided in this act or who is a minor or incompetent person, may be given or refused 
by any competent parent, spouse, or legal guardian of such person unless the patient is a 
competent adult who has refused to give such consent. 
 
(b)  Competent relative or other person. If no parent, spouse or legal guardian is 
readily available to do so, then consent may be given by any competent relative representing 
himself or herself to be an appropriate, responsible person to act under the circumstances; and, 
in the case of a never married minor or mentally incompetent person, by any other competent 
individual representing himself or herself to be responsible for the health care of such person, 
provided, however, that this subsection shall not be deemed to authorize any person to override 
the express refusal by a competent adult patient to give such consent himself. 
 
(c)  Attending physician or dentist. Whenever there is no person readily available and 
willing to give or refuse consent as specified hereinabove in this act, and in the judgment of the 
attending physician or dentist the subject person presents a medical emergency or there is 
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substantial likelihood of his or her life or health being seriously endangered by withholding or 
delay in the rendering of such hospital, medical, dental or surgical care to such patient, the 
attending physician or dentist may, in his discretion, authorize and/or provide such care, 
treatment or procedure as he or she deems appropriate, and all persons, agencies and 
institutions thereafter furnishing the same, including such physician or dentist, may proceed as if 
informed, valid consent therefor had been otherwise duly given. 
 
(d)  Immunity from liability. No person who, in good faith, gives consent or authorization for 
the provision of hospital, medical, dental or surgical care, treatment or procedures to another as 
provided by this act shall be subject to civil liability therefor. 
 
§39-4304: Sufficiency of consent --Consent for the furnishing of hospital, medical, dental or 
surgical care, treatment or procedures shall be valid in all respects if the person giving it is 
sufficiently aware of pertinent facts respecting the need for, the nature of and the significant risks 
ordinarily attendant upon such a patient receiving such care, as to permit the giving or withholding 
of such consent to be a reasonably informed decision. Any such consent shall be deemed valid 
and so informed if the physician or dentist to whom it is given or by whom it is secured has made 
such disclosures and given such advice respecting pertinent facts and considerations as would 
ordinarily be made and given under the same or similar circumstances, by a like physician or 
dentist of good standing practicing in the same community. As used in this section, the term "in 
the same community'' refers to that geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed general 
hospital at or nearest to which such consent is given. 
 
§39-4305: Form of consent - It is not essential to the validity of any consent for the furnishing of 
hospital, medical, surgical or dental care, treatment or procedures that the same be in writing or 
any other form of expression; however, when the giving of such consent is recited or documented 
inwriting and expressly authorizes the care, treatment or procedures to be furnished, and when 
such writing or form has been executed or initialed by a person competent to give such consent 
for himself or another, such written consent, in the absence of convincing proof that it was 
secured maliciously or by fraud, is presumed to be valid for the furnishing of such care, treatment 
or procedures, and the advice and disclosures of the attending physician or dentist, as well as the 
level of informed awareness of the giver of such consent, shall be presumed sufficient. 
 
§39-4306: Responsibility for consent and documentation thereof -- Obtaining consent for such 
health care is the duty of the attending physician or dentist or of another physician or dentist 
acting on his or her behalf or actually providing the contemplated care, treatment or procedure; 
however, a licensed hospital and any medical or dental office lay or professional employee, acting 
with the approval of such a physician or dentist, may perform the ministerial act of documenting 
such consent by securing the completion and execution of a form or statement in which the giving 
of consent for such care is documented by or on behalf of a patient. In performing such a 
ministerial act, the hospital or medical or dental office lay or professional employee shall not be 




(1) Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, (2016): This is an appeal from a jury verdict entered in a 
wrongful death action. Charles Ballard ("Charles") brought suit for wrongful death and medical 
malpractice against Silk Touch Laser, LLP ("Silk Touch") and its owner Dr. Brian Kerr. In 2010, 
Charles' wife Krystal Ballard ("Krystal") underwent a liposuction and fat transfer procedure at Silk 
Touch in Eagle, Idaho. Krystal died less than a week later from septic shock caused by unknown 
bacteria in her right buttock. Charles' suit alleged that the bacteria that caused Krystal's death 
were introduced into her body during the procedure at Silk Touch because certain reusable 
medical equipment was not properly disinfected and sterilized. The Court affirmed the jury 
judgement for plaintiff, finding, inter alia that in this case the standard of care was a question of 





(2) Lepper v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 160 Idaho 104, (2016): This appeal arose from a medical 
malpractice suit, where Charles and Janice Lepper (the Leppers) alleged the negligence of a 
hospital (EIRMC) and Dr. Stephen R. Marano, (Dr. Marano), which rendered Charles Lepper a 
paraplegic. The Leppers appealed a grant of summary judgement in favor of defendants.  The 
supreme court vacated and remanded, holding inter alia that in circumstances where not a single 
medical provider is willing to consult with a plaintiff's expert regarding the standard of care, the 
standard becomes indeterminable and the plaintiff may then look to other similar localities or 
communities outside the state. 
 
(3) Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, (2014): In a medical malpractice case, an affidavit that fails to 
identify an anonymous consultant does not categorically fail to comply with the foundation 
requirements for admissibility of an out-of-area expert's testimony under Idaho Code Ann. § 6-
1013, and rather, the inquiry remains whether the out-of-area expert demonstrates how he 
became adequately familiar with the community standard of health care practice.  
 
 
SHERWOOD v. CARTER 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
119 Idaho 246,805 P.2d 452 (1991) 
 
BOYLE, J. -In this medical malpractice action, we are called upon to determine whether the jury 
instructions adequately framed the issues and properly stated the law of informed consent. 
 
Plaintiffs, Joe and Carol Sherwood, filed a medical malpractice action against the defendant, 
Stephen J. Carter, M.D. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. 
 
[Dr. Carter saw Carol Sherwood in August 1980, when he diagnosed a lump as being cancerous. 
Dr. Carter performed a mastectomy and referred her to an oncologist for chemotherapy. A few months 
after the mastectomy, Mrs. Sherwood saw Dr. Roger Tall, a urologist, for an unrelated problem. He 
discovered and removed a small nodule located on her neck; a biopsy showed that the nodule was 
cancerous. Approximately one year after Mrs. Sherwood's mastectomy, she saw Dr. Tall and reported a 
lump under the previous biopsy site. Dr. Tall referred Mrs. Sherwood to Dr. Carter who recommended a 
biopsy and chemotherapy. Mrs. Sherwood cancelled scheduled biopsies. She next saw Dr. Carter on 
September 6, 1984, complaining of a large ulcerated sore on the back of her head. Dr. Carter also 
discovered enlarged lymph nodes in her neck which she stated had been present for several years. Dr. 
Carter recommended diagnostic procedures and told Mrs. Sherwood that the sore was probably 
cancerous and was potentially life threatening; he recommended radiation therapy and biopsies. Mrs. 
Sherwood agreed and signed a consent form. The biopsy was performed on September 19, 1984.In the 
first week following the surgery, Mrs. Sherwood expressed no complaints. When Dr. Carter next saw Mrs. 
Sherwood on November 13, 1984, she complained of stiffness in her left shoulder. Dr. Carter found 
nothing abnormal. Shoulder x-rays were taken by an orthopedic surgeon who advised her that the 
stiffness was probably caused by tendinitis due to immobilization. Mrs. Sherwood then had a neurologist 
administer several diagnostic tests; the tests revealed no enervation in the muscles which would have 
been present had Dr. Carter severed the spinal accessory nerve as alleged by Mrs. Sherwood. 
 
[Mrs. Sherwood alleged that Dr. Carter negligently performed the biopsy and failed to obtain 
informed consent. Dr. Carter was granted a partial summary judgment on the issue of negligence. The 
jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant. In this appeal, Mrs. Sherwood asserts that the jury 
instructions did not correctly present the law of informed consent.] First, Mrs. Sherwood argues the trial 
court improperly failed to instruct the jury concerning the elements of the plaintiff's prima facia case and 
the applicable burden of proof. Secondly, she asserts that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury 
that it must consider what a "reasonable person" would have done in the plaintiff's position. Thirdly, she 
argues that the trial court erred by giving one instruction which stated that the defendant was to be held to 
the standard of care of physicians practicing in the "same or like community," and another instruction 
which stated that the defendant was to be held to the standard of care of physicians practicing in the 
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"same community." The fourth alleged error is that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the "patient-





It must be kept in mind that the issue of informed consent is governed by I.C. §39-4304. In 
addition to analyzing I.C. § 39-4304, we will review existing case law from Idaho and other jurisdictions in 
an effort to clarify the law on the issue of informed consent. In the instant case it is evident from both 
parties' briefs and our review of the current state of the law that there is considerable need to clarify Idaho 
law concerning the issue of informed consent. 
 
Ordinarily, the liability of a physician for damages for injuries suffered by a patient in the course of 
treatment administered by the physician is predicated on the failure of the physician to exercise due care 
in performing such treatment. [] However, a physician may also be held liable in some circumstances 
even though the physician is free from personal negligence in the actual treatment of the patient. 
[](doctrine of informed consent implies a duty which is completely separate and distinct from his 
responsibility to skillfully diagnose and treat the patient's ills).This would be the case in a situation where 
the physician treats a patient without the latter's consent or beyond the scope of the consent given, or 
where the physician fails to inform the patient of the risks of a particular treatment thus preventing the 
patient from making an informed decision as to whether he or she is willing to undergo the proposed 
treatment. []; Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr.505, 502 P.2d 1(1972). Hence the doctrine of 
informed consent is the general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose to his patient those 
risks of injury which might result from a proposed course of treatment. LePelley v. Grefenson, 101 Idaho 
422, 614 P.2d 962 (1980); []. 
 
The sufficiency of informed consent is expressly governed by Idaho statutes. Idaho Code 
§ 39-4304 states: 
 
The most recent Idaho case addressing the issue of informed consent is Rook v. Trout, 
113 Idaho 652, 747 P.2d 61 (1987). In Rook, this Court held that the first two sentences in I.C. 
§ 39-4304 set forth two "alternative defenses" to a claim of lack of informed consent. Specifically, 
the Court stated: 
 
The first [sentence] is a codification of the "material information" patient-based standard of 
disclosure which this Court adopted in LePelley v. Grefenson, []. * * * The second, which is found 
in the second sentence of section 39-4304, grounds the level of disclosure in the then-existing 
standard of medical care practiced in the community. *** 
[] 
 
The above cited language has created substantial confusion among the members of the trial 
bench and bar as a result of what appears to be two inconsistent standards, i.e., "patient-based" versus a 
"physician-based" standard of disclosure....Most jurisdictions hold that the duty to properly inform the 
patient is measured by a professional medical standard, i.e., either the customary disclosure practices of 
physicians or what a reasonable physician would disclose under the same or similar circumstances. 
Some jurisdictions [hold that] the scope of a physician's duty to disclose risks and alternatives is governed 
by the individual patient's personal subjective needs.... 
 
In LePelley v. Grefenson, [], ... this Court stated that it adopted the analysis which the California 
Supreme Court announced in the case of Cobbs v. Grant, []. In Cobbs, ... the California Supreme Court 
[held that in] regard to complicated procedures that may involve death or serious bodily harm, the 
California court held: 
 
[A] medical doctor has a duty to disclose to his patient the potential of death or serious harm, and 




disclosure, a doctor must also reveal to his patient such additional information as a skilled 
practitioner of good standing would provide under similar circumstances. 
 
In sum, the patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the physician's duty to reveal. 
That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses adequate information to 
enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician's communications to the patient, then, 
must be measured by the patients need, and that need is whatever information is material to the 
decision. Thus, the test for determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality 
to the patient's decision. 
[] 
 
.... In LePelley, a case in which the informed consent statute contained in I.C. § 39-4301 did not apply, 
this Court expressly adopted the common law "patient-based" standard in informed consent cases from 
Cobbs v. Grant.... For those cases arising prior to the enactment of the Idaho informed consent legislation 
contained in I.C. § 39-4301, the common law rule cited in Cobbs v. Grant and adopted in LePelley v. 
Grefenson is appropriate. 
 
However, in 1975the Idaho legislature enacted the medical consent law contained in I.C. §39-
4301 which significantly changes the complexion of our analysis of the informed consent issue in the 
instant case. In LePelley, this Court was not considering the case in light of the statute and thus was at 
liberty to adopt the common law rule of Cobbs v. Grant. However, Rook v. Trout was clearly subject to the 
provisions of I.C. § 39-4304 and should have been analyzed with regard to the statute rather than under 
the common law rule established in LePelley v. Grefenson as adopted from California's Cobbs v. Grant 
case. 
 
Hence, because we have a clear, express and unequivocal legislative directive, I.C. § 39-4304, 
stating the law of informed consent, we must look directly to the language of the Idaho statute to resolve 
the issue. We cannot continue to be controlled by the common law adoption in LePelley v. Grefenson, or 
to be bound by the analysis of another state's court which did not have an informed consent statute to 
interpret or apply. 
 
A. Statutory Construction Standards 
 
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that, unless the result is palpably absurd, we must 
assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. [].... 
 
In carefully studying and reviewing our prior decisions we are of the opinion that the interpretation 
of I.C. § 39-4304 as set forth in Rook is contrary to the clear meaning and intent of the express language 
contained in the statute. It is our opinion that the language of I.C. § 39-4304 clearly and expressly 
establishes an objective medical-community standard, not a subjective patient-based standard as urged 
by appellants. The first sentence of I.C. § 39-4304 states that consent to medical treatment is valid if: 
 
the person giving it is sufficiently aware of pertinent facts respecting the need for, the nature of 
and the significant risks ordinarily attendant upon such a patient receiving such care as to permit 
the giving or withholding of such consent to be a reasonably informed decision. 
 
The word "ordinary," as defined in Webster's Seventh Collegiate Dictionary means "routine, 
normal." Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) defines "ordinary'' as "usual, common, customary, reasonable, 
not characterized by peculiar or unusual circumstances." Webster's Seventh Collegiate Dictionary defines 
"ordinarily" as "in an ordinary manner or to an ordinary degree." The word "such" is defined as "of the 
same class, type or sort: similar." Applying the ordinary and usual meanings of the words used in I.C. § 
39-4304, the phrase "such a patient" can logically and reasonably be interpreted to mean a patient within 
the class of similarly situated patients. As such, the language in the first sentence of I.C. § 39-4304 can 
logically be interpreted as creating an objective standard of disclosure based on reasonableness with 
regard to patients who are similarly situated. To interpret the language in the first sentence to be a 
subjective "patient-based" standard of disclosure is contrary to the ordinary, common and usual meaning 
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of the words used. Furthermore, and perhaps more important, interpretation of the first sentence as 
creating a "patient-based" subjective standard clearly conflicts with the express language contained in the 
second sentence of I.C. § 39-4304. 
 
The second sentence of I.C. § 39-4304 sets forth the standard for determining what are the 
pertinent facts that should ordinarily be disclosed in order to allow a patient to make a reasonably 
informed decision. The language in the second sentence states that consent is valid if the disclosure of 
the pertinent facts are those that, would ordinarily be made and given under the same or similar 
circumstances, by a like physician or dentist of good standing practicing in the same community. 
 
As defined previously, the word "ordinarily" as used in the second sentence of I.C. § 39-4304, 
indicates those disclosures that are customarily or reasonably made in "same or similar" circumstances 
by a physician practicing in the "same community." Hence, the only logical and reasonable interpretation 
of the language contained in I.C. § 39-4304 is to interpret the statute as creating an objective, 
professional medical standard for disclosure. To construe the two sentences separately, interpreting the 
first sentence as establishing a "patient-based" standard of disclosure, ignores the express language of 
the statute which defines the necessary degree of disclosure as being the same as that which a "like 
physician" in the "same community" would ordinarily disclose. Accordingly, we hold that I.C. § 39-4304 
mandates an objective, professional medical standard for disclosure in informed consent cases. 
 
B. Standard For Application of Stare Decisis 
 
We acknowledge that Rook v. Trout is of recent origin having been decided by this Court in 1987. 
We, like those who preceded us, have struggled with the prospect of overruling such recent case law.... 
 
We therefore overrule those portions of Rook v. Trout which held that I.C. § 39-4304 merely 
provides alternative defenses to a claim of lack of informed consent, and which held that the statute 
provides for a subjective patient-based standard of disclosure for informed consent. We hold that I.C. § 
39-4304 sets forth and requires an objective, medical-community standard for determining whether a 
patient has been adequately informed prior to giving consent for medical treatment. A valid consent must 
be preceded by the physician disclosing those pertinent facts to the patient so that he or she is sufficiently 
aware of the need for, the nature of, and the significant risks ordinarily involved in the treatment to be 
provided in order that the giving or withholding of consent be a reasonably informed decision. The 
requisite pertinent facts to be disclosed to the patient are those which would be given by a like physician 
of good standing practicing in the same community. 
 
After carefully considering all of the various alternatives available to us and the underlying 
policies of each, we are persuaded to adopt the objective standard as the fairer test to both the patient 
and the physician. Applying the objective test is fair to the patient because it requires consideration by the 
factfinder of what a reasonable person with all of the characteristics of the plaintiff would have done under 
the same circumstances, Fain v. Smith, [], and is likewise fair to the physician-defendant because the 
physician is not placed in jeopardy of the patient's hindsight. [] 
 
 
BAKES, C.J., CONCURS. 
 
McDEVITT, J., AND WINMILL, D. J., PROTEM., CONCUR IN THE RESULT. 
 
JOHNSON, J., DISSENTING -I dissent from the Court's opinion. If we were writing on a clean slate 
concerning the proper interpretation of I.C. § 39-4303, I would agree with the view expressed by the 
majority. However, in my view, the interpretation of this statute set forth in Rook v. Trout, [], is a 
permissible interpretation, and this recent decision should not be overruled. I would reverse and remand 









(1)  When is consent "informed" in Idaho? Is the court's reconciliation of the first two sentences of I.C. 
§ 39-4304 convincing? Is it preferable to the court's previous reconciliation in Rook v. Trout? What must 
plaintiff prove to prevail in an informed consent case? 
 
(2)  Anderson v. Hollingsworth:  Defendant performed a procedure intended to reduce the size of 
plaintiff’s stomach as a weight loss treatment. A clamp was left in plaintiff’s abdominal cavity, 
necessitating additional surgery twelve days after the first operation.  Additional complications developed 
with the band that was used to reduce the size of plaintiff’s stomach. The band was subsequently 
removed along with a major portion of plaintiff’s stomach. The trial court granted defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The supreme court began its analysis of the informed consent 
issue by noting that, to establish a claim based on the lack of informed consent, a patient "'must prove 
three basic elements: nondisclosure, causation and injury.' Shabinaw v. Brown, 131 Idaho 747,751,963 
P.2d 1184, 1188 (1998) (citing Sherwood v, Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 257, 805 P.2d 452, 463 (1991)).'' The 
court then turned to the two "relevant" statutes, I.C. §§ 39-4304, 39-4305. Defendants argued that 
 
Satisfying §39-4305, by a written, signed consent, fulfills the requirements of §39-4304. They 
contend that § 39-4305 creates a presumption that the consent given by Anderson was informed, 
and the only way to rebut this presumption is to show convincing proof that it was secured 
maliciously or by fraud. 
 
The court disagreed: 
 
This contention ... is incorrect. This Court has previously held "[t]he convincing proof 
requirement applies only to challenges regarding whether the patient consented to the furnishing 
of medical care." Rook v. Trout, 113 Idaho 652,658,747 P.2d 61,67 (1987), overruled on other 
grounds by Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d452 (1991). 
 
A patient challenging the "advice and disclosures" and the "level of informed awareness" is only 
required to overcome an ordinary presumption as to the sufficiency of consent Id. Anderson 
challenges the disclosures by Decker and Hollingsworth and is only required to overcome an 
ordinary presumption as to the sufficiency of consent. Therefore, to prove nondisclosure, 
Anderson must prove that Decker and Hollingsworth failed to meet the objective, medical 
community-based standard of disclosure for informed consent as set forth in Sherwood v. Carter, 
[]. 
 
The court concluded that plaintiff’s affidavit was sufficient to raise an issue of whether the consent was 
informed. This, however, is only the first element of the claim: plaintiff must also prove causation. ''To 
prove causation the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a prudent person in the 
patient's position would not have consented to the proposed procedure had full and adequate consent of 
the significant risks been made at the time consent was originally given." This is an objective, reasonable 
person standard. Here there was no evidence on what a reasonable person would have done. Anderson 
v. Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho 800, 41 P.3d 228 (2001). 
 
Is causation the element which most clearly demonstrates the difference between a patient-based 
view of consent and an objective, physician-based view? Is "objective consent" an oxymoron? 
 
(3) Shabinaw v. Brown, 131 Idaho 747, 963 P.2d 1184 (1998) provides significant detail in a post-
Sherwood informed consent case.  Shabinaw arose in Moscow, Idaho and was argued by the Legal Aid 
Clinic of the University of Idaho College of Law, specifically by Academic Success Director Nancy 




b. Legal Malpractice 
 
 
SAMUEL v. HEPWORTH, NUNGESTER & LEZAMIZ, INC. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
134 Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303 (2000) 
 
KIDWELL, J.- Charles F. Samuel and Valerie A. Samuel (the Samuels) sued the defendant attorneys and 
law firm seeking damages for attorney malpractice, breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation. The 
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Samuels appealed.  We affirm. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Charles Samuel was a seasonal employee of the U.S. Forest Service at the Priest Lake Ranger 
District in the summer of 1988. During the season, Charles and his family lived in a trailer in a Forest 
Service group camping area near the ranger station. Several incidents caused friction between Charles 
and his supervisors. Among other things, Charles believed that his supervisors illegally garnished his 
wages, unjustly suspected him of stealing several crosscut saws, deliberately furnished him with faulty 
equipment, unfairly deprived him of tree planting and firefighting assignments, and unreasonably withheld 
mail and messages addressed to him. Most importantly, Charles believed that the Forest Service, 
together with the Bonner County Sheriff’s Office, was spying on him and his family using hidden listening 
devices and night vision equipment. 
 
When Charles and his wife Valerie decided to sue the Forest Service, local attorney Bruce 
Greene referred them to the Twin Falls law firm of Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz (the Hepworth firm). 
The Samuels met with John T. Lezamiz of the Hepworth firm in April 1989. Accounts of this meeting 
differ. The Hepworth firm asserts that it limited the scope of its representation to investigating the 
Samuels' claims and filing any necessary tort claim notices. The Samuels have variously contended that 
(1) they signed a contingent fee agreement and that the Hepworth firm agreed to fully represent them, 
and (2) they reached no agreement which would allow the Hepworth firm to take any action on their case. 
No written agreement between the Samuels and the Hepworth firm is in the record. The Hepworth firm 
did, however, prepare a "New Matter Report" indicating that it would have a contingency fee of 40%. 
 
After Lezamiz interviewed several Forest Service employees at Priest Lake, the Hepworth firm 
prepared federal and state tort claim notices which the Samuels signed. On August 22, 1989, the 
Hepworth firm filed tort claim notices with the Forest Service. The Forest Service denied the tort claims on 
February 20, 1990. Bonner County also denied the tort claim brought against it. 
 
On March 6, 1990, Brit Groom of the Hepworth firm wrote to the Samuels. Groom wrote that the 
Samuels' claims had merit but stated that, for financial reasons, the Hepworth firm declined to represent 
the Samuels any further. The letter recited that the Hepworth firm had agreed only to investigate the 
Samuels' claim and to file tort notices. Groom advised the Samuels that they had six months from the 
denial date in which to file a complaint against the federal government, and he further advised them to 
seek other legal counsel. 
 
After the Hepworth firm withdrew, the Samuels wrote a series of letters to the firm accusing it of 
numerous instances of malfeasance, including forging the government documents that denied the 
Samuels' tort claims. The Hepworth firm corresponded with the Samuels for several months concerning 
these accusations. On May 22, 1990, however, the Hepworth firm ended its correspondence with the 
Samuels, calling it "fruitless." 
 
Although the Samuels contacted forty-seven attorneys, they were unable to obtain legal 
representation for a case against the Forest Service. Therefore, they proceeded pro se. The Samuels 
pursued a federal tort claim action, Samuel v. United States, against the Forest Service and the United 




involving invasions of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On the date set for trial, the 
Samuels moved for a dismissal, which the federal district court granted. Nevertheless, the Samuels 
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See Samuel 
v. United States, 37 F.3d 1506 (9th Cir.1994) (unpublished disposition). 
 
Acting on their belief that a tort claim notice was never filed with Bonner County, the Samuels   
also filed   suit   in state   district   court, Samuel v.  Bonner   County   Records, CV-92-0085-JRM. 
Thereafter, alleging that Judge Michaud allowed perjured testimony in Bonner County Records, the 
Samuels sued Michaud and fifty-five other defendants in federal district court. This action was decided in 
favor of the defendants. Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F.Supp. 1381, 1417-18 (D. Idaho 1996), aff'd, 129 F.3d 
127 (9th Cir.1997) (unpublished disposition). 
 
The Samuels filed a complaint against Lezamiz, Groom, and the Hepworth firm (collectively, the 
Hepworth firm) for "professional malpractice, breach of warranty and implied covenant, and fraud and 
deceit." After several adverse rulings, the Samuels moved to disqualify Judge Michaud for bias and 
prejudice. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. The Samuels also moved to amend their 
complaint to seek punitive damages. The district court denied this motion as well. 
 
The Hepworth firm moved for summary judgment.  The district court granted partial 
summary judgment for the Hepworth firm on the issues of attorney malpractice and breach of 
contract. lt held that the Samuels had not demonstrated any injury caused by the Hepworth firm's alleged 
negligence. When the district court denied the Samuels' motion for reconsideration, the Samuels filed an 
appeal with this Court. They subsequently withdrew their appeal. 
 
In its first motion for summary judgment, the Hepworth firm failed to present argument 
regarding the Samuels' claims of fraud and misrepresentation. After the grant of partial summary 
judgment, the Hepworth firm filed for summary judgment on the remaining issues. The district court, again 
finding no proof of damages, granted summary judgment for the Hepworth firm on the remaining issues. 






B. Summary Judgment on the Attorney Malpractice Claim Was Proper Because the Samuels 
Failed to Produce Affidavits of Expert Witnesses 
 
In its memorandum decision on the attorney malpractice claim, the district court held that the 
Samuels' allegations of damages involved an evaluation of issues not within the ordinary knowledge and 
experience of laypersons. Because the Samuels did not present a qualified expert's opinion on damages, 
the district court granted summary judgment based on the Samuels' failure to present a prima facie case 
of legal malpractice. The Samuels assert that they provided adequate evidence to show that the 
Hepworth firm committed attorney malpractice. 
 
To establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of a civil action, the plaintiff must show 
that the attorney's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff to lose the right to recover in the underlying 
case. Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224,227,796 P.2d 101, 104 (1990); see also Lamb v. 
Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269,272, 923 P.2d976, 979 (1996). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that 
the attorney was negligent and that the attorney's negligence caused the plaintiffs damages. Lamb v. 
Manweiler, 129 Idaho at 272, 923 P.2d at 979. 
 
A plaintiff must normally produce expert evidence of negligence and causation of damages to 
establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 273, 731 P.2d 813, 816 
(Ct. App. 1986) (Jarman 1). Where a defendant attorney moves for summary judgment in a malpractice 
case, the plaintiff must ordinarily provide affidavits of expert witnesses to resist the motion. Jarman v. 
Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 961, 842 P.2d288,297 (Ct.App. 1992) (Jarman II). The reason for these 
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requirements, as in malpractice actions against other professionals, is that "the factors involved ordinarily 
are not within the knowledge or experience of laymen composing the jury." Corey v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 54, 
58, 454 P.2d 951, 955 (1969). Expert testimony is unnecessary, however, ''where the attorney's alleged 
breach of duty of care is so obvious that it is within the ordinary knowledge and experience of laymen," 
Jarman I, 112 Idaho at 273, 731 P.2d at 816, such as when an attorney allows a statute of limitations to 
run on a client's claim for relief. 
 
Here, the Samuels did not present any expert affidavits to show that the Hepworth firm breached 
the standard of care. They also failed to present expert affidavits to show that any negligence by the 
Hepworth firm caused damages to them. ln this matter, whether the Hepworth firm breached the standard 
of care and caused damages to the Samuels was not an issue within the ordinary knowledge and 
experience of lay persons. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the 
Hepworth firm on the attorney malpractice claim. 
 
 




(1)  What must plaintiff establish to avoid summary judgment in a legal malpractice action? Why is 
expert testimony required when the judge is an attorney? That is, expert testimony in a medical 
malpractice case is necessary since the judge is not a doctor and therefore has no basis upon which to 
evaluate plaintiffs claim of negligence. Ina legal malpractice case, however, the judge is an attorney and 
can independently evaluate the merits of the claim. 
 
(2)  Lamb v. Manweiler:  In affirming the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, the court offered the following analysis of the plaintiff’s prima facie case: 
 
The elements required to establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of a civil action 
are: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the 
lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or of the standard of care by the lawyer; and (4) the failure to 
preform the duty must have been a proximate case of the damages suffered by the client. Marias 
v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d 350,352 (1991); Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 
705,652 P.2d 650,654 (1982). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the attorney has been 
negligent or has failed to act with proper skill, as well as the burden of showing that the 
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ damage. Without proximate 
cause there is no liability for negligence in a malpractice action. Marias, 120 Idaho at 13,813 P.2d 
at 352; Murray v. Farmers Insurance Co., 118 Idaho at 224, 227, 796 P.2d at 101, 104 (1990); 
Johnson, 103 Idaho at 706, 652 P.2d at 654. In a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must 
establish that he or she would have "some chance of success" in the underlying action before he 
or she would be entitled to recover from the attorney. Murray, 118 Idaho at 227, 796 P.2d at 104; 
e.g., Fitzgerald v. Walker, 121 Idaho 589, 592, 826 P.2d 1301, 1304 (1992). Lamb does not 
dispute the proposition that in a legal malpractice action arising from representation of a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, the person pursuing the claim must establish the additional 
element of actual innocence of the underlying criminal charges. 
Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269, 923 P.2d 976 (1996). See also Blough v. Wellman, 132 Idaho 424, 
974 P.2d 70 (1999). 
 
(3)  Jordan v. Beeks: Plaintiffs employed Beeks for advice on the enforceability of an oral agreement 
that they had entered into with third parties to purchase the stock of a closely held corporation. Beeks 
advised plaintiffs that he thought that the agreement was enforceable against the majority but not the 
minority stockholder. Following filing of suit in the shareholder litigation, the trial court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants, holding that the oral agreement was not binding because the parties had 
assumed that it would be reduced to writing. Plaintiffs initially appealed the summary judgment, but then 
dropped the appeal and brought an action for malpractice against Beeks. The trial court granted summary 




Plaintiffs claim that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in ruling on defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. Based on the decision in Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224,796 P.2d 101 
(1990), they argue that the court should have determined whether their claim had "some chance of 
success." This is, the court asserts, a "refinement of the proximate cause element," i.e., that plaintiff must 
prove "that the attorney's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff to lose the right to recover in the 
underlying cause." The showing required to meet this burden varies, however, with the stage at which the 
underlying cause was terminated. When the cause has actually gone to trial, "the court reviewing the 
attorney malpractice case need not merely speculate on the chance of success of the underlying claim 
but has the benefit of scrutinizing the underlying action, the conduct of the attorney, and the opinion of the 
trial court." The court then reviewed the facts and concluded that any incompetence by the plaintiffs' 
original attorney had not been the cause of the plaintiffs' loss in the underlying claim. 
 
(4)  Other professionals: Attorneys are not the only non-medical professionals to face malpractice 
suits. The court has held a broad range of professionals subject to such claims, including accountants, 
Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986); Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174,706 
P.2d 63 (1985); Owyhee County v. Rite, 100 Idaho 91,593 P.2d 995 (1979); architects, Twin Falls Clinic & 
Hasp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,644 P.2d 341 (1982); surveyors, Williams v. Blakely, 114 Idaho 
323, 757 P.2d 186 (1988); notary publics, Osborn v. Ahrens, 116 Idaho 14, 773 P.2d 282 (1989); and title 
companies, Merrill v. Fremont Abstract Co., 39 Idaho 238, 227 P. 34 (1924); Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust 









































(1)  "when and as": 
Whenever that would not have happened when and as it did happen, had it not been for this, 
this is an actual cause of that. Suppose, for example, an unarmed man is completely surrounded 
by enemies bent on his destruction, and armed with knives, so that he has no possible chance of 
escape; but only one blow is struck because it is instantly fatal. It may be true that without this 
blow he would have been killed at almost the same instant by some other knife; but no amount of 
repetition of such argument can conceal the fact that the actual cause of death was the blow 
struck. And the man who was killed by two bullets that hit him at the same time, each of which 
would have been instantly fatal, would not have died when and as he did die (by two bullets) had 
only one been fired.... A proper analysis will show that no occurrence would have happened when 
and as it did happen, had any contributing cause thereof been wanting. Consequently, if what 
happened would have happened exactly when and as it did happen regardless of what the 
defendant did or failed to do, he had nothing whatever to do with it.... 
ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 600 (957). 
 
(2)  Patrie v. Oregon Short Line R.R.: Perkins' perspective is found in an early Idaho case. Five 
horses owned by plaintiff were killed (on three different days) by defendant's trains. Defendant had not 
fenced its right of way as required by statute, which specified that railroads were required to fence their 
tracks "wherever the line of their road ... passes through or ...abuts private property." Plaintiffs land 
bordered on bordered on the defendant's line in an area in which public and private lands were 
intermingled. Defendant argued 
 
that building a fence on the east side of said track where it passes through said private property 
would be no protection to stock; that stock could pass around the ends of such fence and get 
upon the track....[The court responded that w]e think the record shows that said horses would not 
have been killed, where and when they were killed, if the defendant had maintained such a fence 
as the law requires. 
Patrie v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 6 Idaho 448, 56 P. 82 (1899). 
 
(3)  The Donne effect: 
 
What courts are made to face ...is the problem that professional historians continuously face and 
never solve: ...the "Donne effect." Everything depends on everything else. If everything had not 
been as it was, things would not now be as they are. A kingdom is lost for want of a nail, and 
Richard Nixon might have served out his term as president but for the glint of a piece of masking 
tape. The bird that flies across the evening sunset would be flying elsewhere if the nearby road 
had not been built. What will the bird do? Eat the mosquito that might give your child 
encephalitis? The consequences of an event radiate out in a myriad direction, passing 
consequences from a myriad other events that are at the same time radiating in to change the 
condition that made the event possible. The present is a pulsating, organic whole; the past is a 
succession of states like the present; and the future is unknown. Of course, courts find difficulty in 
discussing what they perceive. It threatens the atomistic premise of legal thought and language, 
which divides reality into cases, structures them in bipolar form, arrests the passage of time, and 
concerns itself with exclusivities. 
 
… 
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The world upon which the courts might act is influx. Causal chains do not run in parallel straight 
lines into the future, to be clipped or moved here and there by the remedial hand. They grow, branch, 
intertwine, curl back, some faster and some slower but all at a rate that seems breathless in relation to 
our capacity to follow them. JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 85-86, 89 (1978). 
 
The followings cases examine the relationship between these two components of causation, 
cause in fact and scope of liability: 
 
 
HAYES v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
143 Idaho 204, 141 P.3d 1073 (2006) 
 
TROUT, J: This case involves a wrongful death action following a collision between an automobile driven 
by the decedent, Melvin Hayes (Hayes), and a Union Pacific Railroad (UPR) train. Appellants Jean 
Hayes, the surviving spouse, and Colin Hayes and Marcy Road, the surviving children (collectively the 
Hayes family), appeal from a district court decision granting summary judgment in favor of UPR. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On February 20, 2001, Hayes was killed in a collision when his vehicle crossed the railroad tracks 
and was struck by a UPR train at a railroad crossing in Minidoka County. The crossing is located less 
than 2 miles from Hayes' home and he had driven over the crossing many times over the past 42 years. 
There was at least some evidence that at the time of the accident, visibility was reduced due to heavy fog 
in the area, although UPR disputes that there was fog at the accident site. The road was also icy. 
 
A dirt and gravel roadway run in a generally north/south direction and the railroad tracks run in an 
east/west direction. Hayes was driving southbound toward the crossing and the train approached from the 
east. The crossing was protected by a yellow railroad "advance warning" sign, located approximately 583 
feet north of the crossing; standard railroad crossbuck signs, located at the northeast and southwest 
comers of the intersection; and a red stop sign located at the crossing for southbound traffic. No active 
warning device, such as flashing lights or an automatic gate, was in place at the time of the accident. 
 
Approximately 1/4 mile before the crossing is a ''whistle board" which signals the train's 
crew to begin sounding the train's horn or bell. At the whistle board, the train crew began blowing the 
standard crossing signal of two longs blasts, followed by a short blast and another long one and also 
activated the bell on the lead locomotive. As the train approached the crossing it was traveling at 
approximately 60 m.p.h. 
 
The only eyewitnesses to the accident were UPR engineer, Timothy Tripple and conductor, Jerry 
Winterbottom. Tripple testified that approximately 100 feet before the train reached the crossing, Tripple 
realized Hayes' vehicle was failing to stop at the stop sign, at which time Tripple activated the train's 
emergency braking system. Tripple testified it appeared Hayes locked his brakes and slid onto the track 
into the train's path. 
 
The Hayes family brought suit against the Minidoka County Highway District, which was 
subsequently dismissed from the suit, and against UPR, claiming that it was negligent in a number of 
different aspects. UPR made a motion for partial summary judgment and, in the alternative, for summary 
judgment on the entire claim. The district judge ruled specifically on each of the issues raised by UPR in 
the partial summary judgment and then granted summary judgment in favor of UPR dismissing the case 







The Hayes family alleges the district court erred in dismissing their negligence claims against 
UPR, maintaining UPR was negligent in the way the train crew used the horn as a warning device, [and] 
for exceeding the internally imposed speed restrictions .... 
 
A. Use of horn 
 
The Hayes family argues UPR was negligent because it (1) failed to blow a required emergency 
whistle pattern prior to the collision; .... 
 
First, the Hayes family argues the train crew should have switched to an emergency whistle 
pattern in anticipation of striking Hayes and failure to do so constitutes negligence. They submitted 
testimony from their expert, Dr. David Lipscomb, who concluded an emergency pattern would have 
increased the alerting capability of the device by increasing the decibel output by 5 decibels. He also 
admitted, however, that sounding the emergency pattern alone would not have provided an alerting signal 
to Hayes until less than one second before the accident and, therefore, would have had made no 
difference in preventing the collision.... 
 
… 
B. Excessive speed 
 
Although there is no indication that the locomotive ever exceeded federal speed restrictions, the 
Hayes family argues UPR was negligent because it exceeded its own internally imposed speed limits, 
which were imposed by UPR because of the type of cargo being carried by the train and varied terrain. It 
appears from records maintained for the train that it exceeded the internally imposed speed limit at a 
point twelve minutes prior to the accident and at another point thirty-eight miles before the accident. The 
Hayes family argues that but for the train speeding at these points, it would not have arrived at the 
crossing at the same time as Hayes did and he would have had ample time to cross the tracks.... 
 
This argument ignores the foreseeability element of proximate cause. "Proximate cause consists 
of two factors, cause in fact and legal responsibility." Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 813 P.2d 350 
(1991); See Doe I v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036,895 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1995). The "legal 
responsibility element of proximate causation is satisfied if at the time of the defendant’s negligent act the 
Appellant's injury was reasonably foreseeable as a natural or probable consequence of the defendant's 
conduct." Doe I, 126 Idaho at 1041,895 P.2d at 1234. "Only when reasonable minds could come to but 
one conclusion as to whether the Appellant's injury was reasonably foreseeable may the judge decide this 
legal responsibility issue as a matter of law." Id. 
 
It is not reasonably foreseeable that slight increases (or decreases, for that matter) in speed 
either twelve minutes or thirty-eight miles prior to the accident would result in the train arriving at the 
crossing at the exact time that Hayes' truck was on the tracks and thus cause an accident. The same 
argument could be made that had the train never left that day, the accident would not have been caused. 
Thus, as a matter of law, UPR's conduct was not the proximate cause of the accident and we affirm the 
district court's decision dismissing the excessive speed claim. 
 
… 





(1)  Two categories of "cause": Was the failure of the locomotive's engineer to blow the emergency 
whistle pattern prior to the collision a cause in fact of decedents death? That is, would he have died when 
and as he did if the engineer had blown the whistle pattern? The plaintiff’s expert testified that the whistle 
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would have alerted the decedent less than one second before the collision - which would have been 
insufficient for the decedent to act. 
 
In contrast, was the locomotive's violation of the speed limits prior to the collision a cause in fact 
of decedent's death? Again: would he have died when and as he did if the train had obeyed the speed 
limit? The court silently concedes that the speeding was a cause in fact of the decedent's death: the train 
would not have been at the crossing at the same time as the decedent if the train had been driving more 
slowly. 
 
How does the court avoid holding the defendant responsible for causing decedent's death? Is the 
test the court employs- whether "at the time of the defendant's negligent act" the "injury was reasonably 
foreseeable as a natural or probable consequence of the defendant's conduct" - a question of causation? 
Is an ethical or policy question similar to the question of whether the defendant's conduct was that of a 
reasonable person under the circumstances? 
 
(2)  Restatement (Third) and "cause": The Restatement {Third) distinguishes between "factual cause" 
and "scope of liability." 
 
(a)  Factual cause: Two sections define factual cause: 
 
§26. Factual Cause 
 
Tortious conduct must be a factual cause of harm for liability to be imposed. 
Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the 
conduct.... 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (2010). 
 
§27. Multiple Sufficient Causes 
 
If multiple acts occur, each of which under § 26 alone would have been a factual 
cause of the physical harm at the same time on the absence of the other act(s}, each act 
is regarded as a factual cause of the harm. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS§ 27 (2010). 
 
Was the failure of the locomotive's engineer to blow the emergency whistle pattern prior 
to the collision a factual cause in fact the of decedent's death? That is, would the death have 
occurred if the whistle had been blown? 
 
         Was the locomotive's violation of the speed limits prior to the collision a factual cause of 
the decedent's death? That is, would the death have occurred if the train had not been 
speeding? 
 
               (b) Scope of liability: Since scope of liability is an ethical/policy decision, the drafters 
required eight sections. The definitional sections state: 
 
§29. Limitations on Liability for Tortious Conduct 
An actor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made 
the actor's conduct tortious. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS§ 29 (2010). 
 
§30 Risk of Hann Not Generally Increased by Tortious Conduct 
        An actor is not liable when the tortious aspect of the actor's conduct was of a 
type that does not generally increase the risk of that harm. 





Was the decedent's death within the scope of liability created by the engineer's tortious 
conduct? Was the harm (physical injury) that occurred a result of a risk that made the defendant's 
conduct tortious (i.e., a breach of duty)? If the tortious conduct was the violation of the speed 
limits, did the conduct create a foreseeable risk to someone who will be crossing the railroad 
tracks in twelve minutes? 
 
(3}  Limiting liability: Recall the cases on duty. A recurrent concern was the need to limit potential 
liability since unlimited liability is out of proportion to the culpability of negligent conduct. Given the infinite 
number of causes and the equally large number of results from any bit of conduct, the emergency whistle 
decision in Hayes is relatively uncommon. As we have seen, the common liability-limiting concept in 
negligence is "foreseeability." For example, an actor has a duty to act with care when her conduct 
involves a foreseeable risk of harm. In negligence, the second liability limiting mechanism is scope of 
liability or "proximate cause." 
 
 
DOE v. GARCIA 
 
Court of Appeals of Idaho 
126 Idaho 1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (1995) 
 
LANSING, JUDGE- John Doe I, a minor child ("Doe"), and his father brought this action alleging that 
Sisters of the Holy Cross, doing business as St. Alphonsus Hospital ("the hospital"), is liable for sexual 
abuse of Doe inflicted by a former employee of the hospital. Summary judgment was entered in favor of 
the hospital on the ground that the plaintiffs' damages were not proximately caused by the alleged 
negligence of the hospital. On appeal the plaintiffs argue that summary judgment was improper because 
... there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the hospital's negligence was the proximate 
cause of Doe's injuries.... 
 
The uncontroverted evidence presented on the summary judgment motion established the 
following. Doe, who was then thirteen years old, was admitted to St. Alphonsus Medical Center following 
an accident in which he was seriously injured. While there he became acquainted with Fred Garcia, a 
respiratory therapist employed by the hospital. Shortly before Doe was discharged from the hospital, 
Garcia gave the boy Garcia's home telephone number and asked him to call sometime. About a month 
after his release from the hospital, Doe contacted Garcia and began seeing him. With his parents' 
permission, Doe visited with Garcia regularly and often spent the night at Garcia's residence. Garcia took 
the boy on numerous outings and in general appeared to befriend the boy. 
 
Garcia's employment was subsequently terminated for misconduct involving young male 
employees of the hospital. The termination was based on allegations that Garcia had repeatedly invited 
these employees, who were under twenty-one years of age, to his home and offered to provide alcohol to 
them. At some point in the summer of 1989, after he had been fired by the hospital, Garcia began to 
sexually abuse Doe. This abuse continued until early 1992 when Doe's father became aware of it and 
reported Garcia to the police. Garcia was eventually convicted of lewd conduct with a minor, I.C. § 18-
1508, and was incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional Institution. Doe and his father then brought 
this suit against the hospital alleging that the hospital was negligent in its hiring, supervision and retention 
of Garcia. 
 
The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(b) asserting that, even 
assuming it was negligent with respect to its employment of Garcia, the hospital's negligence was not a 
proximate cause of Doe's injuries. For purposes of the hospital's motion it was stipulated that the hospital 
was under a duty to use care in hiring and supervising its employees and to protect its patients from harm 
at the hands of its employees. The hospital also stipulated for purposes of the motion that it had breached 
this duty by not using reasonable care in hiring and supervising Fred Garcia. The sole issue, therefore, 
was whether the hospital's breach of duty was the proximate cause of Doe's injury, i.e., his molestation at 
the hands of Fred Garcia. 
… 
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Before addressing [the procedural issues raised by the appeal,] it is necessary to have clearly in 
mind what "proximate cause" means. The concept expressed by the term, "proximate cause," is 
exceedingly complex and has been the subject of much debate. See Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 Idaho 
591,818 P.2d 295 (1991); Matter of Estate of Eiiasen, 105 Idaho 234, 243,668 P.2d 110, 119 (1983); 
Munson v. State Department of Highways, 96 Idaho 529,531 & n.3., 531 P.2d 1174, 1176 & n.3 (1975). 
We are once again called upon to address the meaning and the component parts of proximate causation. 
 
"Proximate cause," as the term has developed in the law of Idaho, is composed of two 
elements: cause in fact and scope of legal responsibility. Edmark Motors, Inc. v. Twin Cities Toyota, Inc., 
111 Idaho 846, 849, 727 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Ct. App. 1986); Crosby v. Rowand Machinery Co., 111 Idaho 
939, 941, 729 P.2d 414, 416 (Ct. App. 1986); Challis Irrigation Company v. State, 107 Idaho 338, 343, 
689 P.2d 230, 235 (Ct. App. 1984).3 The cause in fact component has been much discussed in Idaho 
cases. In Challis, we stated that cause in fact was made up of two elements: 
 
First, an event is the cause in fact of a succeeding event only if the succeeding event would not 
have occurred "but for" the prior event.*** The second element is a requirement that the first 
event be a "substantial factor" in producing the succeeding event. 
Challis, 107 Idaho at 343, 689 P.2d at 235. 
 
Subsequent to our discussion in Challis, however, the Idaho Supreme Court in Fussell, held that 
use of "but for'' terminology in a jury instruction on actual causation is improper where there are multiple 
independent forces that may have caused or contributed to the harm. The Court there held that in multiple 
causation cases the jury must be instructed that proximate cause is established if the jury finds that the 
defendant's negligence was a "substantial factor" in causing the plaintiffs injury.... In Manning v. Twin 
Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc., 122 Idaho 47, 830 P.2d 1185(1992), the Supreme Court reiterated that a 
substantial factor instruction alone was proper in multiple cause cases. 
 
The substantial factor test was adopted to allow recovery in circumstances where the defendant's 
negligence may have concurred with another cause to bring about the injury, even though it could not be 
established that the damage to the plaintiff would not have occurred "but for'' the defendant's negligence. 
See Fussell, 120 Idaho at 593-95, 818 P.2dat 297-99. In other words, substantial factor is a more liberal 
standard, allowing recovery in situations where a strict "but for" analysis might relieve the defendant of 
liability. 
 
The second component of proximate cause-the scope of legal responsibility- has been little 
discussed in Idaho case law. In Munson v. State Department of Highways, 96 Idaho at 531, 531 P.2d at 
1176, the Court stated: "Proximate [legal) cause focuses upon legal policy in terms of whether 
responsibility will be extended to the consequences of conduct which has occurred." Id. See also 
Henderson v. Cominco American, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 695, 518 P.2d 873, 878 (1973). These decisions 
say little, however, about the practical application of this element.15 
 
A subsequent Idaho Supreme Court decision, Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 
(1980), suggests that this issue as to whether the defendant's legal responsibility will be extended to 
cover the plaintiff’s injury is determined by assessing whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such 
harm would flow from the negligent conduct. In Alegria the Court overruled Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 
389, 462 P.2d54 (1969), which had held that vendors of intoxicants would not be liable for injuries caused 
by drunk drivers who had purchased liquor from the vendors, because the sale of liquor was "too remote 
                                                     
15       This distinction between cause in fact and scope of legal responsibility has sometimes been referred to by the Idaho Supreme 
Court as a distinction between "actual cause" and "proximate cause:" Actual cause has often been confused with proximate 
causation. The significance of proximate cause focuses upon legal policy in terms of whether responsibility will be extended to the 
consequences of conduct which has occurred. Actual cause, however, is a factual question focusing on the antecedent factors 
producing a particular consequence. Henderson  v. Cominco American,  Incorporated, 95 Idaho 690, 695, 518 P.2d 873, 878 (1973) 
(citations omitted). See also Hickman v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Boise, 114 Idaho 545, 549, 758 P.2d 704,708 (1988); Munson v. 
State Department of Highways, 96 Idaho at531, 531 P.2d at 1176. In more recent years, however, actual causation analysis has 
been discussed by the Supreme Court under the rubric of "proximate cause." See Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic and Hospital, Inc., 




to be considered a proximate cause." In overruling this precedent, the Supreme Court applied a 
reasonable foreseeability test: 
 
In general, it is held that "one owes the duty to every person in our society to use 
reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably 
anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury."*** Kirby v. 
Sonville, 286 Or. 339, 594 P.2d 818, 821 (1979). 
****  
In ruling on the correctness of the summary judgment entered in this case, we must 
determine ''whether [appellant’s injury and the manner of its occurrence [were] so highly unusual 
that we can say, as a matter of law that a reasonable man, making an inventory of the 
possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected the 
injury to occur."  
 
Kirby v. Sanville, supra. Alegria, 101 Idaho at 619-20, 619 P.2d at 137-38 (emphasis in original). We note 
that Idaho Pattern Jury Instruction 230 incorporates this foreseeability standard by specifying that 
proximate cause means, "a cause which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the complained 
injury, loss or damage.***" The term "natural or probable sequence" implies a requirement of 
foreseeability. 
 
Based upon these authorities, we conclude that the legal responsibility element of proximate 
causation is satisfied if at the time of the defendant's negligent act the plaintiffs injury was reasonably 
foreseeable as a natural or probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. 
 
Resolution of this issue is nearly always for the jury. Only when reasonable minds could come to 
but one conclusion as to whether the plaintiffs’ injury was reasonably foreseeable may the judge decide 
this legal responsibility issue as a matter of law. As the court stated in Alegria: 
 
[W]here the evidence on material facts is conflicting, or where on undisputed facts reasonable 
and fair-minded men may differ as to the inferences and conclusions to be drawn, or where 
different conclusions might reasonably be reached by different minds, the question of 
negligence*** and proximate cause is one of fact to be submitted to the jury and not a question of 
law for the court; if, upon all the facts and circumstances, there is a reasonable chance or 
likelihood of the conclusions of reasonable men differing, the question is one for the jury.                                                          
101 Idaho at 619-620, 619 P.2d at 137-138. See also PROSSER AND KEETON, § 45 at 320-21. 
 
Both the factual cause and the legal cause components of proximate cause must be present in 
order for a negligent defendant to be liable for the plaintiff’s damages. Thus, a negligent act may meet the 
"but for'' or "substantial factor" test, so as to be a cause in fact, the defendant may not be liable because it 
was not reasonably foreseeable that defendant's act would lead to the harm suffered by the plaintiff. 
Conversely, a careless act may foreseeably create a risk of great harm to the plaintiff, but the actor will 
not be liable if the careless conduct was not, in fact, a source contributing to the plaintiff’s injury. 
 
In Doe's case, the district court, in granting summary judgment in favor of the hospital, appears to 
have been rendering a judgment that, as a matter of legal policy, liability should not be allowed to extend 
so far from the negligent act. That is, the district court's concern related to the scope of legal 
responsibility. However, the court articulated the issue as whether the hospital's negligence was a 
"substantial factor'' in causing the sexual abuse- which is a question of factual cause.16 We conclude that 
this was not a correct analytical approach. 
                                                     
16 This use of a foreseeability analysis is consistent with the approach advocated by Professors Prosser and Keeton in their treatise 
on the law of torts, W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser and 
Keeton). The authors pose several analytical frameworks for defining the scope of legal responsibility and conclude that a model 
based upon the foreseeable risk of harm created by the breach of the duty of care is the most widely adopted and analytically 
correct method of expressing the legal responsibility component of proximate cause. Id. at §§42-43. 
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As explained above, the substantial factor test applies to determine cause in fact when there are 
multiple alleged causes of the plaintiffs’ injury and cause in fact is at issue. In the present case, when the 
substantial factor standard is properly recognized as a matter of factual cause, it is apparent that the 
evidence is sufficient to preclude summary judgment on that issue. 
 
First, although this may be a multiple cause case because the negligence of the hospital, 
misconduct by Garcia and alleged negligence of Doe's parents may have combined to bring about 
the harm, the other two causes are not actually independent of the hospital's negligence for purposes of 
substantial factor analysis. The hospital cannot claim that Garcia's actions constitute an independent 
intervening force. As the Supreme Court noted in Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986): 
 
The fact that the plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by a third party does not absolve the school 
district from liability for its negligence. The concept of supervening causation is inapplicable, 
under the allegations of the present case. Durtschi's actions were the foreseeable result of the 
school district's alleged failure to exercise due care to protect its students. The very risk which 
constituted the district's negligence was the probability that such actions might occur. 
 
It is clearly unsound to afford immunity to a negligent defendant because the intervening 
force, the very anticipation of which made his conduct negligent, has brought about the expected 
harm. Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1395 (3rd Cir. 1972). To do so would fly in the 
face of basic principles of tort law, as recounted in the Restatement: 
 
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of 
the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, 
intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm 
caused thereby. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449. See Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420, 428, 354 P.2d 172, 
176 (1960). 
Id. at 471-72, 716 P.2dat 1243-44. The third potential cause- Doe's parents' alleged negligence 
- also could not be an independent cause of the injury. The parents' negligence, if any, was in 
failing to prevent the harm to Doe caused by actions set in motion by the hospital's negligence. 
Standing alone, his parents' negligence would have caused no injury to Doe, and even if their negligence 
is proved, it would not eliminate the hospital's negligence as a cause in fact contributing to Doe's injury. 
 
Second, the uncontroverted facts show that even the more stringent "but for" test is met 
here- but for the hospital's acts in employing Garcia and permitting Garcia to have contact with 
Doe in the hospital, the two would not have met and the ultimate abuse would not have occurred. 
Doe argues, and we agree, that the substantial factor standard is employed to make proof of factual 
cause easier than it would be under the "but for" test, not more difficult. It aids the plaintiff in 
circumstances where the strict "but for'' test may not be satisfied. It is not intended to defeat the cause in 
fact element when "but for'' causation is established. 
 
                                                     
The authors also note that such an analysis is similar to that used when determining whether there has been a breach of 
the general duty of care. Id. at 280. A distinction exists, however, in that a breach of the duty of care may occur and yet the plaintiffs 
particular injury may exceed all bounds 
of reasonable foreseeability. Thus, a storekeeper who leaves a slippery floor has breached the duty of care and might be expected 
to foresee injury to a person who slips and falls, but not foresee that a person who falls may injure a muscle but walk away only to 
suffer a muscle spasm while driving home, which causes him to ram his automobile into another who in tum receives inadequate 
medical treatment and loses a limb. In such a case liability should be limited to those consequences that a person in the 
circumstances of the defendant could reasonably foresee as a result of his breach of the duty of care. 
Our Supreme Court has never expressly stated that the substantial factor analysis applies 
only to determinations of cause in fact as distinguished from legal cause. The Court hinted at such, however, in Hickman v. Fratemal 
Order of Eagles, 114 Idaho545, 549,758 P.2d 704,708 (1988), and the Court's decisions have applied the substantial factor analysis 
only in circumstances where factual cause, not legal cause, was at issue. See Manning, 122 Idaho 47, 830 P.2d 1185; Fussell, 120 
Idaho 591,818 P.2d 295; Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 107 Idaho 701,692 P.2d 345 (1984). Prosser and Keeton note that a 




Thus, it is not a cause in fact issue that is presented by the hospital's argument that its 
negligence could not be the proximate cause of Doe's injury. Rather, the hospital's assertion - that itis not 
liable to Doe because the molestation was too remote in time and circumstance from the hospital's 
negligent acts- presents a question as to the other component of proximate cause, the scope of legal 
responsibility. Therefore, the appropriate inquiry is whether the harm suffered by Doe was a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the hospital's breach of its duty of care. 
 
The court concluded that the trial court had erred in denying plaintiff the opportunity to pursue 
discovery to determine what the hospital knew about Garcia.] 
 




(1)  Doe is a decision that amply rewards a careful reading. To assist you in doing so, consider the 
following note, questions, and comments: 
 
First, note the issue in the case: "[a]re [there] genuine issues of material fact as to whether the 
hospital's negligence was the proximate cause of Doe's injuries?"[ 1] To answer that question, the court is 
required to unpack the meaning of the term "proximate cause." As the court notes, 'The concept 
expressed by the term, "proximate cause," is exceedingly complex and has been the subject of much 
debate." [5) 
 
Consider the steps in the court's analysis: 
 
(a) What are the elements of "proximate cause"? 
 
(b) What are the categories of factual cause? Do these categories correspond to those 
presented in the Restatement (Third) sections following Hayes? 
 
(c) What are the legal tests jury instructions appropriate for each of the categories of factual 
cause? [The IDJI is are set out in note (2) below.] 
 
(d) How does the court define "scope of liability," which it calls "scope of legal 
responsibility''? 
 
(e) What legal test for scope of liability does the court provide? What IDJI language does the 
court identify as corresponding to the legal test? Note the hypo the court provides. 
 
(f)  Is Doe a single or multiple cause case? How does the court determine the answer? Can 
the but-for test be used to determine whether the case presents a single or multiple cause situation? 
  
 
(3)  IDJis on "proximate cause": 
 
(a)  IDJI 2.30.1 - Proximate cause - "but for'' test 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural 
or probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that 
cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient 
                                                     
17 But when the "substantial factor" is made to include all of the ill-defined considerations of policy which go to limit liability once 
causation in fact is found, it has no more definite meaning than "proximate cause; and it becomes a hindrance rather than a help. It 
is particularly unfortunate insofar as it suggests that the questions involved are only questions of causation, obscuring all other 
issues.... 
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra, §42 at 278. 
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if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.  
  
[There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent 
conduct of two or more persons or entities contribute concurrently as substantial factors 
in bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury 
regardless of the extent to which each contributes to the injury.] 
 
(b)  IDJI 2.30.2- Proximate cause- "substantial factor," without "but for" test 
 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need 
not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, 
loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have 
occurred anyway. 
 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent 
conduct of two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors 
in bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury 
regardless of the extent to which each contributes to the injury. 
 
Which IDJI should be used for the whistle (factual causation) issue in Hayes? Which IDJI should 
be used for the speeding (scope of liability) issue in Hayes? Which IDJI should be used when there are 
potential multiple causes of the injury? 
 
Which of the instructions poses the foreseeability issue for the jury? 
 
(4)  Doe (the prequel): In the previous appellate decision in the case, the court of appeals made the 
obvious point: 
 
Both the factual cause and the legal cause components of proximate cause must be 
present in order for a negligent defendant to be liable for the plaintiffs’ damages. Thus, a 
negligent act may meet the "but for" or "substantial factor" test, so as to be a cause in fact, the 
defendant may not be liable because it was not reasonably foreseeable that defendant's act 
would lead to the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Conversely, a careless act may foreseeably 
create a risk of great harm to the plaintiff, but the actor will not be liable if the careless conduct 
was not, in fact, a source contributing to the plaintiff's injury. 
Doe v. Sisters of Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1995) 
 
(5) Doe (an addendum): Following the decision by the court of appeals excerpted above, the district 
court again granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment, deciding that the defendant did not owe 
plaintiff a duty since the tort had occurred after Garcia's employment had ended. On appeal, the supreme 
court reversed, holding that the hospital did owe plaintiff a duty. Doe v. Garcia, 126 Idaho 1036, 895 P.2d 
1229 (1995), abrogated by Hunter v. State, Dept. of Corrections, Div. of Probation & Parole, 138 Idaho 
44, 57 P.3d 75 (2002).  Hunter limited Doe, stating: "extend[ed] the duty of an employer too far for 
consequences outside employment over which the employer has no realistic control.  See generally, 
Monique C. Lillard, “Their Servants’ Keepers: Examining Employer Liability for the Crimes and Bad Acts 







CAUSE IN FACT 
 
[A] SINGLE CAUSES 
 
HENDERSON v. COMINCO AMERICAN, INC. 
 
Idaho Supreme Court 
95 Idaho 690, 518 P.2d 873 (1974) 
 
McFADDEN, J: [Plaintiffs farmed neighboring property in Ada County. Like other peppermint growers, 
Henderson and Olsen had problems with weeds, which both crowd out the peppermint, diminishing yield, 
and also can taint the flavor of the peppermint oil. In the spring of 1967, Henderson contemplated using a 
herbicide on his peppermint and discussed the matter with Jenkins, an employee of Cominco. Jenkins 
recommended Sinox PE as an effective herbicide over competing brands and told him that Sinox PE had 
been successfully used on peppermint crops in Washington and Oregon. Jenkins advised that Sinox PE 
could be applied after the mint sprouted with minimal harm to the mint but with effective weed control. As 
a pre-emergent herbicide, Sinox PE is applied to the soil's surface before annual weeds emerge; as the 
weeds emerge and contract the herbicide, it destroys the plant tissue. Thus, Sinox PE destroys only what 
it touches. If the herbicide contacted the leaf or stem of a plant, it would not translocate down into the 
root. In contrast, a hormonal herbicide translocates throughout the entire plant and destroys the entire 
plant. Sinox PE was designed to control only annual broadleaf weeds and grasses. Henderson and Olsen 
acknowledged that their fields were infested with perennial weeds. 
 
[Henderson and Olsen purchased Sinox PE and sprayed one application on their peppermint 
crop during early April. Both farmers applied Sinox PE in conformance with mixing instructions on the 
containers. After his first application, there was unsatisfactory weed control in one of Henderson's fields. 
At Henderson's request, Jenkins and a chemist from Cominco inspected the field. They recommended 
that Henderson put another application of Sinox on the field; Henderson sprayed the field a second time. 
On June 12, Jenkins and three other Cominco employees visited the field to check the weed control. 
During this inspection, Jenkins noticed some peppermint plants which appeared to be dying. When 
Henderson harvested his mint crop, seventy-five out of one hundred seventy acres were barren. Olsen 
also lost part of the crop and had reduced yield on the remainder. Somewhat inconsistent with 
Henderson's and Olsen's loss was the fact that Henderson's field which had double application of Sinox 
PE was not barren, although it produced a diminished yield of mint. Henderson and Olsen instituted this 
action against Cominco for damage to their peppermint crops from the application of Sinox PE.] 
 
II. ACTUAL CAUSE 
 
....Actual cause has often been confused with proximate causation. The significance of proximate 
cause focuses upon legal policy in terms of whether responsibility will be extended to the consequences 
of conduct which has occurred. []Actual cause, however, is a factual question focusing on the antecedent 
factors producing a particular consequence. [] In this case there is a question whether the Sinox PE, in 
fact, caused the plaintiffs' crop damage. 
 
The primary issue is whether the plaintiffs adduced sufficient circumstantial proof of causation in 
fact for the case to go to the jury. Defendants contend that there is [no] proof of causation ... Plaintiffs 
insist that the absence of injury to other mint crops not sprayed with Sinox PE proves that Sinox PE was, 
in fact, the causative agent, and they exclusively rely on this as proof of causation. 
 
A summary of plaintiffs' evidence concerning the absence of injury to other mint crops in useful. 
First, Laverne Larsen, one of the original plaintiffs, applied Sinox PE to all his mint crop except one-half 
acre. The one-half acre flourished while the rest died. Second, Ed Schwisow, plaintiffs' neighbor, 
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harvested a good yield of mint except for five barren acres. Schwisow did not use Sinox PE. Third, Robert 
Friday, Defendants' witness, grew a good crop of mint in 1967, but he did not use Sinox PE either. 
 
In reviewing this evidence, the first question for consideration is whether the nonoccurrence of 
other injuries is competent proof of causation in this case.... 
 
In both negligence cases and warranty actions reasonable inferences may be drawn in 
connection with causation from circumstantial evidence. [] Also, causation may be proved by the 
occurrence or nonoccurrence of injury in similar circumstances. [] In cases using non-occurrence 
of injury as a mode of proof, the product alleged to be the causative agent had been used or consumed in 
those instances evidencing the presence or absence of injury. Here, the converse is true: Sinox PE was 
never applied to the fields which produced good mint yields. 
 
To infer Sinox PE was the causative agent because other crops not sprayed with Sinox PE 
flourished is speculative. There are too many variables in agricultural practices among the plaintiffs and 
their witnesses to conclude that differences in crop yields were due solely to the application of Sinox PE. 
Except for cursory statements by Ed Schwisow about the similarity between his farming practices and the 
plaintiffs' and Larsen's there is scant evidence concerning the method and frequency of watering, soil 
characteristics, age of peppermint and type and frequency of cultivation. Robert Friday never testified 
about any of the of these variables. On the basis of these variables the crop yields suggest an equally 
probable inference that it was the nature of the farming methods, soil and water conditions, or even 
disease which caused the injury rather than Sinox PE. 
 
Although portions of the plaintiffs' mint crops perished, there is no rational explanation for the 
difference between the amount of mint acreage sprayed with Sinox PE and the amount which actually 
died. To infer that Sinox PE was the cause of the injury on the basis of this evidence would be speculative 
and unreasonable. At best, it is as equally probable as not that devastated mint crops resulted from the 
application of Sinox PE. 
 
.... After reviewing the evidence, inferences, and conclusions we hold that there is no rational, 
competent, basis in the record showing that: (1) Sinox PE was the cause of the injury, 
.... The judgment is reversed. 
 





(1)  Where did plaintiffs' evidence on causation fail? Given the "many variables in agricultural 
practices," what could the plaintiffs have presented as evidence that it was Sinox PE? Since causation is 
the primary factual question in a negligence case, were they required to negative the "many variables"?  
Or should the problems be viewed as a question of the standard of proof? What is the proof requirement? 
 
(2)  Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. San Tan Ranches: Defendant contracted with the plaintiff for the 
aerial application of herbicide to its potato fields. When the fields were severely weed infested, the farmer 
refused to pay; plaintiff brought suit for the contract price of its services and the farmer counterclaimed for 
its losses. At trial, although the farmer was unable to offer any direct evidence that the weed problems 
were caused by a misapplication of the herbicide, he did introduce evidence  
 
that the weed infestation in at least some of the fields occurred in noticeable strips, alternating 
with strips which were relatively weed free; that the weeds were of types controllable with the 
proper application of Sencor [herbicide]; that the proper field preparation, irrigations and timing 
necessary for effective Sencor application were effected [by thefarmer]; that the best control of 
weeds required application of one pound of Sencor compound per acre; that ...2,480 pounds of 
Sencor had been used [and]2, 315 acres had been sprayed ...;that experts held the opinion that 




Sencor had been applied due to error on [the farmer's] part, weed infestation would have been 
uniform rather than stripped. 
 
During cross examination and through the introduction of exhibits, plaintiff cast doubt on 
much of this evidence. Plaintiff also introduced evidence indicating that there were several 
alternative possible causes of the distinctive striped pattern. 
 
         Should the trial court grant plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict on the counterclaim? 
See Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. San Tan Ranches, 102 Idaho 567, 633 P.2d 1145 (1981). See also 
Chisholm v. J.R. Sirrplot, Co., 94 Idaho 628,495 P.2d 1113 (1972). 
 
(3)  Dent v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.: Decedent was found unconscious, his head slumped 
against the steering wheel of his automobile. He was bleeding from the nose and mouth; his face was 
bruised. The condition of the automobile indicated that it had struck a bridge abutment. The weather that 
morning was foggy with a light glaze of ice. There were no witnesses, skid marks, or other direct evidence 
of the cause of the accident. The decedent was taken to the hospital where he died without regaining 
consciousness. The death certificate attributed death to a cerebral hemorrhage with an "accident, head 
injury'' as a contributing cause. 
 
Plaintiff contended that the hemorrhage was caused by striking the bridge; defendant insurance 
company argued that the hemorrhage caused the decedent to strike the bridge. The doctor who 
performed the autopsy concluded that the 
 
findings reveal that death was due to a massive cerebral hemorrhage without specific evidence of 
trauma. This is associated with heart strain due to extensive coronary arteriosclerosis and cardiac 
hypertrophy. There is probably a terminal congestive heart failure with death occurring rather 
suddenly (within a matter of 2 hours). 
 
The surgeon on duty at the emergency room concurred in the conclusion that death was 
caused by cerebral hemorrhage but maintained that there was evidence of trauma. At trial, the surgeon 
testified that  
 
whether this blood vessel broke before he ran into the bridge or whether it broke afterwards, I 
don't think we know from this sort of picture, because you could get the same effects from either 
one of them. I would say this, that I feel it presumptuous to say that you know it did happen 
before he ran into the bridge. I think that the picture I saw, he well could have run into the bridge 
before-hand because he did have - he was bleeding, he had signs of injury, but as to whether this 
hemorrhage- and it could happen and it would be a reasonable expectation in a man of this age 
group who had hardening of the arteries, to have an injury, for it to break. But whether this 
happened before or after he hit the bridge, I think you are a little presumptuous to be able to say 
that you are sure that that's what happened. I don't think we know. 
 
Should the trial court grant a directed verdict for the defendant? See Dent v. Hardware Mutual Casualty 
Co., 86 Idaho 427, 388 P.2d 89 (1964). 
 
(4)  Martineau v. Walker: On September 18th, plaintiff purchased 129 calves from defendant. At the 
time of the purchase, the calves appeared healthy. They were immediately trucked to a local veterinarian 
for inoculation. All of the calves except for one which appeared sickly were treated. They were then 
trucked to the buyer's nearby ranch. The sickly calf died that night. By October 1, 10-12 calves had died; 
the veterinarian was summoned. After performing an autopsy, he concluded that the calves had died of 
leptospirotic infection and inoculated the entire herd. Calves nevertheless continued to die. A second 
autopsy confirmed the initial findings. By the end of December, 22 calves had died -- most within the 30 
days following delivery. 
 
Leptospira is an organism which infects cattle though the mucous membrane. It lives in moist 
areas and may be transmitted though waterways, contact with diseased animals, or from contact with any 
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environment which allows the fluid excreted by the diseased animals to remain moist. It has an incubation 
period of 7 days before any symptoms are evident. The symptoms are similar to shipping fever, a stress 
disease produced by transporting animals. Animals infected with leptospirotic infection may linger for 30-
40 days before dying. 
 
Autopsies were performed on a total of 4 animals. No autopsies were performed after the second 
visit on October 12th. The veterinarian on cross examination at trial admitted that the organism could 
have entered the animals at the seller's ranch, during shipment, at the veterinarian establishment, at the 
buyer's ranch, or even before the seller obtained the animals for resale. The veterinarian then said, 
"Okay, now, I would like to qualify this. I don't believe the organism could have come from any of these 
other sources." 
 
Should the trial court grant a directed verdict for the defendant? See Martineau v. Walker, 
97 Idaho 246, 542 P.2d 1165 (1975). 
 
(4a) Sales v. Peabody, 157 Idaho 195, (2014): Plaintiff claimed that she contracted a toe 
infection as a result of a pedicure performed at a spa. The supreme court vacated summary judgement 
against plaintiff.  The court found the complaint adequate, and held it improper for the district judge to 
raise, sua sponte, causation issues.  
 
(4b) Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs., 156 Idaho 802, (2014):  A split supreme court held 
that plaintiff was not required to eliminate every potential alternative source of her infrection. 
 
(4c)  Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834 (2007):  Expert evidence 
based on sound scientific prinicples was sufficient to withstand summary judgement, even though the 
expert could not pinpoint to “reasonable medical probability” the exact effect of certain meedications upon 
decdent’s brain. 
 
(5)  Counter factual "causation": Carefully consider how you intuitively analyze the following two 
cases. What steps were you required to follow? How do these cases differ from the preceding ones? 
 
(a)  Stephens v. Stearns: After visiting friends and having two drinks, the plaintiff returned to 
her apartment shortly after 10:00p.m. She turned on the television and went upstairs to change. After 
changing, she started downstairs to watch television. As she reached the top of the stairs, plaintiff either 
slipped or fell forward. She testified that she "grabbed" in an attempt to catch herself. She was unable to 
do so and fell to the bottom of the stairs. The evidence showed that the stairway was 36 inches wide and 
did not have a handrail as required by local ordinance. 
 
Should the trial court grant a directed verdict for the defendant? See Stephens v. Stearns, 
106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984). 
 
(b)        Leliefeld v. Johnson: As plaintiff approached the Lightning Creek Bridge from 
the west, defendant was approaching from the east, driving his employer's dump truck and pulling 
a trailer carrying a bulldozer. The minimum width of defendant's load was 9'2"; the blade of the bulldozer 
extended beyond the right-hand edge of the trailer. The bridge was 20'wide. While both parties were 
crossing the bridge, the bulldozer's blade caught on a bridge girder pushing the bulldozer into the path of 
the plaintiff's oncoming vehicle. 
 
At the time of the accident, an Idaho statute provided that no vehicle using the highways 
of the state could exceed 8' in width without a permit from the state; defendants did not have a 
permit. They argued that the jury should not have been instructed on the existence of the statute because 
there was no evidence that the breach of the statute was a cause of the accident. The 
court disagreed: 
 
Even though violation of a statute enacted for public safety is negligent per se, the 




actionable negligence....[Camline  and Johnson] maintain that the absence of a permit could not 
have been a proximate cause of the accident....Camline and Johnson correctly cast their 
argument in terms of sufficiency of the evidence; ...;they argue that plaintiffs offered no evidence 
that failure to obtain a permit was a proximate cause of the accident. They suggest that evidence 
showing that a permit would have required the bulldozer to be moved at a different time, or along 
a different route, or under different conditions, would have established a causal link between the 
lack of a permit and the accident, but that in the absence of such evidence that is it impossible to 
find such a link. They claim therefore that admission of evidence of the violation of the statute is 
irrelevant and error. We disagree. 
 
Plaintiffs submitted evidence that wide loads such as Camline's are commonly flagged, 
that a permit would probably have ˙required flagging, but that no flagging was present on the 
bulldozer at the time of the accident. While the question of flagging was contested by Camline 
and Panoramic, plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to submit the question of a permit requirement 
and noncompliance therewith to the jury, and to allow the jury to draw the inference that the 
accident might not have happened if a permit had been obtained. 
Lefiefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983). 
 
The causation issues presented by these cases resemble questions presented in a range 
of cases. For example, would the decedent have died if his friend had taken him to the hospital 
rather that merely driving him around (Farwell v. Keaton)? Why didn't the court address this issue? 
 
(6)  Counterfactual causation: "lost chance" Daryl Manning had chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease which is characterized by a decrease both in the body's ability to transfer oxygen into the 
bloodstream and to expel carbon dioxide from the bloodstream. Manning had been hospitalized 
numerous times with life threatening episodes. When he was admitted on April 17th, the attending 
physician told the family that his death was imminent. On April 20th, the hospital decided to move 
Manning to a private room. By this time, "[v]irtually all of Manning's strength and energy were needed for 
breathing and he was unable to sleep or eat." When the nurses removed Manning's oxygen supply to 
move him, "his condition suddenly and dramatically worsened. In the few seconds that the supplemental 
oxygen was disconnected, Manning suffered extreme respiratory distress and, according to the record, he 
may have stopped breathing altogether." The family had signed a "do not resuscitate" order when 
Manning was brought to the hospital on the 17th and the hospital staff did not attempt to revive him. The 
evidence at trial indicated that Manning had at most a few hours to live and that removal of the 
supplemental oxygen was the cause of death. The supreme court reversed a verdict for the plaintiffs, 
rejecting without elaboration the "doctrine" of lost chance. Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, 122 
Idaho 47, 830 P.2d 1185 (1992). 
 
Is Stephens v. Stems actually a "lost chance" case? That is, did the defendant's negligence 
(violating the ordinance requiring a handrail) fail to prevent an unfavorable outcome (falling down the 
stairs)? Does Stephens differ from Manning? Should the court have affirmed on the ground that the 
decedent had lost the chance of living longer and reduced damages to reflect the brevity of the lost time? 
 
 
[B] MULTIPLE CAUSES 
 
 
HACKWORTH v. DAVIS 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
87 Idaho 98, 390 P.2d 422 (1964) 
 
McFADDEN, J.- The facts disclosed by the record are virtually without dispute. [On December 4, 1959, 
Vera Weltz lost her life in an automobile accident outside Sandpoint on U.S. Highway No. 95. She was 
riding in the front seat of a car owned and operated by George Cussen, a teacher from Noxon, Montana. 
Mr. Cussen was driving four high school students from Noxon to Spokane, Washington. Going through 
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Sandpoint at about 8:30 a.m., the Cussen car overtook an empty logging truck owned and operated by 
the defendant, Laurence Davis. The Cussen car followed Davis's truck which had slowed down to about 
15 to 20 mph because the highway made a sharp tum. The Cussen car followed the truck around this 
tum, onto a straight stretch, and as the truck approached the next curve, Cussen passed the truck at 
about 25 to 30 mph. The highways were icy and slick. Mer passing the truck, Mr. Cussen returned to the 
southbound lane and proceeded about a quarter of a mile. 
[Davis was driving four or five car lengths behind the Cussen car; both were travelling about 25 to 
30 miles an hour. A line of about four cars approached from the south at about the same rate of speed. 
Mr. Cussen testified that a car driven by Elizabeth Stanfield, the last car in the line, got out of control 
about 100 feet from him and skidded across the road into the path of his car; the cars collided head on. 
Almost immediately after being struck by the Stanfield car, the Cussen car was struck in the rear by the 
Davis truck. After the accident, Vera Weltz was found on the floor of the Cussen car; her neck was broken 
and spinal cord severed. 
 
Mrs. Stanfield was never served with process and the action was dismissed as to her. 
The jury found for defendant Davis. Plaintiff appealed.) 
 
[Plaintiff] asserts error in the refusal of the trial court to give his requested instructions to the jury 
dealing with the law concerning a single, or indivisible injury resulting from two separate, unrelated, but 
almost contemporaneous blows. 
 
The facts disclose an impossibility of any determination as to whether the cause of death of Vera 
Weltz was from injuries received resulting from the impact from the Stanfield car, the Davis truck, or a 
combination of the two. It is likewise impossible to attribute any proportion of the injuries to either blow. 
Testimony of witnesses and the photographic exhibits disclose extensive damage to both the front and 
rear of the Cussen vehicle. The physician who examined Miss Weltz while she was still in the vehicle was 
unable to render an opinion as to which of the two collisions caused the fatal injuries. 
 
[Plaintiff] sought to have the court instruct the jury on his theory of the case. He asserted it is the 
law that when it is impossible for anyone to determine whether a decedent dies as a result of injuries 
received from either one of the two blows, or from a combination of both, that because of such 
impossibility of determination as to the actual cause, the law requires a decedent be considered as 
having died as a result of both blows. His requested instructions specifically pointed out that it was for the 
jury to determine all the facts of the accident; also, to determine whether any act or omission of Mr. Davis 
was a proximate cause or contributing efficient cause of his truck striking the Cussen car, and if so 
determined, whether such act or omission constituted negligence. 
 
In evaluating [plaintiffs] assignment of error, consideration must begiven to the fact that only one 
of the two alleged tort-feasors is before the Court; the cause was dismissed as to Mrs. Stanfield. 
Consideration must also be given to respondent Davis's admission contained in the pleadings that the 
decedent died from injuries received in the collision of the car, in which she was riding, with the other two 
vehicles. By [plaintiffs] contention, he is asserting a joint and several liability against respondent Davis, 
although he cannot prove that the girl was not already dead at the time of the second collision, or that 
there was a causal relation between the subsequent collision and her death. 
 
A number of jurisdictions have been faced with a similar factual situation as is presented 
in this case, involving a multiple collision of vehicles, with a single or indivisible injury. The problem, that 
first plagued the courts in resolving the law in such cases was how one defendant could be held to be 
jointly and severally liable with another defendant when in fact their tort was not a "joint" tort; there was no 
joint duty owed to a plaintiff, and no breach of any joint duty when two automobile drivers successively 
collided with the plaintiffs’ car. [] 
 
Generally, the courts have resolved such problem on a practical basis .... 
Prosser, in his handbook on the Law of Torts § 45 (2d ed. 1955), states the proposition 
thus: 





logical division, each may be a substantial factor in bringing about the Joss, and if so, each may 
be charged with all of it. Here again the typical case is that of two vehicles which collide and 
injure a third person. The duties which are owed to the plaintiff by the defendants are separate, 
and may not be identical in character or scope, but entire liability rests upon the obvious fact that 
each has contributed to the single result, and that no rational division can be made. []; Summers 
v. Tice,33 Cal. 2d 80, 199P.2d 1(1948). 
 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 879 states what we believe to be the correct rule: 
Except as stated in § 881 [pertaining to persons contributing to a nuisance], each of two 
persons who is independently guilty of tortious conduct which is a substantial factor in causing a 
harm to another is liable for the entire harm, in the absence of a superseding cause. 
 
[Defendant] counters [plaintiffs] contention there was reversible error in failing to instruct on the 
indivisible injury theory, by asserting that the law applicable to the facts and issues of this action were 
fully covered by the court's Instructions .... These instructions properly covered the law as to a factual 
situation where the negligence of two or more persons did in fact combine or concur in causing injury to a 
third person. However, in the instant action, under the instructions given, in order for [plaintiff] to recover, 
the jury had to find negligence on the part of both Mrs. Stanfield and [defendant] Davis; also that the 
negligence of each of them was a contributing cause of the accident; and also determined that the 
combined injuries suffered by the Weltz girl, from the collisions, brought about the tragic result; or the jury 
had to find Davis negligent and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injuries. Under 
[plaintiff's] theory, however, if the jury found Davis to be negligent, there was no requirement that the jury 
find the negligence of Davis combined or concurred with the negligence of Mrs. Stanfield in bringing 
about the results, or that Davis's negligence was solely responsible; all the jury was required to find was 
negligence on the part of Davis, and a single or indivisible injury suffered as a result of two separate 
collisions. If the jury made such findings, either driver found negligent could be held responsible 
for the full injury. 
 
It is our conclusion that the instructions given by the court did not adequately cover this principle 
of law, and failure to instruct upon [plaintiffs] theory of the case as embraced in his requested instructions 
was prejudicial error. 
 
       The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for new trial.  
 




(1)  Hackworth is a classic example of an injury traceable to multiple causes. It also demonstrates 
why the but-for test is problematic when it is applied to multiple causes. It is clear (isn't it?) that Weltz was 
killed by either one of or the combination of the impact of the Stanfield car and the Davis log truck. Is it 
possible, however, to assign but-for causation to either of the other drivers individually? Both, therefore, 
would be able to avoid liability through the but-for test. Does the solution that the court adopted a 
pragmatic ethical position reflecting a recognition that neither side can prove who did it- and therefore the 
allocation of the burden of proof will be decisive. 
 
(2)  Which IDJI would the trial court use if the case were going to trial today? 
 
(3) Restatement (Third) and proof of causation: 
 
28.  Burden of Proof 
 
(a)  Subject to Subsection (b), the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the 
defendant's tortious conduct was a factual cause of the plaintiff’s harm. 
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(b)  When the plaintiff sues all of multiple actors and proves that each engage in 
tortious conduct that exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm and that the tortious conduct of one or 
more of then caused the plaintiffs harm, but the plaintiff cannot be reasonably be expected to 
prove which actor or actors caused the harm, the burden of proof, including both production and 
persuasion, on factual causation is shifted to the defendants. 
RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS § 28 (2010). 
 
(4)  Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp.: Plaintiff was injured when his automobile struck a stationary 
vehicle in the emergency lane of an interstate highway. Plaintiff brought suit against only the 
manufacturer of his automobile, alleging that his injuries were enhanced because of a defect in the 
vehicle's seat belt system. The trial court concluded that plaintiff failed "to prove affirmatively what injuries 
would have occurred had the defect not been present." Since plaintiff had failed to apportion the damages 
by proving which were the result of each causative factor, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict. 
 
The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the 
conduct of the defendant[s] was a substantial factor in causing the injury: 
 
If the plaintiff fails to show that the defects were a substantial factor, there can be no recovery. If 
the defects are shown to be a substantial factor, then the burden of proving apportionment falls 
on the defendants. Where no apportionment is established, the plaintiff is entitled to recover fully 
from any defendant whose (conduct] was a substantial factor in producing the injuries. 
 
On review, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed in a rehearing decision that emphasized the 
rule that causation was a factual question "reserved for the jury unless the proof is so clear that 
all reasonable minds would construe the facts and circumstances in the same manner," an event 
which the court characterized as a "rare situation." Justice Bistline then turned to defendant's 
contentions: 
 
Chrysler argues that because Mr. Fouche introduced no expert medical testimony to 
demonstrate that "plaintiffs injuries would not have occurred but for the alleged failures of 
the seat belt and collapsible steering column to properly function ...,the jury would have 
had to speculate whether plaintiffs tom aorta and other injuries would have sustained in 
the collision even if there had been no defect or whether plaintiff’s injuries were caused 
solely by the allegedly defective seat belt and steering column." However, this objection 
misconceives the proper analysis. The question is merely whether, giving full 
consideration to the evidence produced by the plaintiff and every legitimate inference 
which can be drawn therefrom, the product's defect was a substantial factor in causing 
the injuries suffered. Cf. Munson v. State Department of Highways, 96 Idaho 529, 531 
P.2d 1174 (1975); Hackworth v. Davis, 87 Idaho 98, 390 P.2d422 (1964). The conduct of 
the manufacturer need not be the sole factor, or even the primary factor, in causing the 
plaintiff's injuries, but merely a substantial factor therein. [] 
 
Justice Bakes dissented, contending that "not only did Mr. Fouche fail to show what caused his 
aorta to rupture, he failed to prove any connection between the alleged defects and the injury." Fouche v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 107 Idaho 701, 692 P.2d 345 (1984). 
 
(5)  Petersen v. Parry: Plaintiffs' decedent died in a head-on automobile collision that killed all of the 
occupants of both cars. The decedent was a passenger in one of the vehicles. Plaintiffs appealed a 
summary judgment for the estates of both drivers. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that 
plaintiff had failed to prove that the accident was caused by the other driver: 
 
when an Idaho state police officer, trained in the art of investigating accidents and determining 
the cause thereof, could not form an opinion as to the cause of this accident on the basis of all 
and the only evidence available, twelve untrained ladies and gentlemen of a jury could not fix or 




conjecture. This court has previously held that a verdict cannot rest on conjecture. Dent v. 
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 86 Idaho 427, 388 P.2d 89 (1964); Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74 




It is contended that the submission of the question of proximate cause to the jury is authorized by 
the Idaho case of Hackworth v. Davis, 87 Idaho 98, 390 P.2d422 (1962), based on the California 
case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). 
 
These cases however are distinguishable from the cause at bar, for the basic theory 
proclaimed therein is that where the negligence of two or more persons combined in causing a 
single, indivisible injury to a third person, then all the tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for 
the injury produced. As previously pointed out in this opinion, the evidence at hand is insufficient 
to support a finding of negligence on the part of [the other driver]. Therefore, Hackworth and Tice 
are inapplicable. 
 
Is Petersen distinguishable from Hackworth? Is the Court's description of Hackworth correct? 
 
(6)  Joint and several liability: As Hackworth demonstrates, the issue can be phrased in different 
ways: was defendant's conduct the cause of plaintiffs injury? Was it a cause? For what portion of 
plaintiff’s injury is defendant responsible? As the court notes, "The problem, that first plagued the courts 
... in such cases was how one defendant could be held to be jointly and severally liable with another 
defendant when in fact their tort was not a "joint" tort; there was no joint duty owed to a plaintiff, and no 
breach of any joint duty when two automobile drivers successively collided with the plaintiff’s car. 
[]Generally, the courts have resolved such problem on a practical basis .... 
 
The resolution that the court notes was dependent upon a common-law solution to the payment of 
judgments- the law of joint and several liability: where two or more persons are liable for the same injury 
(e.g., the death of Vera Weltz) they may either be jointly liable (each is liable for the total) or severally 
liable (i.e., each if liable for their share of the total). When defendant are jointly and severally liable, the 
plaintiff is not required to pursue each defendant severally but can obtain the whole judgment from any 
liable defendant who is then obligated to seek contribution from the other defendant(s). The decision in 
Hackworth- which requires the defendants to apportion their responsibility- operates in this system.
 . 
The plaintiff’s argument was that the death in this case was not apportionable- and that the 
plaintiff was able to recover the whole loss from either party. Can death ever be apportioned? 
 
The Idaho Legislature has substantially limited the common law of joint and several liability: 
 
I.C. § 6-803.  Contribution among joint tortfeasors - Declaration of right - 
Exception - Limited joint and several liability. 
 
(1) The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors, but a joint tortfeasor is not 
entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common 
liability or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof. 
(2) A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to 
recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not 
extinguished by the settlement. 
 
(3) The common law doctrine of joint and several liability is hereby limited to causes of 
action listed in subsection (5) of this section. In any action in which the trier of fact attributes the 
percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility to persons listed on a special verdict, the 
court shall enter a separate judgment against each party whose negligence or comparative 
responsibility exceeds the negligence or comparative responsibility attributed to the person 
recovering. The negligence or comparative responsibility of each such party is to be compared 
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individually to the negligence or comparative responsibility of the person recovering. Judgment 
against each such party shall be entered in an amount equal to each party's proportionate share 
of the total damages awarded. 
 
(4) As used herein, "joint tortfeasor'' means one (1) of two (2) or more persons jointly or 
severally liable intort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been 
recovered against all or some of them. 
 
(5) A party shall be jointly and severally liable for the fault of another person or entity or 
for payment of the proportionate share of another party where they were acting in concert or 
when a person was acting as an agent or servant of another party. As used in this section, "acting 
in concert" means pursuing a common plan or design which results in the commission of an 
intentional or reckless tortious act. 
 
       Would the statute have changed the result in Hackworth? Why/why not? The missing information that 
would allow you to answer this question is the development of comparative fault. 
 
 
GARCIA v. WINDLEY 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819 (2007) 
 
BURDICK, J: [On November 24, 2001, a car accident occurred when defendant Jay Windley's vehicle 
struck Maria Garcia's vehicle from behind. The jury found that Windley was negligent. At trial, Garcia 
argued that] before the accident she had spondylolysis (a weak or fractured pedicle on the back of her 
vertebra) making her susceptible to injury, that this is a benign condition unless something causes 
traumatic injury, and that the collision caused a teardrop fracture in Garcia's vertebra and traumatic 
spondylolis thesis (one vertebra actually slipping on top of the other). Windley argued the accident only 
caused a lumbar strain and that the teardrop fracture and spondylolis thesis preexisted the accident. 
2 Garda moved for a new trial on several grounds including the causation instruction ... The district court 
denied the motion for a new trial and held the causation instruction was not erroneous, did not mislead 
the jury, and that even if it were misleading there was no prejudice since the jury found Windley's 




Garcia argues ... that the jury instruction on proximate cause was erroneous and prejudiced 
Garcia in this case.... 
 
B. Jury Instruction 
 
Garcia argues that the proximate cause jury instruction was erroneous and prejudicial because 
this was a multiple cause case and thus a "substantial factor'' jury instruction should have been used 
rather than a "but for'' jury instruction. Windley argues that this is not a multiple cause case and that even 
if it were a "substantial factor'' instruction would not have been appropriate.... We analyze each issue 
below. 
 
Instruction No. 15, the proximate cause jury instruction stated: 
 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the 
damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. Itis sufficient if it is a substantial 
factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or 





There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contribute concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an 
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
(Emphasis added). 
 
In Idaho, the "but for'' test may be employed when there is a single possible cause of the injury; 
however, the "substantial factor'' test must be employed when there are multiple possible causes of injury, 
and the jury must be instructed accordingly. Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 288, 127 P.3d 187, 191 
(2005). "The 'but for' instruction and the 'substantial factor' instruction are mutually exclusive." Id. (quoting 
Le'Gall v. Lewis County, 129 Idaho 182, 187,923 P.2d 427, 432 (1996)). 
 
The jury instruction at issue here is identical to the jury instruction used for the proximate cause 
"but for'' test. IDJI 2.30.1.2 The first paragraph of the instruction used in this case is also identical to the 
jury instruction we reviewed in Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 Idaho 591, 818 P.2d 295 (1991).18 
 
In Fussell, the plaintiffs argued that a doctor committed medical malpractice resulting in the brain 
damage and death of their child. The Fussells asserted the doctor was negligent in that he:(1) artificially 
ruptured Mrs. Fussell's fetal membranes during delivery when the child was too high, thereby causing a 
prolapsed umbilical cord; and (2) mismanaged the delivery when the prolapsed umbilical cord was 
discovered. Fussell, 120 Idaho at 592, 818 P.2dat 296. The doctor submitted evidence to show that there 
was a nonnegligent cause for the child's brain damage and death for which he was not responsible-an 
occult (hidden) prolapsed umbilical cord. Id. at 593, 818 P.2d at 297. We held the Fussell jury instruction 
was erroneous as the jury could have concluded that the doctor's negligence was nota proximate cause 
because the brain damage and death of the child "would likely have occurred anyway." Id. We also noted 
that it was not appropriate for the trial court to use the bracketed portion of IDJI 2.30 referring to one or 
more proximate causes due to multiple negligent actors because neither party alleged any person other 
than the doctor was negligent. Id. at 593-94, 818 P.2d at 297-98. 
 
In Fussell, we concluded that because the evidence presented by the defense would have 
permitted a jury finding that two forces or causes caused the damage, the substantial factor 
instruction should read: 
 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the damage complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is 
sufficient if it is a substantial factor concurring with some other cause acting at the same time, 
which in combination with it, causes the damage. 
 
Id. at 595, 818 P.2d at 299. The suggested instruction omits any mention of "but for" and also omits the 
portion instructing that it is not a proximate cause if the damage "likely would have occurred anyway." 
 
This Court recently reaffirmed its position in Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 
P.3d 187 (2005). In that case, the trial court used the suggested substantial factor instruction found in 
Fussell.3 Id. at 287, 127 P.3d at 190. There, Newberry argued the loss of vision in his right eye was due 
to his doctor's negligence in failing to locate the metal shard in his eye and in failing to refer Newberry to a 
specialist. Id. at 288, 127 P.3d at 191. The doctor argued that the loss was caused by the presence of 
bacteria which had been introduced to the eye with the metal shard. Id. The doctor in Newberry 
contended that the trial court should have used a "but for'' instruction instead of a "substantial factor'' 
instruction because there was only one allegedly negligent cause of injury. Id. However, we held that the 
district court correctly determined that it was a multiple cause case since the plaintiff argued the doctor's 
negligence caused the injury and the defendant doctor argued the presence of bacteria caused the injury. 
Id. We rejected the doctor's arguments that the Fussell rule only applies when there are multiple 
                                                     
18 Note that in the Idaho Jury Instructions, the second paragraph is bracketed, indicating that it may be used in appropriate cases. 
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defendants and multiple potential acts of negligence. Id. at 289-90, 127 P.3d at 192-93. Instead, we held 
that policy supports the use of a "substantial factor'' instruction when there are multiple causes, even if 
there is only one potentially negligent defendant. Id. at 291, 127 P.3d at 194. Additionally, we held that 
the omission of the sentence instructing that there is no proximate cause if the injury "likely would have 
occurred anyway'' was appropriate. Id. at 288-89, 127 P.3d at 191-92.4 
 
Windley attempts to justify the jury instruction given on several grounds. First, Windley argues 
that Fussell and Newberry do not apply to the present case because those holdings are limited to medical 
malpractice cases. However, there is nothing to suggest the discussion surrounding a "substantial factor'' 
instruction in Fussell and Newberry was meant to apply only to medical malpractice cases. Both of those 
cases rely on cases outside the medical malpractice context.... Thus, we have previously determined a 
"substantial factor'' causation instruction is appropriate in non-medical malpractice cases, and we decline 
to now limit such an instruction to medical malpractice cases. 
 
Next, Windley argues that a "substantial factor" instruction would have been inappropriate 
because this was not a multiple cause case. Garcia contends that throughout Windley's presentation of 
his case, Windley asserted several possible additional causes of Garcia's injuries including the weather 
and that the spondylolis thesis preexisted the accident. First, weather cannot be considered a possible 
cause of the accident. Weather, in and of itself, did not cause the accident. The state of the weather goes 
to breach- either Windley was driving negligently in that weather or he was not. The parties to this action 
have continuously mixed and matched arguments concerning the cause of an injury and the cause of an 
accident. In this case there was one possible cause of the accident and two possible causes of the injury. 
In this opinion, we are discussing the cause of an injury. 
 
As to possible causes of the injury, Windley theorized that spondylolis thesis preexisted the 
accident.19 In Newberry, the defendant argued that the introduction of bacteria, which occurred prior to 
Newberry visiting the doctor, caused the loss of vision. We did not allow the doctor to "point to a second 
cause, independent of his negligence, and at the same time maintain that [it was] a single cause case." 
Newberry, 142 Idaho at 289, 127 P.3d at 192. Similarly, Windley has pointed to a second and 
nonnegligent cause of Garcia's damages - that spondylolis thesis developed prior to the accident. 
 
Thus, because this was a multiple cause case a "substantial factor" instruction and not a "but for" 
instruction should have been used. Jury Instruction No. 15 should not have included the phrase "but for," 
nor should it have included the statement that there is no proximate cause if the injury "likely would have 
occurred anyway." However, the erroneous instruction is reversible only if Garcia can show she was 
prejudiced. See Newberry, 142 Idaho at 287, 127 P.3d at 190. 
 
[After evaluating the prejudice issue, the court concluded] because this was a multiple cause 
case, because a "but for" instruction was given instead of a "substantial factor'' instruction, and because 
that erroneous instruction could have affected the outcome of the trial, we reverse and remand for a new 
trial. 
 
JUSTICES TROUT, EISMANN AND JONES, CONCUR. 
 
                                                     
19 In addition, the subsequent jury instruction, also appealed by the doctor in Newberry read: 
A cause can be a substantial contributing cause even though the injury, damage or loss would likely have occurred 
anyway without that contributing cause. A substantial cause need not be the sole factor, or even the primary factor in 
causing the plaintiffs injuries, but merely a substantial factor therein. 
Newberry, 142 Idaho at 287, 127 P.3d at 190. 
Thus, IDJI 2.30.2, the proximate cause "substantial factor'' instruction, which contains the sentence "V]t is not a proximate 
cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred 
an}'Way" is in conflict with Fussell and Newberry. 
Garcia argued that her preexisting condition of spondylolysis was aggravated by the accident to cause spondylolis thesis. 
Windley argued that Garcia had spondylolis thesis before the accident. Windley is correct that spondylolysis is not a cause of 
Garcia's damages that would make this a multiple cause case. However, Windley's argument that the damages resulting from 
Garcia's spondylolis thesis were caused by the preexisting condition of spondylolis thesis and not by the accident is an alleged 









(1)  What did the court hold? Must the "but for" test be used when there is a single possible cause of 
the injury? Must the "substantial factor" test be used when there are multiple possible causes? 
 
How would a trial court be required to instruct the jury if Henderson came to trial after the decision 
in Garcia? That is, was the case a single- or multiple-cause case? 
 
After Garcia, are "single-cause cases likely to be very uncommon? Is there ever a situation in 
which only one thing is the cause? Is that the issue? Consider these issues in the context of the following 
cases. 
 
(2)  Causation IDJIs (What's left?): What portions of IDJI 2.30.1-.2 did the court void? 
 
(3)  Breach not causation: Note the court's statement that "Weather, in and of itself, did not cause 
the accident. The state of the weather goes to breach - either Windley was driving negligently in that 
weather or he was not." 
 
(4)  Woodland v. Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irrigation Co.: Plaintiff sought to recover damages for loss 
of his hay crop caused by the flooding of his land. Defendant appeals a jury verdict: 
 
It is established by the evidence and admitted by the company that some water from its canals 
contributed toward the flow that overflowed Woodland's land and injured his hay. In defense it is 
contended by the company that the evidence does not show that the water wrongfully discharged 
from the canals, or laterals of its irrigation system, was sufficient by itself to overflow the channel 
of the creek through Woodland's land or cause any of the injury to his crops. But this is not a 
good defense, even though true, because where one contributes as an independent tort-feasor 
toward causing an injury, he will be liable for the injury done by him although his acts or 
negligence alone might not have caused any injury. In this case the evidence tends to prove that 
there were at least six sources from which the water came that injured Woodland's hay, and it is 
not contended by him that the company was responsible for more than one. And, while the 
evidence is very indefinite as to the relative and specific amount of water from each source, it is 
sufficient to show that considerable water from the company's canals wrongfully ran into the 
creek that overflowed its banks and flooded Woodland's property. And everyone who permits 
water to waste on to the land of others without right is liable for his proportionate share of the 
injury caused or the harm resulting therefrom, even though the water allowed to run down by 
each would do no harm if not combined with that of others, and the injury is caused by the 
combined flow wherein the waters of all are mixed and indistinguishable. If the injury follows as 
the combined result of the wrongful acts of several, acting independently, recovery may be had 
severally against each of such independent tort-feasors in proportion to the contribution of the 
injury. [] 
Woodland v. Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irrigation Co., 26 Idaho 789, 146 P.1106 (1915). If all of the other 
sources of water that contributed to the flooding of plaintiff’s hay were not traceable to human actions, 
would the defendant have been liable for the entire loss since that water would be like the weather in 
Garcia? 
 
(5)  Cause of the injury rather than cause of the accident: "In this case there was one possible 
cause of the accident and two possible causes of the injury." 13] Is it possible to have two causes of an 
accident and only one cause of the injury? Does the court's statement only apply to accidents? In 
Henderson, there were a large number of causes of the injury-- the court's "many variables." 
 
(6)  Woodland v. Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irrigation Co. (redux): If the other sources of water that 
flooded the plaintiff’s hay were not traceable to human actions, would the defendant be successful in 
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distinguishing Garcia by arguing that the water was in fact a cause of the injury unlike the weather in 
Garcia? 
 
(7)  In re Estate of Eliasen: Edgar and Lucille were having marital difficulties and Lucille moved out 
of their residence. Edgar responded by filing for divorce in July 1974. In September, Lucille came to the 
ranch and shot Edgar in the abdomen. Edgar had a stomach cancer for which he had been receiving 
chemotherapy. Although the chemotherapy had been effective in inhibiting the stomach cancer, it 
interfered with the healing of the abdominal wound and had to be discontinued for some time. Following 
Edgar's death on November 28, 1974, Lucille pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon. 
 
Edgar expressly disinherited Lucille and she challenged the will. The case thus required the court 
to construe Idaho's slayer statute, I.C. §15-2-803. The statute provided that "[n]o slayer shall in any way 
acquire any property or receive any benefit as a result of the death of the decedent" and defined "slayer" 
as "any person who participates, either as principal or as an accessory before the fact, in the willful and 
unlawful killing of any other person." If Lucille caused Edgar's death, she was not entitled to share in his 
estate; if she did not, she had been excluded unlawfully. 
 
A divided Idaho Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Shepard held that Lucille fell within the 
statute. Noting that Edgar had been responding well to chemotherapy prior to the shooting, 
 
[w]hile the chemotherapy treatment was withheld from the decedent, there was a rebound and 
rapid growth of the cancer, and the decedent remained hospitalized until his death on November 
28, 1974. Decedent's death certificate listed the primary cause of death as tumor cachexia, a 
terminal state of cancer .... 
 
The magistrate and the district court declined to apply the slayer's statute, on the grounds 
that the proximate cause of the decedent's death was cancer, not the gunshot wound inflicted by 
the appellant widow. We disagree. The clear and undisputed evidence supports the magistrate's 
finding that the gunshot wound hastened the decedent's death by weakening his physical 
condition and by interrupting his chemotherapy treatments, thus allowing the cancer, which had 
been controlled, to rebound and rapidly grow. We hold that the gunshot wound was a substantial 
factor and a proximate cause of the death of decedent, and therefore the slayer's statute applies 
to prevent Lucille Eliasen from inheriting from Edgar Eliasen's estate. 
 
In the instant case, the magistrate had before him the testimony of two doctors relating to 
the cause of decedent's death. One stated that the drastic change in decedent's condition was 
attributable to the gunshot wound and that the gunshot wound was a contributing cause of the 
decedents death .... 
 
The second doctor indicated that adenocarcinoma is one of the most difficult cancers to 
treat, and that the probability was ten per cent that the decedent would have lived one year from 
the time the cancer was diagnosed, but this doctor stated: 
 
"A. I believe that, from reviewing the records,that he would have died of the 
adenocarcinoma of the stomach in any event. I don't believe that the 
gunshot wound was either necessary or sufficient to explain his death. I 
do believe that it was a contributing factor, in the sense that it may have 
hastened his death by weeks because of its effect on his stomach and 
because of the fact that it necessitated a 2-week discontinuance of his 
chemotherapy." 
 
We hold that the magistrate's conclusion that the wound inflicted must necessarily have 
been the "direct cause" of death was erroneous. The fact that the gunshot wound was not the 
immediate cause of death is not controlling. One accused of homicide cannot escape liability 
merely because the wound he inflicted is not by itself mortal or the immediate cause of death. A 




and the one who inflicted such a wound has committed homicide. [] The gunshot wound involved 
here, by itself, was not fatal, since the wound had healed prior to the decedents death and death 
would not have occurred "but for'' the decedent's cancer. However, the medical testimony clearly 
indicates that, except for the wound, the decedent would have lived for a longer period of time, 
i.e., some weeks or some months. He may have lived a much longer period of time, and it is 
impossible to set a specific time framework. It is a certainty, however, that the decedent's death 
would not have occurred when it did, "but for" the gunshot wound. Hence, we hold that the 
gunshot wound caused the decedent's premature death. 
 
  It is a universally accepted rule that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him and will 
be held responsible for the full extent of the injury, even though a latent susceptibility of the victim 
renders his injury far more serious than reasonably could have been anticipated. [] Equally well 
established but less familiar is the principle that one whose wrongful conduct forwards a diseased 
condition and thereby hastens and prematurely causes death cannot escape responsibility, 
although the disease probably would have resulted in death at a later time. Thus, an act which 
accelerates death, causes death, according to both civil and criminal law. [] 
       
Justice McFadden, with Bistline, dissented: 
 
Decedent's death certificate was properly admitted into evidence. Under cause of death, 
disease or condition directly leading to death is written, "Tumor cachexia." Under antecedent 
causes is written, "Metatastic Cancer of stomach adenocarcinoma of stomach" and under "other 
significant conditions" is written, "bullet wound of stomach." 
 
.... I.C. § 39-263 provides: 
 
"Evidentiary character of records and copies of records- Any certificate filed in 
accordance with the provisions of this act and the regulations prescribed by the board, or 
any copy of such records or part thereof, duly certified by the state registrar, shall be 
prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein." 
 
The death certificate being admitted into evidence, [], the burden was on the estate to 
prove that decedent did not die of the condition listed on the certificate but rather from the 
gunshot wound. The evidence supports the conclusion of the trial court and the district court... 
Proximate cause has been defined as the "cause without which the result would not have 
occurred,"[]; and "[b]y proximate cause is meant a direct cause, that is, a cause which, by direct 
and natural sequence, produced the death in question. To say it differently, the proximate cause 
of a thing is that cause which produces it and without which it would not have happened." 
Decedent was dying of cancer at the time of the gunshot and while it may have hastened his 
death by a matter of weeks, the testimony supports the lower courts' conclusion that the gunshot 
wound was not the proximate cause of his death. Because the gunshot wound was not the 
proximate cause of decedent's death, the slayer's statute is inapplicable. Findings of fact 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, though conflicting, will not be disturbed on 
appeal. [] 
In re Estate of Eliasen, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110 (1983). 
 
Does the dissent argue that Lucille's conduct did not hasten Edgar's death? Or does it merely 
disagree with the plurality on the legal significance of the results of her conduct? Does the dissent's 
argument suggest the problems associated with any attempt to find a single "sufficient" or "proximate" 
cause in a world where everything is intimately connected? 
 
(8)  Munson v. Department of Highways: What is the relationship between causation and 
comparative responsibility? Plaintiffs decedent was the owner of a van being driven by a third party. The 
van struck a pickup truck which had stopped for highway repairs and the decedent was killed. The state 
highway repair crew had failed to set out the required warning sign, a breach of a statutory duty upon 
which the plaintiff predicated her case. 
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Plaintiff appealed a summary judgment; the court began its analysis by setting forth the 
conditions under which the accident occurred: 
 
[T]he record discloses that the conditions of the accident were as follows: the Ostergar 
van, driven by Gooch, approached the work site on a dry highway, with one-quarter to one-half 
mile of clear visibility as a result of the full daylight; the pickup truck with which the van collided 
had been stopped by a highway crew flagman wearing a fluorescent red vest and holding a red 
paddle-type stop sign; the flagman was standing near the pickup; Mansfield ... had failed to move 
the warning signs up the highway as he told a co-worker he would do; the Ostergar van collided 
with the rear of the stopped pickup truck, throwing that vehicle approximately 285 feet into the 
sagebrush beside the road; there is no evidence that the van either slowed down or swerved prior 
to the collision. 
 
Within that factual framework the plaintiffs allege that Mansfield's conduct constituted a 
negligent act resulting in Ostergar's death. The analysis of a negligence question requires 
consideration of both factual cause and legal cause of the injury. Henderson v. Cominco 
American, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 518 P.2d 873 (1973). As the Court stated in Henderson, "*** 
proximate [legal] cause focuses upon legal policy in terms of whether responsibility will be 
extended to the consequences of conduct which has occurred. *** [while] actual cause *** is a 
factual question focusing on the antecedent factors producing a particular consequence." The 
relationship is well explained by Professor Green as, "It is the defendant's conduct (actual cause) 
that inflicts the hurt, but it is the law (legal cause) that makes his conduct negligent." Green, The 
Causal Relation Issue, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 551. Thus, the threshold question of negligence 
analysis is whether the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the 
injury suffered by the plaintiff. 
 
Although the determination of the factual cause of an injury is normally left to a jury, the 
court may perform that function as a matter of law when the undisputed facts can lead to only one 
reasonable conclusion .... We believe this to be such a situation. The record does not support a 
contention that the conduct of Mansfield was a factor in the death of Ostergar. 
 
The driver of an automobile is held to have notice of that which is plainly visible on the 
highway before him. Yearout v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 82 Idaho 466, 354 
P.2d 769 (1960); Whiffen v. Union Pacific R.R., 60 Idaho 141, 89 P.2d 540 (1939). The repair site 
was identifiable by the flagman, the pickup truck, the various vehicles of the repair crew, and the 
members of the crew. All this was clearly visible from a considerable distance. The Ostergar van 
drove directly into the parked pickup truck. To find that Mansfield's failure to erect yellow, four-
foot by four-foot warning signs was an actual cause of Ostergar's death would require a finding 
that those signs would have provided more notice of the blocked highway than did the obvious 
blockage itself. This we cannot do. Therefore, we find that Mansfield's conduct was not an actual 
cause of Ostergar's injury. (] 
 
Justice Bakes concurred specially on the ground that the trial court had been correct in imputing 
the negligence of the driver of the vehicle to the owner of the vehicle under §49-1404(1): 
 
However, it is necessary to comment on certain statements expressed in the majority 
opinion with which I strongly disagree. The majority opinion, while assuming that the defendants 
were negligent for failure to properly put up warning signs, nevertheless concludes that "[t]o find 
that Mansfield's failure to erect yellow, four-foot by four-foot warning signs, was an actual cause 
of Ostergar's death would require a finding that those signs would have provided more notice of 
the blocked highway than did not obvious blockage itself. This we cannot do." By weighing the 
evidence and deciding that a vehicle stopped in the roadway at a construction site necessarily 
provides more notice of the need to stop than would appropriately placed warning signs farther 
down the road, and majority has invaded the province of the jury and usurped their factfinding 




more notice of the blocked highway than did the blockage itself, the jury, not the trial court upon 
motion for summary judgment or this Court upon appeal, should decide that issue of fact. Itis the 
jury's responsibility to determine if there was negligence and, if so, whether that negligence 
actually caused the injuries involved. 
 
Aside from my objections concerning the usurpation of the jurors' traditional functions, it 
further believe the quoted language displays a lack of understanding of the concept of causation 
in negligence actions. The majority opinion states, "To find that Mansfield's failure to erect yellow, 
four-foot by four-foot warning signs, was an actual cause of Ostergar's death would require a 
finding that those signs would have provided more notice of the blocked highway than did the 
obvious blockage itself. This we cannot do." What that phrase says is that negligence, in order to 
be actionable, must constitute more than 50% of the proximate cause of the accident. I don't 
understand that to be the law. The majority earlier said that negligence is an actual cause of an 
injury when it is a substantial factor in bringing the injury about. This latter statement is accurate. 
[] But taking the two statements together, the majority is saying that negligence is not a 
substantial factor unless it is more than 50% of the cause of the accident. I know of no authority 
supporting that position, and the majority has cited none. In any event, such a finding is an 
invasion of the province of the jury to find the facts. As stated in PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS at 
240: 
 
The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material element and a 
substantial factor in bringing it about. Whether it was such a substantial factor is for the 
jury to determine, unless the issue is so clear that reasonable men could not differ. It has 
been considered that "substantial factor" is a phrase sufficiently intelligible to the layman 
to furnish an adequate guide in instructions to the jury, and that it is neither possible nor 
desirable to reduce it to any lower terms. As applied to the fact of causation alone, no 
better test has been devised. 
 
The plaintiff has shown sufficient facts from which reasonable men could conclude that 
there were two independent negligent acts, both of which were an actual cause of the accident. 
The first was the failure of the contractor to erect the appropriate signs, and the second was the 
negligence of the driver of the Ostergar vehicle in which the plaintiffs' decedent, Mr. Ostergar, 
was riding. Had there been a third party who was injured by the collision, such as an occupant of 
the car which the Ostergar vehicle struck, the third party should certainly be able to proceed 
against either or both of these negligent joint tortfeasors, the driver or the contractor, and should 
be able to collect damages from either of them. However, the majority, in order to maintain 
consistency, would still have to say that the signs would not have provided any more notice than 
the third party's car, and therefore hold that the negligence of the contractor in failing to put out 
the signs was not an actual cause of the accident. Thus, a third party would have no right of 
recovery against the contractor, one of the joint tortfeasors. Merely because the majority feels 
that the driver's negligence contributed to the accident to a greater extent than the contractor's 
negligence does not mean the contractor's negligence could not be a cause of the accident. Yet 
this is the effect of the majority opinion, and if it becomes the law it would rewrite the law of joint 
tortfeasors and set dangerous precedent for the developing law of comparative negligence. 
Munson v. State Department of Highways, 96 Idaho 529,531 P.2d 1174 (1975). Cf. Garrett Freightlines, 
Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 735 P.2d 1033 (1987). 
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(1)  Restatement (Third) and scope of liability: Recall the basic standard for evaluating whether the 
harm that occurred was within the scope of liability of the actor: 
 
§29. Limitations on Liability for Tortious Conduct 
 
An actor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's 
conduct tortious. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS§  29 (2010). 
 
(2)  Restatement (Third) and unforeseeable harm: 
 
§31. Preexisting Conditions and Unforeseeable Harm 
 
When an actor's tortious conduct causes harm to a person that, because of a preexisting 
physical or mental condition or other characteristics of the person, is of a greater magnitude or 
different type than might reasonably be expected, the actor is nevertheless subject to liability for 
all such harm to the person. 
RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS§ 31 (2010). 
 
(3)  Jones v. City of Caldwell: Plaintiff was injured when she stepped on a broken board in the 
sidewalk and fell. Following the fall, she suffered severe abdominal pain and eventually underwent an 
operation. The surgeon discovered that her fallopian tubes were inflamed, and they were removed. The 
defendant city presented no evidence to contest plaintiff's claim on the cause on the fall. It did, however, 
argue that it should not be responsible for the injury to plaintiff's reproductive organs: 
 
The action of the court in refusing to give the following instruction requested by the 
plaintiff is assigned as error: "If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff was caused to fall by a 
defect in the sidewalk negligently permitted to exist by the defendant, the defendant is 
responsible for all ill-effects which naturally and necessarily follow the injury in the condition of 
health in which plaintiff then was at the time of such fall, and it is no defense that such injury may 
have been aggravated and rendered more difficult to cure by reason of plaintiff's state of health at 
that time, or that by reason of latent disease the injuries were rendered more difficulty to cure by 
reason of plaintiff's state of health at that time, or that by reason of latent diseases the injuries 
were rendered more serious to her than they would have been to a person in robust health." 
 
That instruction contains a correct statement of the law upon the subject there involved, 
and upon the evidence introduced on the trial the instruction should have been given. A person or 
corporation has no more right to negligently inflict injuries upon a sick person than upon a well 
person, and the existence of latent disease brought into activity by a fall or other injury would not 
constitute a defense to an action to recover damages for such injuries. Dr. Stewart testified that 
the plaintiff might have been suffering from latent infection which, however, would be likely never 
to break into activity or cause any discomfort or illness or pain except for a violent fall or similar 
accident. If that be true, in this case the proximate cause of the pain, discomfort and suffering 
from such latent disease would be the fall and not the latent condition. If the latent condition itself 
did not case pain, suffering, etc., but such condition plus the fall caused such pain, the fall and 
not the latent condition is the proximate cause. 
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Jones v. Caldwell, 20 Idaho 5, 116 P.110 (1911). 
 
Recall the decision of the court of appeals in White v. University of Idaho, 115 Idaho 564, 768 
P.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1989) [Chapter I]in which plaintiff was seriously injured by a light tap on the shoulder. 
Are the cases distinguishable? What is "unexpected harm"? 
 
(4)  Hayhurst v. Boyd Hospital: Plaintiff was in a hospital convalescing from typhoid fever. The 
nurse placed him in a chair before an open window. He subsequently developed pneumonia. Defendant 
argued that: 
 
the evidence does not show that the acts of defendant were the proximate cause of plaintiff's 
subsequent ailments, but rather shows that the proximate cause was the previous existence in 
his body of the germs which cause pneumonia; arguing that although the germs might not have 
developed except for plaintiff's exposure, he was prior to such exposure being attacked by the 
pneumonia germs, and that the negligence, if any, merely created a condition under which the 
pneumonia developed. He cites in this connection cases wherein injuries to a plaintiff due to a 
defendant's negligence so weakened the plaintiff that he became more readily a prey to a 
disease subsequently contracted. The cases cited properly apply the rule as to an independent 
intervening cause which would not ordinarily be anticipated as the result of the negligent acts 
complained of and are not applicable here. This case is rather within the rule that the negligent 
acts producing an injury are actionable, even though in themselves they would not have produced 
the injury, had the physical condition of the plaintiff not been in such condition as to render him 
susceptible to such injury. 
Hayhurst v. Boyd Hospital, 43 Idaho 661, 254 P. 528 (1927). 
 
(5)  Linder v. City of Payette: Lloyd Linder was injured in an accident on March 31, 1941, that broke 
his left arm. On June 14, 1941, with 
 
his left arm still in plaster cast weighing about eight pounds and extending from the shoulder to 
the fingers, holding the elbow rigid, the forearm at right angles to the upper arm, Linder with a 
companion in a small boat was fishing in Sage Hen Reservoir. The companion, sitting in the 
stem, caught a fish; Linder raised up from the bow to assist in landing the fish; the prow went 
straight up in the air, and the boat turned over backwards, precipitating both into the water. The 
companion was rescued. Linder's body was later recovered. No autopsy was performed, and 
there is no direct evidence as to the exact cause of death. Appellant and respondent, however, 
evidently agreed he was drowned, have so stated, the board has so found, and it was so 
pronounced, though perhaps prematurely, in the previous opinion. 
 
On such assumption appellant urges the original accident was the proximate cause of the 
death because the cast on Linder's arm interfered with his efforts to save himself by swimming or 
holding on to the boat and misled rescuers into thinking he had a life preserver, wherefore they 
successfully assisted his companion first. 
  … 
We accept as correct appellant's proposition of law that the definition and determination 
of "proximate cause" in the field of torts is applicable herein. A recognized concomitant is that if 
there occurs, after the initial accident and injury, an intervening, independent, responsible, and 
culminating cause, the latter occurrence becomes the proximate cause. 
 
"The proximate cause of an event must be understood to be that which in a natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by a new cause, produces that event and without which that 
event would not have occurred." Pilmer v. Boise Traction Co., 14 Idaho 327,94 P. 432 (1908). 
 
''The law regards the one as the proximate cause of the other, without regard to the lapse 
of time where no other cause intervenes or comes between the negligence [initial injury] charged 




between the alleged negligence [first accident and injury] and the injuries [death]." Antler v. Cox, 
27 Idaho 517, at527, 149 P. 731 (1915)). 
 
It must be clearly kept in mind that the essential causal connection which must not be 
broken is, not that between the concededly compensable accident and the direct injury therefrom, 
Brink v. H. Earl Clack Co., 60 Idaho 730, 96 P.2d 500 (1939), but between the initial accident and 
injury and a subsequent and otherwise disconnected injury having no relationship whatever to 
decedent's employment. 
 
While the facts are not in dispute, difference inferences might be drawn therefrom as to 
what actually caused Linder's death and what was the proximate cause. The judgment for 
defendant was therefore affirmed.  
Linder v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 656, 135 P.2d 440 (1943). 
 
(6)  Burkland v. Oregon Short Line R.R.: Plaintiff was a fireman on one of defendant's locomotives. 
As the train approached a grade crossing, plaintiff notice9 a gasoline truck pulling a tank trailer about to 
cross the track. He yelled to the engineer to stop the train. The engineer did not respond. When the train 
struck the tank, it ruptured and enveloped the locomotive in a ball of flames. The engineer died of his 
injuries and plaintiff was severely burned. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that defendant was 
only liable for the consequence 
 
which ordinarily follows an act, "the result of which may reasonably be anticipated"; and again 
they were told that "proximate causes are such as are the ordinary and natural result of the 
omission or negligence complained of' and such only as "are usual and might have been 
reasonably expected to occur," and not the "result of which could not be reasonably anticipated." 
These definitions taken in connection with the other statements contained in this instruction were 
calculated and most likely to lead a jury of laymen to the belief that unless the engineer saw the 
trailer on the track or had reason to know, or was informed, that it was on the track, and that he 
could have reasonably foreseen that the collision would result in bursting the tank and spraying 
the locomotive with gasoline and burning the plaintiff, the company would not be liable. If so 
construed and understood by the jury, the instruction would be erroneous and extremely 
prejudicial to the plaintiff. He might not have recognized the trailer as a gasoline tank; he could 
not know whether it was empty or loaded nor could he foresee that a collision would burst the 
tank or that the contents of the tank would ignite and envelop the locomotive, burning himself and 
the fireman. The law does not require such an exact foresight into probable results before holding 
one responsible in whole or in part for the results of an act of negligence. 
 
The true rule, as we understand it, does not require that the defendant must have been 
able to foresee the precise injury which in fact resulted from the accident, or the particular, 
injurious result which might be inflicted upon person or property as the result thereof; on the other 
hand the Jaw only requires that he shall be able to understand and appreciate that the results of 
some kind of injurious nature may reasonably be anticipated from the negligent act of omission or 
commission . 
Burkland v. Oregon Short Une R.R., 56 Idaho 703, 58 P.2d 773 (1936). 
 
(6) The Magic Circle: Prosser offers a description of the result in these cases: 
 
It is as if a magic circle were drawn about the person, and one who breaks it, even by so much as 
a cut on the finger, becomes liable for all resulting harm to the person, although it may be death. 
W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON TORTS 291 (5th ed. 1984). 
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(1) Restatement (Third) and unexpected acts: 
 
§34. Intervening Acts and Superseding Causes 
 
When a force of nature or an independent act is also a factual cause of harm, an actor's 
liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious. 
RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS § 34 (2010). 
 
 
DEWEY v. KELLER 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
86 Idaho 506, 388 P.2d 988 (1964) 
 
McFADDEN, J. Plaintiff Norma Dewey is the mother and guardian ad litem of the minor plaintiffs, and the 
widow of John C. Dewey, who died from injuries received in an automobile accident December 11,1957. 
This action was brought by Mrs. Dewey, seeking compensation for her loss and the loss of her children 
occasioned by Mr. Dewey's death. Her complaint charges negligence on the part of defendant Roy Keller 
in parking a house on a public highway during hours of darkness, without any lights, flares or other 
warning signals; the complaint also alleges defendant Robert Worley was a deputy sheriff of defendant 
Gem County, and that he was negligent in signaling traffic around the parked house, and in failing to 
place, or cause to be placed, lights or other devices to warn of the obstruction, and that the county is 
responsible for his negligence.... The answers of the respective defendants generally denied the charges 
of negligence and asserted contributory negligence on the part of Mr. Dewey as the proximate cause of 
the accident. 
 
Defendant Keller on December 11, 1957, was moving a 60foot house, sitting on dollies, easterly 
on Highway 52toward Emmett, Idaho. The tractor pulling the house broke down, leaving the house on the 
highway, totally blocking the south lane of the highway, and obstructing the north lane to the extent of 
about four and a half feet. Keller, in moving the house, had a truck acting as a "pilot car" to warn 
oncoming traffic of the obstruction, which truck was being driven by one Mary E. Heil, now Mary Keller. 
Keller replaced the broken-down tractor with a smaller one being carried on the truck. Before he could 
move the house, it was necessary to fill the radiator of the smaller tractor. Keller left Mrs. Keller to guide 
traffic around the house while he went for water. For that purpose, she was using a flashlight, it being 
dark or dusk at the time. 
 
About 6:00o'clock, p.m., Deputy Sheriff Worley, in response to a call, went to the scene, 
expecting to find a house in the process of being moved, but instead found the house stopped on the 
highway. When he arrived at about 6:10p.m., Keller had not yet returned, and Worley took charge. Keller 
returned shortly. Finding there were no flares, reflectors or warning devices in either the truck or the 
tractors, and having none in his own vehicle, Worley then radioed for assistance and the necessary 
equipment. Keller desired to move the house further down the highway, but Worley refused to permit him 
to do so. Keller upon his return to the house left his truck, facing the east, in front of the house; Worley 
placed his vehicle 75 to 100 feet east of the house, with lights focused on the house, and with the red 
flashing light of his vehicle burning. Worley directed Mrs. Keller to tum the truck lights off to avoid blinding 
drivers approaching the house from the east. Worley, using a flashlight to warn traffic, stood in the 
highway so he could observe traffic from both directions. Mrs. Keller also stood in the highway with her 
flashlight. 




In the meantime, decedent John C. Dewey, who resided some miles further west from Emmett, 
left his home in his Ford vehicle, accompanied by Stanley Harwell. They were going easterly toward 
Emmett in response to a relative's call concerning an injured child. As they approached the house, which, 
unknown to them, was blocking their lane of traffic, they observed a flashlight on the left side of the 
highway. Harwell stated he and Dewey figured someone might be having tire trouble. Shortly after they 
passed the flashlight, Harwell told Dewey, "There is a house!" The brakes were applied, but the car did 
not stop in time to avoid hitting the house, severely injuring Harwell, and fatally injuring Dewey. Worley 
and Mrs. Keller, at the time, were some 75 to 100 feet to the west of the house and had been signaling 
the Dewey car with the flashlights. It was totally dark at the time of the accident, and there were no flares, 
reflectors, or other warning devices indicating the presence of the obstruction. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of all the defendants, on which judgment was entered. It is 
from this judgment that the appeal was taken by the plaintiffs. 
 
Plaintiffs attack instruction no. 16. This instruction dealt with an issue presented by the answers 
of the respective defendants, Keller and Worley. Keller asserted that any negligence on his part had been 
superseded by the negligence of Worley when he took charge of the hazard on the highway. The 
instruction dealt with the issue of proximate cause of the accident and advised the jury among other 
things that if they should find from a preponderance of the evidence that Worley's acts were such as to 
break the causal connection of Keller's acts so that Keller's acts were not a proximate cause of the 
accident, they should find for Keller. 
 
It is difficult to see where prejudicial error arose from the giving of this instruction. Under the 
issues presented by the respective parties' pleadings, it was essential to give such an instruction. It was 
for the jury to determine whether after the initial negligence of Keller there was a totally unanticipated, 
intervening and superseding cause which in fact became the proximate cause of the accident, and 
whether the antecedent negligence of Keller was therefore not the proximate cause or a contributing 
proximate cause of the accident. Chatterton v. Pocatello Post, 70 ldaho 480,223P.2d389(1950); Clark v. 
Chrishop, 72 Idaho 340,241 P.2d 171 (1952); Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420, 354 P.2d 172(1960); []. 
Under the principles as announced by this court, before an intervening superseding cause of an accident 
can become the sole proximate cause of the injury, and thus relieve the first negligent wrongdoer of 
liability, such subsequent cause must have been unforeseen, unanticipated and not a probable 
consequence of the original negligence. Chatterton v. Pocatello Post and Smith v. Sharp. The 
intervention of a third person's negligence or of other and new direct causes of injury does not preclude 
recovery against the original negligent actor if the injury was the natural or probable result of the original 
wrong. Carron v. Guido, 54 Idaho 494, 33 P.2d 345 (1934). 
 
In Scrivner v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 46 Idaho 334, 268 P. 19(1928), it was held that a 
subsequent independent act of negligence does not displace a former one as the proximate cause of an 
injury where the succeeding act is so connected with the first in time and nature as to make it plain that 
the damage was the natural and probable consequence of the original wrongful act or omission. 
 
Having determined that this cause must be remanded for new trial, we deem it proper to point 
out, [], that in giving of an instruction on the principles covered by instruction no. 16, the jury should be 
advised that before Keller could be exonerated by any acts of Worley, those subsequent acts must not 
have been reasonably foreseeable at the time of Keller's initial conduct, nor a natural or probable 
consequence of Keller's misconduct. The question of foreseeability and natural or probable consequence 
is a question of fact for the jury to determine. Care must also be taken that the jury is not misled into 
believing that only the acts of one person could be considered in resolving the problem of the proximate 
cause of the injuries; nor misled into believing that the combined acts of two or more persons could not 
both be considered as proximate causes of the injuries. 
 
 
KNUDSON, C.J., AND McQUADE, TAYLOR, & SMITH, JJ., concur. 
 




(1)  What standard did the court approve to give the issue to the jury? What does this standard 
require the jury to determine? 
 
Was Roy Keller's conduct a cause in fact of John Dewey's death? What was the risk that made 
Keller's conduct a breach of Keller's duty to act with due care? Was the harm that befell Dewey within the 




LUNDY v. HAZEN 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
90 Idaho 323,411 P.2d 768 (1966) 
 
SMITH, J. -This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing an action brought by appellants 
against respondent for recovery of damages which Franklin Lundy, a minor, sustained June 27, 1963, on 
account of personal injuries, together with medical and hospital expenses. The boy was playing with a 22-
caliber cylinder type pistol loaded with a single shell, when the pistol discharged, the bullet wounding him 
in the face with resultant residual scars. 
 
Appellants, at the time of the accident, maintained their home in Kimberly, Idaho, with their two 
children, Franklin, 13 years old, and Julie, 15 years old. Appellant Arch Lundy was a forest service 
employee. The parents, on June 1st, moved to a ranger station about 31 miles distant from Kimberly. 
Mrs. Lundy traveled back and forth from the station to the home sometimes 3 or 4 times a week, returning 
to the station at night. The children worked in the beet fields. Mrs. Lundy kept in close touch with the 
children both personally and by telephone. 
 
For some time prior to the accident Franklin had in his possession a 22-rifle loaned to him by a 
relative. Esther Lundy, in her deposition, stated that the boy was allowed to go hunting with the rifle and 
was permitted to purchase ammunition for it. He had had instruction in the use of the gun. Mrs. Lundy 
considered him to be a careful boy. 
 
On June 27, 1963, Franklin, accompanied by his sister, went to a sporting goods store in Twin 
Falls, owned by respondent, for the purpose of buying a pistol with moneys he had earned. The sister 
advised her brother to consult his father before purchasing the gun. Respondent, without requesting 
written parental consent, sold the pistol to Franklin. His parents had not given their consent, either orally 
or inwriting, to the purchase, although the boy's mother knew of the boy's desire to acquire the pistol. 
 
The evening of June 27th, Julie telephoned her mother. Mrs. Lundy, in her deposition, stated that 
during the conversation, she first learned about her son's purchase of the pistol. Earlier that day, when 
she visited the children at the home, Franklin told his mother of his desire to obtain the pistol. Mrs. Lundy 
then stated, "I asked him not to, to talk to his dad first, and he said, well, he had the money, and I 
excused it at that, because I figured the man wouldn't sell it to him because he wasn't old enough." She 
then stated that she did not tell Julie, the daughter, to take the pistol away from Franklin, but consented to 
the boy keeping it "for the time being, because she ''figured he would handle it with care and keep it put 
up. She didn't remember whether she told her husband that Franklin had the pistol; later she stated that 
on June 28, 1963, after the accident, she told the boy's father that the boy had purchased the gun. The 
father, Arch Lundy, in his deposition, stated that the pistol was bought without his consent or knowledge. 
 
The afternoon of June 28, 1963, after purchasing ammunition, Franklin returned home; after 
"restacking" the ammunition in its box, he had one cartridge left over which he inserted in the pistol. Later, 
he was "playing" with the pistol, snapping its hammer and trigger mechanism; the cartridge discharged 
and the bullet caused the boy to suffer sundry wounds in his face, neck and mouth. 
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Esther Lundy, in answer to an interrogatory, stated that on the evening the gun was purchased, 
the automobile which she used in going to and from the ranger station and her home was not capable of 
making the trip. 
 
The trial court, upon hearing respondent's motion for summary judgment, dismissed the action, 
and from the resulting judgment appellants have appealed. 
 
Appellants contend that respondent’s act of selling the pistol to Franklin Lundy, a minor under the 
age of 16years, without the child having presented the written consent of his parents to the purchase of 
the gun, was in violation of l.C. § 18-3308, and that such act was the proximate cause of the child's injury. 
I.C. § 18-3308, reads in part as follows: 
 
No person, firm, association or corporation shall sell or give to any minor under the age of sixteen 
years *** any firearms of any description, without the written consent of the parents or guardian of 
such minor first had and obtained. Any person, firm, association or corporation violating any of 
the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, **** 
 
I.C.  §18-3308 enunciates a positive prohibition of the act committed by respondent, i.e., the sale of a 
firearm to Franklin Lundy, a minor then of the age of 13 years, without the written consent of his parents. 
Carron v. Guido, 54 Idaho 494, 33 P.2d 345 (1934). 
 
Respondent, while admitting that violation of I.C. §18-3308 constitutes negligence per se, 
nevertheless contends that no liability attaches to the seller of the firearm unless the illegal sale is the 
proximate cause of the injury. 
 
While the act complained of is negligence per se, that alone is not sufficient to render respondent 
liable. For one to be liable for his negligent act, it must be shown that the act was the proximate cause of 
the injury. Dewey v. Keller, 86 Idaho 506, 388 P.2d 988 (1964); Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420, 354 P.2d 
172 (1960); Clark v. Chrishop, 72 Idaho 340, 241 P.2d 171 (1952); Carron v. Guido. 
 
In Chatterton v. Pocatello Post, 70 Idaho 480, 223 P.2d 389 (1950), this court stated: "The breach 
of duty to be actionable must be the proximate cause of the injury complained of, that is, the cause which 
in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause produces the result, and 
without which the result would not have occurred." 
 
Respondent asserts however, that the minor's mother acquiesced in and consented to her son's 
possession of the pistol and thereby she assumed control over its use prior to the injury, thereby 
constituting an independent intervening cause sufficient of itself to be the proximate cause of the injury; 
that from the point of assumption of parental consent, the seller's negligence no longer was the proximate 
cause of the injury. 
 
Respondent shows that appellant Esther Lundy had notice or knowledge of the fact that Franklin 
had purchased the pistol and asserts that by not ordering it taken away from her son, she consented to 
his possession of the same; that such parental consent and failure to take steps to have the gun taken 
from Franklin, constituted an intervening or superseding cause of the boy's injury, which relieved 
respondent of liability for harm resulting from the sale of the firearm. 
 
In Smith v. Sharp, this Court, quoting from Restatement Torts adopted the definition of an 
efficient, intervening cause or superseding cause, comment thereon, and considerations to be regarded 
in determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause of the injury. We quote almost 
identical language from Restatement Torts 2d, as follows: 
 
A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention 
prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a 
substantial factor in bringing about. 
Comment 
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*** 
b. A superseding cause relieves the actor from liability, irrespective of whether his 
antecedent negligence was or was not a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Therefore, 
if in looking back from the harm and tracing the sequence of events by which it was produced, it 
is found that a superseding cause has operated, there is no need of determining whether the 
actor's antecedent conduct was or was nota substantial factor in bringing about the harm. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440. 
 
The following considerations are of importance in determining whether an intervening force is a 
superseding cause of harm to another: 
*** 
 (b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be 
extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its operation; 
 
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created 
by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a situation; 
 
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or to 
his failure to act; 
 
(e) the fact that-the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is wrongful 
toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him; 
 
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening 
force in motion." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442. 
 
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent 
manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's negligent conduct is a 
substantial factor in bringing about, if 
 
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so 
act, or 
 
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done 
would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or 
 
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct and 
the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent." 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447. 
 
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm 
to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situation which 
afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the 
time of his negligent conduct realized, or should have realized, the likelihood that such a situation 
might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a 
tort or crime. 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §448. 
 
In Dewey v. Keller, speaking of foreseeability of an intervening cause, this Court said: 
*** Under the principles as announced by this court, before an intervening superseding cause of 
an accident can become the sole proximate cause of the injury, and thus relieve the first negligent 
wrongdoer of liability, such subsequent cause must have been unforeseen, unanticipated and not 
a probable consequence of the original negligence. [] The intervention of a third person's 
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negligence or of other and new direct causes of injury does not preclude recovery against the 
original negligent actor if the injury was the natural or probable result of the original wrong. [] 
 
This court has not ruled on the question of parental consent as being an efficient, intervening 
cause such as to relieve a seller of a firearm of liability for harm resulting from allowing a child to gain 
possession of a gun. The few cases decided in other jurisdictions indicate that where the negligent acts of 
a third person have permitted a child to come into possession of dangerous explosives or firearms with 
resultant injury, and the parent or parents became cognizant of the situation but permitted the child to 
retain possession, the parents' acts have been deemed to be an intervening cause sufficient to relieve the 
third party of liability. [] 
 
Although Mrs. Lundy, in her deposition, stated that she knew of the boy's desire to purchase the 
pistol, nevertheless she deferred to the boy's father in the matter of consent. She told the boy to talk to his 
father first. Julie, the sister, expressed herself to the same effect when Franklin was looking at the pistol 
in respondent's store, her testimony being as follows: 
 
Well, we went in the store and Skip [Franklin]was looking at this 22, and, as I said before, I told 
Skip to wait and talk to dad, and Skip didn't say anything, and I says, "Well, put some money on 
it, you know, so you will have it," and Mr. Hazen [respondent said something to the effect that 
"you better buy it now, this kind goes fast," or something like that. I don't remember his exact 
words, and Skip said he would rather buy it now. 
 
The conversations to which Julie referred in the foregoing testimony are shown to have 
taken place in the presence of respondent; nevertheless, though respondent was put on notice by the 
conversation, he urged and induced the boy to purchase the gun. 
 
The affidavit of appellant Arch Lundy shows that not only was the pistol purchased without his 
consent or knowledge, and against his wishes, but that he did not know that his son had the gun until 
after the accident, and that he had not at any time consented that his son have a pistol; also, that he had 
lectured the boy about having such a firearm and told him that it was dangerous for children to play with 
pistols. 
 
The record, as it relates to the conduct of Mrs. Lundy, cannot be interpreted as clearly showing 
that she gave her "consent" to respondent's sale of the pistol to Franklin. Whether she did consent and if 
so, whether such consent constituted an intervening superseding cause which insulated respondent from 
his antecedent negligence as the proximate cause of the boy's injury, would be questions of fact for 
determination by the finder of the facts. The conduct of Mrs. Lundy, if it constituted "consent," must be 
considered in the light of Restatement Torts 2d §442(c), as to whether the asserted intervening force, i.e., 
Mrs. Lundy's conduct, operated independently of any situation created by respondent’s negligence, "or, 
on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a situation"; also, in the light of Restatement Torts 
2d §  447, that the asserted intervening negligent act of Mrs. Lundy does not make it a superseding cause 
of harm to the boy which respondent's negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about, if 
 
(a)  respondent, at the time of his negligent conduct, should have realized that Mrs. Lundy 
might so act, or 
 
(b)  a reasonable man, knowing the situation existing when Mrs. Lundy so acted, would not 
regard it as highly extraordinary that she so acted, or 
 
(c)  the asserted intervening act on the part of Mrs. Lundy was a normal consequence of a 
situation created by respondent's conduct, and the manner in which Mrs. Lundy acted was not 
extraordinarily negligent. 
 
In other words, was the conduct of Mrs. Lundy extraordinary, or rather, was it a fairly normal 
response to the stimulus of the situation created by respondent? On the other hand, was her conduct an 
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intervening force operating independently of the situation which respondent created? These theories are 
recognized in Scrivner v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., in language as follows: 
 
The principles to be drawn from the authorities are that, in order that a subsequent independent 
act of negligence shall not displace a former one as the proximate cause, or to constitute the first 
of two acts of negligence the proximate cause of an injury, it is necessary  that the succeeding act 
of negligence should be so connected with the first in time and nature as to make it plain that the 
damage was the natural and probable consequence of the original wrongful act or omission, and 
that to establish this the original negligence must have been such that it must have been known 
to, or anticipated by, the original wrongdoer that, in the natural course of human conduct, a 
succeeding act of negligence was at least likely to be committed, or, as said in Lynch v. Nurdin, [], 
it was extremely probable that some other person would unjustifiably set in motion the dangerous 
instrumentality or negligent condition created by the original wrongdoer, and thus cause an injury.                                                                                  
 
The summary judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the cause remanded with 
instructions to reinstate the action. 
 





(1)  What standard did the court approve to give the issue to the jury? What does this standard 
require the jury to determine? 
 
Was J.W. Hazen's conduct a cause in fact of Franklin Lundy's injury? What was the risk that 
made Hazen's conduct a breach of his duty to act with due care? Was the harm that befell Lundy within 
the risk created by Hazen's conduct? Was the injury "not [the] highly extraordinary'' result of the breach? 
Was the injury "foreseeable"? 
 
(2)  Ness v. West Coast Airlines: What function is served by the search for the "proximate cause" of a 
result? Is it an attempt to ensure that the basic policies of the cause of action are applied in situations 
which seem unusual? That is, since negligence is concerned with conduct which imposes foreseeable 
and unreasonable risks, conduct which gives rise to such risks is the proximate cause of the injury. In 
Ness v. West Coast Airlines, Inc., the court wrote: 
 
It was not necessary to establish the precise cause of the air turbulence. It is not 
contended or suggested that defendant was in anywise responsible therefor. But, it was 
defendant’s duty to exercise such means as were available to it to avoid or minimize the danger 
to its passengers which probably would result from such turbulence. 
 
As to proximate cause, it was sufficient to show that the probability of air turbulence, and 
the likelihood of injury to passengers therefrom, in the absence of warning thereof, was 
foreseeable. 
Ness v. West Coast Airlines, Inc., 90 Idaho 111,410 P.2d 965 (1965). 
 
(3)  Scrivner v. Boise Payette Lumber Co.: Defendant employed a watchman to patrol its mill at 
Barber Flats. The watchman owned a gun which he had recently cleaned and (apparently) had failed to 
set the safety. On the night of the accident, the watchman attended a dance at the company's town, 
Barber. The facts were such that the jury could have reasonably concluded that he did so within the 
scope of his employment. The decedent and the watchman met at the dance and in the course of some 
joking, the decedent was killed by a discharge from the watchman's gun. After reviewing a number of 
cases, the Court stated the general rule as set forth in Lundy. It concluded: 
 
Unless it can be said that it should have been apparent to a man of ordinary capacity and 
prudence, and the defendant company must have known and anticipated that it was likely, and 
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well within the range of reasonable foresight, that [the watchman], in the ordinary and natural 
course of events, would, upon occasion in nowise calling for it, and not as a part of the 
performance of any duty, or in the scope of his employment, needlessly, willfully, carelessly, and 
as a joke, draw and point this loaded pistol at someone ...the original negligence [of the company] 
cannot be said to be the proximate cause of the injury. 
Scrivner v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 46 Idaho 334,268 P. 19 (1928). To ask the question is to answer it. 
On the other hand, if the court had phrased the issue as whether it is reasonably foreseeable that an 
armed watchman might accidentally shoot someone with his pistol the answer might well be different. 
 
(4)  Rowe v. Northern Pacific Ry.: Plaintiff was injured when the Studebaker sedan in which he was 
riding struck a boxcar sitting in the middle of Main Street in Moscow. The accident occurred about 12:30 
a.m. The intersection was lighted with a street light 70 feet south and 50 feet north of the crossing. The 
defendant was in violation of a Moscow ordinance. The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff: 
 
The conclusion is inescapable that, due to the unfortunate thoughtlessness of the car's occupants 
and their unwarranted assumption of a clearance at the time not apparent, the car came hurtling 
through the night with a momentum uncontrollable the remaining distance. The presence of the 
boxcar merely presented a condition: it was not the proximate cause of respondent's mishap. 
That cause lay primarily in the negligence of respondent and his host. 
Rowe v. Northern Pacific Ry., 52 Idaho 649, 17 P.2d352 (1932). Was the presence of the boxcar a cause 
in fact of the injury? Was a foreseeable result of leaving a boxcar in the middle of a poorly illuminated 
road at night an accident? 
 
(5)  Smith v. Sharp: Plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions against the driver of the automobile in 
which their daughters were riding and the City of Pocatello. The decedents drowned in the Portneuf River 
when the automobile went through a barrier at the dead end of a street. Plaintiffs alleged that the city was 
negligent in failing to erect proper barricades or signs to indicate that the street was a dead end. The trial 
court dismissed the action against the city. 
 
The court began by noting that cities had a statutory duty "to keep the streets within their 
limits in a 'reasonably safe condition for use by travelers,"' a duty that required the city to maintain 
barriers or warning devices. Nonetheless, to be actionable the negligence "must be the proximate 
cause, or a contributing proximate cause, of plaintiff's injury." Here, the conduct of Sharp was 
highly extraordinary and not a normal response to any stimulus of the situation created by the 
defendant city. []"Men of ordinary experience and reasonable judgment, looking at matter after 
the event and taking into account the prevalence of that 'occasional negligence, which is one of 
the incidents of human life,' would" regard it as extraordinary the Sharp would knowingly and 
intentionally drive the death car at excessive speed, in the nighttime, with out lights and without 
keeping any lookout whatsoever as to the roadway ahead. [] 
 
The negligence of Sharp was an intervening force operating independently of any 
situation created by the city. [] The intervening negligence of Sharp was wrongful toward the 
passengers in the automobile. 
 
The acts of the defendant city, in maintaining South Hayes street with its dead end upon 
the bank of the river and with a steel post barrier, were not such that the city should have realized 
that a third person, such as Sharp, would knowingly and intentionally operate a motor vehicle 
thereon, in the nighttime, at excessive speed, without lights and without keeping a lookout ahead. 
The intentional unlawful and tortious conduct of Sharp, being altogether extraordinary and 
unusual, was the superseding cause of the injury which resulted. [] 
 
It is evident from the allegations of the complaints that it was the unlawful operation of the 
Sharp automobile in the nighttime, at excessive speed, without lights, and without keeping a 
lookout to the road ahead, which proximately caused the accident. Neither reflectors, signs nor a 
penetrable barrier, would have been of much help to such a driver.... A consideration of these 
facts impels us to the conclusion that the city was not required to foresee nor anticipate that 
SCOPE OF LIABILITY 
368 
anyone would operate an automobile upon South Hayes Street in the manner in which the 
automobile involved was operated by defendant Sharp. 
 
More in point is our own decision in Rowe v. Northern Pacific Ry., 52 Idaho 649, 
17P.2d352. In that case the plaintiff, a guest, was injured when the car in which he was riding 
crashed into a boxcar standing across the main street of Moscow. The accident occurred in the 
nighttime. Plaintiff claimed the defendant was negligent in failing to maintain an adequate light at 
the crossing, as required by a city ordinance. It was plaintiff’s contention that the glare from the 
light maintained by defendant blinded the vision of plaintiff and his host, driver, so that they were 
unable to see the obstruction until it was too late to avoid the collision. After referring to the facts 
that the plaintiff and his host were familiar with the crossing; the imposed duty to stop, look and 
listen; the speed at which the car was being driven, as indicated by the severity of the impact; and 
that the temporary stopping of railroad cars upon the crossing was not unlawful, this court said 
 
"The conclusion is inescapable that, due to the unfortunate thoughtlessness of the cars 
occupants and their unwarranted assumption of a clearance at the time not apparent, the car 
came hurtling through the night with a momentum uncontrollable the remaining distance. The 
presence of the boxcar merely presented a condition: it was not the proximate cause of 
respondent’s mishap. That cause lay primarily in the negligence of respondent and his host." [] 
Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420, 354 P.2d 172 (1960). Recall the discussion of Sharp in the materials on 
recklessness in Chapter 1. 
 
(6)  Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho Equipment Co.: The court was confronted with a claim that the 
defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. The Court responded: 
 
Recovery in negligence requires that appellants' damages be within the scope of the risk 
created, that is, proximately caused, by the unsafe condition of the hoist.... Damages in this case 
resulted from the interplay between uneven distribution of the load on the truck bed and the loss 
of hydraulic fluid in one cylinder relative to the other. The proximate cause issue turns on whether 
the uneven loading represented an intervening factor that vitiated the causal relation between 
appellants' damages and the unsafe condition of the hoist. 
 
Respondent knew the purpose for which the hoist was purchased. From the 
circumstances portrayed in the record it appears that uneven distribution of the load was, in 
practical terms, an unavoidable incident of using the unit in the roofing business. Even where the 
contents of the truck bed were precisely balanced, some instability necessarily resulted when a 
worker walked upon the elevated bed to unload it. In any case, it appears that maintenance of a 
balance of the materials themselves could not always be expected with loads of gravel or other 
roofing supplies. The central question is whether the degree of unevenness could have been 
reasonably foreseen and was sufficient to cause one cylinder to lose fluid relative to the other. If 
so, then the uneven loads were foreseeable intervening factors which fell, as a matter of law, 
within the scope of the original risk created by the unsafe condition of the hoist. In that event, they 
did not vitiate the proximate relation between that condition and the resultant damage. 
 
The trial court made no findings on this critical question; rather, he concluded, without 
discussion, that proximate cause had not been shown. That general finding, like any finding by 
the trial court, would be upheld if supported by competent though conflicting evidence. However, 
appellants established without challenge that the second accident occurred after the hoist had 
been extended, as an employee walked upon the elevated bed and unloaded sacks of gravel. 
That event appears to demonstrate that the foreseeable degree of unevenness in the load was 
sufficient to cause one cylinder to lose fluid relative to the other. The only contrary evidence 
adduced by respondent which might have pertained indirectly to this issue was the mere fact that 
none of the Marion hoists, which had been on the market for a number of years, contained flow 
control devices. However, respondent made no attempt to connect that fact with this case by 
showing that when other Marion hoists were used in a similar manner the two cylinders extended 
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and retracted equally. Due to this failure, in light of appellants' evidence, the trial court's 
conclusion on proximate cause is unsupported by the record before us. 
Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho Equipment Co., 94 Idaho 819,498 P.2d 1292 (1972). 
 
(7)  Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp.: The case began as a wrongful death action 
brought by the parents of a small child who died after drinking apple juice that had been diluted with tap 
water. The tap water contained methanol that had been put into the trailer's water system as an antifreeze 
by the retailer, Mico. Because of a plugged cold water line and a defective kitchen faucet, the methanol 
had not been purged from the system. The water line and the faucet were the responsibility of the trailer's 
manufacturer, Skyline. After settling the parent's claim, Mico sought indemnification from Skyline, arguing 
that the plugged line and the faucet were the cause of the child's death. After reviewing the earlier cases, 
the Idaho Supreme Court concluded: 
 
Skyline argues that the two defects (plugged water line and defective faucet) chargeable 
to it were nota legal cause of the death because Mico's act of placing a toxic substance in the 
domestic water system was a superseding cause. This court has adopted the definition of 
superseding cause of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §440 (1965). 
 
A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention 
prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence 
is a substantial factor in bringing about. 
Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 411 P.2d 768 (1966). Accord Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420, 354 
P.2d 172 (1960). Mico's act of placing a toxic substance in the water system intervened between 
the prior alleged negligent acts of Skyline and the injury to the child. 
 
[] This court must determine whether, as a matter of law, the intervening act of Mico 
constituted a superseding cause. According to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442 (1965), the 
following guidelines should be considered in determining whether an intervening act was a 
superseding cause of harm to another. 
*** 
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that which would 
otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence; 
 
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be 
extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its 
operation; 
 
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created 
by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a 
situation; 
 
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or to 
his failure to act; 
 
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is wrongful 
toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him; 
 
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening 
force in motion. 
 
Ordinarily, a question of foreseeability is a question of fact. Dewey v. Keller, 86 Idaho 
506,388 P.2d 988 (1964). However, when the undisputed facts can lead to only one reasonable 
conclusion, this court may rule upon the issue of foreseeability as a matter of law. Munson v. 
State Department of Highways, 96 Idaho 529,531 P.2d 1174 (1975). 
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Mica's use of methanol in a fresh water plumbing system was in violation of the 
"Standard for Mobile Homes" formulated by the American National Standards Committee on 




"11.4.3 Prohibited Material. *** Pipe dope, solder flux, oils, solvents, chemicals, or other 
substances that are toxic, corrosive, or otherwise detrimental to the water system shall 
not be used." 
 
According to an administrative rule promulgated by the Department of Labor, the 
plumbing system of a mobile home must be installed in accordance with these standards. [] It is 
unlawful to sell a mobile home which is not manufactured in compliance with this standard and itis 
unlawful to alter or convert a plumbing system so that the system is not in compliance with this 
standard. [] 
 
.... Mica's act of placing the methanol in afresh water system was in violation of state law, 
mobile home industry standards, and plumbing trade practices; thus, its act was an extraordinary 
event which was not foreseeable to Skyline. As a matter of law, Mica's act of placing a toxic 
substance (methanol) in the fresh water system was a superseding cause. 
Mica Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 546 P.2d 54 (1975). 
 
(8)  Orthman v. Idaho Power Co.: A customer brought a negligence action against an electric utility for 
injuries he received when he was shocked as he attempted to reconnect power. He argued that utility 
knew or should have known that a customer would attempt to reconnect his power after utility allegedly 
wrongfully terminated it. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff 
appealed. The supreme court reversed, holding that whether utility could have foreseen that disconnected 
electrical power source created general risk of harm was a jury question that precluded summary 
judgment for utility. 
 
Justice Silak with Justice Schroeder dissented: 
 
The question is "'whether [appellant's] injury and the manner of its occurrence [were] so highly 
unusual that we can say, as a matter of law that a reasonable [person], making an inventory of 
the possibilities of harm which [that person's] conduct might produce, would not have reasonably 
expected the injury to occur."' Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 620,619 P.2d 135,138 (1980) 
(quoting Kirby v. Sanville, 2860r. 339,594 P.2d818, 821 (1979) (emphasis added)). I would hold 
that the question must be answered in the affirmative. 
 
We have indeed stated that the resolution of whether an injury was a foreseeable result 
of a negligent act is generally a question of fact for the jury. Alegria, 101 Idaho at 619-20, 619 
P.2d at 137-38; Mica Mobile Sales and Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 412,546 
P.2d 54,58 (1975). However, in order for foreseeability to be a jury question, one of three possible 
scenarios must exist. The first scenario is that there is conflicting evidence on material facts. The 
second possibility is that there are undisputed facts upon which reasonable and fair-minded 
persons might reach different inferences or conclusions. Or, the third and final scenario is that 
"different conclusions might reasonably be reached by different minds." Alegria, 101 Idaho at 
619-20, 619 P.2d at 137-38. When considering each of those three scenarios, it is important to 
keep in mind that we require a power company to guard against probabilities, not possibilities. [] 
 
In this case, the first scenario does not apply, because as the trial court found, the parties 
do not dispute the essential facts of this case. The question then becomes whether reasonable 
people could reasonably conclude that Russell's actions were foreseeable, or phrased differently, 
whether Russell's actions were such that a reasonable person could find that they were a 
probability against which a power company should guard. We have held that when a mobile 
home retailer illegally used methanol in a mobile home plumbing system, that illegal act was an 
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extraordinary event not foreseeable to the mobile home manufacturer. Thus, as a matter of law, 
the retailer's actions were not foreseeable, and we upheld the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the manufacturer. Mico, 97 Idaho at 414, 546 P.2d at 60. 
 
Although Russell was not charged with a crime, he illegally attempted to reconnect his 
own power, in violation of Idaho Code section 18-4621. Under Mico, that fact alone is sufficient to 
call into question the foreseeability of Russell's actions. Further, the fact that Russell 
acknowledged in his deposition that he knew that raising a metal pole around power lines 
presented a risk of shock calls into question whether a reasonable person could find it 
foreseeable that someone would take such a risk. Really, the record contains facts showing that 
Russell's wife was communicating with Idaho Power in an effort to have electrical service 
restored; thus, Idaho Power could have only reasonably believed that the Orthmans were taking 
legal steps to have power restored. 
 
Given these facts, I would hold as a matter of law that while it was possible that Russell 
would attempt to reconnect his own power, it was not probable. Phrased differently, and to 
paraphrase Alegria, I would hold that Russell's injury and the manner of its occurrence were so 
highly unusual that this Court can say, as a matter of law, that a power company, making an 
inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably 
expected Russell's injuries to occur. 
 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 




[C] UNEXPECTED PLAINTIFFS -- OF DUTY AND SCOPE OF LIABILITY 
 
 
ALEGRIA v. PAYONK 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980) 
 
DONALDSON, C.J.: This case is before us on appeal from an order granting summary judgment against 
plaintiffs-appellants in favor of defendants-respondents liquor vendors. 
 
On December 2, 1973, seventeen-year-old Lawrence Payonk consumed quantities of beer in 
taverns known as "John's Bam" and ''The Office." Later in the evening, while driving in an allegedly 
intoxicated condition, Payonk collided with a car in which Marie Alegria was a passenger. Mrs. Alegria 
was killed in the accident and her husband, Albert Alegria, was injured. Albert Alegria and the children of 
decedent filed suit against Payonk and the owners and employees of the two taverns for the injuries 
sustained by Mr. Alegria and for the death of Marie Alegria. The material allegations of plaintiffs' 
complaint are, in substance, that defendants sold, served and dispensed alcoholic beverages to Payonk, 
notwithstanding that defendants knew or should have known that Payonk was under the legal drinking 
age of nineteen years and knew that he was actually, apparently and obviously intoxicated at the time so 
served; that the auto collision occurred as a result of the intoxication of Payonk, which intoxication 
resulted from consumption of the alcoholic beverages negligently served to him by defendants; and that 
the negligent acts of defendants were the actual and proximate cause of the death of decedent and the 
injuries and damages sustained by plaintiffs. 
 
Pursuant to motion the district court ruled that the decision in Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 
462 P.2d 54 (1969), compelled the conclusion that as a matter of law the vending of intoxicants cannot be 
a proximate cause of damage to a third person and accordingly granted summary judgment against 
plaintiffs. 
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[T]he narrow issue presented is whether in this state the sale of alcoholic beverages by a 
licensed vendor of such beverages to an actually, apparently and obviously intoxicated person known to 
be a minor can be a contributing actual and proximate cause of the damage resulting to a third person 
from the subsequent negligent operation of an automobile by such intoxicated minor, thereby giving rise 
to a cause of action against such vendor. 
 
In Meade v. Freeman, this Court was first presented with the question whether the sale 
of intoxicants could, under any circumstances, visit upon the seller liability for injury tortiously 
caused by the consumer of such intoxicants. The question was answered by the Court in the 
negative: 
 
[Plaintiff’s theory runs squarely in the face of almost all authority. Itis nearly universally 
held, [], that it is the consumption of intoxicants that constitutes the proximate cause of 
damage to third parties resulting from the tortious or unlawful acts of the consumer and that the 
vending of intoxicants is too remote to be considered a proximate cause. 
 
In the intervening decade since Meade was decided, four of the cases upon which the 
majority relied have been overruled.... 
 
Appellants contend the time has come for this Court to reexamine the wisdom of a rule 
which in all cases precludes the fact finder from considering the sale of intoxicants as a possible 
proximate cause of subsequent injury occasioned to others by the drunken consumer. In their view, the 
rule is anachronistic in an age where death and destruction occasioned by drunken driving is so tragically 
frequent. They urge that in the case of an already intoxicated minor, the progression of sale-consumption-
aggravated drunkenness-driving-injury flows so logically as to make continued application of the rule 
indefensibly at odds with the well-settled principle that, where reasonable minds could draw differing 
inferences, questions of negligence and proximate cause are normally to be resolved by the trier of fact. 
See, e.g., Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724, 552 P.2d776(1976); Smith v. City of 
Preston,97 Idaho 295, 543P.2d 848(1975); Fairchild v. Olsen, 96 Idaho 338, 528 P.2d 900 (1974). We 
agree. 
 
The elements of common law negligence have been summarized as (1) a duty, recognized by 
law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a 
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or 
damage. Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation District, 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80 (1976). 
 
In general, it is held that "one owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care 
to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen 
that a failure to use such care might result in such injury." Kirby v. Sonville, 286 Or. 339, 594 P.2d 
818,821 (1979). And in Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536 (1974), this Court stated: "Every 
person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others, to avoid injury to others by any 
agency set in operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his property as to avoid such 
injury." []quoting Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 418 P.2d 278 (1966). 
 
In determining whether such duty has been breached by the allegedly negligent party, his 
conduct is measured against that of an ordinarily prudent person acting under all the circumstances and 
conditions then existing. Nagel v. Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 408 P.2d468 (1965). We perceive no 
justification for excusing the licensed vendor of intoxicants from the above general duty which each 
person owes all others in our society. 
 
We come now to the question whether the jury in the present case should have been allowed to 
determine whether respondents, engaged in the daily business of selling intoxicants for consumption on 
their premises, could reasonably have foreseen or anticipated that their sale of intoxicants to Payonk, 
whom they knew or should have known to be a minor and whom they knew or should have known to be 
actually, apparently and obviously intoxicated, might result in injury to appellants; and whether the 
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conduct of respondents in so acting fell below that of a person of ordinary prudence acting under the 
same circumstances and conditions. 
 
In Nagel v. Hammond, it was held that where the evidence on material facts is conflicting, or 
where on undisputed facts reasonable and fair minded men may differ as to the inferences and 
conclusions to be drawn, or where different conclusions might reasonably be reached by different 
minds, the question of negligence ... and proximate cause is one of fact to be submitted to the 
jury and nota question of law for the court; if, upon all the facts and circumstances, there is a 
reasonable chance or likelihood of the conclusions of reasonable men differing, the question is 
one for the jury. 
[] quoting Stowers v. Union Pacific R.R., 72 Idaho 87, 237 P.2d 1041 {1951). The Oregon Supreme Court, 
faced with an appeal from a judgment of involuntary nonsuit in Kirby v. Sonville, framed the central issue 
as 
 
"whether plaintiffs injury and the manner of its occurrence [were] so highly unusual that 
we can say as a matter of law that a reasonable man, making an inventory of the 
possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably 
expected the injury to occur." [] 
 
In the present case, it is alleged {1) that respondents liquor vendors sold further intoxicants to a 
minor at a time when he was already actually, apparently and obviously intoxicated, with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the minor consumer's age and condition; and {2) that such conduct on the part 
of respondents constituted an actionable breach of the general duty owed appellants, as members of 
society, to use reasonable care to avoid injury to others in a situation in which injury was foreseeable 
should respondents fail to use such care. 
 
Subsequent to Meade, this Court in Kinney v. Smith, 95 Idaho 328, 408 P.2d 1234 (1973), held 
that a car owner who lends his vehicle to an unlicensed driver may be liable not only on a theory of 
imputed negligence, but also on the basis of the owner's independent negligence in entrusting the 
automobile to the unauthorized driver. In a footnote, we indicated that negligent entrustment of an 
automobile to one who is intoxicated would also be actionable. [] 
 
The "negligent entrustment" tort approved in Kinney is a recognition of the risk of injury which 
exists when two ingredients are combined; the automobile and an incompetent or incapacitated driver. In 
Kinney, we said that a party may be liable for providing an intoxicated individual with an automobile. The 
issue in this case is the converse, i.e., should a party ever be held liable for providing the driver of an 
automobile with intoxicants. 
 
In ruling on the correctness of the summary judgment entered in this case, we must determine 
"whether [appellants’ injury and the manner of its occurrence [were] so highly unusual that we can say, as 
a matter of law that a reasonable man, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct 
might produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." Kirby v. Sonville, []. We are 
constrained to hold that, under the facts alleged at this stage of the proceedings, the question is not one 
of law but of fact and should be resolved not by the court but the jury. It appears to this Court that if 
appellants are able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondents knew or reasonably 
should have known that the intoxicated minor Payonk would operate an automobile upon leaving their 
establishment, in addition to proving the allegations of the complaint, a reasonable jury could conceivably 
find liability. 
 
In Meade v. Freeman, the Court considered whether it should, in the absence of statute, make a 
change in the common law regarding actionable negligence in the vending of intoxicants to consumers. 
The answer then was in the negative. [] However, as the court further said in Meade v. Freeman 
 
the strength of the common law lies in its capacity to adopt itself to ever changing circumstances. 
Although traditionally hesitant to change, it should not fail to do so where a hoary doctrine loses 
its raison d'etre, []. 
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We therefore declare that decision, to the extent it infers that under common-law rule and present 
statutes the vending of intoxicants can never be the proximate cause of damage to third parties resulting 
from the tortious or unlawful acts of the consumer, is overruled.20 
 
Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of defendants-respondents is reversed and the 
cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance herewith. Those proceedings may include a 
renewal of the motion for summary judgment and any response thereto, both of which must be made in 
light of the proximate cause standard as set out in this opinion. 
 
BAKES & BISTLINE, JJ., CONCUR.  
 
SHEPARD, J., DISSENTING: .... 
 
McFADDEN, J., DISSENTING: In Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389,462 P.2d 54 (1969), this court 
recognized the common law rule that an injury to a third person caused by an intoxicated person is not 
actionable against the vendor who sold liquor to the intoxicated person because the sale was only a 
remote, and not a proximate, cause of the injury. We stated in Meade that the common law rule arises 
from the normal assumption that a person should not be able to relieve himself from responsibility for his 
own acts by becoming intoxicated, and from the further assumption that it is not a tort to sell liquor to an 
able-bodied person, since the liquor vending business is legitimate, and the purchaser is deemed 
responsible.  [] 
 
The logical premises on which the common law rule is based have not changed since the Meade 
decision. Intoxicated persons are still legally responsible for their acts, liquor vending is still a legitimate 
business, and the consumption of liquor is still closer to the injury in terms of causation than the sale or 





(1)  The majority argues that the question of the causal connection between the defendant's conduct 
and plaintiff's injury is a "question of ...fact to be submitted to the jury and not a question of law for the 
court" except when ''the plaintiff's injury and the manner of its occurrence [were] so highly unusual ... that 
a reasonable man, making on inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, 
would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." To which of the elements of causation -- cause-
in-fact or scope of liability - does this standard apply? And, a corollary: is the standard actually a ''factual" 
question? Or, is the court using "factual" simply as the exclusive alternative to "legal"? 
 
(2)  What is the dissent's argument? Is McFadden's claim that the most immediate (i.e., "proximate") 
cause-in-fact is the sole responsible cause? Or, is his claim that a judicial decision creates a rule that a 
subsequent court cannot overturn? If it is the latter, could a subsequent court create exceptions and 
redefine its scope since rules can be stated more or less expansively? 
 
(3)  Is Alegria a Palsgraf case? What is the basic pattern of a Palsgraf case? What does it mean to 
say that Helen Palsgraf was "not foreseeable"? Does Cardozo actually make such a statement? Is it 
unforeseeable that a person will be standing on the platform at a train station? Were Albert and Marie 
Alegria "not foreseeable"? 
 
(4)  The three Palsgraf questions: Palsgraf raises three issues: 
 
                                                     
20 It is of pivotal significance in this case that respondents are persons and entities engaged in the daily business of selling 
intoxicants by the drink, and to whom a jury might reasonably attribute a conscious awareness of the number of drinks sold to and 
consumed by the minor Payonk as well as the effect such consumption would have on one particularly susceptible to the 
incapacitating effects of alcohol due to physical and mental immaturity. 
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(a)  Is duty relational? What is the nature of duty? Is the source of duty the relationship 
between plaintiff and defendant - or is it the defendant's act? 
 
(i)  Cardozo is widely interpreted as arguing that duty is relational: ''The conduct of 
the defendant's guard, if wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not wrong in its 
relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. And: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the 
duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of 
apprehension."[ 4] And finally: "Negligence, like risk, is a term of relation. Negligence in the 
abstract, apart from things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all." 
Although the language is not unambiguous, it is generally understood as concluding that the 
existence of a duty requires the defendant to have some relationship to the plaintiff or to the class 
of people of which the plaintiff is a member. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 
COLUM. L.REV. 789, 789-90 (1930). 
 
        Andrews, on the other hand, argued that duty arises from the act that creates the risk: "Due care 
is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or C 
alone." [See , 10] And: "Every one owes the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may 
unreasonably threaten the safety of others. 
 
(ii)  Is duty a relational concept in Idaho? 
 
(A)  Does "relationship" play a role in duty in Idaho? As we have seen, it is a 
significant factor in the affirmative duties such as Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 
649, 671 P.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1983) (landowners have an obligation to make premises 
safe for invitees), Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 987 P.2d300 
(1999) (sorority assumed a duty to take care of a pledge), Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 
270 P.2d 1016 (1954) (public callings),  Rife  v. Long,  127 Idaho 841,  908 P.2d  143 
(1995)  (custodial relationships), S.H. Kress& Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515P.2d561 
(1973) (special expertise on the risk), etc. Did Cassie Jo have a relationship with the 
school district? Are the relationships in these cases similar to those that Cardozo seems 
to require? 
 
If Ms. Palsgraf had been standing next to the passenger and thus have been 
potentially injured from a direct (and nonexplosive) impact of the package, would she 
have been within "the orbit of duty"? That is, the various special relationship cases that 
we have seen involved ex ante relationships. Is this what Cardozo meant - or is mere 
physical proximity sufficient? 
 
(B)  Recall also the Idaho courts' recurrent citation of the list of duty factors: 
"In determining whether a duty will arise in a particular context, our Supreme Court has 
identified several factors to consider. Turpen, 133 Idaho at 247, 985 P.2d at 672. The 
factors include the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy 
of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to 
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and 
the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Id.; Rife v .Long, 
127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d 143, 148(1995)."Boots ex rei. Boots v. Winter. 145 Idaho 
389, 179 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 
Is a relationship between defendant and plaintiff required by any of these 
factors? Although the first- "the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff'- might be read as 
doing so (by placing the emphasis on "to the plaintiff'), the courts have instead 
emphasized the degree of foreseeability: 'Where the degree or result of harm is great, but 
preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Turpen, 
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133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673; Sharp [v. W.H. Moore Inc.,] 118 Idaho [297,] 300--01, 
796 P.2d [506,] 509-10 [(1990)]. 
 
Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the burden of preventing 
such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required." Boots ex rei. Boots 
v. Winter. 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008). Rather than relationality, 
foreseeability appears to be the central question in the multi-factor policy decision. 
 
(iii)  Finally, recall Restatement (Third)'s duty standard: 
 
(a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when 
the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm. 
 
(b) In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle 
or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may 
decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care 
requires modification. 
RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS §7 (2010). Unlike- as will be discussed below? 
 
Restatement (First), the new duty standard does not include any consideration of a relationship between 
the defendant and the plaintiff. 
 
(b)  Should the foreseeability of the plaintiff a question under duty or scope of liability? The 
second issue raised by Palsgraf is whether duty or scope of liability is the appropriate liability-limiting 
mechanism. Cardozo argued "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and 
risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension." That is, duty is 
predicated upon the foreseeability of the plaintiff. Andrews, on the other hand, argued that the 
foreseeability of the plaintiff was a question exclusively for scope of liability- or, in the language of the 
day, "proximate cause": "But there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with the 
negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former.” 
 
(i)  Foreseeability and the duty vs. scope of liability "debate" in Idaho: Given that the 
court's opinion is stated in terms of whether defendant owed plaintiff a duty, does the court decide 
that duty is the limiting mechanism? How can this be squared with the statement that "[n]ormally, 
the foreseeability of a risk of harm, and ... is a question of fact reserved for the jury. [] 
Foreseeability is most commonly addressed when considering the question of proximate 
causation"? 
 
Consider Johnson v. McPhee: Johnson was a licensed real estate agent Coeur d'Alene. 
McPhee was a real estate developer. They were social acquaintances and had worked together 
on at least one previous real estate project. Johnson's complaint alleged that McPhee told him of 
McPhee's plans to develop a subdivision and asked Johnson to find and to help acquire land for 
the project. Johnson and McPhee orally agreed that Johnson would be paid a commission. 
Johnson located and helped negotiate purchase of land for the subdivision. McPhee, however, 
rebuffed his repeated demands for payment. 
 
Johnson also claimed that during the period when he was working on the subdivision 
development and later when he was engaged in conflict with McPhee over his claim for payment, 
he was subjected to verbal abuse by McPhee.  
 
The verbal abuse was mostly sexual in nature and included repeated demands 
from McPhee to participate in sexual acts as well as a graphically descriptive threat that 
McPhee would have sex with Johnson's girlfriend.... 
 
Johnson alleges that McPhee's verbal abuse caused Johnson severe emotional 
distress.  Johnson produced evidence that he suffered from post-traumatic stress 
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disorder, was at times rendered nearly immobile due to his emotional state, once fainted 
while discussing McPhee's alleged abuse with a business acquaintance, and generally 
suffered "strange chaotic bodily experiences." 
 
The district court granted McPhee's motion for summary judgment on all claims. On 
appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court's stated reason for granting summary 
judgment was erroneous. The court then turned to the other grounds that McPhee had asserted 
because "we must consider whether the dismissal of this cause of action can be affirmed on any 
alternative ground that was urged by the defendants in their summary judgment motions." 
Because summary judgment is appropriate when a party fails to present evidence sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, the court examined McPhee's 
alternative grounds for summary judgment. 
 
The defendants assert that the facts alleged by Johnson are insufficient even to 
raise a genuine factual issue as to some of the elements of a cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. They contend that Johnson's evidence [does not 
show an injury caused by McPhee.] The defendants assert that ...Johnson's emotional 
distress was not caused by McPhee's acts but was instead caused by other factors in 
Johnson's life, such as economic hardship and perceived ostracization from the local 
community due to his odd or improper behavior. Johnson acknowledges that he suffered 
from unrelated emotional instability and other stressors in his life, but contends that his 
level of emotional pain was severely exacerbated by McPhee's behavior. 
 
We conclude that the disposition of the defendant's argument for summary judgment on 
the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim turns largely upon whether Johnson's evidence 
is sufficient to support a finding that a risk of serious harm to Johnson from McPhee's conduct 
was foreseeable to McPhee when the conduct occurred, for foreseeability is a component of both 
the duty element and the causation element of a negligence claim. The duty element recognizes 
that every person "has a 'duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable 
risks of harm to others."' Nation, [](quoting Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,247,985 P.2d 
669,672 (1999)) (emphasis added). See also Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 
399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999); Le'Gall v. Lewis County, 129 Idaho 182, 185, 923 P.2d 427, 430 
(1996); Sharp v. WH. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990); Boots ex rei. 
Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389,393, 179 P.3d 352, 356 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 
Foreseeability is also a factor in the causation element of a negligence cause of action. An injured 
party may recover only for harm that was proximately caused by a breach of the duty of care. Hayes v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 143 Idaho 204, 208, 141 P.3d 1073, 1077 (2006). Proximate cause consists of two 
components, actual cause and legal cause, also referred to as cause in fact and scope of legal 
responsibility. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 204 P.3d 508 (2009); Hayes, []; Doe v. Sisters of the Holy 
Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 1039-41, 895 P.2d 1229, 1232-34 (Ct. App. 1995). The "legal responsibility'' 
component focuses upon "whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the 
negligent conduct." Cramer, [];Hayes,[]; Sisters of the Holy Cross, []. Proximate causation cannot be 
established if "the injury and manner of occurrence are 'so highly unusual that ... a reasonable [person], 
making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have 
reasonably expected the injury to occur."' Cramer, [](quoting Sisters of the Holy Cross,[]. See also Alegria 
v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,619-20,619 P.2d 135, 137-38 (1980). 
 
This Court would readily hold that in ordinary circumstances of social interaction, it would not be 
foreseeable that insulting and demeaning remarks like those attributed to McPhee could inflict serious 
emotional harm. As observed by our Supreme Court in Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d 1371 
(1985): 
 
The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime 
plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough 
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language and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no 
occasion for the law to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are hurt. 
Id. [] (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 (1965)). Johnson's claim is not so readily 
disallowed, however, because he has presented evidence of unusual emotional fragility and susceptibility 
to harm from McPhee's insults due to Johnson's emotional instability or mental illness, and he asserts that 
McPhee was aware of this exceptional emotional vulnerability when he engaged in the abusive behavior. 
 
Liability can arise from otherwise unactionable conduct if the conduct caused serious emotional 
harm to a peculiarly fragile individual and the defendant knew or should have known of the individual's 
susceptibility. As stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965), comment C, "[O]ne 
who unintentionally but negligently subjects another to such an emotional distress does not take the risk 
of any exceptional physical sensitiveness to emotion which the other may have unless the circumstances 
known to the actor should apprise him of it." (emphasis added). A treatise refers to this concept as a 
"pervading principle of tort law," saying: 
 
Generally defendant's standard of conduct is measured by the reactions to be expected of normal 
persons.... Activity may be geared to a workaday world rather than to the hypersensitive. It may 
be otherwise, however, if defendant has knowledge or notice of the presence of idiosyncrasy in 
any given case. This, of course, is the application of a pervading principle of tort law. 
Fowler v. HARPER ET AL., 3 THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.4, at 691-92 (2d ed. 1986)... 
 
Thus, the existence or non-existence of a duty of care and proximate causation in this case turns 
upon whether McPhee was aware of Johnson's abnormal vulnerability and the consequent risk of serious 
emotional injury from McPhee's insults.... After reviewing Johnson's evidence, the court concluded: 
 
It thus appears that, if all reasonable inferences are drawn in his favor, Johnson provided 
sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could find that his burden of proof is satisfied on all of 
the elements of his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.... 
Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 210 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 
How does the court decide the question of duty vs. scope of liability? Note that the court states, 
"foreseeability is a component of both the duty element and the causation element of a negligence claim." 
Does the court subsequently choose between the alternatives? 
 
(ii)  Andrews' position has been adopted by the Restatement (Third): 
n.         Unforeseeable plaintiffs. No express limitation in this Section [§ 29] 
places harm to unforeseeable plaintiffs outside the scope of an actor's liability. The 
limitation on duty for negligence actions, § 6, and the definitions of strict liability torts, §§ 
20-23, also contain no such express limitation. Ordinarily, the risk standard contained in 
this Section will, without requiring any separate reference to the foreseeability of the 
plaintiff, preclude liability for harm to such plaintiffs. 
 
RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS § 29, cmt. n. (2010). 
 
(iii)  Duty or scope of liability- who cares? What difference does it make if the court 
treats the liability-limitation as a duty issue rather than a scope of liability issue? Which member 
of the trial tribunal decides each element? 
 
Note that Alegria is anomalous on this point: what is the effect of announcing a rule to 
decide a scope of liability issue? Is there any difference between the decision in Meade holding 
that conveying intoxicants was as a matter of law not a cause of injury to third parties and a 
decision holding that there is no duty to avoid injuring third parties? What is the difference 
between standards and rules? Recall our discussion of the role of the reasonable person 
standard. 
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(c)  Is the court or the jury the proper decisionmaker on the foreseeability question? Recall 
that duty is a question of law. Recall also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman [FRG@ 60] and Pokora v. 
Wabash Ry. [FRG @ 62]. 
 
(i)  In Palsgraf, Cardozo writes, "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the 
duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of 
apprehension ...The range of reasonable apprehension is at times a question for the court, and at 
times, if varying inferences are possible, a question for the jury. Here, by concession, there was 
nothing on the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel wrapped in 
newspaper would spread wreckage through the station. 
 
Is Cardozo's statement a reflection of the fact that the jury resolves the factual questions 
upon which duty depends? Recall that in Farwell v. Keeton the court noted that ''the jury must 
determine, after weighing all the evidence, whether the defendant attempted to aid the victim. If 
he did, a duty arose which required defendant to act as a reasonable person. This task would be 
given to the jury through an instruction that stated "if you find ...,then ...." 
 
(ii) In Stoddart v. Pocatello School District, 149 Idaho 679, 239 P.3d 784 (2010), the court 
wrote: 
 
Normally, the foreseeability of a risk of harm, and thus whether a duty consequently 
attaches, is a question of fact reserved for the jury. [] Foreseeability is most commonly addressed 
when considering the question of proximate causation. [] 
 
"[W]hen the undisputed facts can lead to one reasonable conclusion, this court may rule 
upon the issue of foreseeability as a matter of law." [] We conclude that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and that the danger to Cassie Jo was not foreseeable. 
 
        Is the court's statement correct that foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury when it is an 
element of duty issue? The court's statement raises tow questions: 
 
(A)  First, if duty is a legal issue for the court, the court must necessarily decide 
whether there is sufficient foreseeability of harm to impose a duty on the defendant. This may be 
a contingent conclusion similar to that made by the court in Farwell v. Keaton, but Keaton is the 
exception rather than the rule. When a court concludes that there is a duty, it necessarily is 
deciding that, because this type of conduct involves a sufficiently foreseeable degree of risk and 
social policy, one individual is required to act with due care in regard to the interests of another. Is 
this type of foreseeability qualitatively different than the question before the jury in the scope of 
liability element? 
 
(B)  Second, is foreseeability a question of fact? Is it a normative, law- applying 
judgment decision?  Note that the question is often phrased as "reasonably foreseeable." 
 
(5)  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: Shortly after Palsgraf was argued before the New York Court of 
Appeals, Cardozo participated in a meeting of the "advisers" to the reporter (Professor Francis Bohlen) of 
the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts. The meeting involved an extended discussion of a 
draft on the elements of a cause of action for negligence. The draft contained language stating that a 
careless defendant was not liable to an unforeseeable plaintiff. In the ensuing discussion, Cardozo and 
Learned Hand (United States v. Carroll Towing Co. and The T.J. Hooper) forcefully debated the 
proposition and Cardozo finally stated, ''The error I think I started with was assuming that when destroyed 
the box [which unbeknownst to the actor contained explosives] I invaded the interest in the ownership of 
the house [which was destroyed in the ensuing blast]. But I think that the general statement that it must 
be negligent with respect to the interest invaded covers the matter." ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 
291 (1998). 
 
The Restatement adopted the position espoused by Hand and accepted by Cardozo: 
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§ 281  Statement of the Elements of a Cause of Action for Negligence  
 
The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if  
 
(a)  the interest invaded in protected against unintentional invasion, and 
 
(b)  the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to such interest or any other 
similar interest of the other which is protected again unintentional invasion, and 
 
   (c)  the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion .... RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 281 (1934). 
 
The same discussion also provided arguments that foreshadowed Andrews dissent in Palsgraf. 
See Robert E. Keeton, A Palsgraf Anecdote, 53 TEX. L. REV. 513, 515-16 (1977-78). 
 
(6)  "Dram-shop" liability: Vendors of intoxicants operate "dram-shops" as these establishments 
were known in England. The potential liability of such vendors has a long history. It is also a highly 
emotional topic. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Alegria was not the last word on the issue. 
 
(a)  Idaho caselaw: The Idaho appellate courts have decided several additional cases 
applying Alegria in a variety of factual contexts. See Idaho Department of Labor v. Sunsewt Marts, Inc., 
140 Idaho 207, 91 P.3d 1111 (2004) (recounting history of dram shop liability in Idaho); Slade v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 119 Idaho 482, 808 P.2d 401 (1991) (suppliers of intoxicant's at company party); 
Fischer v. Cooper, 116 Idaho 374, 775 P.2d 1216 (1989) (tavern operator without a valid liquor license); 
Bergman v. Henry, 115 Idaho 259, 766 P.2d 729 (1988) (vending intoxicants to an obviously intoxicated 
adult); Estates of Braun v. Cactus Pete's, Inc., 107 Idaho 484, 690 P.2d 939 (Ct. App. 1985) (vending 
intoxicants to an obviously intoxicated adult), rev'd on other grounds, 108 Idaho 798, 702 P.2d 836 
(1985). 
 
(b)  The legislative response: Because the facts of Alegria involved the sale of intoxicants to 
someone who was both obviously intoxicated and under the legal drinking age, some construed it as 
merely creating a narrow exception (serving intoxicants to someone under the legal drinking age) to the 
prior rule of no liability established in Meade. The Court subsequently decided that Alegria also applied to 
serving intoxicants to an obviously intoxicated adult. Bergman v. Henry, 115 Idaho 259, 766 P.2d 729 
(1988). See also Fischer v. Cooper, 116 Idaho 374, 775 P.2d 1216 (1989). Development of the common 
law was largely foreclosed when the Idaho Legislature adopted a dram shop act in 1986. The Act begins 
with a statement on "causation": 
 
The legislature finds that it is not the furnishing of alcoholic beverages that is the proximate cause 
of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons and it is the intent of the legislature, therefore, to limit 
dram shop and social host liability [with exceptions set out in section (3)]. 
 
The Act precludes liability for "injury, death or other damage caused by an intoxicated person against any 
person who sold or otherwise furnished alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated person" with two 
exceptions: 
 
(a)  The intoxicated person was younger than the legal age for the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages at the time the alcoholic beverages were sold or furnished and the person who 
sold or furnished the alcoholic beverages knew or ought reasonably to have known at the 
time the alcoholic beverages were sold or furnished that the intoxicated person was 
younger than the legal age for consumption of the alcoholic beverages; or 
 
(b)  The intoxicated person was obviously intoxicated at the time the alcoholic beverages 
were sold or furnished, and the person who sold or furnished the alcoholic beverages 
knew or ought reasonably to have known that the intoxicated person was obviously 
intoxicated. 
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Did the legislature expand or merely codify the liability created by Alegria its progeny? 
 
The Dram Shop Act was held to be constitutional in Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 
Idaho 388, 987 P.2d 300 (1999). 
 
 























































CROWN v. STATE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
 
Court of Appeals of Idaho 
131 Idaho 297, 955 P.2d 612 (1998) 
 
PERRY, JUDGE- In this case, we review whether the district court erred in involuntarily dismissing an 
action brought by Wayne Crown, Clark Bean and Steve Bean (the growers) against the Department of 





The background of this case is as follows: 
 
From 1983 to 1988 the growers delivered their bean crops to the Hawkins Warehouse, a 
licensed and bonded commodities warehouse in Filer, Idaho. The DOA conducted regular 
inspections of the physical contents and financial records of the warehouse pursuant to I.C. §§ 
69-201 to 267 in order to ensure that the warehouse had sufficient inventory for its depositors. 
 
Jerry Hawkins (Hawkins), the warehouse manager, called the DOA in April of 1988 and 
requested that the DOA come and conduct its inspection. Because he knew that he had a 
substantial shortfall of bean inventory, Hawkins moved one to two hundred boxes of dirt and bean 
culls into the warehouse and then surrounded them with boxes of beans. Hawkins also doctored 
the warehouse books so that it appeared that 40,000 cwt. of beans were "written off." He also had 
checks drawn up to show a fictional planned purchase of 30,000 cwt. of additional beans. 
 
David Sparrow (Sparrow) came to the warehouse on behalf of the DOA and conducted 
the inspection from May 3, 1988, to May 9, 1988. Sparrow never discovered the boxes filled with 
dirt and culls and accepted Hawkins' explanation that the40,000 cwt. of beans that had been 
"written oft" were transferred to treated seed. Although Sparrow's inventory still found the 
warehouse to be 6,475 cwt. short, Sparrow accepted Hawkins' representation that additional 
beans were to be purchased when Hawkins showed Sparrow several uncashed checks made 
payable to growers. 
 
Sparrow completed his inspection but never followed up to see if Hawkins purchased the 
beans as promised. In late August 1988, the growers began to deliver their 1988 bean crop to the 
warehouse. On November 21, 1988, after an internal audit revealed the warehouse's serious 
inventory shortfall, the warehouse management ceased operation and contacted the DOA which 
then seized the warehouse. 
 
The growers' case was originally brought on January 5, 1989, as a class action against a 
number of parties, including the DOA. However, the DOA was dismissed as a party because the 
growers had failed to comply with the Idaho Tart Claims Act's requirement that they first present 
their claim to the governmental defendant. 
 
On January 6, 1989, the Hawkins Warehouse filed a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy. 
The growers then initiated an adversarial proceeding as part of that litigation in which the DOA 
was named as a defendant. 
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After the DOA was dismissed from the above-described class action and the growers' 
claim under the Tart Claims Act was denied, the present case was filed on November 2, 1990. 
The growers alleged that the DOA had negligently conducted inspections of the Hawkins 
Warehouse that failed to disclose shortfalls in inventory from the 1983-88growing seasons. In 
addition, the growers alleged that the DOA negligently failed to inform them of the insufficient 
inventory and failed to close the warehouse upon learning of the shortfall in 1988, thus allowing 
the growers to deliver their 1988 crop to a warehouse that the DOA knew was in non-compliance. 
The growers alleged damages for loss of half of their 1988 crop and for beans deposited prior to 
1988. 
Crown v. State, Dep't of Agriculture, 127 Idaho 175, 177-78, 898 P.2d 1086, 1088-89 (1995) (footnotes 
omitted). Subsequently, the DOA moved for summary judgment and dismissal which the district court 
granted. The growers appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting 
summary judgment and dismissal in favor of the DOA, but only on the issue as it related to "the loss of 
bean inventory before July 1, 1988, due to negligent inspections." Id. at 182, 898 P.2d at 1093. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order on all other issues. Id. 
 





A.      Sufficiency of Evidence 
 
The growers allege that the district court's findings of fact are not supported by substantial, 
competent evidence. Specifically, the growers assert that the "conduct of Mr. Sparrow in testimony under 
oath concerning his physical count of the warehouse, his review of the book record and the impossible 
reconciliation of those sets of figures, establish an orderly and absolutely false and negligent 
examination." The growers also assert that the "inspection performed by David Sparrow was not that of 
an ordinarily prudent person acting under all of the circumstances and conditions then existing." 
 
The DOA argues that the growers failed to present evidence to support the growers' negligence 
claim. Specifically, the DOA contends that ... [because the] inventory loss pre-dated the DOA's 
examination [, even] assuming Sparrow negligently conducted his examination, ...the growers failed to 
prove that the plaintiffs suffered any harm. 
 
In dismissing the growers' case, the district court found: 
… 
4. As to Harm 
 
37.       No evidence was adduced, nor can any reasonable inference be drawn from the evidence 
which was presented, which established that any member of the Plaintiffs' class sustained any 
harm or loss before July 1, 1988. 
Subsequently, the district court concluded: 
 
13. The court concludes that the Plaintiffs failed to prove, either directly or by reasonable 
inference, and no evidence does prove, that any member of the Plaintiffs' class sustained any 
harm or loss before July 1,1988. 
… 
 
Next, we review the main thrust of the growers' appeal - whether the district court's findings of 
fact are supported by substantial, competent evidence. At trial, the growers failed to call any class 
members to testify. The growers did call Sparrow, the DOA inspector. Counsel for the growers extensively 
examined Sparrow and attempted to demonstrate that Sparrow's inspection had been negligently 
conducted. Besides Sparrow's testimony, the growers' only other witnesses who testified at trial were 
Walter DeForest and Rick Davis, Hawkins warehouse employees. DeForest and Davis both testified that 




May of 1988. It was undisputed, however, that Hawkins, the warehouse manager, doctored the books 
and had boxes of culls and dirt moved into the warehouse to conceal the shortage of beans. Although 
DeForest testified that he had accompanied Sparrow through the warehouse during Sparrow's 
examination, DeForest's testimony did not evidence that Sparrow negligently conducted his examination. 
 
As set out earlier in this opinion, the district court made numerous findings of fact 
regarding the growers' negligence claim in dismissing their case. In the growers’ appeal, however, 
they have not challenged any specific finding of fact as being clearly erroneous; rather, the growers' 
argument is based on bare assertions and conclusory allegations, many of which are based on evidence 
not admitted at trial- Sparrow's work papers and the individual grower cards. Thus, after thoroughly 
reviewing the growers' contentions, we conclude that the district court's findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous. Accordingly, the district court's order involuntarily dismissing the growers' case is affirmed. 
LANSING, CHIEF JUDGE, SPECIALLY CONCURRING- While I join in the foregoing opinion, I write 
separately to address what I consider to be a specific fatal deficiency in the growers' trial evidence. 
 
In Crown v. State Department of Agriculture, 127 Idaho 175,898 P.2d 1086 (1995), the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's summary judgment against the growers with respect to all 
claims except those relating to "the loss of bean inventory before July 1, 1988, due to negligent 
inspections." Id. at 182, 898 P.2d at 1093. The Court held that as to any losses occurring after that date, 
the trial court had properly granted summary judgment based on I.C. §§ 6-9048, and 6-904C. Therefore, 
the Court reversed the summary judgment "only as it relates to loss of bean inventory before July 1, 
1988." Id. at 180, 898 P.2d at 1091. Thus, upon remand following that Idaho Supreme Court decision, it 
should have been abundantly clear to plaintiffs' counsel that in any ensuing trial it would be incumbent 
upon the plaintiffs to prove they suffered some loss between May9, 1988, the date that the allegedly 
negligent inspection was completed, and July 1,1988. However, the record here is devoid of evidence of 
any losses occurring during that short time frame, either through additional deposits of commodities by 
the growers or additional thefts committed by Hawkins. Therefore, regardless of the correctness of other 






(1)  Negligence requires some actual, compensable injuries. In the absence of such an injury, plaintiff 
has failed to prove her prima facie case. 
 
 
[A] COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 
 
One provision of the 1987 legislature's "tort reform" package was a limitation on "noneconomic" 
damages: 
 
§ 6-1601: DEFINITIONS - As used in this act: 
… 
(3) "Economic damages" mean objectively verifiable monetary loss, including but not limited 
to out-of-pocket expenses, loss of earnings, loss of use of property, cost of replacement or repair, 
cost of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, medical expenses, or loss of 
business or employment opportunities. 
 
(4)  "Future damages" mean noneconomic damages and economic damages to be 
incurred after entry of a judgment. 
 
(5)  "Noneconomic damages" mean subjective, nonmonetary losses including, but not limited 
to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, disability or disfigurement incurred by the 
injured party; emotional distress; Joss of society and companionship; loss of consortium; or 




(7) "Personal injury" means a physical injury, sickness or death suffered by an individual. 
 
(8) "Property damage" means loss in value or in use of real or personal property, 
where such loss arises from physical damage to or destruction of such property. 
 
§ 6-1603:  LIMITATION ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES- 
 
(1) In no action seeking damages for personal injury, including death, shall a judgment for 
noneconomic damages be entered for a claimant exceeding the maximum amount of four 
hundred thousand dollars ($400,000); provided, however, that beginning on July 1, 1988, and 
each July 1 thereafter, the cap on noneconomic damages established in this section shall 
increase or decrease in accordance with the percentage amount of increase or decrease by 
which the Idaho industrial commission adjusts the average annual wage as computed pursuant to 
section 72-409(2), Idaho Code. 
 
(2)  The limitation contained in this section applies to the sum of: 
 
(a) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant who incurred personal injury or who 
is asserting a wrongful death; 
 
(b) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant, regardless of the number of persons 
responsible for the damages or the number of actions filed. 
 
(3)  If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of the limitation contained in 
subsection (1) of this section. 
 
(4)  The limitation of awards of noneconomic damages shall not apply to: 
 
(a)  Cause of action arising out of willful or reckless misconduct. 
 
(b)  Causes of action arising out of an act or acts which the trier of fact finds beyond 
a reasonable doubt would constitute a felony under state or federal law. 
 
The 1990 legislature added an additional restriction: 
 
§6-1606: PROHIBITING DOUBLE RECOVERIES FROM COLLATERAL SOURCES- In any action for 
personal injury of property damage, a judgment may be entered for the claimant only for damages which 
exceed amounts received by the claimant from collateral sources as compensation for the personal injury 
or property damage, whether from private, group or governmental sources, and whether contributory or 
noncontributory. For the purposes of this section, collateral sources shall not include benefits paid under 
federal program which by law must seek subrogation, death benefits paid under life insurance contracts, 
benefits paid by a service corporation organized under chapter 34, title 41, Idaho Code [Hospital and 
Profession Service Corporations, e.g., Blue Shield, etc.], and benefits paid which are recoverable under 
subrogation rights created under Idaho law or by contract. Evidence of payment by collateral sources is 
admissible to the court after the finder of fact has rendered an award. Such award shall be reduced by the 
court to the extent the award includes compensation for damages which have been compensated 












[B] PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
 
The 1987 and 2003 legislatures also changed the common law on punitive damages: 
 
§6-1601: DEFINITIONS - As used in this act: 
… 
(9)   "Punitive damages" mean damages awarded to a claimant, over and above what will 
compensate the claimant for actual personal injury and property damage, to serve the public 
policies of punishing a defendant for outrageous conduct and of deterring future like conduct. 
 
§6-1604:  LIMITATION ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES- 
 
(1)  In any action seeking recovery of punitive damages, the claimant must prove, by clear 
and convincing evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct by the party 
against whom the claim for punitive damages is asserted. 
 
(2)  In all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted, no claim for damages shall be 
filed containing a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. However, a party may, pursuant to a 
pretrial motion and after hearing before the court, amend the pleadings to include a prayer for 
relief seeking punitive damages. The court shall allow the motion to amend the pleadings if after 
weighing the evidence presented, the court concludes that, the moving party has established at 
such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of 
punitive damages. A prayer for relief added pursuant to this section shall not be barred by lapse 
of time under any applicable limitation on the time in which an action may be brought or claim 
asserted, if the time prescribed or limited had not expired when the original pleading was filed. 
 
(3)  No judgment for punitive damages shall exceed the greater of two hundred fifty thousand 
dollars ($250,000) or an amount which is three (3) times the compensatory damages contained in 
such judgment. If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of this limitation. The 
limitations on noneconomic damages contained in section 6-1603, Idaho Code, are not applicable 
to punitive damages. 
 
(4)  Nothing in this section is intended to change the rules of evidence used by a trier of fact 
in finding punitive damages. 
 
The 2003 amendment changed the required level of proof from "by a preponderance of the 













At the common law, an elaborate classification of reasons for no-liability was developed. These 
were divided into several categories, of which the following were relevant to torts: 
 
(1)  justification is the power to act offensively, i.e., the defendant was justified in doing what 
she did because she was acting within a legally protected interest. Thus, a person is justified in 
publishing true statements about a public figure. If the public figure brings a defamation action, 
the defendant may avoid liability by proving the statement to have been true. 
 
(2)  excuse is a power only to act defensively, i.e., the defendant's conduct is excused 
because she did what she did in response to some external event which threatened a protected 
interest. Thus, a person is excused from liability if the conduct was reasonably necessary for self-
defense. 
 
(3)  immunity differs from the other two defenses because it does not negate one of the 
elements of the underlying tort, but rather avoids liability under all circumstances because of the 
status of the defendant, i.e., because of who or what the defendant is, it cannot be liable. Thus, 
the servant employed by a charity may be negligent without the charity being liable for any 
resulting injuries: the conduct remains tortious- there simply is no liability. 
 
As a general matter, the distinctions between justification and excuse are no longer relevant; both 
terms have been subsumed under the more modem term: 
 
privilege avoids liability only under particular circumstances because the circumstances make the 
conduct non-tortious. That is, proof of the privilege negates one of the elements of the tort. 
 
 
[A] COMPARATIVE FAULT 
 
 
I.C. § 6-801: Comparative negligence or comparative responsibility - Effect of contributory 
negligence- Contributory negligence or comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an action by 
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence, gross negligence or 
comparative responsibility resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence or 
comparative responsibility was not as great as the negligence, gross negligence or comparative 
responsibility of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to the 
person recovering. Nothing contained herein shall create any new legal theory, cause of action, or legal 
defense. 
 
I.C. §  6-802: Verdict giving percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to 
each party- The court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury to find separate 
special verdicts determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence or comparative 
responsibility attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of damages in 
proportion to the amount of negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to the person recovering. 
Nothing contained herein shall create any new legal theory, cause of action, or legal defense. 
 
I.C. § 6-803: Contribution among joint tortfeasors - Declaration of right -- Exception - 
Limited Joint and Several Liability - 
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(1)  The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors, but a joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a 
money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has 
paid more than his pro rata share thereof. 
 
(2)  A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover 
contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished 
by the settlement. 
 
(3)  The common law doctrine of joint and several liability is hereby limited to causes of action listed in 
subsection (5) of this section. In any action in which the trier of fact attributes the percentage of 
negligence or comparative responsibility to persons listed on a special verdict, the court shall 
enter a separate judgment against each party whose negligence or comparative responsibility 
exceeds the negligence or comparative responsibility attributed to the person recovering. The 
negligence or comparative responsibility of each such party is to be compared individually to the 
negligence or comparative responsibility of the person recovering. Judgment against each such 
party shall be entered in an amount equal to each party's proportionate share of the total 
damages awarded. 
 
(4)  As used herein, "joint tortfeasor" means one (1) of two (2) or more persons jointly or severally 
liable intort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been 
recovered against all or some of them. 
 
(5)  A party shall be jointly and severally liable for the fault of another person or entity or for payment 
of the proportionate share of another party when they were acting in concert or when a person 
was acting as an agent or servant of another party. As used in this section, "acting in concert" 
means pursuing a common plan or design which results in the commission of an intentional or 
reckless tortious act. 
 
I.C. § 6-804: Common law liabilities preserved - Nothing in this act affects: 
 
(1)  The common law liability of the several joint tortfeasors to have judgment recovered and payment 
made from them individually to the injured person for the whole injury shall be limited to causes of 
action listed in section 6-803, Idaho Code. However, the recovery of a judgment by the injured 
person against one (1) joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other joint tortfeasors. 
 
(2)  Any right of indemnity under existing law. 
 
I.C. § 6-805: Effect of release of one tortfeasor on liability of others - A release by the injured person 
of one (1) joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors 
unless the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the 
consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the 
total claim shall be reduced, if such amount or proportion is greater than the consideration paid. 
 
I.C. § 6-806: Effect of release of one tortfeasor on his liability for contribution to others - Limits on 
application of section -A release by the injured person of one (1)joint tortfeasor does not relieve him from 
liability to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor unless the release is given before the right of the 
other tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued, and provides for a reduction, to 
the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable 
against all the other tortfeasors. This section shall apply only if the issue of proportionate fault is litigated 













(1)  Comparative fault systems: Although comparative fault statutes vary, they share basic features. 
Most fundamentally, all comparative fault schemes require the factfinder to assign a percentage of fault to 
the parties. Based on this determination, the different approaches all specify under what situations a 
plaintiff may recover and specify a method for determining how much money plaintiff will be entitled to 
recover. There are three types of statutes based on their specification of when a plaintiff can recover: 
 
(a)  pure comparative fault statutes allow the plaintiff to recover when another party has any 
fault. 
 
(b)  no-greater-than comparative fault statutes allow the plaintiff to recover when the 
plaintiffs fault is no greater than defendant's fault. 
 
(c)  not-as-great-as comparative fault statutes allow the plaintiff to recover when plaintiffs 
fault is not as great as defendant's fault. 
 
(2)  Contribution: When there is more than one defendant who is liable to plaintiff, a second question 
arises: how is the liability to be allocated among the potentially liable defendants? This is a question not 
of comparative fault but of contribution. "Contribution" is the right of one tortfeasor who has paid all or a 
disproportionate share of a judgment to recover part of that payment from another tortfeasor. Contribution 
was not available at the common law. As a creature of statute, contribution comes in a variety of forms. 
 
There is no necessary connection between contribution and comparative fault. Simply because a 
jurisdiction adopts comparative fault does not require it also to rework any existing statutory system of 
contribution.  Generally, however, comparative fault systems do modify contribution requirements by 
providing for contribution on the basis of the comparative fault of the defendants. 
 
How does the Idaho resolve contribution? 
 
(3)  The "individual rule": In Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, 624 P.2d 383 (1981), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the Idaho comparative fault statute had adopted the "individual rule," i.e., fault 
was to be compared individually in determining liability. Thus, a plaintiff who was 25% at fault could not 
recover from a defendant 10% at fault; recovery could only be from the remaining defendant who was 
65% at fault. The court thus rejected the "unit" rule, which permits the plaintiff to recover from any 
negligent defendant so long as the plaintiff’s negligence is less than the combined negligence of all 
defendants. In 1981, the language of § 6-803 did not specifically resolve the issue; it now appears to do 
so. 
 
One effect of adopting the individual rule is demonstrated by the decision in Tucker v. Union Oil 
Co. The jury determined the comparative fault as: Collier Carbon (defendant), 60%; Feed Services 
(plaintiffs employer), 30%; and Tucker (plaintiff), 10%. The trial court reduced the damage award by 10% 
and entered judgment for the remainder against Collier since the employer is immune from tort liability 
under the state's workers' compensation law. Collier thus was required to pay 90% of plaintiff’s loss. 
 
On appeal, Collier argued that it should be responsible for only 60% of the total award since that 
was the amount of its relative fault: 
 
Collier Carbon contends that the enactment of our comparative negligence statutes, I.C.  
§6-801 to -806, together with general principles of equity and fairness require that its liability for 




I.C. § 6-801 provides: 
 
To be particularly noted is the language that the damages allowed should be "diminished 
in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering." The trial court 
reduced the total award for damages by the 10% of the negligence which was attributable to 
James Tucker. The result sought here by Collier Carbon would effectively attribute the negligence 
of Feed Services to the Tuckers. That result is not required by I.C. § 6-801. The express 
language of portions of our comparative negligence act make clear that our legislature intended 
to retain the general common law rule of joint and several liability.... 
 
We deem it clear that the contention of Collier Carbon that a negligent tortfeasor's liability 
is to be limited solely to his proportionate fault would undermine the fundamental rationale of the 
joint and several liability doctrine. At this time at least, the adoption of our comparative negligence 
act in Idaho does not require and we do not deem it appropriate to find a legislative intent to so 
abolish joint and several liability. 
Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 603 P.2d 156 (1979). 
 
(4)  The "individual rule" and vicarious liability: When DiAnn Adams went to Dr. Krueger's office, she 
was initially examined by Krueger's nurse-practitioner, Leila Parker, and diagnosed as having genital 
herpes. Krueger prescribed an ointment to help relieve the symptoms. Adams subsequently consulted 
another doctor and was advised that she did not have herpes but rather a severe yeast infection. Ms. 
Adams and her husband filed a malpractice action against Krueger and Parker. The jury found Parker 
41% negligent, Krueger 10%negligent, and DiAnn Adams 49% negligent. 
 
The district court determined Krueger to be 51% negligent, reasoning that Krueger was 
responsible for the negligence of his employee, Parker. The district court also imputed DiAnn Adams's 
negligence in considering Patrick Adams's award. The court accordingly entered a judgment against 
Krueger, awarding DiAnn and Patrick Adams 51% of their sustained damages. 
 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the verdict: 
 
In Idaho, the legislature has adopted the so-called "individual rule" of comparative 
negligence. That is, in those cases where the negligence of co-defendants is merely concurrent, 
each defendant’s negligence is compared separately. I.C. § 6-801; Ross v. Coleman Co., 114 
Idaho 817, 761 P.2d 1169(1988). Thus, Krueger argues that he is not individually liable because 
the jury found him to be only 10% negligent. He further contends that he cannot be held 
responsible for his employee's actions because she was found to be 41% negligent where in 
contrast DiAnn Adams was found to be 49% negligent. In other words, Krueger contends that 
because the employee is not individually liable the employer cannot be vicariously liable. 
 
[W]e adopt the well-reasoned opinion written by Chief Judge Walters: 
 
... Krueger and Parker stand in relation as master and servant, whereby the negligent 
acts of the servant, or employee, are imputed to the master, or employer, under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior. [ 1 The historical and economic genesis of the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, or vicarious liability, lies in the fact that the tort is brought about in the course of an 
undertaking for the benefit of the master, and that the master possesses the right to control the 
servant's course of conduct as well as the result to be accomplished through such conduct. 
Because the "employment" is a factor causing the tort, the law regards the business as a unit and 
deals with the act of any member of it as the act and responsibility of its principal the employer. 
 
The enactment of our comparative negligence law has not changed the basic principle of 
vicarious liability.... 





(5)  The fault of non-parties: What should be the effect of the contribution of non-parties to the injury-
causing event? 
 
(a)  Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc.: An issue presented but not decided in 
Tucker was whether the comparative fault of only the parties before the court should be considered or 
whether the fact finder should determine the comparative fault of all actors. In Pocatello Industrial Park 
Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,787,621 P.2d 399,403 (1980), the Idaho Supreme Court formally 
adopted the rule implicit in the Union Oil decision: 
 
when apportioning negligence, a jury must have the opportunity to consider the negligence of all 
parties to the transaction, whether or not they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or not they 
can be liable to the plaintiff or to the other tortfeasors either by operation of law or because of 
prior release. 
 
(b)  Beitzel v. City of Coeur d'Alene: Robert Beitzel was injured when he drove his motorcycle 
into an unmarked and unbarricaded trench in a public street. He sued the city, the telephone company 
(GTNW), and the telephone company's excavation and paving contractors. At trial, the evidence 
established that an unknown person had removed the barricades sometime between Friday afternoon 
and Monday morning. 
 
The city and GTNW assert that the trial court should have included on the special verdict 
form a place for the jury to apportion to unnamed parties’ negligence for having removed a lighted 
barricade from the site of the excavation prior to Beitzel's accident. Because the jury did not 
apportion any negligence to Beitzel, itis not necessary for us to address this question. 
 
The Court has ruled that in appropriate cases where comparative negligence is at issue 
the name of a non-party should be placed on the verdict form. Hickman v. Fraternal Order of 
Eagles, 114 Idaho 545, 547 758 P.2d 704, 706 (1988); Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 
536, 542, 726 P.2d 648, 654 (1985); Lasselle v. Special Prod. Co., 106 Idaho 170, 172,677 
P.2d483,485 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho783, 786-87, 621 
P.2d399,402-03 (1980). As stated most recently by the Court in Hickman, I.C. § 6-801 and 6-802 
"envision apportionment where there is 'negligence attributable to the person recovering."' [] In 
Hickman, the Court upheld the trial court's decision not to include an allegedly negligent non-
party on the verdict form where the plaintiffs were not negligent. The rationale of the Court for 
upholding the trial court's decision was that any negligence of the non-party could not serve to 
lessen the award to the plaintiffs. 
 
Under the "individual rule" adopted by the Idaho legislature when it enacted comparative 
negligence, the negligence of the plaintiff must be compared against each individual defendant in 
determining whether the plaintiff may recover. I.C. §6-801 to -803; see also Ross v. Coleman Co., 
114 Idaho 817, 830, 761 P.2d 1169, 1182 (1988); Oldenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, 5, 624 P.2d 
383, 387 (1980). In this case, the jury found that Beitzel was not negligent, but that there was 
negligence on the part of each of the four named defendants which was a proximate cause of any 
damages suffered by Beitzel. Therefore, even if an unnamed party who allegedly removed the 
lighted barricade from the site of the excavation had been included on the verdict form, all of the 
named defendants would have been liable to Beitzel. Also, if some negligence had been 
apportioned to an unnamed party, the four named defendants would not have been able to obtain 
contribution against the unnamed party pursuant to I.C. § 6-803, since the identity of the party 
was unknown. The verdict would not have been binding on the unnamed party, in any event. 
Beitzel v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 121 Idaho 709, 827 P.2d 1160 (1992). 
 
(7) Comparative fault and other varieties "fault" decisions: 
 




Once the jury finds there is negligence on the part of the driver and the passenger, it 
must weigh the negligence of each party to determine what part of percentage each 
party's negligence played in causing the accident. This weighing process is done on the 
same scale, without regard to whether one was an adult and one was a child. 
Krieger v. Howell, 109 Idaho 704, 710 P.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1985). 
 
(b)  Negligence per se: Should the fact that a party's conduct is negligence per se affect the 
allocation of responsibility? 
 
Porter's violation of I.C. § 49-640 (1) by failing to yield [was] negligence per se. [] This does not, 
however, compel a conclusion that Porter's negligence exceeded that of Vaughn. The function of 
negligence per se is not to assign to a defendant a degree of fault; the effect of demonstrating 
negligence per se is to conclusively prove the first two elements of a negligence cause of action, 
namely, the existence of a duty and a breach thereof. [] Once proved, negligence per se does not 
differ in its legal consequences from ordinary negligence. 
Vaughn v. Porter, 140 Idaho 470, 95 P.3d 88 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 
(7)  The jury's role: Should the jury be informed of the effect of their assessment of comparative 
fault? In Seppi, the Idaho Supreme Court considered this question. It noted that several jurisdictions had 
concluded that to so instruct the jury was reversible error because it undercut the theoretical basis of the 
special verdict which is intended to prevent bias. The court doubted the value of such verdicts in 
preventing bias: "jurors are concerned about the effect of their verdicts on the ultimate outcome of the 
case and the use of a special verdict or special interrogatories does not magically eliminate that well 
known trait of American juries." Additionally, the court felt that this tendency was at least arguably a virtue 
rather than a vice. Regardless of whether a vice or virtue, jurors speculate and "in those instances where 
the legal effect of their answers is not so obvious, the jurors will speculate often incorrectly and thus 
subvert the whole judicial process." The court continued: 
 
It is this latter problem, juries speculating on the effect of their answers, that creates a 
unique danger when the issues in a comparative negligence case in Idaho are submitted to a jury 
in a special verdict form. A jury uninformed about the precise working of the Idaho comparative 
negligence law, when presented with questions asking them to apportion the negligence between 
the parties and to fix the total amount of damages, is likely to assume that the plaintiff's recovery 
will be reduced in proportion to his negligence. In such situation the Idaho comparative 
negligence rule, which bars recovery if the plaintiff's negligence is50% or more, poses a trap for 
the uninformed jury. The jury may become frustrated with the formidable task of determining as a 
matter of fact what percentage of the total negligence in the case is attributable to the various 
acts of the various parties and treat the question as one which requires them to determine how 
much of the plaintiff's damages the defendant should be responsible for. In the case where it is 
clear that both parties were negligent to some extent, a 50-50 allocation of negligence is 
singularly attractive to a jury, particularly in a highly contested case or one in which the jurors 
themselves are sharply divided. Consequently, a jury, not knowing the critical importance Idaho 
law places on a finding of 50% negligence, may reach such a verdict too quickly and without 
carefully examining the facts. The rule against informing the jury of the effect of a 50-50 allocation 
of negligence of course places the defense counsel in a position to exploit the sense of equity 
implied in such a finding without the plaintiff's counsel being able to argue the critical legal import 
of such a determination. Thus, the uninformed jury could easily deceive itself into believing that it 
has decided that the defendant should pay for half of the plaintiff's damages when in fact it has 
determined that the plaintiff will recover nothing at all. 
 
Contrast that situation to one in which the jury is composed of members at least some of 
whom have learned from prior jury experience or other sources how the comparative negligence 
law in Idaho actually operates. A reminder in the deliberations by one of the jurors that a finding 
of 50% negligence will result in no recovery by the plaintiff is likely to cause the jurors to examine 
the facts more closely before quickly coming to the appealing 50-50 allocation of negligence. 




much upon how "courtwise" the members of the jury are as upon how the jurors view the facts. In 
short, not informing the jury of the effect of a 50% negligence finding in many cases is likely to 
cause an unjust result and produce a judgment which does not reflect the wisdom of the jury or 
their view of the facts, but only their ignorance of Idaho law. 
Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d683 (1978). The court applied the reasoning from Seppi to the 
question of joint and several liability in Luna v. Shockey Sheet Metal & Welding Co., 113 Idaho 193, 743 
P.2d 61 (1987). 
 
(8)  Negligence and intent: Is plaintiffs claim to be reduced under the comparative fault scheme if 
defendant's conduct is intentional rather than negligent? The court held that, since the statute does not 
limit its applicability of negligence and it definition of tortfeasor is very broad, the statute applies to 
intentional conduct. Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 80, 14 P.3d 1074 (Ct. App. 2000). 




2. WHAT IT MEANS: THE EFFECTS OF COMPARATIVE FAULT ON THE 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 
 
As the courts developed the tort of negligence, they created a variety of doctrines that reflected a 
fundamental policy decision: if plaintiffs conduct contributed to the injury-causing event and that conduct 
was less than reasonably careful, the plaintiff was barred from recovering for her injuries regardless of the 
relative degree of culpability of plaintiff and defendant. This policy was explicitly stated in the defenses of 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk. But it was also implicit in a variety of other situations that 
were often stated as no-duty rules-for example, recall the rule emphasized by the dissent in McKinley v. 
Fanning that a lessor has no duty to remove a risk that the lessor created if the lessee is aware of the 
risk- or as proximate cause. For example, there was the plaintiffs conduct in Rowe v. Union Pacific which 
the court treated as a superseding cause. As long as contributory negligence was a complete bar to 
recovery, it made no difference whether plaintiffs conduct was viewed as contributory negligence or 
proximate cause or subject to a no-duty rule: plaintiff’s conduct precluded recovery. 
 
In 1971, however, the Idaho legislature replaced contributory negligence with a system 
of comparative fault under which the jury is required to assess the degree to which the conduct of all of 
the actors contributed to the accident. With that decision, the courts were presented with a quandary 
since a no-duty rule continued to bar all recovery while comparative fault did not automatically do so. Did 
the legislative abrogation of contributory negligence affect all situations in which a plaintiff’s conduct 
arguably is a cause of her injury? 
 
 
HARRISON v. TAYLOR 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989) 
 
BISTLINE, J.-This is a trip and fall case. The Harrisons brought a negligence action against the owner 
and lessor of a building for injuries sustained from a fall when her shoe allegedly caught the lip of a hole 
in a private sidewalk. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis that 
the hole was an open and obvious danger. 
 
On August 14, 1985, at about noon, plaintiff Norma Harrison and her husband made a business 
visit to Gloria's House in Bloom, operated by defendant Gloria Struchen, in order to pickup a floral 
arrangement. The sidewalks were dry that day. While approaching Gloria's House in Bloom, Mrs. 
Harrison encountered what she described as a hole. A section of concrete was missing from the private 
sidewalk due to "flaking." A slab had been removed and gravel remained. Mrs. Harrison stated in her 
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deposition that she successfully negotiated the hole when entering the floral shop by stepping into the 
middle of it. 
 
After being informed that her flowers were not ready, Mrs. Harrison began to leave the floral 
shop. She carried a checkbook and shoulder bag. As she exited, plaintiff walked on the sidewalk closest 
to the building and stepped over the hole with her right foot. She saw the hole. 
Her left foot caught the lip of the hole and plaintiff fell, breaking both arms. She hit the sidewalk with such 
force that the fall flattened a metal bracelet she was wearing. The hole was in the same condition it had 
been when she entered the shop. 
 
The affidavit of James Ann establishes that prior to Mrs. Harrison's fall, he too tripped 
on the lip of the hole and informed defendants Struchen that the hole constituted a defect which should 
be remedied. His affidavit states that the defect extended across the full length of the sidewalk, or 49 
inches. The width of the hole throughout its extension ranged from 20 1/2 inches on the east side to about 
8 inches on the west side. The south edge of the depression had ridges ranging from 1/2 inches to 1 inch 
in height. 
 
Plaintiff and her husband commenced an action against the owners and the tenants alleging 
negligent maintenance and failure to repair the defect in the sidewalk. Daniel Harrison seeks damages for 
loss of consortium. The building is owned by a partnership which includes defendant Taylor. 
Defendant/tenants-in-possession are Gloria Struchen, doing business as Gloria's House in Bloom, and 
Ed Struchen, doing business as Ed's Office Products. 
 
All defendants moved for summary judgment. A hearing was held. The Harrisons filed a 
motion to join additional defendants who owned the building in partnership with the Taylors. The 
trial judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the open and obvious doctrine.... 
 
This appeal requires us to consider these issues: 
 
(1)  Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for the defendants based on 
the open and obvious danger doctrine; 
 
 
The judicially-created open and obvious danger doctrine has served this state long but not 
particularly with an even hand since the legislature established comparative negligence in 1971. To date, 
our cases have established two lines of authority. One line, represented by Otts v. Brough, 90 Idaho 
124,409 P.2d 95 (1965), states that owners or persons in charge of property owe to an invitee the duty to 
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn of hidden dangers which the owner or person 
in charge knows or should know by the exercise of reasonable care. However, this duty does not extend 
to dangers known to the visitor. Otts; accord McCasland v. Floribec, Inc., 106 Idaho 841, 683 P.2d877 
(1984); Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1980). 
 
The other line, represented by Ryals v. Broadbent, 98 ldaho 3922,565 P.2d 982 (1977), and 
Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984), holds that there is an exception to the 
open and obvious danger defense when the injured party encounters a known danger while acting in the 
course of employment. The rationale for the exception is that an employee is faced with an economic 
compulsion, i.e., possible loss of employment, which implicitly encourages the employee to encounter the 
danger or hazard notwithstanding that he or she perceives the risk. Keller, accord Marcher v. Butler, 113 
Idaho 867, 749 P.2d486 (1988). 
 
[W]e base our decision today on a broader reading of our cases and of the legislative intent 
derived in Idaho's comparative negligence statute. We do not today simply extend the Ryals/Keller 
employee exception from the open and obvious danger doctrine to the facts of this case. Instead, as 
explained below, we simplify the standard of care applicable to both owners and occupiers of land - and 
to the invitees who come upon the premises. Fundamental to our decision is the legislative mandate that 




In Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 695 P.2d 369 (1985), we concluded that application 
of the implied assumption of risk doctrine is untenable in the era of comparative negligence established 
by I.C. § 6-801. We reasoned as follows: 
 
The scope of I.C. § 6-801 is broad. It is not limited to certain types of action; it is not limited by 
exceptions. Rather, it covers any action in which the plaintiff is seeking to recover on grounds of 
negligence. Section 6-801's intent is clear: Contributory negligence is not to be a complete bar to 
recovery; instead, liability is to be apportioned between the parties based on the degree of fault 
for which each is responsible. 
 
We find no reason that justifies the continued use of assumption of risk as an absolute 
bar to recovery in light of I.C. § 6-801's mandate and intent. Rather, we think reason and logic 
compel us to hold that § 6-801 applies to any use of assumption of risk as a defense, **** 
Therefore, assumption of risk shall no longer be available as an absolute bar to recovery in any 
action instituted in this state. As we mentioned above, to hold otherwise, would be to perpetuate a 
gross legal inconsistency by prohibiting the use of contributory negligence as an absolute bar yet 
allow its effect to continue under the guise of assumption of risk. [] 
 
We find support for this approach to the relationship of comparative negligence to assumption of 
risk in the language of Professor Schwartz: 
 
A rigorous application of implied assumption of risk as an absolute defense could serve to 
undermine seriously the general purpose of a comparative negligence statute to apportion 
damages on the basis of fault. This is perhaps the reason that every commentator who has 
addressed himself to this specific problem has agreed that plaintiff should not have his claim 
barred if he has impliedly assumed the risk, but rather that this conduct should be considered in 
apportioning damages under the statute. 
V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.5, at 180 (2d ed.  1986). He notes only one 
jurisdiction "vigorously applies" assumption of risk as an absolute defense after the adoption of 
comparative negligence. [] 
 
We believe there are no significant differences between the implied assumption of risk 
and the open and obvious danger defenses. In fact, in this jurisdiction the doctrine first appeared in a 
case which virtually equated assumption of risk with the open and obvious defense: 
 
The invitee assumes all normal, obvious and ordinary risks attendant on the use of the premises 
and the owner is under no duty to reconstruct or alter the premises so as to obviate known or 
obvious dangers. [] 
Alsup v. Saratoga Hotel, 71 Idaho 229,229 P.2d 985 (1951), cited in Otts v. Brough, 90 Idaho 124,409 
P.2d 95 (1965). 
 
The open and obvious danger doctrine is recognized as a corollary rule to assumption of 
risk. [] The words are different, but the conduct of a person injured when confronting a known danger is 
the same. Where Salinas has cut the heart out of assumption of risk, the same rationale and reasoning 
mandates an identical operation upon the open and obvious danger defense. [] 
 
That the open and obvious danger defense operates inappropriately to bar recovery under the 
comparative negligence regime of I.C. §6-801 was recognized by our Court of Appeals in its Keller v. 
Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 1112 (ct. App. 1983): 
 
There is also a statutory reason in Idaho to treat an invitee's knowledge or the 
obviousness of a danger as a limitation of liability rather than as an excuse of duty. Since 1971, 
Idaho has been a comparative negligence state. I.C. § 6-801 provides that the plaintiff’s 
contributory negligence does not bar recovery in a negligence action, so long as his negligence is 
not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Rather, any 
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damages awarded to the plaintiff are reduced in proportion to the amount of causal negligence 
attributable to him. 
 
Prior to the advent of comparative negligence, contributory negligence was an absolute 
bar to recovery. Thus, it made little difference whether a known or obvious condition excused a 
land possessor's duty to an invitee, or simply insulated the possessor from liability for any breach 
of such duty. In either event, the injured invitee could not recover. But under the comparative 
negligence system, the difference is profound. If duty is not excused by a known or obvious 
danger, the injured invitee might recover, albeit in a diminished amount, if his negligence in 
encountering the risk is found to be less than the land possessor's negligence in allowing the 
dangerous condition or activity on his property. In contrast, if the invitee's voluntary encounter 
with a known or obvious danger were deemed to excuse the land owner's duty, then there would 
be no negligence to compare- and, therefore, no recovery. The effect would be to resurrect 
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery in cases involving a land possessor's 
liability to invitees. 
[] 
 
[W]e join ... numerous state and federal courts ...and hereby retire the open and obvious danger 
doctrine. Henceforward, owners and occupiers of land will be under a duty of ordinary care under the 
circumstances towards invitees who come upon their premises.... 
 
Today's opinion harmonizes our case law with the comparative negligence statute passed 
by the legislature in 1971. We have been already operating in the context of comparative negligence; now 
the legislative policy expressed in I.C. § 6-801 will operate freely. The jury will compare the owner or 
occupier of land's behavior versus that of invitees who come upon the premises. Disputes in this area will 
normally present a jury question under particular facts, unless reasonable minds could not differ. 
McKinley v. Fanning, 100 Idaho 189,595 P.2d 1084 (1979). 
 
 
OLIVER & TOWLES, JJ. PROTEM., concur. 
 
JOHNSON, J., dissenting.  
 




(1)  Recall that I.C. § 6-801 provides "[c]ontributory negligence or comparative responsibility shall not 
bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence, 
gross negligence or comparative responsibility resulting in death or in injury to person or property." Is 
"contributory negligence" simply a synonym for "plaintiff's conduct that contributes to an injury-causing 
event? 
 
This issue has been examined in cases excerpted earlier in these materials. In addition to the 
court of appeals consideration of the question in Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 
1112 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984) which is excerpted in 
Harrison- the majority and dissent in McKinley v. Fanning, 100 Idaho 189, 595 P.2d 1084 (1979),also 
debated the proper classification of the plaintiff lessee's conduct and the defendant lessor's obligation: 
should plaintiff's knowledge be treated as a limitation on defendants potential liability, i.e., comparative 
fault, or as an excuse of duty, i.e., as the basis for a no duty rule? As Harrison, Keller, and McKinley 
suggest, the effect of comparative fault on duty rules is potentially significant. 
 
(2)  "Natural" vs. human conditions: Plaintiff slipped and fell in a snow-covered parking lot. The Idaho 





we are not able to discern how we could construe the statute to allow an exemption for 
negligence as to natural accumulations. To do so would require us to construe the statute as 
allowing us to apply comparative negligence in some cases but not in others. As we read the 
statute, it does not allow us to do that. The statute speaks categorically about actions in 
negligence. 
Robertson v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 117 Idaho 979, 793 P.2d 211 (1990). Justice Bakes 
dissented, arguing that there was a difference between contributory negligence and no duty 
 
(3)  Orthman v. Idaho Power Co.: A rural residential customer was electrocuted while attempting to 
reconnect his electrical service. He brought suit against the electricity provider alleging in part that it was 
liable for his injuries because it had negligently terminated his service. The district court dismissed the 
complaint. 
 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed: 
 
the district court determined that Russell Orthman's actions in attempting self help to reconnect 
his electrical service was an intervening cause which would intervene in the causal link between 
Idaho Power's breach of duty and the cause of the injuries.... In light of our previous holdings 
requiring an act by a third person or other force to establish an intervening, superseding cause, 
Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., []. 
 
It seems unlikely that Russell Orthman's actions could be viewed as an intervening cause and 
there is no allegation that a third party was the intervening, superseding cause. 
Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 895 P.2d 561, 126 Idaho 960 (1995). 
 
The court reaffirmed this holding in Brooks v. Logan. Decedent was a student who committed 
suicide; his parents brought a wrongful death action against the school district, arguing that one of the 
student's teachers should have taken steps to prevent the suicide. The defendants argued in part that the 
students’ act of taking his own life was a superseding cause that precluded their liability. The court 
rejected this argument because a superseding cause is an act of a third party and there was no party. 
Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 903 P.2d 73 (1995). 
 
(4)           A confusion of doctrines: An example of the confusion of doctrines that can be applied to bar 
plaintiff's recovery when plaintiff's conduct contributes the injury-causing event is presented in Jacobsen. 
Grace O'Connor was separated from her husband, Dan. When Ms. O'Connor heard that her husband 
intended to shoot her, she took refuge in a third person's house. In attempting to protect her, the third 
person was shot and wounded by Mr. O'Connor. Mr. O'Connor subsequently was determined to be 
insane and confined to the state hospital in Blackfoot. He walked away from the hospital, returned, and 
shot Martin Jacobsen who had been employed by Ms. O'Connor to protect her. The court upheld a 
dismissal of plaintiff's action against the director of the state hospital and the county sheriff. Its decision, 
however, offered a jumble of reasons: 
 
It is clear from the complaint, that [plaintiff] was apprised and knew of O'Connor's affliction with 
homicidal insanity ...Possessed of such knowledge, [plaintiff] took employment and voluntarily 
placed himself in a position, subjecting himself to any attack that might be made by O'Connor. In 
cases of personal injury, the law looks to the proximate and not the remote cause. [] The 
proximate cause of [plaintiffs] injuries was his acceptance of employment, going to and remaining 
at the place when and where he knew the offense was likely to be committed, if at all. 
Jacobsen v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 132 P.2d 773 (1943). Was plaintiff precluded from recovering 
because he accepted the risk? Because his knowledge of the danger was an intervening, superseding 
cause? Such confusion is not uncommon and was of comparatively little practical effect as long as the all-
or-nothing principle remained central to common law negligence. Should plaintiff's conduct ever be a legal 
bar to recovery or should the issue always go to the jury for a determination of the percentage 




For other examples, see Joyner v. Jones, 97 Idaho 647,551 P.2d 602 (1976) ("danger [of another 
visitor's presence] was either known by [decedent] or so obvious and apparent as to charge him with 
knowledge of it" and thus the landowner owed decedent not duty); Metz v. Haskell, 91 Idaho 160, 417 
P.2d 898 (1966) ("as a matter of law ... the ladder involved in this case was a 'simple tool,' that the 'simple 
tool doctrine' applies, that the defendant owed no duty to inspect, warn or protect and that there was, 
therefore, no negligence on the part of defendant"). 
 
 
[B] ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
 
 
ROUNTREE v. BOISE BASEBALL, LLC 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
-Idaho-, 296 P.3d 373 (2013) 
 
J. JONES, J.- [Bud Rountree has been a Boise Hawks season ticket holder for over 20 years. On August 
13, 2008, he took his wife and two grandchildren to a Boise Hawks game at Memorial Stadium in Garden 
City. He was struck a foul ball and lost his eye. The Hawk's owner moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that Rountree impliedly consented to the risk of being hit by a foul ball. The district court denied the 






C. Primary implied assumption of risk is not a valid defense in Idaho 
 
In ...Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 989, 695 P.2d 369, 374 (1985), ...this Court held that 
"assumption of risk shall no longer be available as an absolute bar to recovery."... 
 
The sole issue here is whether, in light of Salinas and Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 
7n P2d 722 (1989)], primary implied assumption of risk is a viable defense in Idaho. We reaffirm 
Salinas's holding that assumption of the risk has no legal effect as a defense, except in instances 
of express written or oral consent. Thus, primary implied assumption of the risk is not a valid defense. 
 
Generally speaking, the implied assumption of risk doctrine "is divided into two subcategories: 
'primary' and 'secondary."' []. Secondary implied assumption of risk "is an affirmative defense to an 
established breach of duty and as such is a phase of contributory negligence." [] Conversely, primary 
implied assumption of risk essentially means that the defendant was not negligent because there was no 
breach, or no duty. Id. Primary implied assumption of risk arises when "the plaintiff impliedly assumes 
those risks that are inherent in a particular activity." [] In contrasting the two subcategories, some courts 
have held that primary implied assumption of the risk, because it is "treat[ed] as part of the initial duty 
analysis, rather than as an affirmative defense," is compatible with comparative negligence schemes. Id.; 
but see Pfenning v. Lineman, 947N.E.2d392, 399-400(ind. 2011) (holding to the contrary that "incurred 
risk, even when characterized as objectively-assessed primary assumption of risk, cannot be a basis to 
find the absence of duty on the part of the alleged tortfeasor''). 
 
Idaho uses a comparative negligence standard. I.C. § 6-801 ("Contributory negligence or 
comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to 
recover damages for negligence...."). This creates a logical inconsistency with assumption of risk, which 
by definition bars recovery based on comparative responsibility. See Salinas, 107 Idaho at 989, 695 P.2d 
at 374. Thus, this Court held in Salinas that, "the use of assumption of risk as a defense shall have no 
legal effect in this state." Id. At the same time, Salinas identified limited circumstances in which 
assumption of the risk may still be used as a defense.





The one exception to our holding today involves a situation where a plaintiff, either in 
writing or orally, expressly assumes the risk involved. In such a case, the plaintiffs assumption of 
the risk will continue to be a complete bar to recovery. Again, in order to avoid misunderstanding 
and confusion, the terminology of assumption of risk, however, should not be used. Rather, since 
express assumption of risk clearly sounds in contract and not tort, [] the correct terminology to 
use to assert this defense should be that of "consent" or something of a similar nature. 
Id. 
 
Four years later the Winn Court revisited Salinas, and in particular, its import on primary implied 
assumption of risk. Winn, []. While noting the disparate ways in which courts framed the duty at issue 
there, the Winn Court explained that: 
 
Defendants have suggested that we use assumption of the risk in the "primary sense" as the 
basis for our acceptance of the fireman's rule, despite the general rejection of assumption of the 
risk as a defense in Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 695 P.2d 369 (1985).We note with interest 
at that the special concurrence of Justice Spear in Fawcett v. lrby, 92 Idaho 48, 54-6, 436 P.2d 
714, 720-21 (1968), that was relied upon by Justice Bistline in Salinas, (107 Idaho at 988, 990, 
695 P.2d 369), carefully distinguished assumption of the risk in the "primary sense" from 
assumption of the risk in the "secondary sense," i.e., as a form of contributory negligence. Our 
reading of Salinas convinces us, however, that any implied rejection of assumption of the risk in 
the "primary sense" by the majority there was only dicta. The facts of Salinas were appropriate for 
the application of assumption of the risk in the "secondary sense" only. We do not, therefore, feel 
bound not to consider whether Salinas declared assumption of the risk in the "primary sense" no 
longer viable. Nevertheless, we decline to premise our decision here upon such a nebulous and 
confounded concept. 
 
Id. In sum, although Salinas barred assumption of risk in general, our decision in Winn forestalled 
resolving whether primary assumption of risk was somehow different. 
 
We reaffirm our holding in Salinas: the use of assumption of risk as a defense shall have no legal 
effect. Furthermore, we resolve the question left open by Winn, and hold that the general rule from 
Salinas applies to both primary and secondary assumption of the risk. Thus, primary implied assumption 
of the risk is not a valid defense. As this Court explained in Salinas, "Section 6-801's intent is clear: 
Contributory negligence is not to be a complete bar to recovery; instead, liability is to be apportioned 
between the parties based on the degree of fault for which each is responsible." Salinas, 107 Idaho at 
989, 695 P.2dat 374. Accordingly, the Salinas Court warned of the "gross legal inconsistency [of] 
prohibiting the use of contributory negligence as an absolute bar," while allowing "its effect to continue" 
through assumption of risk defenses. Id. Because "[t]he types of issues raised by a plaintiff's non-express 
assumption of risk are readily handled by contributory negligence principles," we concluded that "issues 
should be discussed in terms of contributory negligence, not assumption of risk, and applied accordingly 
under our comparative negligence laws." Id. 
 
Based on this analysis, we are not persuaded that primary implied assumption of the risk should 
be treated any differently. Allowing assumption of risk as an absolute bar is inconsistent with our 
comparative negligence system, whether the risks are inherent in an activity, or not. Moreover, cases 
involving primary implied assumption of the risk are "readily handled" by comparative negligence 
principles; as in any case, fault will be assessed, and liability apportioned, based on the actions of the 
parties. Whether a party participated in something inherently dangerous will simply inform the 
comparison, rather than wholly preclude it. Here, whether watching baseball is inherently dangerous, and 
the degrees of fault to be apportioned to Rountree and Boise Baseball, are questions for the jury. 
Because comparative negligence can adroitly resolve these questions, there is no need for this Court to 









.... We ... hold that, apart from express written and oral consent, assumption of the risk, whether 
primary or secondary, is not a valid defense in Idaho. 
 





{1) What was the basis for the court's decision? 
 
{2) Consent rather than assumption of risk? Lee v. Sun Valley Co.: The decision in Salinas was 
announced on January 10; four days later the court denied rehearing in Lee v. Sun Valley Co. Lee was a 
tourist from New Jersey who signed up for a trail ride. He signed a form entitled "Rental Agreement- 
Saddle Animals For Hire" which stated: 
 
Upon my acceptance of horse and equipment, I acknowledge that I assume full responsibility for 
my safety. I further understand that I ride at my own risk, and I agree to hold the above entity, its 
officers, employees, etc., harmless from every and all claim which may arise from injury, which 
might occur from use of said horse and/or equipment, in favor of myself, my heirs, 
representatives or dependents. I understand that the stable does not represent or warrant the 
quality or character of the horse furnished. 
 
Halfway through the ride, plaintiffs saddle loosened and began to slide forward on the 
horse. Since plaintiff was riding the last horse in the group, his calls for help were not heard by 
the trail guide who was riding the first horse. "Plaintiff stopped the horse and, while attempting to 
dismount, the saddle rotated on the horse. The horse reared and threw the plaintiff to the ground 
causing injuries to his back." Plaintiff sued for his injuries, attacking the exculpatory clause. The court 
began its analysis by noting that it had 
 
previously held that parties to a transaction may agree by contract to limit liability for negligence 
or contractually waive rights and remedies, subject to certain exceptions. See Steiner Corp. v. 
American District Telegraph, 106 Idaho 787, 683 P.2d 435 (1984); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. 
Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 595 P.2d 709 (1979); Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 
Idaho 496, 465 P.2d 107 (1970). The validity of the exculpatory contract in the present case is not 
attacked on the basis of defects in formation since plaintiff admits that he read and signed the 
contract, and he alleges no failure of consideration. Plaintiff does argue that the language of the 
contract is ambiguous and should be construed against Sun Valley; however, we find no merit in 
this argument. The agreement clearly and simply states that Sun Valley should be held "harmless 
for every and all claim which may arise from injury, which might occur from use of said horse 
and/or equipment," which is both unambiguous and applicable to the facts alleged by plaintiff. 
Therefore, it appears that unless the exculpatory contract falls within some exception to the 
general rule set out in the Steiner, Anderson & Nafziger, and Rawlings cases, the agreement 
signed by the plaintiff absolves Sun Valley of any liability. 
 
The general rule that "express agreements exempting one of the parties for negligence 
are to be sustained" is subject to exceptions where: "(1) one party is at an obvious disadvantage 
in bargaining power; (2) a public duty is involved (public utility companies, common carriers)." 
Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho at 499-500, 465 P.2d at 110-111. Plaintiff 
concedes that he had no disadvantage in bargaining power but argues that the second exception 
applies on the theory that the statutes regulating outfitters and guides impose a public duty upon 
Sun Valley. Utilities and carriers were named in the Rawlings case as obvious examples of 
parties owing a public duty, but there may be others who also owe a public duty in Idaho. The 
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idea of a public duty is closely related to the idea of public policy and it is within the domain of the 
legislature, elected by the public, to determine such duties and policies. 
        
After reviewing the statutes establishing standards for licensing guides and outfitters, the court 
concludes that the statutes do not establish a "public duty." Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 
P.2d 361 (1984). 
 




At the common law there were four major immunities based upon the status of the alleged 
tortfeasor: 
 
A.  charitable 
B. governmental 
C.  interspousal 
D.  parental 
 
These immunities are an area in which dramatic change has occurred over the past thirty years. 
The interspousal and parental immunities have been replaced with the limited duty rules that were 
examined in the materials on duty. The common-law immunity for the conduct of governmental 
employees has been replaced by a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity - a waiver that, as is discussed 
below, is less than complete. Finally, there are a miscellaneous collection of statutory immunities. 
 
 




{1)  Rationales for charitable immunities: Three rationales have traditionally been advanced to justify 
an immunity for charitable institutions: 
 
trust fund: the donations that support the charity comprise a trust fund which could not be diverted 
to satisfy tort judgments. implied waiver: a person who accepts charity is presumed to have 
voluntarily waived any right to maintain an action for tortious treatment by her benefactor. 
inapplicability of respondeat superior: the doctrine is inapplicable to doctors and nurses because 
of the degree of skill exercised by such employees and because of the lack of control over their 
conduct. 
 
{2)    Wilcox v. ldaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, Inc.: Idaho originally recognized and applied the 
doctrine of charitable immunity in Wilcox. A paying patient brought an action for the alleged negligence of 
a student nurse employed by the hospital. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the hospital appealed 
arguing that it was immune from suit as a charity. The court reviewed the three rationales which had been 
adopted by various jurisdictions, concluding that immunity resulted from the implied waiver of the patient: 
"one who accepts the benefit of a charity enters into a relation which exempts one's benefactor from 
liability for the negligence of his servants in administering the charity." {Quoting Schoendorff v. Society of 
New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125,105 N.E. 92, 93{1915) (Cardozo, J.)). The majority found no incongruity 
in applying this theory to a plaintiff who was a paying rather than charity patient. Wilcox v. Idaho Falls 
Latter Day Saints Hospital, Inc., 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938). 
 
{3)  Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital: Eighteen years later, the inconsistency of 
implying a waiver in exchange for a charitable benefit when the benefit was not gratuitously conferred led 
to the rejection of the doctrine as applied to paying patients in Wheat. 
The court noted that 
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it seems illogical to say that a patient, who pays for the services of a hospital, is a recipient of 
charity, or waives any rights merely by becoming a patient in an institution which renders services 
to others on a charitable basis. 
Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 78 Idaho 60, 62, 297 P.2d 1041, 1042 (1956). 
 
(4)  Bell v. Presbytery of Boise: In Bell, the court completed the work begun in Wheat. The plaintiffs 
were the parents of a minor child who was injured on a church outing. The defendant argued that it was 
immune from suit as a charity engaged in charitable conduct. The court rejected this argument: 
 
In Idaho two cases, Wilcox v. Idaho Falls L.D.S. Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 
(1938), and Wheat v. Idaho Falls L.D.S. Hospital, 78 Idaho 60, 62,297 P.2d 1041, 1042(1956}, 
rejected all three classic grounds for charitable immunity, i.e., public policy, trust fund doctrine, 
and implied waiver by acceptance of benefits, excepting only the non-paying recipients of charity 
under the third category. Now it is time to go all the way and abrogate this doctrine in toto. 
Personal injury is no less painful, disabling, costly or damage-producing simply because negligent 
harm is inflicted by a charitable institution rather than a non-charitable one. As the author of one 
opinion stated: "It has not been right, is not now right, nor could it ever be right for the law to 
forgive any person or association of persons wronging any other person." This reasoning is 
equally applicable to non-paying recipients of charity as to those recipients who are able to pay 
for the services rendered. 
Bell v. Presbytery of Boise, 91 Idaho 374,421 P.2d 745 (1966). 
 
(5)  Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts of America, Inc.: In response to a request to 
revisit an immunity for charitable organizations, the court noted: 
 
Subject to certain exceptions, parties to a transaction may agree by contract to limit liability or 
waive rights and remedies. Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984). It would 
be improper for the Court to step in and imply a waiver that the parties did not agree to.                                                                     
Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007). 
 
(6)  The legislative response: One provision in the 1987 legislature's "tort reform" package applied to 
"charitable organizations." In 1990, the legislature amended the provision to apply to "nonprofit 
corporations": 
 
§6-1605: Limitation on Liability of Volunteers, Officers and Directors of Nonprofit Corporations and 
Organizations – 
 
(1) In any nonprofit corporation or organization as defined in6-1601(6), Idaho Code, officers, 
directors and volunteers who serve the nonprofit corporation or organization shall be personally 
immune from civil liability arising out of their conduct as an officer, director or volunteer, if such 
conduct is within the course and scope of the duties and functions of the individual officer, 
director or volunteer and at the direction of the corporation or organization .The provisions of this 
section shall not eliminate or limit, and no immunity is hereby granted for the liability of an officer, 
director or volunteer : 
 
(a) For conduct that is willful, wanton, or which involves fraud or knowing violation of the law; 
 
(b) To the extent coverage for such conduct under a policy of liability insurance, whether the 
policy is purchased by the corporation or organization, the individual officer, director, 
volunteer or some third party; 
 
(c) For any intentional breach or a fiduciary duty or duty of loyalty owed by the officer, 
director or volunteer to the corporation, organization or the members thereof; 
 
(d)  For acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct, fraud or 





(e)  For any transaction from which the officer, director or volunteer derived an improper 
personal benefit; 
 
(f) For any violation of the provisions of sections 30-321 (prohibiting loans by nonprofit 
corporations to its directors or officers] and 30-322 [making directors personally liable for 
wrongful distribution of the assets of a corporation], Idaho Code; or 
 
(g) For damages which result from the operation of a motor vehicle. 
 
Section 6-1601 defines 
 
(1)  "Charitable corporation or organization" means a corporation or organization including community 
chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international 
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision or athletic 
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net 
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part 
of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence 
legislation. 
 
(6) "Nonprofit corporation or organization" means a charitable corporation or organization; any other 
corporation organized or existing under chapter 3, title 10, Idaho Code, or an equivalent provision 
of the law of another state; or an unincorporated association; which corporation or unincorporated 
association is organized and existing exclusively for nonprofit purposes, which regularly bestows 
benefits to the community at large and no part of the net income of which is distributable to its 
members, directors or officers. 
 
 
2.  GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
 
a.  State-Law Limitations on Governmental Immunity 
 
Prior to 1970, the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Idaho was built upon a number of distinctions. 
For example, in Strickfadden v. Greencreek Highway District, 42 Idaho 738, 248 P. 456 (1926), plaintiff 
and his family were injured when their car ran into an unlighted pile of rock and dirt from an excavation in 
the roadway. Defendant argued that it was immune from suit as "a quasi-public corporation having the 
particular characteristics of a county." Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that a highway district is "a 
quasi-municipal corporation such as a city." The court offered the following discussion of the differences: 
 
Counties may be said to be true public corporations. They are local organizations, which 
for the purposes of civil administration are invested with a few functions characteristic of a 
corporate existence. They are legal political subdivisions of the state, created or superimposed by 
the sovereign power of the state of its own sovereign will, without any particular solicitation or 
consent of the people within the territory affected. []  
 
Cities, towns and villages may be classified as true municipal corporations, voluntarily 
organized under the general law at the request and with the concurrent consent of their members, 
and in addition to the exercise of the functions of self-government, transact matters of a quasi-
private or business character not governmental in their nature but rather proprietary or for the 
acquisition of private gain for the municipality and its citizens. [] 
 
Highway districts as intended by the Highway District Law, cannot be said to correspond 
identically, [], with either public corporations, or counties, or municipal corporations, or cities, 
towns or villages. They are quasi-municipal corporations, not political municipalities, not created 
PRIVILEGES 
406 
for purposes of government, but for a special purpose, namely, that of improving the highways 
within the district.... 
It is well settled that in the absence of an express statute to that effect, the state is not 
liable for damages either for nonperformance of its powers or for their improper exercise by those 
charged with their execution. Counties are generally likewise relieved from liability, for the same 
reason. They are involuntary subdivisions or arms of the state through which the state operates 
for convenience in the performance of its functions. In other words, the county is merely an agent 
of the state and since the state cannot be sued without its consent, neither may the agent be 
sued. [] 
 
It is well recognized that there are two kinds of duties imposed or conferred upon 
municipal corporations; those termed public governmental functions, where the municipality 
performs certain duties as an agent or arm of the state; and those other municipal activities which 
are sometimes termed administrative, ministerial, corporate, private, or proprietary functions, 
performed for the municipality's own benefit or for the benefit of its citizens, and while acting in 
the performance of its governmental functions or in a public capacity as an arm or agency of the 
state the municipality is not liable for its failure to exercise these powers or for their negligent 
exercise, unless such liability has been imposed by state. [] 
 
In its capacity as a private corporation a municipality stands on the same footing as 
would an individual or body of person upon whom a like special franchise had been conferred. 
Hence it is liable in the same manner as such individual or private corporation would be under like 
circumstances. [] Thus, municipalities are held liable for their torts in the performance of 
ministerial, private, corporate or proprietary functions. [] 
 
Since it has been held in this state that the building of roads is not a governmental duty 
but a ministerial one, Carson v. Genesee, 9 Idaho 244, 74 P. 862 (1903), and that a highway 
district does not perform governmental duties, []it does not appear necessary to lay down any 
exact rule for the determination of what is a governmental or proprietary function. 
 
It was against this background that the Idaho Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity in Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970). The court gave the legislature two years 
to draft legislation. The legislature responded by adopting the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) modeled on 
the Federal Torts Claims Act: 
 
TORT CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
 
§6-901:  Short title 
§6-902:  Definitions 
§6-903:  Liability of governmental entities-Defense of employees 
§6-904:  Exceptions to governmental liability 
§6-905:  Filing claims against state or employee-Time 
§6-906:  Filing claims against political subdivision or employee-Time 
§6-907:  Contents of claims-Filing by agent or attorney-Effect of inaccuracies 
§6-908:  Restriction on allowance of claims 
§6-909:  Time for allowance or denial of claims- Effect of failure to act 
§6-910:  Suit on denied claims permitted 
§6-911:  Limitation of actions 
§6-912:  Compromise and settlement by governing body 
§6-913:  Compromise and settlement by board of examiners 
§6-914:  Jurisdiction- Rules of procedure 
§6-915:  Venue 
§6-916:  Service of summons 
§6-917:  Recovery against governmental entity bar to action against employee 






§6-919: Liability insurance for state- Comprehensive plan by risk manager in the division of 
purchasing 
 
§6-920:  Liability insurance for state procured only by risk manager in division of purchasing 
 
§6-921:  Apportionment of cost of state plan 
§6-922:  Payment by state of claims or judgments when no insurance 
§6-923:  Authority of political subdivisions to purchase insurance 
§6-924:  Policy limits- Minimum requirements 
§6-925:  Policy terms not complying with act- Construction- Exception 
§6-926: Judgment or claim in excess of comprehensive liability plan- Reduction by court- Limits of 
liability 
 
§6-927:  Tax levy to pay comprehensive liability plan 




§6-901: Short title -This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Idaho tort claims act." 
 
§6-902: Definitions - As used in this act: 
 
1.  "State" means the state of Idaho or any office, department, agency, authority, 
commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university or other instrumentality thereof. 
 
2.  "Political subdivision" means any county, city, municipal corporation, health district, 
school district, irrigation district, special improvement or taxing district, or any other political 
subdivision or public corporation. 
 
3.  "Governmental entity'' means and includes the state and political subdivisions as herein defined. 
 
4.  "Employee" means an officer, employee, or servant of a governmental entity, including elected or 
appointed officials, and persons acting on behalf of the governmental entity in any official 
capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the governmental entity, whether with or 
without compensation, but the term employee shall not mean a person or other legal entity while 
acting in the capacity of an independent contractor under contract to the governmental entity to 
which this act applies in the event of a claim. 
 
5.  "Bodily injury'' means any bodily injury, sickness, disease or death sustained by any person and 
caused by an occurrence. 
 
6.  "Property damage" means injury or destruction to tangible property caused by an occurrence. 
 
7.  "Claim" means any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity or its 
employee which any person is legally entitled to recover under this act as compensation for the 
negligent or otherwise wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity or its employee when 
acting within the course or scope of his employment. 
 
§6-903: Liability of governmental entities - Defense of employees – 
 
a.  Except as otherwise provided in this act, every governmental entity is subject to liability for 
money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of 
its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties, whether arising 
out of a governmental or proprietary function, where the governmental entity if a private person or 
entity would be liable for money damages under the laws of the state of Idaho, provided that the 
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governmental entity is subject to liability only for the pro rata share of the total damages awarded 
in favor of the claimant which is attributable to the negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or 
omissions of the governmental entity or its employees. 
b.  A governmental entity shall provide a defense to its employee and be responsible for the payment 
of any judgment on any claim or civil lawsuit against an employee for money damages arising out 
of any act or omission within the course and scope of his employment; provided that the 
governmental entity and its employee shall be subject to liability only for the pro rata share of the 
total damages awarded in favor of a claimant which is attributable to the act or omission of the 
employee; provided further, that to the extent there is valid and collectible, applicable insurance 
or any other right to defense or indemnification legally available to and for the protection of such 
employee, the governmental entity's duty hereunder to indemnify and/or defend such claim on 
behalf of such employee shall be secondary to the obligation of such insurer or indemnitor, whose 
obligation shall be primary and provided finally, this paragraph shall not be construed to alter or 
relieve any such indemnitor or insurer of any legal obligation to such employee or to any 
governmental entity vicariously liable on account of or legally responsible for damages due to the 
allegedly wrongful error, omissions, conduct, act or deed of such employee. 
 
c.  The defense of its employee by the governmental entity shall be undertaken whether the claim 
and civil lawsuit is brought in Idaho district court under Idaho law or is brought in a United States 
court under federal law. The governmental entity may refuse a defense or disavow and refuse to 
pay any judgment for its employee if it is determined that the act or omission of the employee is 
not within the course and scope of his employment or included malice or criminal intent. 
 
d.  A governmental entity shall not be entitled to contribution or indemnification, or reimbursement for 
legal fees and expenses from its employee unless a court shall find that the act or omission of the 
employee was outside the course and scope of his employment or included malice or criminal 
intent. Any action by a governmental entity against its employee and any action by an employee 
against the governmental entity for contribution, indemnification, or necessary legal fees and 
expenses shall be tried to the court in the same civil lawsuit brought on the claim against the 
governmental entity or its employee. 
 
e.  For the purposes of this act and not otherwise, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that any act or 
omission of an employee within the time and the place of his employment is within the course and 
scope of his employment and without malice or criminal intent. 
 
f.  Nothing in this act shall enlarge or otherwise adversely affect the liability of an employee or a 
governmental entity. Any immunity or other bar to a civil lawsuit under Idaho or federal law shall 
remain in effect. The fact that a governmental entity may relieve an employee from all necessary 
legal fees and expenses and any judgment arising from the civil lawsuit shall not under any 
circumstances be communicated to the trier of fact in the civil lawsuit. 
 
§6-904: Exceptions to governmental liability- A governmental entity and its employees while acting 
within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable 
for any claim which: 
 
1.  Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity exercising ordinary 
care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a statutory or regulatory function, 
whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental 
entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused. 
 
2.  Arises out of the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by a governmental entity, whether 
such quarantine relates to persons or property. 
 
3.  Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of 





4.  Arises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard when engaged in training or duty under 
sections 316, 502, 503, 503, 505 or 709, title 32, United States Code. 
5.  Arises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard when engaged in combatant activities 
during a time or war. 
 
6.  Arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence or 
civil disturbances. 
 
7.  Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, 
bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is prepared in substantial 
conformance with engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan 
or design or approved in advance of the construction by the legislative body of the governmental 
entity or by some other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give 
such approval. 
 
§6-904A: Exceptions of Governmental Liability- A governmental entity and its employees while acting 
within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without 
reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any 
claim which: 
 
1.  Arises out of the assessment or collection of any tax or fee. 
 
2.  Arises out of injury to a person or property by a person under the supervision, custody or care of 
a governmental entity or by or to a person who is on probation or parole or any work-release 
program, or by or to a person receiving services from a mental health center, hospital or similar 
facility. 
 
§6-9048: Exceptions to Governmental Liability- A governmental entity and its employees while acting 
within the course and scope of their employment and without gross negligence or reckless, willful and 
wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which: 
 
1.  Arises out of the detention of any goods or merchandise by any Jaw enforcement officer. 
 
2.  Arises out of the cancellation or recision, or the failure to cancel or rescind, any motor vehicle 
registration and license plates for failure of the owner to verify or maintain motor vehicle liability 
insurance coverage. 
 
3.  Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, deny, 
suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization. 
 
4.  Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an inadequate inspection of any 
property, real or personal, other than the property of the governmental entity performing the 
inspection. 
 
5.  Arises out of any act or omission providing or failing to provide medical care to a prisoner, 
inmate or person in custody of any city, county or state jail, detention center or correctional 
facility. 
 
§6-904C: Definitions - For the purposes of this chapter, and this chapter only, the following words shall be 
defined as follows: 
 
1.  "Gross negligence" is the doing or failing to do an act which a reasonable person in a similar 
situation and of similar responsibility would, with a minimum of contemplation, ne inescapably 
drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not to do such act and that failing that duty shows 




2.  "Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person intentionally and knowingly 
does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a 
high degree of probability that such harm will result. 
 
§6-926: Judgment or claim in excess of comprehensive liability plan - Reduction by court -Limits of liability 
- 
a.  Property damage -The combined, aggregate liability of a governmental entity and its employees 
for damages, costs and attorney fees under this act, on account of damage to property, shall not 
exceed and is limited to one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) per occurrence, unless the 
governmental entity has purchased applicable, valid, collectible liability insurance coverage in 
excess of said amount, in which event the controlling limit shall be the then remaining available 
proceeds of such insurance. If any judgment or judgments, including costs and attorneys’ fees 
that may be awarded, are returned or entered, and in the aggregate total more than one hundred 
thousand dollars ($100,000), whether in one (1)or more such cases, the court shall reduce the 
amount of the award or awards, verdict or verdicts, or judgment or judgments in any case or 
cases within its jurisdiction so as to reduce said aggregate loss to said sum of one hundred 
thousand dollars ($100,000) or the limits provided by said valid, collectible insurance, if any, 
whichever was greater. In no case shall any court enter judgment, or allow any judgment to 
stand, which results in the limit of liability herein provided to the exceeded in any manner or 
respect. If any court has jurisdiction of two (2) or more such claims in litigation in which the 
adjudication is simultaneous and, in the aggregate, exceeds the limits above provided, the 
reduction shall be pro rata in a proportion consistent with the relative amounts of loss of the 
claimants before the court; otherwise, the reduction shall be determined and made in view of 
limits remaining after the prior settlement of any other such claims or the prior satisfaction of any 
other such judgments, and no consideration shall be given to other such outstanding claims, if 
any, which have not been settled or satisfied prior thereto. 
 
b.  Bodily or personal injury or death- The combined, aggregate liability of a governmental entity and 
its employees for damages, costs and attorney fees under this act, on account of bodily or 
personal injury or death of any person, shall not exceed and is limited to one hundred thousand 
dollars ($100,000) subject to the further limitation of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) in 
any one (1) accident or occurrence arising out of any occurrence wherein two (2) or more 
persons sustained such injury and/or death, unless the governmental entity has purchased 
applicable, valid, collectible liability insurance coverage in excess of said limits in which event the 
controlling limit shall be then remaining available proceeds of such insurance. If any judgment or 
judgments, including costs and attorney fees that may be awarded, are returned or entered, and 
in the aggregate total more than the applicable limit, whether in one (1)or more cases, the court 
shall reduce the amount of the award or awards, verdict or verdicts, or judgment or judgments, in 
any case or cases within its jurisdiction as to reduce said aggregate loss to said applicable 
statutory limit or the limits provided by said valid, collectible insurance, if any, whichever was [is] 
greater. 
 
Limits of liability above specified shall not be increased or altered by the fact that a 
decedent on account of whose death a wrongful death claim is asserted hereunder left surviving 
him or her more than (1) person entitled to make claim therefor, nor shall the aggregate recovery 
exceed the single limit provided for injury or death to any one (1) person in those cases in which 
there is both an injury claim and a death claim arising out of the injury to one (1) person, the 
intent of this section being to limit such liabilities and recoveries in the aggregate to one (1) limit 
only. 
 
The entire exposure of the entity and its employee or employees hereunder shall not be 
enlarged by the number of liable employees or the theory of concurrent or consecutive torts of 
tortfeasors or of a sequence of accidents or incidents if the injury or injuries or their 





In no case shall any court enter judgment, or allow any judgment to stand, which results 
in the limit of liability herein provided to be exceeded in any manner or respect. If any court has 
jurisdiction of two (2) or more such claims in litigation in which the adjudication is simultaneous 
and, in the aggregate, exceeds the limits above provided, the reduction shall be pro rata in a 
proportion consistent with the relative amounts of loss of the claimants before the court; 
otherwise, the reduction shall be determined and made in view of limits remaining after the prior 
settlement of any other claims or the prior satisfaction of any other such judgments, and no 
consideration shall be given to other such outstanding claims, if any, which have not been settled 
or satisfied prior thereto. 
 
The court shall reduce any judgment in excess of the limits provided by this act in any 
matter within its jurisdiction, whether by reason of the adjudication in said proceedings alone or of 
the total or aggregate of all such awards, judgments, settlements, voluntary payments or other 





(1)  The Act also specifies a detailed series of steps that the claimant must pursue. First, she must file 
notice of the claim with the governmental entity within 120 days of "the date the claim arose or reasonably 
should have been discovered." §§ 6-905, 6-906 The governmental entity then has 90 days to accept or 
reject the claim. § 6-909 If the claim is rejected, the claimant must file suit within two years. § 6-911. 
 
(2)  The Tort Claims Act has three primary components: 
 
(a) it adopts a rule of liability (§ 6-903); 
 
(b) it sets outs exceptions to that liability (§§ 6-904 to -9048); and 
 
(c) it creates special procedures applicable to claims against governmental units. 
 
As you examine the case excerpts, determine what is required for governmental liability under 
§§ 6-903 to -9048. 
 
SHERER v. POCATELLO SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 25 
 
Idaho Supreme Court  
143 Idaho 486, 148 P.3d 1232 (2006) 
 
SCHROEDER, C.K.: Alyssa Sherer and Nicole Santillanes appeal from the district court's order granting 
summary dismissal of their claims against Pocatello School District No. 25 based on the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act, Idaho Code §§ 6-901 et seq. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Alameda Junior High School sponsored a carnival to celebrate the last day of the school year and 
hired Cliffhanger Recreation, a local business, to provide activities for the students. One of the activities 
was a "bungee run," in which participants donned a harness tethered to a fixed object by a bungee cord. 
Participants ran on an inflated rubberized surface to see who could reach the farthest point before being 
snapped back by the bungee cord. Alyssa Sherer, a student at the school, was injured while participating 
in the bungee run. 
 
Alyssa and her mother, Nicole Santillanes, filed suit ... alleging that the injury was proximately 
caused by the school's negligence.... Shaylon and Roma Christiansen, who owned and operated 
Cliffhanger Recreation, were also named as defendants but are not part of this appeal. They have settled 
the claim against them .... 
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The school district moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was immune from tort 
liability under section 6-904A of the Idaho Tort Claims Act which provides limited immunity for injuries 
caused by persons "under supervision, custody or care of a governmental entity." The district court 
granted the motion, finding that the school's conduct did not rise to the level of recklessness and holding 
that the school district was therefore immune from liability under section 6-904A. The Appellants' motion 
for reconsideration was denied. They appeal to this Court, arguing that the district court erred in finding 
the school district was immune from liability for negligence .... 
 
 
Ill. THE TORT CLAIMS ACT 
 
Under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), I.C. §§ 6-901 et seq., state governmental entities that 
commit torts may generally be held liable for money damages to the same extent a private person would 
be liable under the circumstances: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, every governmental entity is subject to liability 
for money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions 
...where the governmental entity if a private person or entity would be liable for money damages 
under the laws of the state of Idaho.... I.C. § 6-903. 
 
A plaintiff seeking to recover on a tort claim against a governmental entity must survive three 
stages of analysis. [) First, the plaintiff must state a cause of action for which tort recovery would be 
allowed under the laws of Idaho, that is, "whether there is such a tort under Idaho law." [] Second, the 
plaintiff must show that "[no] exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged misconduct from 
liability." [] Third, if no exception applies, the plaintiff still must meet its burden of showing that it is entitled 
to recovery based on the merits of its claim. On a motion for summary judgment, therefore, a court must 
first determine whether the plaintiff has stated a valid tort under Idaho law and whether the ITCA provides 
immunity, after which it proceeds to consider "whether the merits of the claim as presented for 
consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle the moving party to judgment]." [] 
 
In this case there were apparently affidavits before the district court that are cited to this Court but 
not included in the record on appeal. However, there is a verified complaint which sets forth facts that 
would constitute negligence by the school district if established. These factual allegations are sufficient to 
analyze the applicability of the school district's claim of immunity for negligence. 
 
IV. IDAHO CODE SECTION 6-904A (2) DOES NOT PROVIDE IMMUNITY TO THE DISTRICT FOR THE 
CLAIM OF NEGLIGENCE 
 
A. The Appellants Have Stated a Cause of Action 
 
The school district bears "a common law duty to protect against the reasonably foreseeable risk 
of harm to a student while in the [d]istrict's custody." Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d 143, 148 
(1995) (emphasis omitted). This duty is not restricted to activities in the classroom: "Generally, schools 
owe a duty to supervise the activities of their students whether they be engaged in curricular activities or 
non-required but school sponsored extra-curricular activities." Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 331, 
116 Idaho 586, 590, 778 P.2d 336, 340 (1989) (quoting Albers v. Independent School District No. 302, 94 
Idaho 342, 344,487 P.2d936, 938 (1971)). 
 
The duty is not an absolute mandate to prevent all harm; rather, schools are obligated to exercise 
due care and take reasonable precautions to protect their students. See Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho at 
472, 716 P.2d at 1244.... The school's duty includes "anticipat[ing] reasonably foreseeable dangers and 
[taking] precautions protecting the child in its custody from such dangers." Bauer, (]. For that reason, "the 
fact that [a plaintiff’s] injuries were caused by a third party does not absolve [a]school district from liability 





The negligence claim relies upon a number of acts and omissions attributable to the school 
which, if proved, would constitute a breach of duty sufficient to allow a recovery for Alyssa's injuries. 
Alyssa was a student in the custody of the school and was injured while participating in a school-
sponsored activity. The Appellants allege that the school was negligent in choosing to conduct an 
unreasonably hazardous activity, in failing to supervise Alyssa during her participation in that activity, and 
in failing to supervise Cliffhanger to ensure that they provided adequate instruction and supervision. 
These allegations are sufficient to state a claim under Idaho law and for which they would be entitled to 
money damages against a private individual if established. 
 
B. The District Court Erred in Holding that the School District was Immune 
 
The ITCA was amended in 1988 by the addition of section 6-904A to provide limited immunity for 
government entities against tort claims arising out of injuries caused by third persons under the state's 
supervision. The statute in relevant part reads as follows: 
 
 A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their 
employment and without malice or criminal intent and without reckless, willful and wanton conduct 
as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which: 
2. Arises out of injury to a person or property by a person under supervision, custody or care of a 
governmental entity.... 
I.C. § 6-904A.21 The effect of the statute is to require a heightened showing of recklessness, as opposed 
to mere negligence, for such claims. In this way, "[t]he statute protects against ordinary negligence claims 
which would significantly impair effective governmental process yet allows fair compensation for 
egregious wrongs." Harris v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 301,847 P.2d 1156, 1162 
(1992). 
 
The school district's reading of section 6-904A would rewrite the language in subparagraph 2 to 
read, "Arises out of injury to a person or property of a person under supervision, custody or care of a 
governmental entity" rather than "Arises out of injury to a person or property by a person under 
supervision, custody or care of a governmental entity ..."(emphasis added). However, the legislative 
history and the language of the statute make it clear that the intent of the statute was to prevent recovery 
for negligence based upon a particular theory of recovery, i.e., that the government negligently failed to 
prevent third persons under its care from causing injury to members of the public. See Harris, [] (noting 
that the statute reflects a "deliberate policy choice "to overrule Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 
P.2d755 (1986),2 and was based on a legislative finding that the courts had extended liability too far in 
the other direction)....Section 6-904A(2) limits from negligence liability one particular causal pathway upon 
which a valid claim for relief might otherwise proceed, i.e., that the school failed to exercise reasonable 
care in preventing a person under its supervision from causing injury. The limitation upon that theory of 
liability does not limit other negligence claims. 
 
The district court held that because Alyssa was under the school's supervision the school was 
immune from liability unless the Appellants could show that the school was guilty of reckless, willful or 
wanton conduct. Finding no evidence of reckless conduct, the court granted the school's motion for 
summary judgment. The district court's ruling is correct to the extent the Appellants' claims might rely 
upon the school district's failure to prevent Alyssa from harming herself. A school district is immune "to 
the extent [a plaintiff] premises the negligent supervision claim on the School District's alleged failure to 
use reasonable care in supervising her, as a student, for any alleged harm she inflicted on herself...." Hei 
v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 73 P.3d94 (2003); see also Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 944 P.2d 709 
(1997) (school district immune from liability for negligent failure to supervise student so as to prevent him 
from committing suicide). However, "the immunity arises from the status of the person(s) causing the 
                                                     
21 Section 6-904C(2) states: 
        "Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act 
creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result. 
Sterling arose out of injuries caused by a probationer who was in violation of the terms of his probation. The Court allowed the 
possibility of recovery against the probation officer, noting the broad purpose of the ITCA of "attaining substantial justice.The 
legislature in response adopted Section 6-904A to limit the state's liability in such situations. See Harris, [] 
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injury, not the status of the person injured." Coonse, 132 Idaho at 806, 979P.2d at 1164.The fact that 
Alyssa was a student under the school's supervision would be relevant as to claims that the school failed 
to prevent her from harming herself. However, section 6-904A (2) does not limit her claims that she was 
injured as a consequence of the school's negligence in conducting a dangerous activity and failing to 
provide or ensure adequate supervision. Similarly, the allegation that the school planned and sponsored 
an unreasonably dangerous activity is premised on a theory of direct liability and does not rely on any 
claim that the injury was caused by a person under the school's supervision. Appellants should have been 
allowed to proceed on a theory of ordinary negligence with respect to this claim. 
 
The application of section 6-904A to the claim that the school district failed to properly supervise 
Cliffhanger depends on whether Cliffhanger was "under supervision, custody or care" of the school district 
within the meaning of the statute. Broadly interpreted, this phrase could be construed to include all 
employees or other persons acting on behalf of the government. However, if liability is to be the rule and 
immunity the exception, this language should be given a construction that avoids undoing section 6-903's 
creation of a right to recover against the state for its negligence. See Hei, []. 
 
The purpose of section 6-904A was to render the state immune from the unpredictable acts of 
third persons ...." Harris, [] In Hei, the Court declared that a school employee was not under the 
supervision, custody or care" of the school district within the meaning of section 6-904A. [] Thus, the 
school district is not immune from negligence liability for the acts of its employees under section 6-904A, 
even though it might be said to have negligently failed to supervise the employees under its supervision. 
 
In addition to "supervision, custody or care," section 6-904A (2) lists other categories including 
probation, parole, drug court programs, work-release programs, mental health centers, and hospitals. 
Each of these categories is a nonconsensual, custodial relationship under which it is primarily the 
government, rather than the individual, that bears a duty. The legislature was concerned with the 
unpredictable acts of third parties, Harris, [], not with the government's ability to control its own agents 
and contractors. Thus, although an independent contractor may be a third person whose performance is 
monitored by the government entity that hired it, the existence of a consensual, contractual relationship 
does not place that person under "supervision, custody or care" within the meaning of the statute. 
 
To the extent the Appellants' claims are premised upon the school's negligent supervision of 
Cliffhanger, section 6-904A does not limit the school district's liability. The claim that the school 





The summary judgment entered in favor of the school district is reversed and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 





(1)  The ITCA imposes two hurdles on plaintiffs: 
 
(a)  First, the plaintiff must state a cause of action for which tort recovery is possible under 
Idaho law. That is, there has to be a tort. What was the tort in Sherer? A garden-variety negligence 
action? Defendant was engaged in conduct (the bungee run) that involved a foreseeable risk of harm is 
the actions wasn't carried out carefully? 
 
Isn't the question: Would a private person engaged in the same conduct be potentially liable? If 
Bob Smith hired Cliffhanger Recreation to provide bungee runs to his daughter's friends at her birthday 




(b)  Second, the plaintiff must show that there is no exception to liability under the ITCA that 
shields the allegedly tortious conduct. 
 
(3) Exceptions to liability - arises out of an intentional tort: 
 
I.C. § 6-904 provides: 
 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their 
employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which 
... (3) Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse 
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. 
 
Recall White v. University of Idaho, the case involving the piano teacher and his student in which 
the student argued that the teacher's conduct was negligence rather than intentional. She did so to avoid 
§6-904(3). 
 
       In Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238(1986), the parents of children who had been 
sexually molested by a teacher brought an action against the school district. The court held that the 
school district was potentially liable for its negligent supervision of the teacher. Less than two years later 
in Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988), the United States Supreme Court agreed with the 
majority of the Idaho Supreme Court, holding that the United States could be held liable for injuries 
caused by an intoxicated sailor who fired several shots into an automobile. 
 
(3) There are a multitude of ITCA cases. 
 
 
b. Federal-Law Limitations on Governmental Immunity 
  
 
SHIELDS v. MARTIN 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
109 Idaho 132, 706 P.2d 21 (1985) 
 
 
BISTLINE, J. - [Stephen Shields and Laurie Halsey were divorced and custody of their child, Christopher, 
was awarded to Shields. Using a superseding court order, Halsey enlisted a Boise policeman, James 
Martin, to assist her in abducting Christopher from a daycare center. Following a verdict for Shields, 
Martin appealed.] 
 
Martin next argues that the district court erred in allowing the action to proceed against 
him on a theory of negligence, and that the liability imposed upon him must be reversed since negligence 
is an insufficient basis upon which to base a §1983 claim. 
 
Martin relies upon Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), to support his argument. Our review of 
Parratt leads us to the opposite conclusion. In that case, a prison inmate claimed a deprivation of property 
without due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1983 as a result of the 
negligent loss by prison officials of a mail-ordered hobby kit. The Supreme Court denied the inmate's 
claim. Holding that due process was not denied since state tort remedies were available to remedy the 
loss, the High Court stated: 
 
Nothing in the language of §1983 or its legislative history limits the statute solely to intentional 
deprivations of constitutional rights. In Baker v. McCollan, [443 U.S. 137 (1979)] we suggested 
that simply because a wrong was negligently as opposed to intentionally committed did not 




[] The Court went on to add: 
 
Both Baker v. McCollan and Monroe v. Pape, [365 U.S. 167(1961)] suggest that §1983 affords a 
"civil remedy" for deprivations of federally protected rights caused by persons acting under color 
of state Jaw without any express requirement of a particular state of mind. Accordingly, in any 
§1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 
action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting 
under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprive a person of rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. [] 
 
In response to these statements, Justice Powell disagreed. Believing that the Court decided this 
issue without fully addressing it, he concurred only in the result and wrote: "I do not believe that *** 
negligent acts by state officials constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, regardless of whatever subsequent procedure a state may or may not provide." [] 
 
Justice Marshall concurring in part and dissenting in part, made clear that he did concur in that 
part of the opinion which held that negligent conduct by persons acting under color of state law may be 
actionable under §1983. [] As the majority opinion and Justice Marshall point out, the crux of whether a 
negligent cause of action under § 1983 may be made out is whether the alleged constitutional deprivation 
is redressable through resort to an adequate state tort remedy procedure. [] Thus, if an adequate state 
tort remedy is available, no § 1983 cause of action is maintainable; however, if an adequate remedy is not 
available, such an action is maintainable. 
 
Our analysis of Parratt is in accord with the conclusions reached by two Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals panels, Haygood v. Younger, 718 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[N]egligence alone can support a 
section 1983 cause of action."); Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982)("In Parratt, the Supreme 
Court held that negligent conduct by persons acting under color of state law may be actionable under 42 
U.S.C. 1983.There is no express requirement of a particular state of mind in Section 1983."), and two 
First Circuit Court of Appeals panels, Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42 (ist Cir. 1982), cert. denied in 
part, 103 S. Ct. 343 (1982), affd on other grounds sub nom. Chardon v. Sate, 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983) 
("Liability may be grounded on negligence alone."). 
 
In this case, no adequate state tort remedy exists. Both parties concede, and the district court 
below held, that under current Idaho law Martin is immune from any state tort remedy under the Idaho 
Tart Claims Act in light of the interpretation given to that Act by this Court in Chandler v. City of Boise, 104 
Idaho 480, 660 P.2d 770 (1983). Thus, we hold that a negligent cause of action is maintainable in this 





(1) 42 U.S.C.  §1983: Originally enacted in 1871, § 1983 is one of a series of civil rights statutes: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, or any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress. 
 
The number of cases applying and construing §1983 is voluminous: the U.S.C.S. volume containing § 
1983 - and only § 1983 - is more than 1,000 pages long. For our purposes, the important point is to 
recognize that § 1983 exists and is a major limitation on governmental immunity. 
 






3.  Familial Immunities 
 
 
a.  From lnter-spousal Immunities to lnter-spousal Duties 
 
 
ROGERS v. YELLOWSTONE PARK CO. 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
97 Idaho 14, S39 P.2d S66 (1975) 
 
McFADDEN, J.- [Betty Rogers was injured in a one-car accident that occurred near Ashton. She was a 
passenger in a car owned by the Yellowstone Park Company and driven by Peter Rogers, her husband 
who was employed by the company. The company have given her husband permission to operate the 
vehicle and agreed that plaintiff and her son could accompany her husband on this trip. While both the 
company and her husband were named as defendants, the husband was never served with process. The 
company filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that a wife living with her husband cannot 
recover from her husband's employer for the husband's negligent acts, since any recovery by the wife 
would be community property that would inure to the benefit of the husband tortfeasor. The trial court 
agreed and granted the motion. The supreme court reversed:] 
 
Presented for resolution by this court is the fundamental issue of whether the plaintiff wife may 
maintain an action for personal injuries against her husband and his employer for her husband's 
negligence during the course and scope of the husband's employment. Plaintiff relies heavily on the case 
of Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440,209 P.2d 733 (1949), an action involving a tort committed by a husband 
on his wife, as authority that such an action may be maintained. Plaintiff has also cited cases from other 
community property jurisdictions where actions were allowed by one spouse against the other for 
negligent torts. 
 
Defendant points to a number of cases decided prior to Lorang v. Hays, supra, where this court 
held that damages for personal injuries to a spouse were community property. Giffen v. City of Lewiston, 
6 Idaho 231, SSP. 54S (1898); Lindsay v. Oregon Short UneRy., 13 Idaho 477, 90 P.984 (1907); LaBonte 
v. Davidson, 31 Idaho 644,17S P.588 (1918); Muir v. City of Pocatello, 36 Idaho S32, 212 P. 34S (1922); 
Sprouse v. Magee,46 Idaho 622, 269 P. 993 (1928) [dictum]; Swager v. Peterson, 49 Idaho 78S, 291 P. 
1049(1930). See also the following two cases decided subsequent to Lorang v. Hays, Doggett v. Boiler 
Engineering & Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888, 477 P.2d S11 (1970) (concerning survival of claims for personal 
injuries), and Clark v. Foster, 87 Idaho 134, 391 P.2d8S3 (1964). In each of those cases a spouse 
instituted an action against a third-party defendant without joining the husband as a party. Without 
exception, the court did not examine the nature of the interest damaged but assumed the recovery to be 
community property. None of these involved the issue of one spouse suing the other for damages arising 
out of the other's negligence. The principal issue in those cases was whether the proper parties were 
before the court, and the court held that since the husband was the manager of the community property 
under I.C. § 32 -91222: he was a necessary and proper party to bring an action belonging to the 
community. 
 
Defendant relied upon an annotation that set out the policy arguments that supported an 
interspousal tort immunity: (1) maintenance of an interspousal immunity rule is necessary for the 
preservation of domestic peace; (2) its abrogation would encourage litigation which, at least where a 
spouse is protected by insurance, might be collusive; and (3} any change in the rule should be for the 
                                                     
22 I.C.  § 32-912 has been amended by 1974 Sess. Laws ch. 194, to provide for both spouses to have equal management and 
control of community property except that neither spouse may sell of convey community real property unless both join the 




legislature. Plaintiff contends these policy arguments are without merit and refers to WILLIAM PROSSER, 
LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971), where the author states concerning such traditional arguments, 
Stress has been laid upon the danger of fictitious and fraudulent claims, on the very dubious assumption 
that a wife's love for her husband is such that she is more likely to bring a false suit against him than a 
genuine one; and likewise the possibility of trivial actions for minor annoyances, which might well be 
taken care of by finding consent to all ordinary frictions of wedlock- or at least assumption of risk! The 
chief reason relied upon by all these courts, however, is that personal tort actions between husband and 
wife would disrupt and destroy the peace and harmony of the home, which is against the policy of the law. 
This is on the bald theory that after a husband has beaten his wife, there is a state of peace and harmony 
left to be disturbed; and that if she is sufficiently injured or angry to sue him for it, she will be soothed and 
deterred from reprisals by denying her the legal remedy- and this even though she has left him or 
divorced him for that very ground, and although the same courts refuse to find any disruption of domestic 
tranquility if she sues him for a tort to her property, or brings a criminal prosecution against him. If this 
reasoning appeals to the reader, let him by all means adopt it. 
 
Implicit in defendant's argument is that the judicial system is inadequate to safeguard against 
collusion intort actions between spouses. We reject this contention, for courts in this state presently weed 
out fraud and collusion in other cases not involving actions between spouses. We find nothing unusual or 
peculiar in interspousal suits to frustrate the capability of the judicial system to avoid or anticipate such 
abuses. [] It is difficult to perceive how a personal action would disrupt the tranquility of the marital state to 
any greater degree than would actions in partition, ejectment or for contesting of wills, all of which actions 
now may be maintained by a wife against her husband when such actions involve her separate property. 
[] It is the conclusion of the court that the policy arguments referred to by defendant in support of its 
position are fully answered by the quotation from Prosser quoted above. 
 
We now come to the critical issue concerning the nature of the interest which plaintiff by this 
action seeks to protect. If one relies on the cases previously cited by respondent involving tort claims 
against third party tortfeasors, it is clear that there is only one answer, i.e., plaintiff's recovery for damages 
suffered in the automobile accident would be community property and this present action would be 
barred. However, without exception none of those cases considered the character of the right harmed for 
which the damages were sought. 
 
Separate property is defined by statute to include: 
 
"All property of either the husband or the wife owned by him or her before marriage, and that 
acquired afterward either by gift, bequest, devise or descent, or that which either he or she shall 
acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate property, byway of moneys or other property, 
shall remain his or her sole and separate property." 
 
I.C. §32-903. Community property, on the other hand, includes 
 
"All other property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, including the rents and 
profits of the separate property of the husband and wife, is community property* * 
I.C. § 32-906. 
 
The cases previously referred to herein cited by respondent relied on the concept that all property 
acquired during marriage was community property, and that any recovery for damages for personal 
injuries was "property acquired after marriage" but not acquired by "gift, bequest, devise or descent." 
Hence, such recovery was community property. However, we believe the correct concept is first to 
consider the nature of the right or interest invaded or harmed by the negligence of a defendant, and 
based on a determination of the nature of this right, then to characterize the damages recovered in 
relation to the right violated. Thus, the character of any judgment in this type of case as separate or 
community would take its character from the nature of the right violated. [] 
 
When a couple marry they bring to the marriage not only their property, but also themselves as 




One of those rights is that of personal security and freedom from harm to one's person from the spouse. [] 
Any physical injury to a spouse, and the pain and suffering therefrom is an injury to the spouse as an 
individual. Compensation byway of damages for such an injury would partake of the same character as 
that which has been injured or has suffered loss. [] Although not articulated in terms of personal security, 
nonetheless, in Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d733 (1949), this court recognized the right of a 
wife to maintain an action against her husband for a tort committed while the parties were married. Even 
though at the time the action was brought the parties had separated, this court stated We, therefore, 
conclude that a cause of action for damages to the person or character of a married woman, which 
accrue while she is living separate and apart from her husband, is 'an accumulation,' is her separate 
property; that the husband is not a necessary party plaintiff and is not entitled to any of the recovery. This 
rule is particularly applicable where the husband is himself the wrongdoer. [] 
 
Courts in other community property jurisdictions have similarly recognized the right of a spouse to 
maintain a tort action for a personal injury and to recover damages as separate 
property.... 
 
It is the conclusion of this court that the plaintiff is entitled to pursue her remedy for damages 
arising out of the alleged accident, notwithstanding that the tortfeasor was her husband 
and was named as a party defendant.... 
 
One additional issue is presented by this appeal concerning what damages would be allowable to 
a spouse in an action such as this. 
 
It is our conclusion that the Washington Supreme Court in Freehe v. Freehe, [ TI has established 
a workable rule concerning damages in this type of case, an action for personal injuries sustained by the 
wife. Therefore, itis the conclusion of this court that plaintiff in this action is entitled to pursue her remedy 
for damages arising out of the accident alleged notwithstanding that she has named her husband as a 
party defendant. Plaintiff seeks recovery of special damages, including established future specials. She 
also seeks general damages for loss of future earnings, and also general damages as compensation for 
pain and suffering. Plaintiff is entitled to recover her special damage, including established future 
specials, as these are actual out of pocket expenses which are a community liability. And the fact her 
spouse would be relieved of this financial burden is outweighed by the fact such damages are strictly 
compensatory in nature inuring to the benefit of the injured spouse. General damages for loss of Mure 
earnings which would be community property would be recoverable only in the fraction of on half as the 
separate property of the injured spouse, and general damages for pain and suffering and emotional 
distress would be fully recoverable as the injured spouse's separate property. 
 
DONALDSON AND McQUADE, JJ., CONCUR. 
 
SHEPARD, C.J., DISSENTING -I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority for a number of 
reasons.... The threshold question in this case is whether or not the long-standing principle of common 
law commonly known as "interspousal immunity'' should be overruled in Idaho. 
 
It is necessary to point out a number of matters of preliminary importance. Idaho, as distinguished 
from a number of other states, has enacted no legislation directly affecting this question nor has the 
majority opinion utilized statutory construction as a method to obtain its result. [] 
 
The mere fact that a doctrine has existed in the common law for many centuries does not 
In and of itself give any reason for its perpetration. At the same time the mere fact that a doctrine has 
been inexistence for hundreds of years is no excuse to discard it as archaic and without merit to our 
society of today without at least a passing analysis as to its merit. Unfortunately, the majority opinion does 
not indulge in such analysis. 
 
It is clear upon analysis that from time immemorial a husband and wife have legally been 
considered as a unit. Many other units are recognized by the law such as corporations, partnerships, 
voluntary associations and others. Persons who voluntarily enter into a particular relationship recognized 
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by the law acquire certain rights and sacrifice others. By the entry into such relationship they render 
nonactionable many acts and/or omissions which without the relationship would be actionable. Conduct 
within a family differs from ordinary conduct since the members are in a common establishment and 
engaged in a common domestic enterprise. 
 
The questions arising from a change in such relationship are voluminous and staggering. 
Just a few examples may suffice. To what standard of care are members of the family to be held? 
Is that standard the same that applied to one living outside the family relationship or is it something 
special? Is the standard of due care required of a wife in the preparation of food the same standard as 
one outside the family relationship? What of the standard of care of a husband to maintain a staircase? 
What of the doctrine of assumption of the risk? What of the doctrine of contributory negligence? What of 
the doctrine of comparative negligence?  Does every touching against the will of the other constitute a 
battery? What of the right of privacy? 
 
While the preceding parade of horribles may appear facetious, it nevertheless demonstrates 
questions which the majority opinion has not faced, and which should be considered in the proposed 
abolition of a doctrine so fundamental to the common law. 
 
I would hold that the threshold question as to the abolition of the doctrine of interspousal immunity 
should be answered in the negative. The process used by the majority herein and in numerous other 
cases. [] We are told that the only support for the doctrine of interspousal immunity is, (1) the fear of 
collusion and fraud between spouses to mulct insurance companies; (2) perpetuation of domestic 
tranquility. Professor Prosser, various other courts and the majority herein then set forth to destroy the 
two strawrnen and conclude that since those are the only reasons for the perpetuation of the doctrine it 
should be abolished. I suggest such reasoning is fallacious in the extreme and furnishes no answer to the 
threshold question of whether four hundred years of doctrine of the unitary aspect of husband and wife 
should be abolished. I suggest also that the majority must in the future answer the question faced by 
other courts who have abolished interspousal immunity and who have subsequently and logically been 
required to abolish the immunity between parent and child for negligent torts. [] 
 
I suggest that the decision of the majority today will have results and consequences which will 
reach far beyond those envisioned in the humorous comments of Professor Prosser regarding 
interspousal harmony and the bland assumption that the doctrine of interspousal immunity serves and 
protects only insurance carriers. 
 




(1)  Is Shepard correct that the majority had opened Pandora's box? Note that plaintiff did not serve 
her husband with papers and he thus was not a party to the suit. If there had been another person in the 
car with Peter and Betty Rogers, that person could have sued Peter and Peter's employer. Given this, is 
there a sufficient reason to preclude Betty from recovering from the employer for her injuries? Note that 
while Shepard argues that no one should profit from his wrongdoing (and that Peter will profit from Betty's 
recovery), he ignores the fact that Betty loses if she is denied recovery based on her relationship to the 
tortfeasor. Thus, the question turns at least in part on the characterization of Betty's recovery as 
community or individual. 
 
(2)  Policy rationales for interspousal tort immunity: Defendant cited two policy rationales for the 
interspousal tort immunity: 
 
(a)  The rule is necessary for the preservation of domestic peace. Does the quote from 
Prosser that the majority relies upon rebut the rationales? For example, is domestic harmony more likely 
to have already been destroyed when the action is for an intentional tort such as battery and rather than 






(b)  Abrogation of the rule would encourage litigation which, at least where a spouse is 
protected by insurance, might be collusive. Is the court's response - "courts in this state presently weed 
out fraud and collusion in other cases not involving actions between spouses" - sufficient? Ultimately, 
there is a circularity in the two policies: if the litigation destroys domestic peace, then collusion seems 
unlikely- an vice versa. 
 
(3)  Community property and interspousal tort immunity: Was Idaho's original "adoption" of 
interspousal immunity- an adoption assumed by each of the justices despite the fact that no Idaho case 
has so held-error? Remember that Idaho adopted the common law only insofar as it was not inconsistent 
with statutory law. Consider the following introduction to community property: 
 
The community property or ganancial system is of afar greater antiquity than the common 
law principles relating to marital rights in property. ln fact, its antiquity is so great that it first 
obtained recognition inwritten form in 693 A.D., in Visigothic Spain, in the so called Visigothic 
Code or Fuero Juzgo, centuries before the development and formation of the common law. It is a 
concept of property that is entirely alien and foreign to that of common law as to the conjugal 
relationship and marital rights in property, although the community system itself can hardly be 
called a "foreign" institution. 
 
We are not here concerned with tracing the origin and development of the common law, 
but in its developed form in England, it embodied the basic concept that in marriage the husband 
and wife were merged into one and, in effect, the husband was that "one." The wife was subject 
to the husband to the extent that she was only his mere shadow, or at most his alter ego. It is a 
concept which considers the wife only another chattel or belonging of the husband. She is not 
recognized, perhaps through some element of male vanity or obtuseness, as an individual, as 
having a character, a mind, a personality of her own. Whatever movables the wife has at the date 
of the marriage become the husband's and he is entitled to take possession and make his own 
any movables to which she becomes entitled during the marriage. Whatever realty the wife has at 
the time of the marriage, or to which she becomes entitled during the marriage the husband has 
the administration thereof and in entitled to the usufructs thereof. The wife cannot alienate her 
land without the husband's concurrence. In other words, she is practically without proprietary 
capacity. 
 
Under the community or ganancial system the wife retains her own personality as an 
individual and is an equal partner with the husband in the conjugal relationship. Moreover, her 
property rights and her rights to enter into transactions with her husband as an equal have long 
represented the community property system the advanced state that is only now being reached 
through statutory modifications in common law jurisdictions. This recognition of the wife as a 
person in her own right is one of the outstanding principles of the civil law and is one of those in 
which it diverges sharply from the common law.... 
 
Because the legal concept of the community property or ganancial system is so foreign to 
that of the common law, it is frequently very difficult for the judge or lawyer, trained and versed in 
the common law, to grasp and understand its principles. He usually makes the primary mistake of 
trying to understand it and interpret it by the principles and terminology of the common law; a 
serious mistake, for those principles and terminology are not in the least applicable.... 
W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 2-3 (2d ed. 1971). 
 
In as much as the community property system did not submerge the wife's independent identity 
but instead is predicated upon equality, isn't the underlying rationale for interspousal immunity simply 
inapplicable in a community property state? The interspousal tort immunity doctrine thus demonstrates 
again the dangers of assuming too facilely that there is such a thing as "the common law'' and that this 






b.        From Absolute Parental Immunities to Qualified Parental Immunities 
 
 
PEDIGO v. ROWLEY 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho  
101 Idaho 201,610 P.2d 560 (1980) 
 
SHEPARD, J. -This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of third party defendants and 
respondents here, Garren. Debra Pedigo brought action against the Rowleys for personal injury and the 
Rowleys, in turn, sought to join Earl Garren, Debra's father, for contribution since he was allegedly 
negligent in failing to supervise properly Debra Pedigo. Garren moved for summary judgment on the 
theory that the doctrine of parental immunity barred any liability and the district court granted the motion 
for summary judgment. We affirm. 
 
In late 1974, eleven-year-old Debra Pedigo was floating on an air mattress a short distance off 
the north shore of Lake Coeur d'Alene. She was struck by a speed boat operated by Cindy Rowley and 
owned by George Rowley. Pedigo sustained injuries which resulted in the amputation of one leg. Debra 
Pedigo had come to the lake with her father, who was sitting on the lake shore at the time of the accident. 
For purposes of summary judgment, we assume that Earl Garren did not warn Debra Pedigo of the 
alleged dangers of floating on an air mattress in the lake. 
 
The Rowleys asserted that Garren was negligent in his supervision of the activities of Debra 
Pedigo; Garren, therefore, was a joint tortfeasor and is, or could be, liable to the Rowleys for contribution 
in the event that Pedigo recovered a judgment against the Rowleys. The Garrens respond that any action 
by Pedigo against the Garrens was barred by the doctrine of parental immunity; hence, they could not be 
joint tortfeasors and no contribution could be sought from them by the Rowleys. 
 
The doctrine of parental immunity is dispositive in this case and is a matter of first impression in 
Idaho. The doctrine was first articulated in Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), wherein 
the court, citing no authority but relying exclusively on policy, declined to interject itself into the family 
relationship between a mother and minor daughter, stating: 
 
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, 
designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor 
child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries 
suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child 
protection from parental violence and wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to 
demand. 
 
That doctrine was adopted in a majority of jurisdictions. [] 
 
Thereafter, courts began carving out exceptions to the doctrine. For example, courts have 
refused to apply the doctrine when the child is suing the parent's estate, [); a parent is acting in his 
business capacity; a willful or malicious tort is involved, []; the child is an emancipated minor, []; or the 
dispute is contractual, []. 
 
Reasons that have traditionally been given as basis for the parental immunity doctrine have 
included: (1) the disruption of family tranquility and subsequent impairment of the foundations of 
American society, []; (2) the threat to parental discipline and control, []; (3) the proliferation of fraudulent 
and collusive suits between family adversaries, see, e. g.; and (4) the depletion of the family exchequer []. 
 
These policy arguments, however, have been rebutted by other courts. For example, some courts 
believe that the public interest in protecting society's members from losses caused by another's 




the controversy to a third party, thereby avoiding family conflict. [] Regarding the fraud or collusion 
argument, its mere possibility is too tenuous to serve as a basis to bar all parent-child tort suits. [] As in 
any other tort action, judges and juries can be relied upon to ferret out fraudulent and collusive claims. [] It 
is also argued that the impact of the lawsuit on the family exchequer is diminished, if not completely 
eliminated, by the presence of insurance. [] Even if the family exchequer argument is valid, it nevertheless 
ignores the question of compensation for the injuries of the child. [] Finally, some courts have noted that 
their previous elimination of interspousal immunity destroys the validity of arguments against parent-child 
immunity. [] 
 
Courts that have recently addressed this issue have dealt with parental immunity in one of four 
different ways. First, Wisconsin eliminated the doctrine except in two situations. Second, California 
replaced parental immunity with a reasonable parent standard. Other courts have eliminated the doctrine 
completely. Finally, some jurisdictions still retain parental immunity. 
 
Wisconsin was the first jurisdiction to abrogate the parental immunity doctrine. Goller v. White, 
122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963). Wisconsin, however, retained parental immunity in the narrowly defined 
situations when the alleged negligence involved parental authority or parental discretion regarding "food, 
clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care." [] A later Wisconsin case has made it 
clear that other "care" does not encompass ordinary discretion in day-to-day affairs. [] According to this 
view, in order to be immune from suit a parent must show that the alleged negligence falls within one of 
the two exempt categories. That requirement may lead to arbitrary distinctions. []; compare Lemmen v. 
Servais, [] (failure to warn a child to watch for traffic was within parental discretion and immune under 
Goller) with Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., [] (allowing a two-year-old child to play on a swing set was not 
within the Goller immunity). 
 
Other jurisdictions have followed the Wisconsin rationale. [citing Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 
and New Jersey cases.] 
 
The California Supreme Court, however, rejected the Wisconsin approach, because it would 
theoretically allow a parent an unequivocal right to act negligently toward a child in certain 
specified instances. Instead, California requires a parent to act as a reasonable parent regardless of the 
type of conduct involved. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971}. The California approach assumes 
that a common set of standards independent of already existing criminal sanctions applies to all parent-
child relationships. The reasonable parent standard, however, has been criticized because of the 
impossibility of applying a uniform standard across economic, educational, cultural, religious and ethnic 
backgrounds, Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974}. To apply the reasonable parent 
standard "would be to circumscribe the wide range of discretion a parent ought to have in permitting his 
child to undertake responsibility and gain independence." [] 
 
A small minority of jurisdictions have eliminated the doctrine of parental immunity entirely. [citing 
Hawai'i, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Nevada cases.] 
 
Some jurisdictions have eliminated the doctrine of parental immunity in the context of automobile 
accidents. [] But many of those jurisdictions expressly limit their holdings to the individual facts of those 
particular cases. However, New Hampshire, ...completely eliminated the doctrine of parental immunity in 
broad sweeping language in a case involving an automobile accident. Two jurisdictions have expressly 
refused to extend the analogy of automobile circumstance cases to other cases involving parental 
discretion. [] In New York, the doctrine of parental immunity was judicially eliminated in the context of an 
automobile suit, Gelbman v. Gelbman, but the impact of that decision was narrowed in Holodook v. 
Spencer. In Holodook, the Court held that a parent's negligent failure to supervise a child is not a tort 
since a parent owes the child no legal duty to supervise beyond the minimal standards imposed by the 
criminal statutes. 
 
On the other hand, notwithstanding the abolition or curtailment of parental immunity in some 
states, other jurisdictions continue to uphold the doctrine. [] These courts hold that any changed 
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conditions in society that may have occurred since the enunciation of the parental immunity doctrine in 
Hewellette are merely superficial and do not warrant a change of policy. 
We come then, finally, to the adoption of a policy regarding the continuation of parental immunity 
doctrine in Idaho. We believe that the integrity of the family plays an essential role in the welfare of our 
society. To that extent, we agree with those jurisdictions which still retain the doctrine of parental 
immunity. We reject the California notion that all parent-child relationships may be judicially supervised by 
a "reasonable parent" standard. The people of Idaho are too diverse and independent to be judged by a 
common standard in such a delicate area as the parent-child relationship. Our legislature has established 
certain standards of parental conduct in the area of physical abuse or neglect; a parent who violates 
those standards risks criminal sanction or the removal of the child. Short of such acts, our judiciary cannot 
order a "reasonable" parent standard. Our geography, our population, and most importantly, the diversity 
in our religious, ethnic and cultural backgrounds make a common standard inapplicable. 
 
All of us, as parents, have hopes for our children. All of us want our children to grow safely into 
adulthood, but most of us also realize that children cannot mature in a vacuum. To become responsible 
adults, children must learn to assume responsibility and make judgments. This is a process and not an 
instantaneous miracle that automatically occurs at age eighteen, nineteen, or twenty-one. In the area of 
supervision, what one parent may perceive as too dangerous or unnecessary may be thought by another 
parent as desirable for the formation of growth abilities. To suggest that a child should be able to sue its 
parent in such circumstances and that a jury should judge the parent on the basis of some common 
standard is, we believe, nothing short of impossible. For example, how could the same standard apply to 
both the suburban parent of Boise and the rural parent of St. Maries? 
 
We are unwilling to adopt a categorical rule that universally prohibits parent-child actions on the 
basis of a total and absolute parental immunity. It is enough to say in the instant case, involving the 
relatively narrow area of parental immunity for alleged negligent supervision, no cause of action exists 
beyond that specified by our existing legislatively imposed sanctions. 
 
There can be little argument but that the parental immunity of Mr. Garren from suit brought by his 
daughter Pedigo also bars third parties who are tortfeasors from seeking contribution.... 
 
...The reality of the family is that, except in cases of great wealth, it is a single economic unit and 
recovery by a third party against the parent, ultimately diminishes the value of the child's 
recovery. Even if scrupulous care were taken to see that the parent's *** contribution did not 
come out of the child's recovery***, there would still be a strain on the family relationship, a result 
which our courts have consistently sought to avoid. 
Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d at 344. We agree with the Holodook statement. 
 
The summary judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
DONALDSON, C.J., AND McFADDEN, & BISTLINE, JJ., CONCUR. 
 
DONALDSON, C.J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING -It is appropriate to add a word in response to the view 
tendered in Part I of the dissenting opinion. Itis there implied that, unless it can be shown that the reasons 
advanced in support of parental immunity are significantly different from those advanced in support of 
interspousal immunity, "we should be consistent, follow our decision in Yellowstone, and reject the 
doctrine of parental immunity." 
 
The relationship of parent and child is simply not the same as that of husband and wife, a 
distinction the dissent ignores. While some of the bases for interspousal and parental immunity doubtless 
overlap, the doctrine of parental immunity is mandated by at least one fundamental policy which is wholly 
independent of those offered in support of interspousal immunity. Our society has traditionally entrusted 
to parents the delicate process of rearing and training children, and it is not the province of courts to 
second-guess the daily workings of that process. 
 




Although we might safely assume that sometime during the course of any marriage, each spouse may 
well attempt to "train" the other in one or more particulars, perhaps even successfully, the principles 
involved are simply not the same. 
 
In sum, our recognition today of a narrow parental immunity in a case involving alleged passive 
negligence in the supervision of a child, is not inconsistent with our prior rejection of the doctrine of 
interspousal immunity in a case which involved active negligence in the operation of an automobile. 
 
McFADDEN, J., CONCURS. 
 
BAKES, J., DISSENTING- .... I do not believe that the majority's adoption of the doctrine of parental 
immunity in this case can be reconciled with this Court's abrogation of interspousal immunity in Rogers v. 
Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14,539 P.2d 566 (1975). In my mind, the paramount rationale traditionally 
advanced in support of both parental and interspousal immunity has been the preservation of the family 
unit. Since that argument was previously rejected by a majority of this Court, we should be consistent, 
follow our decision in Yellowstone, and reject the doctrine of parental immunity. As Justice Shepard 
observed in his Yellowstone dissent, courts which have abolished interspousal immunity "have 
subsequently and logically been required to abolish the immunity between parent and child for negligent 
torts.  [] 
 
In the case at bar, Justice Shepard, now speaking for the majority, asserts that it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to establish a standard of care to be applied by the finder of 
fact in determining whether a parent was negligent in supervising his child. Not surprisingly, this same 
argument was advanced by Justice Shepard in his Yellowstone dissent, but was apparently found to be 
unpersuasive by the majority in that case. The reappearance of a dissenting rationale in this majority 
opinion will no doubt cause confusion in the trial courts with respect to the continuing vitality of the 
Yellowstone rule. I, too, dissented in Yellowstone, and for some of the same reasons set forth by Justice 
Shepard in his dissent. I still do not favor the abrogation of any type of interfamilial immunity. However, for 
the sake of consistency, we should adhere to the rationale expressed in Yellowstone. 
 
Furthermore, it is one thing to cloak a family member with immunity when he is being sued 
directly by another family member, as was the case in Yellowstone. It is quite another matter to invoke the 
doctrine against a third party as the Court is doing here. In 1971, our legislature enacted I.C. §6-803, the 
"Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors" statute. That statute specifically provides that a defendant in a tort 
action can bring a claim for contribution. The majority opinion has, in effect, given precedence to the 1891 
decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court in Hewellette v. George, [], which apparently started this 





(1)  The courts, while rejecting an absolute privilege, have been concerned with the need to maintain 
some area of parental authority and discretion immune for judicial oversight. Which of the various 
rationales for rejecting parental immunity is most consistent with the desired results? 
 
(2)  Owen v. Burcham: The parents of a nine-year-old boy brought a wrongful death action against 
the motorist whose vehicle struck the decedent's bicycle. The motorist argued that the parents had been 
negligent in allowing their son to bike on the road. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed: 
 
we see no negligence on the part of the parents in allowing their son to ride his bicycle on 
Castleford Road. Even assuming the existence of sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, 
we nevertheless hold that this is a proper circumstance to invoke the rule that is the child commits 
no act which would be considered negligent if committed by an adult, then any negligence on the 
part of the parent in permitting the child to go onto the road would be, at best, a remote cause of 
the injury and not a proximate cause and not sufficient to preclude recovery. 
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Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 599 P.2d 1012 (1979). Since Owen predated Pedigo the court was not 
presented with the issue of whether allowing their son to ride his bicycle on a rural road fell within the 
immunized area of parental discretion. 
 
(3)  Wrongful death and parental supervision: Does Pedigo bar the use of negligent supervision as a 
possible affirmative defense in a wrongful death action brought by the parents of a deceased child? 
Plaintiffs in Nelson, argued that "the failure to properly supervise one's children is not a legally 
recognizable basis for negligence in Idaho, "citing Pedigo for this proposition. The court disagreed: 
 
In Pedigo, an eleven-year-old girl was struck by a speed boat while she was floating on 
an air mattress in Lake Coeur d'Alene. She, through her guardian, brought suit against the 
owners of the boat for her injuries. The defendants sought to join the father of the child as a third-
party defendant on the theory that his negligent supervision of the child was a contributing 
proximate cause of the accident. It was asserted in Pedigo that the father was negligent in his 
supervision of the child, that such negligence would form the basis of a cause of action by the 
child against the parent, that her father was, therefore, a joint tortfeasor, and that he was or could 
have been liable for contribution in the event the child recovered a judgment against the owners 
of the boat. In Pedigo we disagree with the basic premise of that assertion, i.e., that the child had 
a cause of action against its parent and stated: 
 
"We are willing to adopt a categorical rule that universally prohibits parent-child actions 
on the basis of a total and absolute parental immunity. It is enough to say in the instant case, 
involving the relatively narrow area of parental immunity for alleged negligent supervision, no 
cause of action exists beyond that specified by our existing legislatively imposed sanctions. 
 
"There can be little argument but that the parental immunity of Mr. Garren from suit 
brought by his daughter Pedigo also bars third parties who are tortfeasors from seeking 
contribution." 
 
Pedigo does not require a change in the long-standing rule in Idaho and other 
jurisdictions that the negligence of the parents may be asserted as a defense in an action brought 
by the parents for the wrongful death of a child. Pedigo was an action brought on behalf of the 
child. In the case at bar, the action is brought by the parents for their sole benefit. Under Pedigo 
parents may not be sued directly for the negligent supervision of their children, but on the other 
hand, as demonstrated in the case at bar today, parents may not personally profit from their own 
negligence. 
Nelson v. Northern Leasing Co., 104 Idaho 185,657 P.2d 482 (1983). 
 
(4)  Schiess v. Bates: Several people set out for a fishing trip on Palisades Reservoir in a boat owned 
and operated by Mr. Schiess. As it was travelling back to the dock from where they had been fishing, a 
sudden storm arose which capsized the boat. All eight people were thrown into the reservoir. Holding 
onto the boat, Mr. Bates was able to reach and retrieve three persons: his own son, one of Mr. Schiess' 
children, and another boy. The four other individuals, unable to reach the boat, drowned. Mrs. Schiess 
subsequently filed suit for herself and her surviving children, alleging that Mr. Bates' negligence caused 
the boating accident. After denying any negligence on his part, Mr. Bates also moved for leave to file a 
third-party complaint against the estate of Mr. Schiess for the purpose of seeking indemnity or 
contribution for the alleged negligence of Mr. Schiess in causing the death of his daughter. Mrs. Schiess 
responded by arguing that the doctrine of parental immunity precludes the third-party complaint. The 
court, in an opinion by Justice Huntley, rejected the parental immunity defense: 
 
Mrs. Schiess' reliance on the doctrine of parental immunity as authority for precluding the 
maintenance of Mr. Bates' third-party complaint is ... misplaced. That doctrine - founded on the 
idea that family unity should not be disrupted by allowing children to sue their parents for injuries 





The action Mrs. Schiess is bringing against Mr. Bates is under I.C. § 5-310.it is a wrongful 
death action brought by Mrs. Schiess for the loss of her daughter. It is not an action brought by 
Mrs. Schiess on behalf of her daughter's injuries. It is patently clear, then, that no claim is being 
brought by Mrs. Schiess' deceased daughter. This is significant, because the doctrine of parental 
immunity only applies to claims brought by living children. 
 
Likewise, reliance on parental immunity as a bar to the third-party action on the ground 
that it in effect converts Mr. Bates' claim against Mr. Schiess' estate into a claim by the children 
against their father is misplaced, since the Schiess children are not proper party plaintiffs. 
 
The order denying leave to file a third-party complaint is reversed, the parent-child 
immunity doctrine being inapplicable to this case. Further, the trial court is directed to order the 
dismissal of the surviving Schiess children as parties’ plaintiff. 
Schiess v. Bates, 107 Idaho 794,693 P.2d 440 (1984). See also Jacobsen v. Schroder, 117 Idaho 442, 
788 P.2d 843 (1990). 
 
 
4.  A MISCELLANY OF STATUTORY IMMUNITIES 
 
Another example of the recurrent tension between legislative and judicial, between statutory and 
common law, is the creation of statutory immunities. Recall the immunity for liability for negligence that 
the legislature extended to the drivers of emergency vehicles that was the subject of the Athay decisions 
in the introductory materials. Should the legislature be allowed to single out certain classes of individuals 




a.  Workers' Compensation 
 
 
LOUIE v. BAMBOO GARDENS 
 
(1)  Perhaps the most significant legislatively enacted immunity is Compensation Act. Originally 
adopted in 1917, the Workers' Compensation Act was extensively amended and recodified in 1971. The 
Act's purposes are: 
 
The common law system governing the remedy of workmen against employers for 
injuries received, and occupational diseases contracted in industrial and public work is 
inconsistent with modem industrial conditions. The welfare of the state depends upon its 
industries and even more upon the welfare of its wage-workers. The state of Idaho, therefore, 
exercising herein its police and sovereign powers, declares that all phases of the premises are 
withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their 
families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion 
of every other remedy proceeding or compensation, except as provided in this act, and to that 
end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the 
courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished except as in this law provided. 
I.C. §72-201. The Act subsequently states that "the liability of the employer under this law shall be 
exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, [or] 
heirs." Furthermore, 
 
[the] liability of an employer to another person who may be liable for or who has paid damages on 
account of an injury or occupational disease or death arising out of and in the course of 
employment of an employee of the employer and caused by the breach of any duty or obligation 
owed by the employer to such other person, shall be limited to the amount of compensation for 
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which the employer is liable under this law on account of such injury, disease, or death, unless 
such other person and the employer agree to share liability in a different manner. 





I.C. § 25-2118. Animals on open range- No duty to keep from highway. No person owning, or 
controlling the possession of, any domestic animal running on open range, shall have the duty to keep 
such animal off any highway on such range, and shall not be liable for damage to any vehicle or for injury 
to any person riding therein, caused by a collision between the vehicle and the animal. "Open range" 
means all unenclosed lands outside of cities, villages and herd districts, upon which cattle by custom, 
license, lease, or permit, are grazed or permitted to roam. 
 
 
MORELAND v. ADAMS 
 
Idaho Supreme Court  
143 Idaho 687, 152 P.3d 558 (2007) 
 
TROUT, J: This case arises from a wrongful death action and addresses the definition of "open range" 
under Idaho Code section 25-2118. Plaintiffs, the family of the decedent, appeal the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment to defendants Royce and Randy Adams, whom the court found were entitled to 
immunity for cattle running on open range. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On March 19,2004, Rodney Moreland was riding a motorcycle down 4 Mile North Road in Lincoln 
County, Idaho. While corrals and fencing appeared in some areas on the land alongside the road, signs 
posted around the area designated the land as open range. As Rodney Moreland drove his motorcycle 
over a rise in the road, he collided with a calf and was killed. The calf was owned by Randy Adams and 
the land adjacent to the road was owned in part by Royce Adams (Randy, Royce or collectively, the 
Adamses). 
 
In their appeal, the Morelands argue that the trial court erred in its legal conclusions by failing to 
apply a three-prong test for open range immunity under I.C. § 25-2118, requiring land qualifying as open 
range to be (1) unenclosed, (2) outside of cities, villages, and herd districts, and (3) land on which cattle 





The question before this Court is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to 
the Adamses. The trial judge granted summary judgment based on his conclusions that the collision 
occurred on open range land and that livestock owners in open range areas enjoy absolute immunity 
against claims for damages caused by livestock. The Morelands challenge the judge's finding that the site 
of the collision qualifies as open range land and argue that the judge failed to apply a three-prong 
statutory test for open range land as required by I.C. § 25-2118. To determine whether the judge erred in 
granting summary judgment, we must first determine how Idaho law defines open range. 
 
In Maguire v. Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 590 P.2d 85 (1978), this Court discussed the history of laws 
relating to the liability of a livestock owner for damage caused by his stock straying on another's land. 
Under common law, it was the duty of a livestock owner to fence in stock to keep them from causing 




allowing livestock to roam freely and imposing the duty on landowners to fence livestock out (''fence out" 
rule). [] As this Court noted, ''the 'fence out' rule prevails" in Idaho. [] There are important legislative 
exceptions to the ''fence out" rule and landowners may revert to a ''fence in" rule by following statutory 
procedures to create a herd district. I.C. §§25-2401, -2402. 
 
The Adamses claim open range immunity under I.C. §25-2118 ...The Morelands read the statute 
to grant open range immunity against liability to motorists only when three specific statutory requirements 
are met: the land is (1)"unenclosed," (2) falls "outside of cities, villages and herd districts," and (3) is land 
"upon which cattle by custom, license, lease, or permit, are grazed or permitted to roam." The trial judge 
disagreed and focused solely whether the land fell outside of any city, village, or herd district. On the 
uncontroverted facts presented by this case, the district court was correct in determining that the land in 
question was open range. 
 
Our opinion in Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 990 P.2d 1213 (1999), is instructive to this 
case. In Adamson, a federal court certified to this Court the question of whether I.C. § 25-2119 grants 
absolute immunity from liability for negligence to owners of domestic animals involved in accidents on 
public highways. The Court held that where owners could show their animals were lawfully on the 
highway at the time of an accident, they were immune from liability under § 25-2119. [] The Court 
explained that '[l]ivestock areas in Idaho fall into two categories outside cities and villages: open range 
areas and herd districts. 'Open range' is defined by I.C.  §25-2402 as all areas of the state not within 
cities, villages, or herd districts." [] Significantly, I.C. §§ 25-2402 and 25-2118 define open range in 
virtually identical terms. The definition of open range was not an issue before the Court in Adamson; 
however, the discussion of the meaning of open range was both necessary and instructive in 
differentiating between statutory provisions relating to open range, where there is absolute immunity, and 
provisions relating to herd districts, in which there is immunity only if cattle are legally on the road. 
Adamson makes it clear there is no third "hybrid" category for land outside of cities and villages. 
 
This Court recognizes that, in interpreting the definition of open range in I.C. §25-2118, "all parts 
of a statute should be given meaning," and the Court "will construe a statute so that effect is given to its 
provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant." [] The Morelands' attempt to create a 
three-part test for open range immunity from I.C. § 25-2118, however, does not square with the statutory 
language. Neither does it square with the companion herd district statutes or the historical meaning of 
open range under Idaho law. To read "unenclosed" as a requirement that open range land contain no 
fences is to create a test that is unworkable and could not have been intended by the legislature in 
adopting this statutory scheme. In contrast to a rule that all land outside cities, villages and herd districts 
is open range, courts would be analyzing cases on a very fact specific basis. Courts would be forced to 
ask: what type of fence makes land enclosed; is immunity lost only when the livestock owner, as opposed 
to anyone else, erects a fence; must the fence enclose cattle and be gated; does a fence erected for any 
purpose render the land no longer "unenclosed"? As a policy matter, requiring that land contain no fences 
whatsoever in order to qualify as open range would discourage ranchers from erecting fences, for any 
purpose, on open range land, lest they waive their open range immunity. Further, the herd district 
provisions would be meaningless, with de facto herd districts created anytime a fence was constructed, 
thereby shifting liability to livestock owners for damage caused by unfenced animals. The statutory 
reading the Morelands propose violates Idaho's historical policy that open range land is "fence out." 
Indeed, the Morelands would construe the statute to violate the inherent presumption of Idaho's "fence 
out" fence in" system that both open range and herd districts will contain fences, with the difference lying 
in the purpose the fencing serves. 
 
In this case, it is uncontroverted that the site of the collision fell outside any city, village, or herd 
district. The district court was correct in concluding that the land was open range, and that the Adamses 
were entitled to summary judgment based on open range immunity...The judge correctly placed the 
burden of proof on the Adamses to demonstrate the land fell outside a city, village, or herd district. 
Consequently, no genuine issue of material fact remains, and summary judgment was appropriately 
granted. 
 





(1) Is the court's construction of the statute persuasive? What is the court's rationale? That the 
history of cattle grazing in Idaho requires the statute to be read by ignoring some its language? 
 
(2)  Griffith v. Schmidt Plaintiffs vehicle struck two of defendant's horses, which were running loose on 
the road: 
 
  A nighttime collision between a domestic animal and a vehicle is not uncommon in Idaho. 
Our research finds six such cases authored by this Court dealing with rights and liabilities 
between the animal and vehicle owners. The first such case, Shepard v. Smith, 74 Idaho 459, 
263 P.2d 985 (1953), ... ruled that "res ipsa loquitur should be applied at least to the extent of 
requiring the owner of animals unattended upon a heavily traveled highway *** to satisfactorily 
explain their presence in order to avoid an otherwise justifiable inference of negligence." 
[Shepard was followed in O'Connor v. Black, 80 Idaho 96, 326 P.2d 376 (1958).] 
 
Subsequent to these first two cases the legislature enacted statutes granting immunity 
from liability and negligence to the animal owner in accidents stemming from a domestic animal's 
collision with a vehicle if:(1) the animal is running on "open range," I.C. § 25-2118; or (2) if the 
animal is "lawfully'' on any highway, I.C. § 25-2119. The term "lawfully" is not defined, but its 
definition is not at issue in cases of nighttime vehicle collisions with unattended domestic animals 
running at large wherein we can presume the animals' presence on the highway does not fall 
within any reasonable definition of "lawfully." The plaintiff vehicle owner in the present case 
argues that if the statutes grant immunity as a matter of law when the animal is in "open range" or 
is "lawfully" on the highway, then the statutes also impose liability as a matter of law when the 
animal is not in "open range" or "lawfully'' on the highway. We disagree, since a grant of immunity 
in specific circumstances cannot be equated to an imposition of strict liability as a matter of law 
when those specific circumstances are not found. Further, nighttime vehicle-animal collision 
cases considered by this Court subsequent to the enactment of the statutes have never held the 
animal owner negligent as a matter of law. Rather, the most recent opinion of Cunningham v. 
Bundy, 100 Idaho 456, 600 P.2d 132 (1979), continued to cite with approval Shepard and 
O'Connor, the two original cases prior to the statutes, and their limited application of res ipsa 
loquitur which supplies an inference of negligence "unless satisfactorily explained by the [animal] 
owner." [] The animal owner may rebut the inference by submitting evidence of the proper care, 
proper enclosures, fence conditions, fence inspections, diligent searches, etc. See Cunningham 
v. Bundy, []; Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 418 P.2d 278 (1966); Corthell v. Pearson, 88 Idaho 
295, 399 P.2d266 (1965); Saran v. Schoessler, 87 Idaho 425, 394 P.2d 160 (1964); O'Connor v. 
Black, 80 Idaho 96, 326 P.2d376 (1958); Shepard v. Smith, 74 Idaho 459, 263 P.2d985 (1953). 
See also Maguire v. Yanke,99 Idaho 829, 590 P.2d 85 (1978) (crop damage by cattle at large); 
Stanberry v. Gem County, 90 Idaho 222,409 P.2d430 (1965) (owner not liable for negligence of 
bailee in possession of animal). To summarize the law: (1) the owners of domestic animals are 
not liable or negligent when the animals cause a highway collision in "open range" or when the 
animals are "lawfully on any highway," I.C. §§ 25- 2118, 25-2119; (2) if the "open range" or 
"lawful" conditions are not present, then the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supplies an inference that 
the animal owner was negligent; (3) the inference can be supplemented by other evidence of the 
owner's negligence; (4) the inference can be rebutted by a satisfactory explanation or showing by 
the animal owner of proper care, enclosures, and any other evidence tending to negate the 
Inference of the owner's negligence; (5)when properly placed at issue by the parties, the issues 
of lawful presence, inference of negligence, and rebuttal of the inference, are questions for the 
trier of facts: and (6), in any event, the vehicle owner may be liable for contributory negligence 
under various theories. 
Griffith v. Schmidt, 110 Idaho 235, 715 P .2d 905 (1986). See also Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 







d. Recreational Land Use 
 
In 1976, the legislature adopted - and in 1988 amended - a statute to expand recreational 
opportunities on private lands: 
 
§ 36-1004: Limitation of liability of landowner- (a) Statement of Purpose. The purpose of this 
section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public 
without charge for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon 
for such purposes. 
 
(b)  Definitions. As used in this section: 
 
1.  "Land" means private or public land, roads, trails, water, watercourses, Irrigation 
dams, water control structures, head gates, private or public ways and buildings, 
structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to or used on the realty. 
 
2.  "Owner'' means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or 
person in control of the premises. 
 
3.  "Recreational Purposes" includes, but is not limited to, any of the following or any 
combination thereof: Hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, rafting, tubing, camping, 
picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, animal riding, 
motorcycling, snowmobiling, recreational vehicles, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying 
historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites, when done with charge of the owner. 
 
(c)  Owner Exempt from Warning. An owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the 
premises safe for entry by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous 
condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes. 
Neither the installation of a sign or other form of warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, 
or activity, nor any modification made for the purpose of improving the safety of others, nor the 
failure to maintain or keep in place any sign, other form of warning, or modification made to 
improve safety, shall create liability on the part of an owner of land where there is no other basis 
for such liability. 
 
(d)  Owner Assumes No Liability. An owner of land or equipment who either directly or 
indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use such property for recreational 
purposes does not thereby: 
 
1. Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose. 
 
2. Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a 
duty of care is owed. 
 
3. Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property 
caused by an act of omission of such persons. 
 
(e)  Provisions Apply to Leased Public land. Unless otherwise agreed inwriting, the provisions 
of this section shall be deemed applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to 
the state or any subdivision thereof for recreational purposes. 
 
(f)  Owner Not Required to Keep Land Safe. Nothing In this section shall be construed to: 
 
1. Create a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to person or property. 
 
2. Relieve any person using the land of another for recreational purposes for any 
obligation which he may have in the absence of this section to exercise care in 
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his use of such land and in his activities thereon, or from legal consequences or 
failure to employ such care. 
 
3. Apply to any person or persons who for compensation permits the land to be 
used for recreational purposes. 
 
(g) User Liable for Damages. Any person using the land of another for recreational purposes, 
with or without permission, shall be liable for any damage to property, livestock or crops which he 
may cause while on said property. 
 
The most significant aspect of the 1988amendment was the addition of the second sentence to 
§36-1604(C). 
 
McGHEE v. CITY OF GLENNS FERRY 
 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
111 Idaho 921, 729 P.2d 396 (1986) 
 
DONALDSON, C.J.-The facts in this case are undisputed and can be simply stated as follows: On August 
16, 1982, appellant, Johanna McGhee was injured when she fell from a swing located at Hull Memorial 
Park in Glenns Ferry, Idaho. Her mother, Pamela McGhee, brought suit against the city, the owner of the 
park, based on theories of negligence and strict liability. The district court granted summary judgment to 
the city and held that the city was immune from liability pursuant to I.C. §36-1604. This appeal followed. 
 
.... Since the facts in this case are not disputed, we need only determine whether the district court 
properly applied I.C. § 36-1604 in granting respondent's motion for summary judgment. 
 
The statute provides Limited liability to landowners who gratuitously allow others to use the land, 
or equipment attached to or used on the land, for recreational purposes. Appellants argue the legislature 
did not intend the statute to apply to public entities and that the operation of a city park falls outside the 
scope of "Recreational Purposes." We disagree. 
 
I.C. §36-1604 provides in part 
 
In reviewing statutory language, we "will assume the legislature intended what it said in the 
statute, and we will construe statutory terms according to their plain, obvious and rational meanings." [] 
Here the statute in (b)1 defines "land" as "private or public land," and in (b)2, it defines "owner'' as "the 
possessor of a fee interest.***" Based on the plain meaning of this language we conclude that the city of 
Glenns Ferry is the "owner'' and Hull Memorial Park is "public land" as defined by the statute. Therefore, 
the statute applies to public entities. This conclusion is supported by Corey v. State, 108 Idaho 921, 703 
P.2d 685 (1985), where we held the same statute applicable to the state which also owned and operated 
a park. 
 
Appellants' contention that the operation of a city park is outside the scope of "Recreational 
Purposes" is mischaracterized. If what they are asserting is that operation of a city park does not fall 
within the purview of the statute, we have already addressed that issue above. If not, the focus is not on 
the operation of the park, but whether appellants' use of a park swing is a "Recreational Purpose" within 
the meaning of the statute. Although the statute lists several activities in the definition of "Recreational 
Purposes," the statute expressly provides that the list is not exhaustive. Additionally, appellants have not 
argued that using the park swing is not recreational in nature. Nevertheless, applying the plain and 
obvious meaning of "Recreational Purpose," it is clear that such activity is recreational and, therefore, we 
conclude that appellants' activities were within the meaning of the statute. 
 






SHEPARD & BAKES, JJ., CONCUR.  
 
BISTLINE, J., DISSENTING 
  




(1)  The statute was held to be constitutional in Johnson v. Sunshine Mining Co., 106 Idaho 866, 684 
P.2d 268 (1984). 
 
(2)  In Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P .2d 736 (1988), the Supreme Court 
reversed a summary judgment for the defendant in a case where a two-year old child suffered brain 
damage from a near-drowning in a city park. The Court held that there was a factual issue on whether the 
city's conduct in maintaining a dangerous bridge was willful or wanton. The Court also held that the 
recreational use statute did not preclude liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine. 
 
In Corey v. State, 108 Idaho 921, 703 P.2d 685 (1985), the Court held that the statue barred the 
suit of a snowmobile operator who struck a chain across a road at Farragut State Park. 
 
(3) In Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989), plaintiff was a 
junior high school student who broke his leg when he tripped over sprinkler pipes while playing football at 
the school prior to the beginning of classes. The district court granted summary judgment to the school 
district, concluding that the recreational use statute was applicable. The Supreme Court reversed. Justice 
Johnson offered the following explanation: 
 
[Plaintiff] was not the type of recreational user contemplated in the recreational use 
statute. He was a public school student who came to school early before classes began 
to play football with his classmates. If he had come to the school grounds to play a game of 
football that was not organized or sanctioned by the school on a day when school was not in 
session, we would have no trouble in applying the statute to limit the liability of the district. Nor 
would we have any difficulty in applying the statute, if he had come to the school grounds on a 
school day to play a game of football that was not organized or sanctioned by the school before 
the faculty and other students who were not involved in the game began arriving. The problem we 
have in applying the recreational use statute to these facts in that Tregg arrived to play football at 
the very time that the school was beginning its operations for the day, although no classes had 
begun. He was not just a member of the public: referred to in the recreational use statute. He was 
there as a student to begin the school day with a game of football. Some students may come 
early to talk to their teachers, some to visit with their classmates, some to study and others to 
participate in informal activities such as football. All of these are legitimate activities within the 
scope of a student's special relationship with the school. 
 
It would be entirely artificial to apply the recreational use statute to activities of 
students up to the moment the first bell rings and classes begin. No purpose would be served by 
drawing this line for application of the recreational use statute. When the principal is present, 
some faculty members are on duty and students have arrived, the school day has begun, and the 
recreational use statute has no application to a student who is injured on the school grounds. 
 
 
(iv) Miscellaneous Immunities 
 
(1)   Ski area operators: I.C. §§ 6-1101 to -1107 limits the potential liability of ski area 
operators by specifying (i) a limited number of duties, §§ 6-1103 and 6-1104; (ii) that skiers expressly 
assume the risks of the sport, § 6-1106; and (iii) that any skier who violates duties imposed upon the skier 
may not recover, § 6-1107. See generally Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351,787 P.2d 1159 
(1990). The immunity if available only to the operator and hence does not apply to an "educational" 
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foundation set up to teach skiing. Davis v. Sun Valley Ski Education Foundation, Inc., 130 Idaho 400,941 
P.2d 1301 (1997). See also Withers v. Bogus Basin Recreational Association, Inc., 144 Idaho 78, 156 
P.3d 579 (2007). 
 
(2)  State inspection of dams and mine tailing impoundment structures: I.C. §42-1717 requires the 
state to inspect all dams and mine tailing impoundments for their safety, but expressly precludes 
imposition of liability upon the state for its actions. See generally Marty v. State, 117 Idaho 133,786 P.2d 
524 (1990). 
 
(3)  Dramshop liability: I.C. § 23-308 prohibits suits (1)by intoxicated individuals who suffer injury 
against the vendor or provider who furnished that intoxicated person the alcohol; (2) by a third party who 
is injured by an intoxicated person against the vendor or provider, unless (a) the intoxicated person was 
less than the legal age for consuming alcohol and the vendor or provider knew or should have known that 
the person was under age, or (b) the intoxicated person was obviously intoxicated. The statute was 
upheld against a constitutional challenge by an intoxicated person who was injured in a fall from a fire 
escape. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 987 P.2d 300 (1999). 
 
(4)  Disasters: I.C. §46-1011 empowers a mayor or the chair of the county commissioners to declare 
a local disaster emergency. The declaration may be continued beyond 7days only with the consent of the 
governing board of the political subdivision. The declaration triggers the applicable local and 
intergovernmental disaster emergency plans. In addition, I.C. §46-1017 provides a broad immunity: 
Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof nor other agencies, nor, except in cases of 
willful misconduct, the agents, employees or representatives of any of them engaged in any civil 
defense or disaster relief activities, acting under a declaration by proper authority nor, except in 
cases of willful misconduct or gross negligence, any person, firm, corporation or entity under 
contract with them to provide equipment or work on a cost basis to be used in disaster relief, 
while complying with or attempting to comply with this act or any rule or regulation promulgated 
pursuant to the provisions of the act, shall be liable for the death of or any injury to persons or 
damage to property as a result of such activity. The provisions of this section shall not affect the 
right of any person to receive benefits to which he would otherwise be entitled under this act or 
under the workmen's compensation law or under any pension law, nor the right of any such 
person to receive any benefits or compensation under any act of congress. 
 
These provisions have been applied in several contexts. 
 
Inama v. Boise County, the owners of a front-end loader that was destroyed while the 
county was using it, without owners' permission, to clear roads during a natural disaster brought action 
again t county to recover value of loader. The district court granted the county's motion for summary 
judgment and the owners appealed. The supreme court affirmed, holding that (1) the county was immune 
under Disaster Preparedness Act, and (2) the owners were not entitled to recover compensation for 
inverse condemnation under eminent domain provision of Idaho Constitution. Inama v. Boise County, 138 
Idaho 324, 63 P.3d 450 (2003). 
 
In S. Griffin Construction, Inc. v. City of Lewiston, a building owner brought a variety of claims 
against the city, its officials, and wrecking ball operator. The claims were based upon the demolition of 
common wall between owner's building and fire-damaged building. The district court granted summary 
judgment and the building's owner appealed. The supreme court held that, since the city properly 
declared an emergency under the Disaster Preparedness Act as a result of a major fire in the business 
district, the wrecking ball operator was entitled to contractor immunity, under the Act, as to owner's 
negligence claims. S. Griffin Construction, Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 16 P.3d 278 (2000). 
 
